[Fis] Meaning and mind
As Loet, Krassimir and Karl (at least) have all said (or as I take them to have said), meaning is inherently subjective, or at best intersubjective, but certainly not objective. That is why an understanding of information has to be tightly integrated with an understanding of mind. See my paper “Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information” http://triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/323/437 -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Paradigmatic diversity
I hope this doesn't seem arrogant, but I feel it appropriate to reiterate and emphasize some recent themes: There is only one ruler in each domain, but there are many domains. A mechanistic (in the broadest, perhaps fashionable sense) understanding at one level or set of levels does not necessarily conflict with a human-centric understanding at a different level or set. Being humans, after all, there is nothing more natural to us than an anthropocentric stance. But it should be recognised for what it is, and not extended to inappropriate realms. The distinction between arts and humanities on one side and sciences on the other is no longer as clear as it once seemed, but it cannot just be dropped and forgotten altogether. The horse must be chosen to suit the course. There is no single almighty king, thank god! -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] The Information Flow
Tuesday, November 13, 2012, 3:57:10 PM, Bob wrote: ... But for me the interesting phenomena where the logic of cause and effect does not hold is the case of emergence and self-organization. With an emergent system in which the properties of the system can not be derived from, reduced to or predicted from the properties of the components the notion of cause and effect does not hold. The reductionist program of logical thinking does not do much to understand emergent phenomena. It is not that logic is wrong it is that it is irrelevant. So if one is an emergentist one cannot be a mechanist. That is simple logic. ;-) Don't know if I'm an emergentist or not. On one hand, I do not believe in the cannot be derived from, reduced to or predicted from condition because it seems intrinsically subjective, perhaps even circular. But on the other hand I do believe that complex systems are generally just as real and just as significant as their components, higher level explanations being generally just as good as lower level ones, and only the purpose for which the explanation is required determines which level is most appropriate. I also believe that causation can only be considered to occur horizontally, along levels of explanation. That is because causation is inherently temporal, effects following causes, and there is no passage of time in vertical forays into higher or lower levels of description/explanation. There is no vertical causation. However, I do consider myself a mechanist, because as I see it, one high level event can always be decomposed into a number of lower level events, and eventually, if the process is repeated, a level will be reached at which all of the events can be clearly understood as mechanical. The lower level ones do not CAUSE the highest level one, because they are occurring simultaneously, but they COMPOSE it, and there is no mysterious other element to it. Having said which, if the high level event is to be causally explained, other events on the same level will have to be involved in the explanation, a low level story will NOT do the job. So I believe I've reconciled emergence with mechanism, but I suspect that whether you agree with me depends on what you consider to be essential to emergence. Or how strongly you feel about mechanism. Or, of course, maybe I've just made a silly mistake. :) (Some say that levels of description/explanation are not real (Don Ross?), and I don't know whether that's a reasonable thing to say or not, but they're certainly indispensable to us.) -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Aspects of the Logical Philosophy of Information
I'm sorry I missed this first time around. On 2012/06/22 at 02:29 PM, in message 4fe46543.6050...@aragon.es, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote: The concept of form can hardly been maintained along the complexification of information realms... Sorry Pedro, I have to disgree with this. For me, complex forms are just as conceivable as simple ones (though I'll admit that maybe wasn't always the case). Would you accept that, for example, the pattern of neural activity associated with a pleasurable sensation is a form? Or the totality of paths traced by all solar orbiting bodies whose mass is = 1g? (Thinking of examples is actually quite fun but I've leave it at that.) -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Absence and life
Friday, May 18, 2012, 2:55:25 PM, Robert Ulanowicz wrote: Another difference between Terry's narrative and my own is that he keeps referring to the absential in terms of constraints. But constraints are specific realities, not the absence thereof. I'm a little doubtful about that, I got the impression that he views constraints as causing absence, rather than being themselves absential. However, he seems to view semantics as absential, which to me is a great mistake: inter/subjective, yes, but absent, no. I must admit I have not read the book, merely viewed an on-line presentation of some of the ideas: http://fora.tv/2012/04/18/Incomplete_Nature_How_Mind_Emerged_From_Matter -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
Hi Bruno, This is very interesting for me, my approach to information is via the mind-body and hard problems, and I'm sympathetic to computationalism. On the other hand, I have difficulties understanding much of what you say here. Let me focus on one point for now though. Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 8:48:48 AM, Bruno wrote: Let me sketch the reasoning shortly. If I can survive with a digitalizable brain, then I am duplicable. For example I could, in principle, be read and cut in Helsinki (say) and pasted in two different places, like Moscow and Washington (to fix the thing). The subject to such a duplication experiment, knowing the protocol in advance, is unable to predict in advance where he will *feel to be* after the duplication. We can iterate such process and prove that at such iteration the candidate, seeing if he feels to be in W or in M, receive a bit of information, and that his best way to predict his experience, will be, in this case, to predict a random experience (even algorithmic random experience): like WWMWWWMMMWM , for example. That is the first person indeterminacy. It seems to me that, if I believe I am duplicable, and understand the protocol, I must predict that I will experience being in both Moscow and Washington. The process bifurcates one person, who becomes two people with absolutely identical physique and memories immediately afterwards, which will then begin to diverge. Both, looking back to pre-bifurcation times, will say that was me, and both will be correct. There is no essence to be randomly (or non-randomly) assigned to one location and not the other. The individual is now two people and therefore can be and is in both cities. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
Hi again Bruno, Heeding Pedro's kind reminder, this is my second and therefore last message to the list this week. However, I'll be happy to continue the discussion off-list (and to copy in any others who signal their interest). Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 10:57:41 AM, Bruno wrote: The guy know all this in advance. He knows that if comp is true, he will survive the duplication, and that, in all possible future personal situation, he will feel to be in only one city, with an inferred doppelganger in the other city. No, in my view he will experience being in each city (both cities) with an inferred doppelganger in the other city, because he is one before the procedure and two after. This is very counter-intuitive regarding personal identity but it is the logical consequence of your assumptions. So, if he is asked in Helsinki where he will feel to be, he can only answer that he will feel to be in W or in M, but without being able to be sure if he will feel to be in W or that he will feel to be in M. Looking forward, pre-bifurcation, the rational expectation is that his identity will split, so that both post-bifurcation versions are genuinely him, and there is no reason for the pre-bifurcation version to choose either city as his destination, he genuinely has two simultaneous destinations, in this scenario one person (pre-bifurcation) can be in two places at once (post-bifurcation). -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education
Saturday, December 3, 2011, 8:43:47 PM, Gavin wrote: I was reading Richard Dawkins book “the greatest show on earth” and almost fell over backwards when I read his comments about life and information. He says the only difference between living matter and non living matter is information. That would be the most conjectural statement I have ever read. There is not one scrap of evidence or test or mathematical model to prove this statement. Don't you find it strange to think that such a successful and prominent scientist, recipient of many honourary doctorates and other awards* and former Professor of the Public Understanding of Science, would take such a position? Is it not much more probable, a much more conservative hypothesis, that Dawkins means something different by information than you do? I'd suggest that, if people want to promote information science, Dawkins is someone they should be following. He's probably done more for public recognition of the place of information in science than anyone else has or is likely to do in the near future. Though Stephen Hawking, with his work on the black hole information paradox, should not be neglected. (I wrote to Dawkins in the early nineties suggesting that life could be defined as the survival of information. I'd love to say that he got the idea from me, but in fact he replied saying that it was true, but obvious! I have the handwritten letter (actually my own letter returned with his notes in the margin) carefully stored because I think some day it might be valuable!) * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins#Awards_and_recognition -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin
Title: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin
Although I accept neither the title ("Meaning Information Theory") nor
Gavin's description of the content, he tells me that my ideas, among
others, are what he's referring to below, so in case anyone's
interested, my website address ishttp://www.robinfaichney.org. (The
main relevant aspects have been described here before, as well as at
DTMD2011, but I'd welcome further discussion if anyone is so inclined.)
Robin
Monday, October 24, 2011, 5:22:08 PM, Pedro wrote:
Message from Gavin Ritz
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nz wrote:
Stan, John list members
I have had a number of off list email dialogue with list members, from this
list and others.
There seems to be a group of listers that have a Theory of Meaningful
Information (It’s not Shannon’s mathematical Information theory), it’s all
about meaning and electrical communication (I guess in this case
neurological).
The common links seem to be Dawkins, Dennett, Searle and a few others.
Does anyone have any clear propositions, with their logical arguments,
evidence. tests, corroboration, modeling, conceptual mathematics, proofs,
for this Meaning Theory of Information. It also seems to include memes.
I am unable to find any clear propositions with their proofs, it all seems
like smoke and mirrors too me. At one point it becomes sort of Shannon’s
mathematical theory then it spoofs into something like Philosophy meaning
arguments (Like Ogden Richards), then it spoofs into living matter and DNA,
then reappears as cultural units, then energy/matter representations.
Is The Meaning Information Theory a shape shifter. Is it the one size fits
all, theory.
What exactly is this Theory, where did it come from, what is it, what is its
proposition, and if there is one how can it be tested, corroborated, where
and how can we gather the evidence.
Regards
Gavin
--
--
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/
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Re: [Fis] Information as form conveyed by data
Title: Re: [Fis] Information as form conveyed by data Thursday, October 6, 2011, 7:24:09 AM, Loet wrote: ØThere are two ways we can use the idea "in-form". Yes, this is the other notion of information. Shannon-type information does not inform, but is counter-intuitively defined as uncertainty (or probabilistic entropy) and measured, for example, in bits of information. It is based on probability distributions. Surely Shannon information is not uncertainty, but its opposite: the reduction of uncertainty. And it has that in common with meaningful or semantic information. Bateson (1973) and many others did define information as a difference which makes a difference. Probability distributions contain only differences. If these first-order differences make a difference in a second dimension then a system of reference is assumed for which the first-order difference may make a difference. This system of reference may then discard some incoming information as noise and provide meaning to other information. Perhaps, it is useful to call this meaningful information (or observed information) as different from the expected information (or uncertainty) in the case of Shannon-type information. I find it useful to view Shannon information as "pure pattern". But that might be specific to my particular interest in it, which is its relationship to physical information. (I don't mean that in other contexts it might be wrong to view it that way, but it might not always be the most useful way to look at it.) The system of reference does not have to be an observer as is often presumed in the cybernetic tradition; it can also be discourse. Does this contribution make a difference for the discourse? Who or what but an observer can make that judgement? Only to a mind is anything ever meaningful. I read "a difference that makes a difference" as "a significant difference", and only a mind can judge significance. The two notions of information are to be kept apart because otherwise the discussion becomes confused. I certainly agree with that! -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?
Thursday, September 29, 2011, 11:11:36 AM, Michel wrote: *** Karl: [Karl's last paragraph:] As to the assertion of a colleague that the term information can not be subject to a formal definition: if one wants to use a term in a rational, logical discourse, then the term has to be defined. If we are to remain in the romantic stage, where information is like love, patriotism, morality or so, then of course there is no need to connect the term to the basis of rational discourses. Otherwise, the need to explicate the roots of a term by showing its fundaments in a+b=c is of elementary importance. *** My reply to Karl: Ok to avoid the mix of the stuff and its reception. In the addition table: did you meant that having 5 has a result of an addition of two positive integers, the missing information is: was it got from 1+4, 2+3, 3+2, or 4+1 ? If yes, that's indeed a very simple situation helping to define what is information. If I am wrong, please just tell me. That is also my impression of Karl's contribution: an example of information, not a definition of it. The suggestion you did in the last paragraph is of much interest, too. I hope that FISers will post comments about it. I hope I'm not the colleague mentioned there, because that's most certainly not my position. I believe I offer one of the clearest definitions of information (and, of course, the only correct one!) And I certainly disagree with the implication that all proper definitions are mathematical in form. [Gavin:] I think the danger is actually there is no such thing as information. *** My comment about the inexistence of such information: That is a main point to discuss, and again I hope that FISers will post their opinions about it. So do I! *** My reply to Robert: It does not shock me that chemical reactions are considered as part of physics, even if chemical reactions are often used to separate the two fields for pratical purposes. Since biology is often viewed as part of chemistry, it can be viewed as physics too (still does not shock me!), but I'm quite sure that such a conclusion is polemical: this discussion may be postponed to the next FIS session, focussing on biology, despite that it is of interest here. I think there's a big difference between saying, as I do, that in principle all chemical and biological phenomena can be reduced to physics, and saying, as I most certainly do not, that the disciplines of chemistry and biology are or should be part of the discipline of physics. That would be just an academic land grab and I'd want no part of it. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?
Friday, September 23, 2011, 1:07:07 PM, Michel wrote: Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in which you can say: in this situation, information is ... . Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be great, too. I'm no physicist but I'm interested in physical information. It continues to amaze me how little attention is paid by most non-physicists to the very well established concept of information in physics. Of course, there is no law or formula that relates a bit of information to, say, quarks, spin, or whatever. These are different ways of looking at the same thing. Spin is a bit of information (I think it's just one bit, but I might be wrong, as I said, I'm no physicist.) Physical information is a re-conceptualisation of material form that allows it to be quantified. So, for example, physicists can (and do) say that information is generally conserved within black holes. (See the Black Hole Information Paradox, and the bet between physicists concerning it, http://www.theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/jp_24jul04.html) Now, there is obviously more to semantic information than material form, but it is my strongly-held belief that it should be possible to relate all other concepts of information back to physical information, and, in fact, I have proposed a way of doing that for semantic information, which I presented at the DTMD2011 workshop (I've also mentioned it in previous posts on this list), but I'll say no more about it here, because I think that's going too far off the current topic. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] meaningful information
and response systems range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be detected andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of which areexplored within this new framework. The book's home page can be found at: http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/ book/978-1-4614-0157-5 I am eager tofind out what members think about it. Anthony Reading ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- - Pedro C. Marijuán Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª 50009 Zaragoza, Spain Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554 pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ - ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion
Title: Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion Hi Pedro and Anthony, Valentino Braitenberg has a book out this year in German:Information - der Geist in der Natur My knowledge of German is dismal, but it seems to be about information as the "spirit" or "mind" of nature. This would be consistent with a quotation of his fromLuciano Floridi, editor,Philosophy of Computing and Information: Five Questions, 2008, p16: The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. This is Aristotle redivivus, the concept of matter and form united in every object of this world, body and soul, where the latter is nothing but the formal aspect of the former. The very term “information” clearly demonstrates its Aristotelian origin in its linguistic root. Anthony talks about form too, of course, but I'm afraid I find his concept of "meaningful" information to be somewhat dualistic -- but maybe I just haven't understood his view of the relationship between meaningful information and material form. Robin Wednesday, July 20, 2011, 12:38:03 PM, Pedro wrote: Thanks, Anthony, for the info on your book. As you will see during future discussion sessions (currently we are in the vacation pause) some parties in this list maintain positions not far away from your own views. In our archive you can check accumulated mails about the matter you propose --e.g. discussions during the last spring. But I think you are right that the whole biological scope of information has been rarely discussed. best wishes ---Pedro FIS website and discussions archives: seehttp://infoscience-fis.unizar.es/ aread...@verizon.netescribió: I emailed an earlier version of the following contribution to the listserve a few days ago and am interested in finding out if it is suitable for dissemination and, if os, when it might be included. My main interest is in promoting discussion about the approach it takes to dealing with the observer-dependent aspects of information. My book " Meaningful Information: The BridgeBetween Biology, Brain and Behavior' has just been published by Springer. Itintroduces a radically new way of thinking about information and the importantrole it plays in living systems. Thiså opens up new avenues for exploring howcells and organisms change and adapt, since the ability to detect and respondto meaningful information is the key that enables them to receive their geneticheritage, regulate their internal milieu, and respond to changes in their environment.The types of meaningful information that different species and different celltypes are able to detect are finely matched to the ecosystems in which theylive, for natural selection has shaped what they need to know to functioneffectively within them. Biological detection and response systems range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be detected andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of which areexplored within this new framework. The book's home page can be found at:http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/book/978-1-4614-0157-5 I am eager tofind out what members think about it. Anthony Reading ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- - Pedro C. Marijuán Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª 50009 Zaragoza, Spain Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554 pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ ----- -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] BBC Doco; Cell
Monday, March 28, 2011, 12:05:54 AM, Gavin wrote: Even at the most basic level of an organism's communication with its environment. There is no discernable information exchange. Every single one of our senses is an energy transduction structure-processing unit. All we do is transduce say light and sound energy to electrical energy. This much is pretty well established. I think you need to think about what the light and sound, on one hand -- or rather one side of the transduction -- and electrical energy, on the other side, have in common. These are carriers for patterns, and it is the patterns that are carried by light, sound, electricity, whatever, that constitute the information. So the informational analysis is a higher level one, relative to matter and energy, a useful (to some, at least) way of looking at patterns embodied in material/energetic processes. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] On Stan's reply to Gavin
Saturday, January 29, 2011, 9:39:09 PM, Stanley wrote:
On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 6:41 AM, Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nz wrote:
SS: Info theory presumably applies to everything and anything.
GR: It was never intended to apply to anything but communication
instruments. That is sending English language down a pipe.
S: Since it was abstracted from human communication systems, it has
taken on a 'life of its own', as any abstraction has a right to do.
I agree with this. I'm no mathematician, but I believe that the
broader significance of Shannon's work was a method of quantifying
pure pattern. This was then adopted by physicists who saw that
material form can be treated as pure patterns, and thus we get such
concepts as the conservation of information in quantum mechanics and
in black holes. Conservation of information can be translated as
meaning that physical laws do not break down, and the state of
affairs at one time can be considered encoded in the state of
affairs at another time. For instance, events within the event horizon
of a black hole (or, on the holographic principle, on the surface of
the event horizon) could, in principle, be determined by examination
of the Hawking radiation that escapes as the hole diminishes.
I think
the crux of the matter is being examined right now -- is information
('bit') primal or is stuff ('it') primal? In my view there needs to
be stuff in order for there to be a perspective, and there needs to
be a perspective before there is anything to communicate.
I share your focus on perspective (and also context), but I'm not
clear why perspective requires stuff -- but see below.
Information is an abstraction related closely to form, which it is
supposed always could be translated to instructions in a computer,
creating 'bits' from inspection of 'its'. Then the supposition is
that The World also reckons with information, leading to 'its from
'bits' . This, to me, is implausible.
I tend to feel the same way about it from bit, but I think it should
perhaps be taken as implying that the idea of substance derives from
form, which to me is highly plausible. We can take the view that form
is what we encounter -- at all levels, personally and scientifically
-- and substance a theoretical entity or set of such. This view is
related to philosophical idealism, and is, like that, I believe,
strictly irrefutable. By the same token, being unverifiable, it has no
practical consequences. Which is more real, or which came first, form
or substance? These questions are, strictly speaking, meaningless.
Etymologically, information is extremely closely related to form,
and the concept of information used in physics simply IS material
form, where that is generalised from shape to encompass all material
properties. Just as past and future states of affairs are encoded in
the present, so genetic information is encoded in DNA. Biological
information is just a subset of physical information. DNA molecules,
like all physical entities, encode the outcomes of all of their
potential interactions, but in the case of DNA the outcomes are
constrained by the cellular context.
I'm currently working on a paper in which I argue that intentional
information -- using intentional in Brentano's sense, and
encompassing meaning and all mental content -- is best considered
encoded in physical/biological information, being decoded in use.
Perspective is obviously highly relevant here, but it seems to me that
it can probably be explained in (literally) formal terms, that
substance as such need not enter the picture, but perhaps I'm missing
something?
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Re: SV: [Fis] info meaning
Friday, October 5, 2007, 1:53:51 PM, Loet wrote: Dear colleagues, I agree with a lot of Christophe Menant's last mail, but I think that I can take it a step further. The _expression_ of Bateson "A difference which makes a difference" presumes that there is a system or a series of events for which the differences can make a difference. This system selects upon the differences (or Shannon-type information) in the environment of the system. The Shannon-type information is meaningless, but the specification of the system of reference provides the information with meaning. The Shannon-type information which is deselected is discarded as noise. That's (at least approximately) what I mean when I say that intentional information is always encoded in physical information. Intentional information is the ordinary concept of information and is meaningful. Physical information is very closely related to Shannon information and has no intrinsic meaning, being mere physical patterns -- on this conceptualisation, which is widely accepted within physics, all physical patterns are treated as Shannon-type information. Intentional or semantic information, on the other hand, requires a context, which plays the part of a decoding key. Thus semantic information, or meaning, is always encoded within physical patterns. Meaning is provided to the information from the perspective of hindsight. I don't think "hindsight" is strictly correct, because it implies a conscious "looking back", whereas the processing of meaning (decoding) often occurs prior to consciousness. The meaningful information, however, still follows the arrow of time.Meaning processing withinpsychological and social systems reinforces the feedback arrow (from the hindsight perspective) to the extent that control tends to move to this next-order level. The system can then become anticipatory because the information which is provided with meaning can be entertained by the system as a model. Perhaps, human language is required for making that last step: no longer is only information exchanged, but information is packaged into messages in which the information has a codified meaning. Modelling is certainly what allows anticipation, but some modelling, at least, does not require language: consider catching a ball that's thrown to you. You model the trajectory, I would suggest, in order to put your hand in the right place at the right time, but language is obviously not involved there. Of course you might say that meaning plays no part in that scenario, but I think it's a very big mistake to deny a continuum from significance of any sort at one extreme to the highly abstract and sophisticated meanings of the messages on this list, at the other. What both extremes have in common is the concept of use, as in Wittgenstein's later view of meaning: it is our use, I would suggest, of physical patterns, that encodes significance and meaning within them, and the modelling of a trajectory has significant similarities with the modelling of correspondents and their intentions (though significant differences too, of course). -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] about fis discussions (2)
Friday, June 15, 2007, 12:30:07 PM, Pedro wrote: Perhaps we have not achieved a clear demarcation from mechanics yet, theoretically speaking. And that may be another serious problem in itself. In what is different the informational from the mechanical? Or in my own terms: Distinction from the Adjacent versus Force from the Adjacent ? Can I suggest that the form/substance dichotomy is worth considering in this context? The concept of physical information, well established within physics though still controversial for some, basically corresponds to form. Etymologically, "information" derives from "form". I'd argue that "informational" is synonymous with an important if uncommon sense of "formal". The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity seems crucial here. Physical entities are numerically distinct, even when qualitatively identical. Forms, on the other hand, are qualities: if two instances are qualitatively identical, then there's just one form. That, to my mind, is the basic feature of information. This concept is purely syntactic, which for many people is a problem, but I believe that the philosophical problem of meaning can and should be clearly distinguished from the question "what is information"? The concept of form is, I think, more fundamental than that of distinction: both distinctions and similarities are formal features. Information concerns similarities as well as differences. Unfortunately, I don't have the background to present my views formally (to use a different sense of that word), but I'm more than willing to discuss them in such an informal setting as this. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
, such as aspects of interpersonal relationships. Is
this what you have in mind?
Though the physical stance is very natural and practical in many
contexts, the
formal stance is superior in a certain sense: information is all that our
senses convey, we do not experience matter directly, it can be considered a
theoretical entity (or set of entities).
S: The word experience here is critical. Our experience (and
meanings) is engendered by our formal organization. Matter is what is
organized, and so could not itself be the content of experience (or
meaning) even though it is the carrier (channel).
Here at last we seem to have unambiguous agreement.
A mind is a user or processor of intentional information.
S: That is to say, it initiates finality.
Perhaps, I don't think in these terms.
Matter is a theoretical entity extrapolated from physical information.
S: Presumably physical information, then, relates to an array of
possibilities generated by a situation, from which the formal setup
(context) will select some given a nudge informed by an intentional
tendency.
Physical information is simply material form. Any physical process
involves contextual selection, but a perfectly static arrangement of
entities embodies physical information too, by virtue of the fact that
it has some form.
Having looked at your home page, I see we have very different concepts
of form. You suggest {energy - {matter - {form - {organization
but I see form as occurring simultaneously with energy, in fact as
more-or-less synonymous with quality. Whatever has qualities, has
form. Perhaps you limit form to instances of stability?
I'm fairly confident that matter can reasonably be considered a
theoretical entity, but I'm now having some doubts about saying that
it's extrapolated from physical information, because it can be argued
that we don't have direct access to that either, all we experience
being intentional information, so physical information is theoretical
too. This needs more thought.
Meaning is intentional information (though multiple levels of en/decoding
might
be involved), and consciousness is the use or processing of
intentional information.
S: Again, then: mind = matter + meaning.
Perhaps, but I think I'm saying rather more than that.
--
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/
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Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
Probably my last message for a while, as I said. Thanks again for your
help.
Subject: Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
[body begins]
Saturday, March 17, 2007, 2:24:37 PM, Stanley N. Salthe wrote:
A mind is a user or processor of intentional information.
S: That is to say, it initiates finality.
Perhaps, I don't think in these terms.
SS: Well, using 'intentionality' seems to me to implicitly use
finality. Consider {propensity {purpose}}. Intent is necessarilly
directional, and directionality is all that is left is the particular goal
is removed.
OK, now I understand why we keep failing to connect. In philosophy of
mind intentionality refers to the concept revived by Brentano,
meaning aboutness. It has nothing to do with intent except that,
like all other mental phenomena, intent is intentional, i.e. there's
some content, there must be something that you intend to do. I agree
with Brentano that intentionality is the mark of the mental, because
everything that's mental is intentional, and everything that's
physical is not.
Intentionality is central to my thinking, so I don't think there's any
point in continuing this particular exchange. If you'd like to start
again on the basis of this revised understanding then I will respond,
but otherwise I'll keep quiet for a while, as I said in my previous
message, replying to John. I'm really sorry to have wasted your time
by failing to allow for the fact that not everyone who's interested in
information has a phil of mind perspective.
--
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/
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[Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 1972. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. First published in 1953. -- Robin Faichney http://www.robinfaichney.org/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
