Hi again Bruno, Heeding Pedro's kind reminder, this is my second and therefore last message to the list this week. However, I'll be happy to continue the discussion off-list (and to copy in any others who signal their interest).
Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 10:57:41 AM, Bruno wrote: > The guy know all this in advance. He knows that if comp is true, he > will survive the duplication, and that, in all possible future > personal situation, he will feel to be in only one city, with an > inferred doppelganger in the other city. No, in my view "he" will experience being in each city (both cities) with an inferred doppelganger in the other city, because "he" is one before the procedure and two after. This is very counter-intuitive regarding personal identity but it is the logical consequence of your assumptions. > So, if he is asked in Helsinki where he will feel to be, he can > only answer that he will feel to be in W or in M, but without being > able to be sure if he will feel to be in W or that he will feel to be in M. Looking forward, pre-bifurcation, the rational expectation is that his identity will split, so that both post-bifurcation versions are genuinely him, and there is no reason for the pre-bifurcation version to choose either city as his destination, he genuinely has two simultaneous destinations, in this scenario one person (pre-bifurcation) can be in two places at once (post-bifurcation). -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> _______________________________________________ fis mailing list email@example.com https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis