Hi Bruno,

This is very interesting for me, my approach to information is via the
mind-body and "hard" problems, and I'm sympathetic to
computationalism. On the other hand, I have difficulties understanding
much of what you say here. Let me focus on one point for now though.

Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 8:48:48 AM, Bruno wrote:

> Let me sketch the reasoning shortly. If I can survive with a
> digitalizable brain, then I am duplicable. For example I could, in
> principle, be "read and cut" in Helsinki (say) and pasted in two
> different places, like Moscow and Washington (to fix the thing).

> The subject to such a duplication experiment, knowing the protocol
> in advance, is unable to predict in advance where he will *feel to
> be* after the duplication. We can iterate such process and prove
> that at such iteration the candidate, seeing if he feels to be in W
> or in M, receive a bit of information, and that his best way to
> predict his experience, will be, in this case, to predict a random
> experience (even algorithmic random experience): like WWMWWWMMMWM
> ...., for example. That is the first person indeterminacy.

It seems to me that, if I believe I am duplicable, and understand the
protocol, I must predict that I will experience being in both Moscow
and Washington. The process bifurcates one person, who becomes two
people with absolutely identical physique and memories immediately
afterwards, which will then begin to diverge. Both, looking back to
pre-bifurcation times, will say "that was me", and both will be
correct. There is no "essence" to be randomly (or non-randomly)
assigned to one location and not the other. The individual is now two
people and therefore can be and is in both cities.

Robin Faichney

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