Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

Heh, as long as you identify the particulars of the use case, then "both-and" 
is intuitive and correct.  But when someone makes an ambiguous statement with 
no particulars and makes no serious attempt to describe the context in which 
their statement is supposed to be understood, then it's definitely NOT 
"both-and".  Without the particulars, it becomes nonsense and one can only 
answer "Mu".


On 11/02/2017 11:47 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms of 
> "both-and" rather than "either-or".  In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says to A, 
> "you're right".  B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right".  C says that 
> they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


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Re: [FRIAM] death

[Frank Wimberly]

Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms
of "both-and" rather than "either-or".  In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says
to A, "you're right".  B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right".  C
says that they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:31 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:

> Awesome!  I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD
> muddies my water. 8^)  From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I
> can't help but think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to
> "objects", per se.  While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood
> onto the repeating patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have
> trouble inducing patterns from their experiences would have trouble
> developing appropriate to their environment.
>
> In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when
> the familiar patterns of stimulus are not present."  I think it's useful to
> reword it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a
> loved one's traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a
> fundamental way.  Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon
> Allen's testimony in the Bowe Bergdahl trial:
>
> > "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she
> testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very
> different dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open
> his hand and putting mine in."
>
> If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a
> better handle on subtle dynamics like that.
>
> On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces"
> when the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that
> "object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which
> sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
> >
> > Frank
> >
> > Frank Wimberly
> > Phone (505) 670-9918
> >
> > On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly" > wrote:
> >
> > Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to
> be symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
> >
> > Here is a link:
> >
> > http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/
> lack-of-object.html  typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html>
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

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Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

Awesome!  I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD muddies 
my water. 8^)  From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I can't help but 
think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to "objects", per se.  
While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood onto the repeating 
patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have trouble inducing 
patterns from their experiences would have trouble developing appropriate to 
their environment.

In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when the 
familiar patterns of stimulus are not present."  I think it's useful to reword 
it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a loved one's 
traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a fundamental way.  
Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon Allen's testimony in the 
Bowe Bergdahl trial: 

> "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she 
> testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very different 
> dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open his hand and 
> putting mine in."

If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a 
better handle on subtle dynamics like that.

On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces" when 
> the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that 
> "object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which 
> sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
> 
> Frank
> 
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
> 
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly"  > wrote:
> 
> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be 
> symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are 
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
> 
> Here is a link:
> 
> 
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html
>  
> 

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


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Re: [FRIAM] death

[Frank Wimberly]

Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces"
when the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that
"object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which
sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly"  wrote:

> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be
> symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
>
> Here is a link:
>
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/
> lack-of-object.html
>
> I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:
>
>> I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear
>> that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point
>> out.  So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:
>>
>> "Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes
>> the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate
>> identity and is truly a separate individual."
>>
>> In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.
>> Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the
>> *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you
>> know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet,
>> explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more
>> useful. 8^)
>>
>> On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> > You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
>> constancy.
>> >
>> > See
>> > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
>> >
>> > Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms
>> of object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic
>> speaking.  The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes
>> a sound is an example.
>>
>> --
>> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>>
>> 
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>

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Re: [FRIAM] death

[Frank Wimberly]

Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be
symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.

Here is a link:

http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html

I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:

> I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear
> that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point
> out.  So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:
>
> "Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes
> the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate
> identity and is truly a separate individual."
>
> In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.
> Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the
> *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you
> know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet,
> explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more
> useful. 8^)
>
> On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
> constancy.
> >
> > See
> > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
> >
> > Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms
> of object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic
> speaking.  The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes
> a sound is an example.
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

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Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear that 
the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point out.  
So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:

"Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes the 
phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is 
truly a separate individual."

In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.  Perhaps 
there's other literature that talks specifically about how the *fiction* of 
object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you know of that 
literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet, explain it in your 
own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more useful. 8^)

On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object 
> constancy.
> 
> See
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
> 
> Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of 
> object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking.  
> The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an 
> example.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


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Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

Right.  Of course.  But it's very telling that you put the word *purpose* last. 
 It is that purpose that sets the entire context, including the appropriateness 
of any definition in the lexicon used while engaged in the project.  You seem 
to have ignored my point about use cases and how they set the tolerances on 
discretization error.


On 11/02/2017 10:21 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks 
> which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of my 
> sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put them) and 
> that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and load them on 
> my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will use them in the 
> same mode as I did last year, only in a different location.  This all depends 
> on a strong illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and 
> woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to 
> the time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future 
> when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched on top 
> of those very same blocks again.   Of course, I may change plans mid-course 
> if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or promising qualities 
> for the purpose..


-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] death

[Frank Wimberly]

You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
constancy.

See
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler

Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of
object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking.
The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is
an example.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 11:21 AM, "Steven A Smith"  wrote:

Glen ☣ -

This is a very *sophist*icated argument YOU make.  *I* can't tell, however
if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps *YOU* believed
it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from the former now to
the current now?

Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended
(or useful for?)...   I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both
space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, at
least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have memory,
intention, and will to action.   With that in mind:

I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks
which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of
my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put
them) and that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and
load them on my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will
use them in the same mode as I did last year, only in a different
location.  This all depends on a strong illusion of my "self", on the
objectness of said blocks and woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity
of "self" roughly ranging back to the time when I dismantled to the present
as I plan and scheme to the future when, in fact, I am pretty confident I
will find the woodstove perched on top of those very same blocks again.
Of course, I may change plans mid-course if I find another set of blocks
with more appropriate or promising qualities for the purpose..
- Stove

On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's
preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature
registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a
lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization
artifact.  Here, the "continuous fluid self" shines the light on the
fact that discretization problems arise in both time and space.
Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from
10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your
self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're
willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be
part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed
set of use cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where
"self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't
particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're
well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self"
under one usage pattern is magically translated into another usage
pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.
If you want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so
be it.  But the metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there
is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".
If it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my
*instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness,
enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in
the instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion
of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by
the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of
Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian
Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has
been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin
of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory
temporally extended self?




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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

On 10/30/2017 08:34 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> Do humans become more specialized with age?  I propose that we go through 
> cycles of specialization/generalization.  Babies are optimized for two 
> things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating waste is a 
> sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide nourishment and protection 
> from predators and the elements.   As vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in 
> this specialization (until weaned and diaper trained?).

Although this may sound like hair-splitting, I don't think it is.  I don't 
think babies are AT ALL specialized to ingesting, metabolism, and manipulation 
of their adults.  I think babies are maximally generalized.  They're not good 
at *any* particular thing.  Their feces isn't well processed.  They don't 
easily focus on things (faces being a well documented exception).  They can't 
really grasp things well.  Etc.  So, if they're specialized at anything, I'd 
say they're only specialists at specializing.  Why spend so long in that 
specializing phase?  (And why do we have babies that are so generalized and 
vulnerable?) Because the specialties they must learn are HARD to learn.

The semi-universality of the constructors that are humans is very difficult to 
wander into and navigate once almost-there.  When a kid finally *does* learn to 
do some particular thing, they milk it for all it's worth!  When you finally 
learn to manipulate your mom into feeding you, you'll do it as often as you can 
... because it feels good.  It doesn't just feel good to eat.  It also feels 
good to exercise your new specialty.

> As babies become ambulatory and then learn language, they become generalists. 
>   At some point in their growth into adults, they may at least dabble at 
> specialization... picking a sport or a topic of study to excel at.

Everything you say below the above (snipped) was way too focused on the 
(illusory) *mind* and *thought*.  Yes, you mention lots of specialties that 
involve motor skills and subsumption of conscious to unconscious tasks.  But 
you're talking/writing as if the mind controls the body, which is clearly not 
the case.  So my argument above, that babies are more general than toddlers are 
more general than teens are more general than adults allows a body-centric 
conception of specialization.  That mind-centric stuff is nonsense.

But that doesn't mean your main objection isn't valid.  Yes, we can, to greater 
or lesser extent, re-generalize, re-specialize, etc.  That's the essence of the 
claim that humans are the most universal of the animals as constructors.  Some 
ways this can happen are psychedelic drugs, meditation, new exercise regimens, 
as well as the typical (traumatic) events like divorce, losing a job, moving to 
a foreign land, significant illness, etc.

However, my claim would be that the universality is weakened as we age, not 
that we can't (somewhat) re-generalize at any point in our path to death, only 
that the extent to which we re-generalize lessens.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: [FRIAM] death

[Steven A Smith]

Glen ☣ -

This is a very /sophist/icated argument YOU make.  *I* can't tell, 
however if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps 
*YOU* believed it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from 
the former now to the current now?


Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended 
(or useful for?)...   I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both 
space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, 
at least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have 
memory, intention, and will to action.   With that in mind:


I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete 
blocks which I remember to have put there when I took the large 
woodstove out of my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever 
I actually put them) and that when I find them and brush off any 
accumulated detritus and load them on my garden cart, I can haul them 
back to my house where I will use them in the same mode as I did last 
year, only in a different location. This all depends on a strong 
illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and woodstove 
and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to the 
time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future 
when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched 
on top of those very same blocks again.   Of course, I may change plans 
mid-course if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or 
promising qualities for the purpose..


- Stove

On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's preemptive registration, more 
insidious, I think, than premature registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart 
of a lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the 
"continuous fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise 
in both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from 10 
generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your self, then you've got to 
discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're willing to allow some anonymous African or 
Alpha Centaurian to also be part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use cases to engineer 
toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use 
cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at 
all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically 
translated into another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you 
want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the 
metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it isn't *real* it 
certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak 
awareness, enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but 
nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   
In fact, by the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe 
Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has 
been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is 
just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] death

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's 
preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature registration.  
Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a lot of our problems.  We 
could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the "continuous 
fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise in 
both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your 
ancestors from 10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of 
your self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're 
willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be part of 
your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use 
cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about 
willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more 
like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend 
to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically translated into 
another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you 
want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the 
metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it 
> isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous 
> self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness, enlightenment, etc.  
> all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but 
> nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self 
> that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by the some measure, it would seem 
> that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits 
> from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of 
> this?  It has been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of 
> "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory 
> temporally extended self?

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


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