Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[Matt Faunce]

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 9:05 PM Matt Faunce 
wrote:

>
> I was just looking at my comment about all things changing and therefore
> the change of meanings. I now see it was not a valid criticism of Peirce's
> regulative long-run confirmation of any specific proposition. I'm looking
> now to see if Peirce ever said the general conception of a thing would be
> confirmed in the infinite long run of inquiry. That was what I was
> attacking.
>

I meant 'I'm looking now to see if Peirce ever said a single contained
conception, however broad, of a thing would be confirmed in the infinite
long run...'.

Of course he didn't. I knew that. Geeez. I've gotta sharpen my game.

Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[Matt Faunce]

Yes, we addressed that in this thread, or, that is, in the thread with the
title that starts off the same.

I was just looking at my comment about all things changing and therefore
the change of meanings. I now see it was not a valid criticism of Peirce's
regulative long-run confirmation of any specific proposition. I'm looking
now to see if Peirce ever said the general conception of a thing would be
confirmed in the infinite long run of inquiry. That was what I was
attacking.

Matt

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 8:20 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 3/17/2018 3:59 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
> > what anything is, according to Peirce, accords with the final opinion.
> > So, the two statements make a paradox or not depending on whether
> > alterations of things are ultimately bounded by some overarching law or
> not.
>
> Your suggestion led me to check the original CP 5.555, and I believe
> that Margolis (and many others) misinterpreted what Peirce was trying
> to say.  JM thought that Peirce was asserting the following sentence:
> "the act of knowing a real object alters it."
>
> But in the complete paragraph, it occurs in a dependent clause,
> which I believe Peirce was denying.  Following are the first two
> sentences:
>
> CP 5.555
> > It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
> > waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it.
> > They are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them,
> > it may be amusing to see how I think.
>
> My interpretation:
>
>   1. There are certain mummified pedants.
>
>   2. They have not waked to (become aware of) the so-called "truth"
>  that the the act of knowing a real object alters it.
>
>   3. I, CSP, am one of those mummified pedants.
>
>   4. I, CSP, am amusingly (ironically) stating the implications
>  of that so-called truth.
>
> I started to type in the remainder of that paragraph from a paper copy
> of Vol 5 & 6.  But I did some googling and found a PDF.  See below.
>
> John
> 
>
>  From page 3981 of
>
> https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf
>
> 555. It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
> waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it. They
> are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them, it may be
> amusing to see how I think. It seems that our oblivion to this truth is
> due to our not having made the acquaintance of a new analysis that the
> True is simply that in cognition which is Satisfactory. As to this
> doctrine, if it is meant that True and Satisfactory are synonyms, it
> strikes me that it is not so much a doctrine of philosophy as it is
> a new contribution to English lexicography.
>
> 556. But it seems plain that the formula does express a doctrine of
> philosophy, although quite vaguely; so that the assertion does not
> concern two words of our language but, attaching some other meaning
> to the True, makes it to be coextensive with the Satisfactory in
> cognition.
>
> 557. In that case, it is indispensable to say what is meant by the True:
> until this is done the statement has no meaning. I suppose that by the
> True is meant that at which inquiry aims.
>
> 558. It is equally indispensable to ascertain what is meant by
> Satisfactory; but this is by no means so easy. Whatever be meant,
> however, if the doctrine is true at all, it must be necessarily true.
> For it is the very object, conceived in entertaining the purpose of
> the inquiry, that is asserted to have the character of satisfactoriness.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[John F Sowa]

On 3/17/2018 3:59 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
what anything is, according to Peirce, accords with the final opinion. 
So, the two statements make a paradox or not depending on whether 
alterations of things are ultimately bounded by some overarching law or not.


Your suggestion led me to check the original CP 5.555, and I believe
that Margolis (and many others) misinterpreted what Peirce was trying
to say.  JM thought that Peirce was asserting the following sentence:
"the act of knowing a real object alters it."

But in the complete paragraph, it occurs in a dependent clause,
which I believe Peirce was denying.  Following are the first two
sentences:

CP 5.555

It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it.
They are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them,
it may be amusing to see how I think.


My interpretation:

 1. There are certain mummified pedants.

 2. They have not waked to (become aware of) the so-called "truth"
that the the act of knowing a real object alters it.

 3. I, CSP, am one of those mummified pedants.

 4. I, CSP, am amusingly (ironically) stating the implications
of that so-called truth.

I started to type in the remainder of that paragraph from a paper copy
of Vol 5 & 6.  But I did some googling and found a PDF.  See below.

John


From page 3981 of 
https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf


555. It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have never
waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object alters it. They
are curious specimens of humanity, and as I am one of them, it may be
amusing to see how I think. It seems that our oblivion to this truth is
due to our not having made the acquaintance of a new analysis that the
True is simply that in cognition which is Satisfactory. As to this
doctrine, if it is meant that True and Satisfactory are synonyms, it
strikes me that it is not so much a doctrine of philosophy as it is
a new contribution to English lexicography.

556. But it seems plain that the formula does express a doctrine of
philosophy, although quite vaguely; so that the assertion does not
concern two words of our language but, attaching some other meaning
to the True, makes it to be coextensive with the Satisfactory in
cognition.

557. In that case, it is indispensable to say what is meant by the True:
until this is done the statement has no meaning. I suppose that by the
True is meant that at which inquiry aims.

558. It is equally indispensable to ascertain what is meant by
Satisfactory; but this is by no means so easy. Whatever be meant,
however, if the doctrine is true at all, it must be necessarily true.
For it is the very object, conceived in entertaining the purpose of
the inquiry, that is asserted to have the character of satisfactoriness.

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List, here is what I meant with the constructivist imperative: It is the "ethical imperative" by Heinz von Foerster, developed from Kant´s categorical imperative: "Always act in a way that makes the number of possibilities of actions increase". I think this would exclude the pursuit of ultimate aims. Lest you define this increase as ultimate aim. But this I find hard, though our economy is based on constant growth too. But I guess this makes it less ultimate in the sense of sustainability. Anyway, "ultimate" is a quibble-term, isn´t it? Best, Helmut.
 

 17. März 2018 um 22:13 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee" 
wrote:



Dear list,

 

What a crazy.. uh, I mean creative concept, this having an ultimate aim.

There must, then, be more to this..

 

With best wishes,

Jerry R


 
On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 

Stephen, List,

I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant, aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge, as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative, freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.

Best, Helmut


 17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
"Stephen C. Rose" 
 




The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different than saying what we think independently of Peirce. 
 


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted. But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one, because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.


But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?

Best, Helmut


 






 







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

In starting this new thread, Jeff included my off-List message below, which
could use some additional context to explain why I specifically mentioned
ripples in a lake and shadows on the ground.  I was responding to the
following statements that he and Gary R. had made.

JBD:  Roughly put, I tend to think of the immediate object of a
thought-sign as a technical way of talking in the context of a normative
theory of semiotics  about the "object as we are conscious of it" or "the
object as it is represented in a thought-sign" or the "intentional object"
of a belief. The initial question is not, "how can thoughts have such
objects of consciousness?", but rather, "what are the grounds for saying
that some representations are correct and others are in error in terms of
the relation that holds between the object of our thought and the dynamical
object as it really is?" As such, it might make sense to say that only
thought-signs have immediate objects, but that material indices (e.g., the
ripples a lake indicating the direction the wind is blowing) and icons
(e.g., a shadow as a yet unseen image of an object's shape) do not. If we
restrict ourselves to thought-signs, and we accept that all thoughts-signs
are parts of inferential processes, then the question is more a matter of
what we should say about the parts of thought signs. That is, the question
becomes:  do all iconic and indexical rhemes, or do all indexical
dicisigns, considered as parts of larger propositional and inferential
signs, have immediate objects?

GR:  But *if* the "material index" (e.g., the ripples a lake indicating the
direction the wind is blowing) or ​material icon (e.g., a shadow as a yet
unseen image of an object's shape) *function* *as* signs and are not just
analytical abstractions, then there will be some human (or other animal,
perhaps even a plant) which grasps in its consciousness (if not necessarily
its 'thought') the 'indicating' (it would already has collateral knowledge
of 'direction' in your example), or the 'iconicity' which might suggest or
hint at some object.

GR:  I'm not sure how biosemioticians might see this, but certainly we all
see animals responding to signs in nature, and I can certainly imagine them
having an Immediate Object which becomes a Representamen determining the
Interpretant which would result in their fleeing because of signs of a
forest fire, say, or a hare responding to the shadow of a paper kite which
it misinterprets as a falcon on the hunt. So, I find your *first* "restriction"
to (human) thought signs perhaps premature. But you have at least made me
see this as an unsettled point.

GR:  Those interesting questions suggest to me restrictions upon the
restriction noted above. So you seem to me to be assuming that Bellucci is
right in writing that only thought-signs have immediate objects and that
Peirce is wrong in saying that all signs (in sign-action, mind you, not as
isolated abstractions) have immediate objects.


Obviously my new (and still tentative) definitions for the Correlates are
an outcome of my ongoing exploration of concrete semiosis using the
metaphysical terms of Form, Matter, and Entelechy as Peirce employed them.
I have also been experimenting with Sign classification in accordance with
them.  Each *internal* (formal) Correlate, including the Sign itself, is
divided according to its *phaneroscopic* nature; i.e., its Mode of
Apprehension or Presentation.  Each *external* (material) Correlate is
divided according to its *ontological* nature; i.e., its Mode of Being.  The
*telic* (final) Correlate is divided according to its *normative* nature;
i.e., its Purpose.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 12:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 15-Mar-18 22:02
> *To:* Gary Richmond 
> *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Gary Fuhrman <
> g...@gnusystems.ca>; Terry Moore 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] R1467
>
>
>
> All:
>
> I wonder if the new (and still tentative) definitions that I have been
> considering for the semiotic Correlates, formulated in accordance with what
> I have recently been calling the metaphysics of semiosis, might offer some
> food for thought in this context.  In any case, I would welcome your
> feedback on them, since I have not yet posted them on the List.
>
>- The Dynamic Object is the Matter that the Sign *denotes*.
>- The Immediate Object is the Form that the Sign *signifies*.
>- The Immediate Interpretant is the Form that the Sign *communicates*.
>- The Dynamic Interpretant is the Matter that the Sign *determines*.
>- The Final Interpretant is the Entelechy that the Sign *intends*,
>which is the unity of Matter (DI) and Form 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



What a crazy.. uh, I mean creative concept, this having an ultimate aim.

There must, then, be more to this..



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Stephen, List,
> I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign
> (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant,
> aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to
> "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one
> right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an
> "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge,
> as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative,
> freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but
> intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope
> this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the
> term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.
> Best, Helmut
>  17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
> "Stephen C. Rose" 
>
> The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical
> reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will
> inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself
> how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It
> was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the
> evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by
> force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its
> relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought
> different than saying what we think independently of Peirce.
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>> OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of
>> action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an
>> apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted.
>> But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an
>> ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one,
>> because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me
>> moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is
>> evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of
>> the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end
>> of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.
>> But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly
>> suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>>
>>
>
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>
>
>
>

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Stephen, List,

I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant, aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge, as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative, freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.

Best, Helmut


 17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
"Stephen C. Rose" 
 


The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different than saying what we think independently of Peirce. 
 


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted. But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one, because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.


But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?

Best, Helmut


 






 





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[Matt Faunce]

John, I think the following idea should be considered, because what
anything is, according to Peirce, accords with the final opinion. So, the
two statements make a paradox or not depending on whether alterations of
things are ultimately bounded by some overarching law or not.

It's one thing for a general thing to change to and fro but stay within
limits over time and maintain an average over the long run. It's another
thing for a general to change without bounds. When all things change
without bounds it makes inquiry into any one thing's meaning increasingly
difficult over the long run, and at some point, practically impossible.
But, even given the theoretical possibility of continued inquiry, the
meaning of any thing over infinite time will have changed to cover an
infinite and unbounded range, so you have to question its pragmatic worth
both because of its unbounded meaning—determined by the final opinion after
considering the whole range of its changes—as well as because its meaning
at some point way down the road will be so impractical to your life right
now. If things change infinitely and unboundedly there could be no
theoretical final opinion with any pragmatic value.

So, I think the Margolis quote I posted earlier might make more sense now.

"I don't pretend to determine whether the world is a flux or depends in
some ultimate invariance. I think we must decide for ourselves, however, if
the conception of a fluxive world can complete effectively with the usual
commitments to invariance."

Matt


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 12:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> I have been traveling and working on a tight deadline, so I haven't
> been able to read, much less comment on the discussions.  But I
> fail to understand why people think that CP 5.555 and CP 5.565 are
> inconsistent.  (Excerpts below)
>
> In CP 5.555, Peirce is talking about "the act of knowing a real object".
>
> In CP 5.565, he's talking about how "minds may represent it to be".
>
> Those are totally different kinds of actions.  Knowing something
> requires some active experiment and observation.  It's a fundamental
> principle of quantum mechanics that any method of observing anything
> invariably alters the thing in some respect, however small it may be.
>
> Furthermore, representing something as something is independent of
> how much we know or think we know about it.  We can know something
> without being able to represent it accurately.  And we can represent
> something x as y without knowing anything about x (or even y).
>
> Note what I just did.  My choice of letters x and y may be used
> to represent anything, but they do not affect anything or depend
> on any knowledge of whatever they may or may not represent.
>
> Peirce, of course, did not know modern quantum mechanics.  But
> he was very familiar with the experimental methods of his day:
> dissecting, measuring, and analyzing plants, animals, rocks,
> people, languages, and social institutions.  That activity
> would change the things that are being observed.
>
> When Peirce went to some remote location to measure gravity,
> his presence had no effect on the value that he could detect.
> But just disturbing one grain of sand had some effect on gravity.
>
> As another example, Peirce's act of analyzing how a word is used
> and publishing a definition did not change the meaning as intended
> by previous speakers.  But it could change the way future readers
> and speakers might understand and use it.
>
> John
> 
>
> Joseph Margolis:
> > Let me put one paradox before you that is particularly baffling but
> > well worth solving. In discussing the nature and relationship between
> > truth and reality, Peirce says the following two things, which strike
> > me as required by his doctrine but incompatible with it as well:
>
> > the act of knowing a real object alters it. (5.555)
> >
> > Reality is that mode of being by virtue of which the real thing is
> > as it is, irrespectively of what any mind or any definite collection
> > of minds may represent it to be. (5.565)
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection,
assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have
some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have
gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W)
presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of
democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is
binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to
Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different
than saying what we think independently of Peirce.

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of
> action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an
> apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted.
> But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an
> ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one,
> because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me
> moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is
> evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of
> the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end
> of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.
> But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly
> suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Immediate object

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

List,


In a separate discussion, Gary F has suggested that the concept of the 
immediate object "was born in 1904 when Peirce was motivated to distinguish 
between two kinds of objects. For me, understanding what motivated that 
distinction, in the context of a taxonomy of signs, and what motivated further 
refinements of the notion (especially in 1907 in the context of pragmatism), is 
the very essence of understanding what the term means. It’s a matter of fact 
that Peirce wrote some things about it in 1904 and other things in 1907. I have 
no motivation to devise a definition of the term that will subordinate those 
facts to a monolithic overview of “Peircean semiotic” that will present it as a 
finished product. To me, it never was and never will be a finished product — in 
this respect it resembles Peirce’s “perfect sign” (and not incidentally, my own 
Turning Signs)."


In response, I don't think the concept was born at that time. Rather, Peirce 
framed a way of using a set of distinctions between immediate and dynamical 
objects, and between three sorts of interpretants some time around 1904 for the 
sake of supplying a more refined classification of signs based on the character 
of each and the relations that obtain between them. In doing, so, he continued 
to refine the terminology he was employing for the different classes of signs 
based on these distinctions and to develop some new hypotheses about their 
character, but it goes too far to say the concept of the immediate object was 
born at this time. Instead, I believe that Peirce used that concept in central 
arguments from early on--as is clear from his published work in "Questions" and 
"Consequences."


Here is what he says in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for 
Man":


5.241. In the first place, then, the difference between what is imagined or 
dreamed and what is actually experienced, is no argument in favor of the 
existence of such a faculty. For it is not questioned that there are 
distinctions in what is present to the mind, but the question is, whether 
independently of any such distinctions in the immediate objects of 
consciousness, we have any immediate power of distinguishing different modes of 
consciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense difference in the immediate 
objects of sense and imagination, sufficiently accounts for our distinguishing 
those faculties; and instead of being an argument in favor of the existence of 
an intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, 
it is a powerful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction of sense 
and imagination is concerned.


And in Consequences, he draws out some of the implications:


5.286. (3) The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is 
thought; that is to say, this respect is the immediate object of consciousness 
in the thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what 
the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign.

This looks to me like the concept of an immediate object that is entirely 
continuous with the conception in his later writings. While I admit that he is 
refining his account of this conception and exploring various ways of 
understanding and using it, I think it is pretty much the same concept as 
before. Note that in "Consequences", he is not simply talking about an 
immediate object of consciousness. Rather, he is drawing out the consequences 
of his earlier hypotheses and characterize an immediate object that is part of 
sign--and it is represented in that sign in relation to a further interpretant. 
As such, I think that a natural reading of this passage is that the immediate 
object of a sign is (1) a part of a sign of the real object that determined the 
sign and (2) it is part of that sign in relation to a further interpretant that 
interprets it to be part of the sign and to stand in a relation to the real 
object.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2018 7:14:36 AM
To: 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Gary Richmond'
Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard; 'Terry Moore'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] R1467

Jon et al.,
I don’t have any useful feedback to offer on your definitions, Jon, and I’ll 
try to explain why, although the more personal reasons will mostly elude my 
explanation.
First, regarding the Bellucci book (which I’ve now read except for the last 
chapter): both Jeff and Jon see a lack of logical order in it, which for them 
is a defect. For me, on the other hand, it’s an advantage. Or at least the 
chronological order of the book, combined with its thoroughness, is its 
greatest virtue, for me. Bellucci simply starts with Peirce’s remarks about 
signs in 1865, considered in their logical (and mostly Kantian) background, and 
follows the development of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[John F Sowa]

I have been traveling and working on a tight deadline, so I haven't
been able to read, much less comment on the discussions.  But I
fail to understand why people think that CP 5.555 and CP 5.565 are
inconsistent.  (Excerpts below)

In CP 5.555, Peirce is talking about "the act of knowing a real object".

In CP 5.565, he's talking about how "minds may represent it to be".

Those are totally different kinds of actions.  Knowing something
requires some active experiment and observation.  It's a fundamental
principle of quantum mechanics that any method of observing anything
invariably alters the thing in some respect, however small it may be.

Furthermore, representing something as something is independent of
how much we know or think we know about it.  We can know something
without being able to represent it accurately.  And we can represent
something x as y without knowing anything about x (or even y).

Note what I just did.  My choice of letters x and y may be used
to represent anything, but they do not affect anything or depend
on any knowledge of whatever they may or may not represent.

Peirce, of course, did not know modern quantum mechanics.  But
he was very familiar with the experimental methods of his day:
dissecting, measuring, and analyzing plants, animals, rocks,
people, languages, and social institutions.  That activity
would change the things that are being observed.

When Peirce went to some remote location to measure gravity,
his presence had no effect on the value that he could detect.
But just disturbing one grain of sand had some effect on gravity.

As another example, Peirce's act of analyzing how a word is used
and publishing a definition did not change the meaning as intended
by previous speakers.  But it could change the way future readers
and speakers might understand and use it.

John


Joseph Margolis:

Let me put one paradox before you that is particularly baffling but
well worth solving. In discussing the nature and relationship between
truth and reality, Peirce says the following two things, which strike
me as required by his doctrine but incompatible with it as well:



the act of knowing a real object alters it. (5.555)

Reality is that mode of being by virtue of which the real thing is
as it is, irrespectively of what any mind or any definite collection
of minds may represent it to be. (5.565)

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