Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jeff, list From what I can understand, and I'm NOT a mathematician, but the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very fuzzy. I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology. But I do support and agree with your agenda of using both mathematics and phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the world. Edwina On Sat 28/08/21 11:22 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Gary F, John S, all, List, I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim was to clarify the business of philosophers who are doing phenomenology as part of their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics, or what have you. The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of consciousness and the continuity in the degrees of conscious awareness with respect to various phenomena are points I accept--both as an understanding of Peirce's position and as starting points in my own inquiries. I'd go further an add another points Peirce makes, which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much on the conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of cognition because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would do better to focus on the clearer conception what is and is not under self-control. One of the points I was trying to make in asking the question was to put pressure on those who seem to think Peirce's main aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to provide a grounding for a philosophical theory of consciousness. As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing Peircean phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analyses of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis of the phenomena that have been observed puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered this general account of the business of the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like to add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational error and correcting for those errors. In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of Peircean phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians make a distinction between inquiry in pure mathematics and the application of formal systems to real world problems in applied mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might be helpful to make an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a pure theory of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a theory to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding. For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources of observational error, correcting for those errors, framing productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible hypotheses, and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical explanations. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jeff, Helmut, John, List, Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving that word. Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity bet
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F, John S, all, List, I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim was to clarify the business of philosophers who are doing phenomenology as part of their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics, or what have you. The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of consciousness and the continuity in the degrees of conscious awareness with respect to various phenomena are points I accept--both as an understanding of Peirce's position and as starting points in my own inquiries. I'd go further an add another points Peirce makes, which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much on the conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of cognition because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would do better to focus on the clearer conception what is and is not under self-control. One of the points I was trying to make in asking the question was to put pressure on those who seem to think Peirce's main aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to provide a grounding for a philosophical theory of consciousness. As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing Peircean phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analyses of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis of the phenomena that have been observed puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered this general account of the business of the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like to add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational error and correcting for those errors. In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of Peircean phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians make a distinction between inquiry in pure mathematics and the application of formal systems to real world problems in applied mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might be helpful to make an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a pure theory of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a theory to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding. For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources of observational error, correcting for those errors, framing productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible hypotheses, and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical explanations. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jeff, Helmut, John, List, Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving that word. Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity between the various grades of biological consciousness. We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, other
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jeff, Helmut, John, List, Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving that word. Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity between the various grades of biological consciousness. We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus serves as a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and reasoning, or between perception and conception. But if we take this as a boundary between unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary in the sense that (according to synechism) there is no real discontinuity between the two. I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining why I don’t see a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say in response to it. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45 Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses. Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic. Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Helmut, list Exactly. As I've tried to show in previous comments, 'consciousness' in Peircean terms is not confined to the self-aware brain, but includes all sentient interactions of one living organism with another. In that sense, it's part of the semiosic process where external data is received by an organism [and becomes defined as the Dynamic Object] and is processed into a result; an Interpretant, such that the organism can react to this input. Edwina On Sat 28/08/21 3:16 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Jeffrey, List To try to see phaneroscopy/phenomenology as not- anthropocentric resp. not restricted to self-aware brain animals, I tentatively define "consciousness" in a broader sense: Awareness or conscious consciousness is merely an optional highest level of consciousness. In its case, all three parts of consciousness, primisense, altersense, medisense, are provided by the agent brain, with self-awareness partaking. Unconscious reactions also belong to consciousness in this broader sense. There medisense just is not provided by the self-awareness parts of the brain, but by other organs, e.g. the spinal cord for reflexes, or by subconscious parts of the brain and body. In plants it is different again. In all cases, each part of consciousness is a function of a restricted entity: Brain, individual, group of individuals (e.g. ant-state, beehive), or even the species, family, or group of organisms as a whole, depending on shared relations: shared genes or maybe culture too. A chemical or physical reaction also is a product of consciousness, the agent in this case not being an individual, but the universe resp. its quasi-mind. I vaguely remember, when I studied, there was popular an author named Klaus Holzkamp, who also defined consciousness in a broader sense. Best, Helmut 28. August 2021 um 00:45 Uhr "Jeffrey Brian Downard" wrote: Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses. Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic. Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Helmut Raulien Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology": "Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions." So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected? Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appea
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jon: I share your concerns. My thoughts are a bit sharper… Sadly, the consequences of this public discussion of these slides for the future of CSP studies in the USA is unknowable. Hopefully, our European colleagues will not abandon the inquiry. Cheers Jerry > On Aug 27, 2021, at 10:16 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Dear Gary, > > I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on > ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up, > but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip, > as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped. > It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some > new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy. > I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's > not looking so good ... > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 8/27/2021 10:19 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >> O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who >> of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide >> 34. >> Gary f. >> -Original Message- >> From: Jon Awbrey >> Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49 >> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 >> oh goody, >> after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i >> guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. >> jon > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jeffrey, List To try to see phaneroscopy/phenomenology as not- anthropocentric resp. not restricted to self-aware brain animals, I tentatively define "consciousness" in a broader sense: Awareness or conscious consciousness is merely an optional highest level of consciousness. In its case, all three parts of consciousness, primisense, altersense, medisense, are provided by the agent brain, with self-awareness partaking. Unconscious reactions also belong to consciousness in this broader sense. There medisense just is not provided by the self-awareness parts of the brain, but by other organs, e.g. the spinal cord for reflexes, or by subconscious parts of the brain and body. In plants it is different again. In all cases, each part of consciousness is a function of a restricted entity: Brain, individual, group of individuals (e.g. ant-state, beehive), or even the species, family, or group of organisms as a whole, depending on shared relations: shared genes or maybe culture too. A chemical or physical reaction also is a product of consciousness, the agent in this case not being an individual, but the universe resp. its quasi-mind. I vaguely remember, when I studied, there was popular an author named Klaus Holzkamp, who also defined consciousness in a broader sense. Best, Helmut 28. August 2021 um 00:45 Uhr "Jeffrey Brian Downard" wrote: Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses. Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic. Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Helmut Raulien Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology": "Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions." So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected? Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.” Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List You wrote: "what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.".
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses. Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic. Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Helmut Raulien Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology": "Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism>; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions." So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected? Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.” Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List You wrote: "what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.". I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled). Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regar
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F., List So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology": "Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions." So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected? Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.” Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List You wrote: "what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.". I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled). Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197): CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader whi
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.” Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F., List You wrote: "what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.". I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled). Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197): CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. [end CSP] Gary f. From: <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu < <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37 To: Peirce-L < <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jon A., List: I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide. CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external obje
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F., List: GF: One thing I would add: the *initial* observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into *internal* and *external objects*. I agree, but this raises the question of where in Peirce's classification of the sciences the external/internal distinction *does *first come into play. As I have said many times before, the real/fictional distinction only arises in metaphysics as informed by the normative science of logic as semeiotic. However, as Robert Lane spells out succinctly in his excellent book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, these two distinctions are *not * coextensive. RL: Peirce also distinguished between that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*--the real--and that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about anything at all*. The latter is, in his terminology, the *external*, that which is external to the mind (i.e., not within my mind or your mind or anyone else's mind) ... (p. 3) Consequently, as Lane goes on to observe, the popular equation of "real" with "mind-independent" is not strictly accurate from a Peircean standpoint, since some realities are *internal*. Lane then summarizes the thesis of his book as follows. RL: An understanding of Peirce's basic realism and of precisely how he used the terms "real," "external," and "internal" illuminates a number of other aspects of his philosophy, including his views on truth, his pragmatism, his idealism, and his so-called scholastic realism. (p. 7) If Lane is right about this, and if the external/internal distinction is properly an outcome of phaneroscopy despite not pertaining to "the *initial *observation of the phaneron," then the unique role of phaneroscopy in Peirce's classification of sciences and in his philosophy would seem rather obvious. However, I am curious whether anyone would argue for situating the external/internal distinction under *another *science instead. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 10:53 AM wrote: > Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is > right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the > *initial* observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients > into *internal* and *external objects*. By the time you have classified > something as an *external* object, you are past that initial stage, and > you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities > that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how > you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard > your sense experience as a *representation* of something existing > independently of your perception of it. > > But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on *what appears* > (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is *only* an appearance *of > something else* external to your perception), *what appears* is *entirely > open to assured observation*. There is no doubt whatever that what > appears, *appears*. The question *in phaneroscopy* is then: what are the > indecomposable elements of this *appearing*? > > I should mention that the change in terminology is *only* that, in this > case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his > account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197): > > CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the > foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be > quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to > take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, > “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that > phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as > the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different > elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires > and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be > found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can > hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, > and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology > there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even > these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. > Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he > shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive > special attention. [end CSP] > > > > Gary f. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F., List You wrote: "what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.". I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled). Best, Helmut 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197): CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. [end CSP] Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37 To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jon A., List: I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide. CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904) I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ... CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905) Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about external objects is the result o
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jon A, allow me to point out that slide 34 (except for its title) consists *entirely* of a quotation from Peirce. There are two more slides coming which give definitions of the phaneron, and all three present some challenges to interpretation, but to begin by assigning them (or ADT's interpretation) to some academic "-ism" or other does not strike me as a good strategy. So yes, give it a while. Gary f. -Original Message- From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: 27-Aug-21 11:16 To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Dear Gary, I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up, but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip, as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped. It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy. I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's not looking so good ... Regards, Jon _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197): CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. [end CSP] Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37 To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jon A., List: I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide. CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904) I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ... CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905) Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about external objects is the result of inference rather than direct observation, beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote: oh goody, after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. jon _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Dear Gary, I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up, but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip, as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped. It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy. I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's not looking so good ... Regards, Jon On 8/27/2021 10:19 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34. Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49 To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 oh goody, after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. jon _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jon A., List: I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide. CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, *phaneron*, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904) I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ... CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905) Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. His point is *not *that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that phaneroscopy studies *only *that which is or could be *present to the mind*, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we *know *about external objects is the result of *inference *rather than direct observation, beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey wrote: > oh goody, > > after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i > guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. > > jon > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34. Gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49 To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 oh goody, after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. jon _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
oh goody, after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself. jon _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
