Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
ghts to discuss. >> >> Peirce wrote something similar to what you cited from "A Neglected >> Argument" in R 842; I quoted and commented on it in the thread on "Peirce's >> Theory of Thinking," so I will not do so again here. My impression from >> both passages is that he did not believe that he had adequately spelled out >> his complete "theory of thinking" in anything that he had written >> previously. In fact, just this morning I was looking through some >> manuscripts from 1911 (R 846-856)--thanks again to SPIN ( >> http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16)--in which >> Peirce made several attempts to start writing a "logical criticism" or >> "logical critique" of "the Christian creed" or "articles of religious >> faith." All of them begin by laying out his theory of thinking, and none >> of them manage to complete that task, let alone progress beyond it. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >>> Hello Jon S, List, >>> >>> You have found some of what I've said to be inscrutable. Let me try to >>> be clearer about what I was trying to say in the last message: >>> >>> 1. In my own work, I am finding that a closer reading of the first >>> chapter of the Minute Logic is quite helpful in my ongoing efforts to >>> interpret the lines of inquiry and arguments in "A Neglected Argument". >>> >>> 2. Peirce explicitly says this about the essay: "There is my poor sketch >>> of the Neglected Argument, greatly cut down to bring it within the limits >>> assigned to this article. Next should come the discussion of its >>> logicality; but nothing readable at a sitting could possibly bring home to >>> readers my full proof of the principal points of such an examination. I can >>> only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, >>> from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a >>> series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct >>> the continuous line of reasoning for himself. In my own mind the proof is >>> elaborated, and I am exerting my energies to getting it submitted to public >>> censure." (CP, 6.468) >>> >>> 3. As such, I'm interested in seeing how the "table of contents" in "A >>> Neglected Argument" might be pointing to arguments and inquiries in other >>> works. There are a number of essays that we might consider, but this part >>> of the Minute Logic has captured my attention. As such, I wanted to see if >>> others might be interested in taking a look for the sake of comparing the >>> lines of argument and inquiries in the two pieces. >>> >>> 4. There are a number of points that are of particular interest, >>> including his explanation of how we should, in general, make the transition >>> from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the >>> question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite >>> vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, >>> and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the >>> same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be >>> the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive >>> order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished >>> with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, >>> 2.111) >>> >>> 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his >>> hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my >>> eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might >>> be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support >>> for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> >>> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM >>> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard >>> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
gt;> lines of argument and inquiries in the two pieces. >> >> 4. There are a number of points that are of particular interest, >> including his explanation of how we should, in general, make the transition >> from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the >> question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite >> vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, >> and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the >> same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be >> the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive >> order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished >> with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, >> 2.111) >> >> 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his >> hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my >> eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might >> be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support >> for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM >> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard >> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics >> >> Jeff, List: >> >> I must confess that although I continue to find your posts >> thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am >> not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP >> 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in >> relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality. >> >> JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so >> connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so >> is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? >> >> I basically posed this same question at the very beginning of the earlier >> thread. My own answer, after much discussion and consideration, is based >> on this passage from the first manuscript draft of "A Neglected Argument" >> in R 842. >> >> CSP: Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The >> latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind >> can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. >> Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain >> theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism >> that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever >> acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. >> >> The major premiss, "a certain theory of logic," is that every process of >> thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason is >> logical. The minor premiss, "a general description of" the humble >> argument, is that it is a process of thought that produces a spontaneous >> conjecture of instinctive reason. The conclusion that follows is "that the >> humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim; rather than >> demonstrating the Reality of God, Peirce sought merely to show that anyone >> who embraces his theory of logic, and recognizes that the humble argument >> is consistent with it, "need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion." >> >> As for what it would mean to "prove" the major premiss--Peirce indicated >> in "A Neglected Argument" that its primary experiential consequence is >> that, if it is correct, humanity's instinctive reason should exhibit a >> remarkable tendency to generate spontaneous conjectures that successfully >> withstand further deductive and inductive scrutiny. He then contended that >> this is exactly what we find to be the case, attributing it to what Galileo >> had called "il lume naturale" and advocating "that it is the simpler >> Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that >> instinct suggests, that must be preferred" (CP 6.477, EP 2:444-445). He >> also explictly rejected the alternative explanation. >> >> CSP: But may they n
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
eral, make the transition >> from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the >> question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite >> vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, >> and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the >> same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be >> the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive >> order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished >> with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, >> 2.111) >> >> 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his >> hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my >> eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might >> be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support >> for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM >> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard >> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics >> >> Jeff, List: >> >> I must confess that although I continue to find your posts >> thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am >> not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP >> 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in >> relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality. >> >> JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so >> connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so >> is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? >> >> I basically posed this same question at the very beginning of the earlier >> thread. My own answer, after much discussion and consideration, is based >> on this passage from the first manuscript draft of "A Neglected Argument" >> in R 842. >> >> CSP: Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The >> latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind >> can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. >> Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain >> theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism >> that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever >> acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. >> >> The major premiss, "a certain theory of logic," is that every process of >> thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason is >> logical. The minor premiss, "a general description of" the humble >> argument, is that it is a process of thought that produces a spontaneous >> conjecture of instinctive reason. The conclusion that follows is "that the >> humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim; rather than >> demonstrating the Reality of God, Peirce sought merely to show that anyone >> who embraces his theory of logic, and recognizes that the humble argument >> is consistent with it, "need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion." >> >> As for what it would mean to "prove" the major premiss--Peirce indicated >> in "A Neglected Argument" that its primary experiential consequence is >> that, if it is correct, humanity's instinctive reason should exhibit a >> remarkable tendency to generate spontaneous conjectures that successfully >> withstand further deductive and inductive scrutiny. He then contended that >> this is exactly what we find to be the case, attributing it to what Galileo >> had called "il lume naturale" and advocating "that it is the simpler >> Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that >> instinct suggests, that must be preferred" (CP 6.477, EP 2:444-445). He >> also explictly rejected the alternative explanation. >> >> CSP: But may they not have come fortuitously, or by some such >> modification of chance as the Darwinian supposes? I answer that three or >> four independent methods of computation show that it would be ridi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
Jeff, List: That is helpful, thank you. I will try to take a closer look at CP 2.79-118 and see if it prompts any further thoughts to discuss. Peirce wrote something similar to what you cited from "A Neglected Argument" in R 842; I quoted and commented on it in the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," so I will not do so again here. My impression from both passages is that he did not believe that he had adequately spelled out his complete "theory of thinking" in anything that he had written previously. In fact, just this morning I was looking through some manuscripts from 1911 (R 846-856)--thanks again to SPIN ( http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16)--in which Peirce made several attempts to start writing a "logical criticism" or "logical critique" of "the Christian creed" or "articles of religious faith." All of them begin by laying out his theory of thinking, and none of them manage to complete that task, let alone progress beyond it. Regards, Jon On Wed, Nov 2, 2016 at 2:13 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Jon S, List, > > You have found some of what I've said to be inscrutable. Let me try to be > clearer about what I was trying to say in the last message: > > 1. In my own work, I am finding that a closer reading of the first > chapter of the Minute Logic is quite helpful in my ongoing efforts to > interpret the lines of inquiry and arguments in "A Neglected Argument". > > 2. Peirce explicitly says this about the essay: "There is my poor sketch > of the Neglected Argument, greatly cut down to bring it within the limits > assigned to this article. Next should come the discussion of its > logicality; but nothing readable at a sitting could possibly bring home to > readers my full proof of the principal points of such an examination. I can > only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, > from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a > series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct > the continuous line of reasoning for himself. In my own mind the proof is > elaborated, and I am exerting my energies to getting it submitted to public > censure." (CP, 6.468) > > 3. As such, I'm interested in seeing how the "table of contents" in "A > Neglected Argument" might be pointing to arguments and inquiries in other > works. There are a number of essays that we might consider, but this part > of the Minute Logic has captured my attention. As such, I wanted to see if > others might be interested in taking a look for the sake of comparing the > lines of argument and inquiries in the two pieces. > > 4. There are a number of points that are of particular interest, > including his explanation of how we should, in general, make the transition > from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the > question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite > vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, > and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the > same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be > the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive > order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished > with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, > 2.111) > > 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his > hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my > eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might > be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support > for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics > > Jeff, List: > > I must confess that although I continue to find your posts > thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am > not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP > 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in > relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality. > > JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so > connected with a theory o
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
Hello Jon S, List, You have found some of what I've said to be inscrutable. Let me try to be clearer about what I was trying to say in the last message: 1. In my own work, I am finding that a closer reading of the first chapter of the Minute Logic is quite helpful in my ongoing efforts to interpret the lines of inquiry and arguments in "A Neglected Argument". 2. Peirce explicitly says this about the essay: "There is my poor sketch of the Neglected Argument, greatly cut down to bring it within the limits assigned to this article. Next should come the discussion of its logicality; but nothing readable at a sitting could possibly bring home to readers my full proof of the principal points of such an examination. I can only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct the continuous line of reasoning for himself. In my own mind the proof is elaborated, and I am exerting my energies to getting it submitted to public censure." (CP, 6.468) 3. As such, I'm interested in seeing how the "table of contents" in "A Neglected Argument" might be pointing to arguments and inquiries in other works. There are a number of essays that we might consider, but this part of the Minute Logic has captured my attention. As such, I wanted to see if others might be interested in taking a look for the sake of comparing the lines of argument and inquiries in the two pieces. 4. There are a number of points that are of particular interest, including his explanation of how we should, in general, make the transition from a normative theory of semiotics to an objective logic. He raises the question of "whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it." (CP, 2.111) 5. The explanation of the proof that is offered in support of his hypothesis concerning the life of great symbols is something that caught my eye. I also think his remarks about the logic of Pooh-Pooh arguments might be interesting for those who think there is no real observational support for his hypothesis concerning the reality of God. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics Jeff, List: I must confess that although I continue to find your posts thought-provoking, they also tend to be somewhat inscrutable to me. I am not sure exactly what bearing you are suggesting that CP 2.79-110 and CP 2.118 should have on our understanding of Peirce's theory of thinking in relation to the hypothesis of God's Reality. JD: So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? I basically posed this same question at the very beginning of the earlier thread. My own answer, after much discussion and consideration, is based on this passage from the first manuscript draft of "A Neglected Argument" in R 842. CSP: Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. The major premiss, "a certain theory of logic," is that every process of thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason is logical. The minor premiss, "a general description of" the humble argument, is that it is a process of thought that produces a spontaneous conjecture of instinctive reason. The conclusion that follows is "that the humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim; rather than demonstrating the Reality of God, Peirce sought merely to show that anyone who embraces his theory of logic, and recogniz
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
Gary, list: I think this answers your question but it’s a little mysterious. I will leave it at that but do want to emphasize choice of the word retroduction over abduction, that is, choices that are adopted after the fact and not at the outset. “Further, just as in arguments about mathematics *objections that involve first principles do not affect the mathematician* — and the other sciences are in similar case — so, too, objections involving the point that we have just raised *do not affect the physicist*: for it is a fundamental assumption with him that motion is ultimately referable to nature herself.” ~*Physics*, Aristotle Best, Jerry R On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 4:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon S. List, > > Jon cloncluded his post by writing: > > Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was > *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime > importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens > necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of > Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of > connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and > connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, > EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and > connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, > nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive > conjectures. *Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, > phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? *(emphasis > added). > > Why indeed. I see no reason to deny it, but would be very interested in > hearing the reasoning of others who do. It seems to me that there has been > a tendency in much Peirce scholarship to warmly embrace this in much of > Peirce's mathematics, trichotomic phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and > special science, while ignoring or downright pooh-poohing it in his > metaphysics. Good question, Jon! > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 4:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce >> might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the >> Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature >> of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). >> I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every >> retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This >> interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an >> "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. >> >> CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of >> guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have >> noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural >> selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the >> preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that >> man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the >> fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in >> respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot >> adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption >> is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and >> Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history >> of science supports this view. >> >> >> The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to >> provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this >> point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a >> decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an >> unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript >> where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve >> precisely that purpose. >> >> CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted >> much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of >> divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection >> could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My >> reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or >> disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt >> or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and >> further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief >> in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or f
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
Jon S. List, Jon cloncluded his post by writing: Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive conjectures. *Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? *(emphasis added). Why indeed. I see no reason to deny it, but would be very interested in hearing the reasoning of others who do. It seems to me that there has been a tendency in much Peirce scholarship to warmly embrace this in much of Peirce's mathematics, trichotomic phenomenology, logic as semeiotic, and special science, while ignoring or downright pooh-poohing it in his metaphysics. Good question, Jon! Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 4:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce > might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the > Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature > of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). > I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This > interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an > "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. > > CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of > guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have > noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural > selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the > preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that > man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the > fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in > respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot > adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption > is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and > Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history > of science supports this view. > > > The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to > provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this > point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a > decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an > unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript > where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve > precisely that purpose. > > CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted > much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of > divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection > could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My > reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or > disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt > or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and > further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief > in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or false, fit or > disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural > selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this > belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it > acts in respect to ordinary morality. > > > Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief > in *Ens necessarium*" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the > pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*" in CP 6.490, perhaps our > subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related > topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that > cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no > *discontinuity > *between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and > matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters perta
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
ctive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is > logical." > > You then suggest that the interpretation you are recommending fits nicely > with the objection that he considers in the next paragraph. I am wondering > if we might gain some clarity about the claim that "proving his 'theory > of the nature of thinking' would also prove the hypothesis of God's > Reality' if we were to read it in light of his earlier work in the Minute > Logic on Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion. In particular, I think > that the discussion of the role of the CenoPythagorean Categories in the > development of the theories of speculative grammar, critical logic and > speculative rhetoric is really quite clear and to the point when it comes > to interpreting this remark. (CP, 2.79-2.110) I have a hunch that the > movement from the Normative Semiotic to a doctrine of signs that > corresponds to an objective logic provides some ideas that might help in > the interpretation of the more puzzling moves that Peirce seems to > be making in "The Neglected Argument". > > The remarks at 2.118 stand out in my mind. He says: "We now begin to see > the sense of talking of modes of being. They are elements of cooperation > toward the *summum bonum*. The categories now come in to aid us > materially, and we clearly make out three modes or factors of being, which > we proceed to make clear to ourselves. Arrived at this point, we can > construct a *Weltanschauung*. From this platform, ethics acquires a new > significance, as will be shown. Logic, too, shines forth with all is native > nobility." > > So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so > connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so > is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > -- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Monday, October 31, 2016 1:37 PM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics > > List: > > In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce > might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the > Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature > of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). > I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This > interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an > "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. > > CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of > guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have > noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural > selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the > preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that > man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the > fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in > respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot > adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption > is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and > Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history > of science supports this view. > > > The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to > provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this > point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a > decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an > unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript > where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve > precisely that purpose. > > CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted > much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of > divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection > could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My > reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or > disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt > or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and > further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the beli
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
Jon S, List, You say: " In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical." You then suggest that the interpretation you are recommending fits nicely with the objection that he considers in the next paragraph. I am wondering if we might gain some clarity about the claim that "proving his 'theory of the nature of thinking' would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality' if we were to read it in light of his earlier work in the Minute Logic on Originality, Obsistence and Transuasion. In particular, I think that the discussion of the role of the CenoPythagorean Categories in the development of the theories of speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric is really quite clear and to the point when it comes to interpreting this remark. (CP, 2.79-2.110) I have a hunch that the movement from the Normative Semiotic to a doctrine of signs that corresponds to an objective logic provides some ideas that might help in the interpretation of the more puzzling moves that Peirce seems to be making in "The Neglected Argument". The remarks at 2.118 stand out in my mind. He says: "We now begin to see the sense of talking of modes of being. They are elements of cooperation toward the summum bonum. The categories now come in to aid us materially, and we clearly make out three modes or factors of being, which we proceed to make clear to ourselves. Arrived at this point, we can construct a Weltanschauung. From this platform, ethics acquires a new significance, as will be shown. Logic, too, shines forth with all is native nobility." So, let me ask, what does Peirce mean when he says that "it is so connected with a theory of the nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that." In what sense is each being "proved"? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ____________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 1:37 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics List: In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history of science supports this view. The editors of the Collected Papers must have deemed it necessary to provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve precisely that purpose. CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing
[PEIRCE-L] Instinctive Reason and Metaphysics
List: In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of God's Reality (CP 6.491). I eventually proposed that he was referring to the notion that every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason is logical. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that he acknowledged an "obvious" objection in the very next paragraph. CSP: For example, it may be said that since I compare man's power of guessing at the truth with the instincts of animals, I ought to have noticed that these are entirely explained by the action of natural selection in endowing animals with such powers as contribute to the preservation of their different stocks; and that there is evidence that man's power of penetrating the secrets of nature depends upon this, in the fact that all the successful sciences have been either mechanical in respect to their theories or psychological … Metaphysics, however, cannot adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the presumption is that man has no such genius for discoveries about God, Freedom, and Immortality, as he has for physical and psychical science; and the history of science supports this view. The editors of the *Collected Papers* must have deemed it necessary to provide a response from Peirce, because they inserted CP 6.492-493 at this point--despite the fact that he wrote those two paragraphs more than a decade earlier! An accompanying footnote attributes them to "an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." However, as it turns out, the manuscript where CP 6.491 is found (R 844) includes additional remarks that serve precisely that purpose. CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief in the *Ens necessarium* would according as it were true or false, fit or disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it acts in respect to ordinary morality. Since Peirce mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation" of "the belief in *Ens necessarium*" here, and provided some "hints" regarding "the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*" in CP 6.490, perhaps our subsequent discussions in the threads on Peirce's Cosmology and related topics can shed light on this reply. If my understanding of that cosmology--and thus my analysis of CP 6.490--is correct, then there is no *discontinuity *between the natural competence of humanity's instinctive reason and matters of metaphysics; or at least, matters pertaining to the Reality of God. After all, it posits that God is not completely independent of the third Universe of Experience, which includes Mind and continuity itself; and according to Peirce, our disposition to generate true hypotheses is especially well-suited to that Category. CSP: It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the logical situation--the freest from all questionable admixture--is to say that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. (CP 5.173, EP 2:217; 1903) Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought was *synechism*, because it "insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.169; 1902). The hypothesis of God as *Ens necessarium* explains not only the origin of the three Universes of Experience, but also their order (*cosmos*)--the "homogeneities of connectedness" within each one of them, as well as the "homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, EP 2:438-439). Our experience and observation of those "homogeneities and connections" are such that our instinctive reason, while quite fallible, nevertheless has a remarkable tendency to produce successful retroductive conjectures. Why would we acknowledge this in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and the special sciences, but deny it in metaphysics? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
