Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

H…

Well, every individual can connect with pragmatism and realism with whatever 
competencies and experiential wisdom they have acquired.

Cheers

Jerry 

> On Aug 17, 2021, at 4:30 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
>  
> No problem. My assertions belong to the department of pragmatism that Peirce 
> called critical common-sensism.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: 17-Aug-21 17:18
> To: Peirce List 
> Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
> Semiotics.(Part A)
>  
> List, Gary
>  
> CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.
>  
> As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning 
> of signs.
>  
> Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
> philosophies?
>  
> Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 
>  
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry 
>  
>  
>  
> 
> 
>> On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
>> wrote:
>>  
>> Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is 
>> or is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated 
>> without the help of mathematical reasoning.
>> 
>> You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.
>> 
>> Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write 
>> this. This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without 
>> the help of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you 
>> define “scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
>> observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
>> direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are 
>> you going to resort to, in order to prove your point?
>> 
>> Gary f.
>> 
>>  
>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
>> Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
>> Semiotics.(Part A)
>>  
>> List,
>> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
>> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not 
>> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
>> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 
>> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
>> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
>> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
>> explicitely claim: Yes. 
>> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple 
>> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a 
>> kind of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human 
>> Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
>> B. Morand
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary

CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.

As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning of 
signs.

Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
philosophies?

Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 


Cheers

Jerry 




> On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is 
> or is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated 
> without the help of mathematical reasoning.
> 
> You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.
> 
> Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write 
> this. This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without 
> the help of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you 
> define “scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
> observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
> direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
> going to resort to, in order to prove your point?
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Bernard Morand
> Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
> Semiotics.(Part A)
>  
> List,
> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not 
> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 
> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
> explicitely claim: Yes. 
> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple 
> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind 
> of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human 
> Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
> B. Morand
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JLRC: CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.


Above all, Peirce professed to be a synechist, which by his own definitions
is what made him also a pragmat(ic)ist and an extreme scholastic realist,
as well as a tychist and an objective idealist.

JLRC: As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the
meaning of signs.


Peirce did not care much for the term "epistemology" (CP 5.496, EP
2:420&423, 1907) and viewed what is called *Erkenntnislehre *in German as
instead corresponding with speculative grammar (CP 2.206, 1902), the first
branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic (EP 2:257, 1903), on
which metaphysics (including ontology) indeed depends. Of course, these
sciences--like all other positive sciences--depend on phaneroscopy, which
depends on mathematics. Nevertheless, as I have said before (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00133.html), I believe
that it is a mistake to treat anything as *ultimately *"foundational" in
Peirce's thought.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 4:18 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Gary
>
> CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.
>
> As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the
> meaning of signs.
>
> Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s
> philosophies?
>
> Observation of a cedar tree is nice.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[John F. Sowa]

Jerry, Gary F, List, 
I agree that Gary's example of a cedar tree
is good.  And a phaneroscopic analysis of the experience shows precisely
where the mathematical reasoning comes in.  This example does not involve
any deep deduction, but any analysis that is sufficiently detailed for
expression in English must derive a diagram that could go either way:  an
existential graph or an English phrase.
GF:  Well, there is a cedar
tree just outside the window next to me as
I write this.  This is
true of the world of existences, and I have
stated it without the
help of mathematical reasoning.  One example
should suffice — unless
you define “scientifically stated” in such a
way as to exclude
reports of direct observation, or else define
“mathematical
reasoning” in a way that includes direct observation.
So which of
those equally far-fetched definitions are you going to
resort to, in
order to prove your point? 
The phrase "direct
observation" skips many steps of phaneroscopy:  The sensations that
led to the experience; the huge amount of detail from the window; the
muscular feelings of sitting in chair; the computer and other furniture in
the room; the excerpt from that experience that consisted of a narrower
visual experience from the window; the classification of the part that
happens to be a cedar tree; the additional experience from memory of the
parts of the tree not seen; the abstraction from all that experience to
just a diagram consisting of a rhema for 'cedar tree' and an index that
links that rhema to a specific location; and finally a translation to an
English phrase "a cedar tree outside the window".
The
mathematical steps in that process involve the abstraction of the diagram
(a classification of a rhema plus an index to the specific location) from
the immense complexity of the experience.
That diagram is now in a
form that could be represented as an existential graph (or other
mathematical notation) or translated to some natural language, such as
English.
In that paragraph, I emphasized the part of the experience
that led to the English phrase.  But I omitted the earlier steps of
phaneroscopy that led to your recognition that (1) you're awake, (2)
sitting in a room, (3) looking out the window, (4) thinking in English,
(5) planning to type something into the computer, etc., etc.
etc.
All those steps could be mapped to diagrams (in EGs or other
formats) and used for more detailed reasoning about the note you're
writing.
Peirce called those steps mathematical.   Andre did not do
the analysis to the depth that Peirce did, and he did not recognize the
intermediate steps of deriving a hypoicon (a diagram) as a necessary stage
for stating the observation.
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Robert:

It may be useful to add a few comments that may be helpful for the comity of 
this group.

Higher education in the sciences is radically different from eduction in 
mathematics. 
I believe that my own personal experience is typical for most, but not all, 
scientists.

Mathematical terminology is intermingled and entangled with material 
terminology freely and with abandon. 
This entanglement of meanings reaches it zenith in the engineering disciplines.
Even though tacit recognition is given to the distinct  meaning of mathematical 
symbols, the logic used to ground scientific theories, including chemistry and 
biology become synonymous with mathematical terms.

The antecedent “maths-scientific" beliefs, formed under strict mentorships, 
from the early formative years are difficult to re-formulate in later years 
because they encompass both the ontology and epistemology of the scientific 
belief systems.

C P Snow (1958) diagnosed the grounding issues.  The situation has not changed 
much today.

For me personally, it required about three decades to fully separate the 
meanings of mathematical symbols for numbers from biochemical symbols for 
numbers (with heritable internal relational structures.). 

Admittedly, a good fraction of this effort was devoted to separating the 
sin-signs from the legi-signs  because the ontology of chemistry is tightly 
intermingled with the epistemology of chemistry.CSP often attempted to 
semantically express this fact by differentiating the meaning of the term 
“mathematics” from the term “logic”.  Unfortunately, the semantics of set 
theory, without a hint of natural semiosis, as promoted by Whitehead and 
Russell, compelled the development of proof structures for formal logics and 
indeed the natural semantics of computer science.It could have been 
otherwise!  CSP grounded his diagrammatic logics on the logical diagrams of 
chemistry (relevance logics) which we now know to be vastly more perplex than 
the Venn diagrams of Boolean logic. 

N,B. Recall the nature of arithmetic calculations has not changed in centuries, 
only the philosophical interpretations of mathematics and the structures of 
proof (Skolemization of logical semantic symbols).

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Aug 17, 2021, at 11:39 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Dear Jon Alan,
> 
> When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look away?
> 
> "… Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he first 
> frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not concern the 
> drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without inquiring or caring 
> whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to 
> draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis" (CP 3.559)
> 
> Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous mathematics 
> of which you say that ADT "explicitly affirms the dependence of phaneroscopy 
> (and every other positive science) on mathematics for certain principles, 
> including formal deductive logic" [emphasize mine ], are for him pure 
> artifacts. Indeed, he does not exhibit any of them, and neither do you. They 
> are empty argumentation factors, "elements of language without denotation," 
> like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I have to repeat myself). 
> Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of ghosts without risking being 
> contradicted to better exclude realities, like every mathematical object.  
> 
> Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to recognize 
> "mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex phanerons if one 
> does not have them, either in one's mind or if one does not have the capacity 
> to construct them? 
> "At the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are 
> insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first 
> business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame 
> another simpler but quite fictitious problem (supplemented, perhaps, by some 
> supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same time it is 
> sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill, as a 
> substitute for it." (CP 3.559, again)
> 
> But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?
> 
> Regards, 
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt  > a écrit :
> John, List:
> 
> JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics in 
> Peirce's philosophy.
> 
> On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone accusing André of 
> hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has completely misunderstood 
> his point. He explicitly affirms the dependence 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

The quoted statement rather obviously *does not* explicitly claim that "the
world of existences can be scientifically stated without the help of
mathematical reasoning." Instead, it simply says that (pure) mathematicians
cannot be counted on to help us "figure out what goes on in experience,"
precisely because (pure) mathematics is an "unbounded search for formal
necessities." Their task when called upon by a practitioner of a
*positive *science
is limited to formulating a (pure) hypothesis as a "quite fictitious
problem" that is a "skeletonization or diagrammatization of the [real]
problem," from which they proceed to draw strictly deductive conclusions
"without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or
not" (CP 3.559, 1898). Again, as Peirce himself puts it elsewhere ...

CSP: Mathematical reasoning has for its object to ascertain what would be
true in a hypothetical world which the mathematician has created for
himself,--not altogether arbitrarily, it is true, but nevertheless, so that
it can contain no element which he has not himself deliberately introduced
into it. All that his sort of reasoning, therefore, has to do is to develop
a preconceived idea; and it never reaches any conclusion at all as to what
is or is not true of the world of existences. The metaphysician [or other
positive scientist], on the other hand, is engaged in the investigation of
matters of fact, and the only way to matters of fact is the way of
experience. ... It follows, that deductive, or mathematical, reasoning,
although in metaphysics it may oftener "take the stage" than in the drama
of special research, yet after all, has precisely the same *rôle *to enact,
and nothing more. All genuine advance must come from real observation and
inductive reasoning. (CP 8.110, c. 1900)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 4:29 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

> Le 17/08/2021 à 20:41, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
>
> Bernard, List:
>
> For the sake of clarity, please provide an exact quotation where "The
> slides by De Tienne explicitely claim" that "the world of existences can be
> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning."
>
> Thanks,
>
> Here it is:
>
> Slide 25:
>
> Text: *The Urge to Transition out of Mathematics*
>
> •  Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, *we
> cannot count on mathematicians* to help figure out what goes on in
> experience.
>
> B. Morand
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical
>> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not
>> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
>>
>> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ?
>>
>> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be
>> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
>>
>> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne
>> explicitely claim: Yes.
>>
>> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple
>> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a
>> kind of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in
>> Human Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
>>
>> B. Morand
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, Bernard, List
"'Phenomenology,  which does not depend upon any other positive
science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made
to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure
Mathematics"..."A phenomenology which does not reckon with pure
mathematics, a science hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel
wrote, will be the same pitiful club-footed affair that Hegel
produced" 5.40.

But the point, as I see it, is that your single observation of a
cedar tree [and how did you know it belongs to the class of 'cedar'?]
- is not a scientific assertion.  Induction, based on 'direct
observation', requires a collection of observations.

So- I don't think that this is an example of a 'scientific
statement'.

Edwina
 On Tue 17/08/21  4:35 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be
that what is or is not true of the world of existences can be
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning.

 You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.

Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I
write this. This is true of the world of existences, and I have
stated it without the help of mathematical reasoning. One example
should suffice —  unless you define “scientifically stated” in
such a way as to exclude reports of direct observation, or else
define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes direct
observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are
you going to resort to, in order to prove your point?

Gary f. 
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
 Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of
Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A) 
List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that
"mathematical reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to
what is or is not true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can
be scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?


My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De
Tienne explicitely claim: Yes. 

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple
inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about
oenoscopy, a kind of study which has been known under the label of
comparativism in Human Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[gnox]

Jerry,

 

No problem. My assertions belong to the department of pragmatism that Peirce 
called critical common-sensism.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler  
Sent: 17-Aug-21 17:18
To: Peirce List 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List, Gary

 

CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.

 

As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning of 
signs.

 

Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
philosophies?

 

Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 

 

 

Cheers

 

Jerry 

 

 

 





On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
wrote:

 

Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is or 
is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated without the 
help of mathematical reasoning.

You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.

Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write this. 
This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without the help 
of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you define 
“scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
going to resort to, in order to prove your point?

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true 
of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?

My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
explicitely claim: Yes. 

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple inventories 
of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind of study 
which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human Sciences before 
the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand

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https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Bernard Morand]

Le 17/08/2021 à 20:41, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Bernard, List:

For the sake of clarity, please provide an exact quotation where "The 
slides by De Tienne explicitely claim" that "the world of existences 
can be scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning."


Thanks,


Here it is:

Slide 25:

Text: *The Urge to Transition out of Mathematics*

• Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, *we cannot 
count on mathematicians* to help figure out what goes on in experience.


B. Morand


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand > wrote:


List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that
"mathematical reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as
to what is or is not true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ?

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can
be scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?

My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De
Tienne explicitely claim: Yes.

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple
inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about
oenoscopy, a kind of study which has been known under the label of
comparativism in Human Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[gnox]

Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is or 
is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated without the 
help of mathematical reasoning.

You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.

Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write this. 
This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without the help 
of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you define 
“scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
going to resort to, in order to prove your point?

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true 
of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?

My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
explicitely claim: Yes. 

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple inventories 
of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind of study 
which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human Sciences before 
the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

For the sake of clarity, please provide an exact quotation where "The
slides by De Tienne explicitely claim" that "the world of existences can be
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning."

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

> List,
>
> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical
> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not
> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
>
> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ?
>
> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be
> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
>
> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne
> explicitely claim: Yes.
>
> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple
> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a
> kind of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in
> Human Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
>
> B. Morand
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Bernard Morand]

List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is 
not true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.


But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ?

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?


My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
explicitely claim: Yes.


Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple 
inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a 
kind of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in 
Human Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)


B. Morand


Le 17/08/2021 à 19:18, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Robert, List:

RM: When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do
you look away?


I honestly do not understand what prompted this question, since I 
/directly quoted/ the last lines of CP 3.559, and I have previously 
pointed out that the entire referenced paragraph is the central 
passage of my series of articles about the logic of ingenuity. I also 
do not understand the rest of the post that follows, since I have 
repeatedly acknowledged that formulating a pure hypothesis falls 
within the scope of pure mathematics. It is Peirce himself who 
describes this as a "quite fictitious problem" such that the resulting 
mathematical objects are "pure artifacts," not realities that are as 
they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them. Please note 
again the last quotation that I provided, especially these sentences 
to that effect.


CSP: Mathematical reasoning has for its object to ascertain what
would be true in a hypothetical world which the mathematician has
created for himself,--not altogether arbitrarily, it is true, but
nevertheless, so that it can contain no element which he has not
himself deliberately introduced into it. All that his sort of
reasoning, therefore, has to do is to develop a preconceived idea;
and it never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not
true of the world of existences. (CP 8.110, c. 1900)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 11:40 AM robert marty 
mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:


Dear Jon Alan,

When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you
look away?

"… /Thus, the mathematician does two very different things:
namely, *he first frames a pure hypothesi*s stripped of all
features which do not concern the drawing of consequences from it,
and this he does without inquiring or caring whether it agrees
with the actual facts or not; *and, secondly, *he proceeds to draw
necessary consequences from that hypothesis"/ (CP 3.559)

Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous
mathematics of which you say that ADT "/explicitly affirms the
dependence of phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on
mathematics for *certain principles*, including formal deductive
logic"/ [emphasize mine ], are for him pure artifacts. Indeed, he
does not exhibit any of them, and neither do you. They are empty
argumentation factors, "elements of language without denotation,"
like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I have to
repeat myself). Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of
ghosts without risking being contradicted to better exclude
realities, like every mathematical object.

Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to
recognize "mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex
phanerons if one does not have them, either in one's mind or if
one does not have the capacity to construct them?
"A/t the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as
stated, are insufficient to answer the question that is put.
Accordingly, the first business of the mathematician, often a most
difficult task, is to frame another simpler but quite fictitious
problem (supplemented, perhaps, by some supposition), which shall
be within his powers, while at the same time it is sufficiently
like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill, as a
substitute for it/." (CP 3.559, again)

But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?

Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

_https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
_

Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :

John, List:

JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role
of mathematics in Peirce's philosophy.


On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone
accusing 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

RM: When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look
away?


I honestly do not understand what prompted this question, since I *directly
quoted* the last lines of CP 3.559, and I have previously pointed out that
the entire referenced paragraph is the central passage of my series of
articles about the logic of ingenuity. I also do not understand the rest of
the post that follows, since I have repeatedly acknowledged that
formulating a pure hypothesis falls within the scope of pure mathematics.
It is Peirce himself who describes this as a "quite fictitious problem"
such that the resulting mathematical objects are "pure artifacts," not
realities that are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
Please note again the last quotation that I provided, especially these
sentences to that effect.

CSP: Mathematical reasoning has for its object to ascertain what would be
true in a hypothetical world which the mathematician has created for
himself,--not altogether arbitrarily, it is true, but nevertheless, so that
it can contain no element which he has not himself deliberately introduced
into it. All that his sort of reasoning, therefore, has to do is to develop
a preconceived idea; and it never reaches any conclusion at all as to what
is or is not true of the world of existences. (CP 8.110, c. 1900)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 11:40 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Dear Jon Alan,
>
> When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look away?
>
> "… *Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
> first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
> concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without
> inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and,
> secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis"* 
> (CP
> 3.559)
>
> Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous
> mathematics of which you say that ADT "*explicitly affirms the dependence
> of phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for
> certain principles, including formal deductive logic"* [emphasize mine ],
> are for him pure artifacts. Indeed, he does not exhibit any of them, and
> neither do you. They are empty argumentation factors, "elements of language
> without denotation," like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I
> have to repeat myself). Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of
> ghosts without risking being contradicted to better exclude realities, like
> every mathematical object.
>
> Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to recognize
> "mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex phanerons if one
> does not have them, either in one's mind or if one does not have the
> capacity to construct them?
> "A*t the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are
> insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first
> business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame
> another simpler but quite fictitious problem (supplemented, perhaps, by
> some supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same time
> it is sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill,
> as a substitute for it*." (CP 3.559, again)
>
> But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?
>
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
> Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> a écrit :
>
>> John, List:
>>
>> JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics
>> in Peirce's philosophy.
>>
>>
>> On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone
>> accusing André of hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has
>> completely misunderstood his point. He *explicitly affirms* the
>> dependence of phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on
>> mathematics for certain principles, including formal deductive logic.
>> Nevertheless, he rightly distinguishes *pure *mathematics as the science
>> which draws necessary conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of
>> things from *applied *mathematics as an integral part of every other
>> science, including phaneroscopy. We cannot count on *pure *mathematicians
>> to help figure out what goes on in experience, because they only formulate
>> and explicate a *pure *hypothesis "without inquiring or caring whether
>> it agrees with the actual facts or not" (CP 3.559, 1898).
>>
>> JFS: In the second sentence, the phrase "rest of us", which is intended
>> to exclude mathematicians, is extremely insulting to Peirce and the many
>> mathematicians quoted in ppe.pdf.
>>
>>
>> There is no reason to take this remark by André so personally. As with
>> his hyperbolic statement on slide 23--"The world could s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[robert marty]

Dear Jon Alan,

When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look away?

"… *Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and,
secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis"* (CP
3.559)

Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous
mathematics of which you say that ADT "*explicitly affirms the dependence
of phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for
certain principles, including formal deductive logic"* [emphasize mine ],
are for him pure artifacts. Indeed, he does not exhibit any of them, and
neither do you. They are empty argumentation factors, "elements of language
without denotation," like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I
have to repeat myself). Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of
ghosts without risking being contradicted to better exclude realities, like
every mathematical object.

Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to recognize
"mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex phanerons if one
does not have them, either in one's mind or if one does not have the
capacity to construct them?
"A*t the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are
insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first
business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame
another simpler but quite fictitious problem (supplemented, perhaps, by
some supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same time
it is sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill,
as a substitute for it*." (CP 3.559, again)

But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?

Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> John, List:
>
> JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics in
> Peirce's philosophy.
>
>
> On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone accusing André of
> hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has completely
> misunderstood his point. He *explicitly affirms* the dependence of
> phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for certain
> principles, including formal deductive logic. Nevertheless, he rightly
> distinguishes *pure *mathematics as the science which draws necessary
> conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of things from *applied 
> *mathematics
> as an integral part of every other science, including phaneroscopy. We
> cannot count on *pure *mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
> experience, because they only formulate and explicate a *pure *hypothesis
> "without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or
> not" (CP 3.559, 1898).
>
> JFS: In the second sentence, the phrase "rest of us", which is intended to
> exclude mathematicians, is extremely insulting to Peirce and the many
> mathematicians quoted in ppe.pdf.
>
>
> There is no reason to take this remark by André so personally. As with his
> hyperbolic statement on slide 23--"The world could stop existing, but to
> pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience"--he is clearly
> referring here only to the idealization of someone who *never *inquires
> or cares about actual facts. Peirce was indeed a mathematician, but he was
> not *only *a mathematician, and he was certainly not a *pure *mathematician
> in this extreme sense.
>
> JFS: Diagrams are the form of mathematics where the mathematicians and the
> people who claim they know nothing about mathematics share common ground.
>
>
> I agree--for Peirce, all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning,
> and all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning, so all necessary
> reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning.
>
> CSP: For mathematical reasoning consists in constructing a diagram
> according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between
> parts of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that
> these relations will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this
> conclusion in general terms. All valid necessary reasoning is in fact thus
> diagrammatic. (CP 1.54, c. 1896)
>
> CSP: All necessary reasoning is strictly speaking mathematical reasoning,
> that is to say, it is performed by observing something equivalent to a
> mathematical diagram ... (EP 2:36, 1898)
>
>
> CSP: ... I declare that all necessary reasoning, be it the merest verbiage
> of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of necessity in it, is
> mathematical reasoning. Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic. (CP
> 5.14

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics in
Peirce's philosophy.


On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone accusing André of
hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has completely
misunderstood his point. He *explicitly affirms* the dependence of
phaneroscopy (and every other positive science) on mathematics for certain
principles, including formal deductive logic. Nevertheless, he rightly
distinguishes *pure *mathematics as the science which draws necessary
conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of things from *applied
*mathematics
as an integral part of every other science, including phaneroscopy. We
cannot count on *pure *mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
experience, because they only formulate and explicate a *pure *hypothesis
"without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or
not" (CP 3.559, 1898).

JFS: In the second sentence, the phrase "rest of us", which is intended to
exclude mathematicians, is extremely insulting to Peirce and the many
mathematicians quoted in ppe.pdf.


There is no reason to take this remark by André so personally. As with his
hyperbolic statement on slide 23--"The world could stop existing, but to
pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience"--he is clearly
referring here only to the idealization of someone who *never *inquires or
cares about actual facts. Peirce was indeed a mathematician, but he
was not *only
*a mathematician, and he was certainly not a *pure *mathematician in this
extreme sense.

JFS: Diagrams are the form of mathematics where the mathematicians and the
people who claim they know nothing about mathematics share common ground.


I agree--for Peirce, all necessary reasoning is mathematical reasoning, and
all mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning, so all necessary
reasoning is diagrammatic reasoning.

CSP: For mathematical reasoning consists in constructing a diagram
according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between
parts of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that
these relations will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this
conclusion in general terms. All valid necessary reasoning is in fact thus
diagrammatic. (CP 1.54, c. 1896)

CSP: All necessary reasoning is strictly speaking mathematical reasoning,
that is to say, it is performed by observing something equivalent to a
mathematical diagram ... (EP 2:36, 1898)


CSP: ... I declare that all necessary reasoning, be it the merest verbiage
of the theologians, so far as there is any semblance of necessity in it, is
mathematical reasoning. Now mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic. (CP
5.148, EP 2:106, 1903)


Nevertheless, the distinction between mathematics as a *hypothetical *science
and all the *positive *sciences must be carefully maintained. Accordingly,
I believe that what Peirce says in the following passage about metaphysics
and metaphysicians is equally applicable to phaneroscopy and
phaneroscopists.

CSP: Metaphysicians have always taken mathematics as their exemplar in
reasoning, without remarking the essential difference between that science
and their own. Mathematical reasoning has for its object to ascertain what
would be true in a hypothetical world which the mathematician has created
for himself,--not altogether arbitrarily, it is true, but nevertheless, so
that it can contain no element which he has not himself deliberately
introduced into it. All that his sort of reasoning, therefore, has to do is
to develop a preconceived idea; and it never reaches any conclusion at all
as to what is or is not true of the world of existences. The metaphysician,
on the other hand, is engaged in the investigation of matters of fact, and
the only way to matters of fact is the way of experience. ... It follows,
that deductive, or mathematical, reasoning, although in metaphysics it may
oftener "take the stage" than in the drama of special research, yet after
all, has precisely the same *rôle *to enact, and nothing more. All genuine
advance must come from real observation and inductive reasoning. (CP 8.110,
c. 1900)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 15, 2021 at 11:37 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Robert, List,
>
> I strongly agree with your approach, and I would like to add three
> quotations by Peirce (copied below).  They show that De Tienne has
> misunderstood the role of mathematics in Peirce's philosophy.
>
> But I am not claiming that ADT does not understand Peirce, People were
> doing mathematical thinking for thousands of years before anyone knew they
> were doing mathematics.  What they were doing is diagrammatical reasoning,
> which creative mathematicians, especially Peirce, have always known is the
> foundation for mathematics.
>
> For quotations that emphas

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[John F. Sowa]

Robert, List,

I strongly agree with your approach, and I would
like to add three
quotations by Peirce (copied below).  They show
that De Tienne has
misunderstood the role of mathematics in Peirce's
philosophy.

But I am not claiming that ADT does not understand
Peirce, People were
doing mathematical thinking for thousands of
years before anyone knew
they were doing mathematics.  What they were
doing is diagrammatical
reasoning, which creative mathematicians,
especially Peirce, have
always known is the foundation for
mathematics.

For quotations that emphasize that point, see the
first 10 slides of
a talk I presented at a Peirce session at an APA
meeting in April 2015
and extended for a workshop hosted by Zalamea
in Bogota:  Peirce,
Polya, and Euclid:  Integrating logic,
heuristics, and geometry,
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

In the first sentence of ADT's slide 25 (see the attached file
ADT25.jpg), he belittles Peirce's life's work:  "we cannot count
on
mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
experience."

That is contrary to all three quotations by
CSP.  There are indeed
some mathematicians (pedantic, non-creative
ones) whose guidance would
be unreliable.  But Peirce, Polya, Euclid,
Archimedes, Einstein, and
others quoted in ppe.pdf aren't among
them.

In the second sentence, the phrase "rest of
us", which is intended to
exclude mathematicians, is extremely
insulting to Peirce and the many
mathematicians quoted in ppe.pdf.

In the third sentence, the question "how do we
transition" is answered
by Peirce:  use diagrams!  Diagrams are
the form of mathematics where
the mathematicians and the people who
claim they know nothing about
mathematics share common ground.

John

_

Three quotations by Peirce:

Phaneroscopy... is the science of
the different elementary
constituents of all ideas.  Its material is,
of course, universal
experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful
and the abstract, as
well as of the concrete and real.  Yet to
suppose that in such
experience the elements were to be found already
separate would be to
suppose the unimaginable and
self-contradictory.  They must be
separated by a process of thought
that cannot be summoned up
Hegel-wise on demand.  They must be picked
out of the fragments that
necessary reasonings scatter; and therefore
it is that phaneroscopic
research requires a previous study of
mathematics.  (R602, after 1903
but before 1908)

My
trichotomy is plainly of the family stock of Hegel’s three stages
of
thought, -- an idea that goes back to Kant, and I know not how much
further.  But the arbitrariness of Hegel's procedure, utterly
unavoidable at the time he lived, -- and presumably, in less degree,
unavoidable now, or at any future date, -- is in great measure
avoided
by my taking care never to miss the solid support of
mathematically
exact formal logic beneath my feet  (R318, 1907,
p. 37)

The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or,
for that matter,
to any other department of philosophy), has been
entirely the fruit of
this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth
much more than the
small sum total of the rest of my work, as time
will show.  (CP 5.469, R318, 1907) 





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I think Robert has to provide his purpose for us - because my
interpretation of Robert's outline is different from your
interpretation.

I read Robert's outline - not as referring to 'applied mathematics'
within phaneroscopy, as you do - but as referring to the role of pure
mathematics within the scientific method. And this method includes
pure mathematics. 

That is, I see phase 2 [for want of a better term] as pure
mathematics; then, phase 3, the inductive phase, I wouldn't call it
'applied mathematics' but an examination of the actual viability of
the Posets. 

Edwina
 On Sun 15/08/21  8:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: And notice the difference between this and the outline by De
Tienne, where we are told that 'pure mathematics plays freely with
forms, unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience' but
then, he also says that 'phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through
corrective suggestions, observational clues, theoretical validation'.

 The two outlines are different because they have different purposes.
Robert's post as nicely summarized below primarily aims to describe
what he calls "the chronological order of discovery" within
phaneroscopy, which includes the application of mathematics, while
André's slides seek to distinguish phaneroscopy from pure
mathematics in accordance with Peirce's classification of the
sciences. As the latter states in the four quotations that I provided
Friday (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00168.html [1]),
phaneroscopy draws general regulating principles from mathematics,
while mathematics draws data, instances, special facts, and new
applications from phaneroscopy (as well as the other positive
sciences). Again, it seems like we might have finally landed on some
common ground here.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
 On Sun, Aug 15, 2021 at 9:35 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[4]> wrote:
Robert, list

And here is the scientific method as outlined by Robert - and, in my
view,  Peirce.  It seems different from that outlined by De Tienne.
And I have several questions about these differences. 

Robert's Outline of the Scientific Method: 

1] the abstract observation of phenomena  [this is mere physical and
mental observation of 'facts']

2] the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). --> a Poset

3]the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with
this abstract form, [and testing its validity]

 4]In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms
with all guarantees of universality 
 Notice how embedded this method is in BOTH matter-and-mind; how the
two continuously work together to understand the real world. Notice
how abduction generates an hypothesis and model [poset], which is
then tested within induction, which is then set up as a deductive
premise.

And notice the difference between this and the outline by De Tienne,
where we are told that 'pure mathematics plays freely with forms,
unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience' but then,
he also says that 'phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through
corrective suggestions, observational clues, theoretical validation'.
 [Question: When does this interaction happen?] 

Because he also tells us that we have: 'The Urge to transition out
of mathematics', for 'we cannot count on mathematicians to help
figure out what goes on in experience"and insists on this
irrelevance,  despite mathematics being 'the first' stage of research
'.He writes: ".How do we transition out of it into a concern no longer
detached  from but attached to the conditions sustaining the cosmos,
the world, nature, life in general, our life?" 

A. My first question- is, so what is the point of mathematics if you
have to transition out of it?

B My second question is: What is the definition of Mathematics? De
Tienne seems to redefine mathematics - moving it from what I
understand as an Argument - i.e., an intellectual process in
Thirdness, capable of offering rhematic symbols [those Posets]…..
into a purely detached abstract 'feeling' in a mode of Firstness! 
That is, are 'Posets' or Forms really similar to what I understand as
Qualia? Or are they Rhematic Symbols?  

As Rhematic Symbols, I can see Posets as explaining the Real World.
I don't see how a 'possible' - which to me is Qualia - can explain
the Real World.

That's where I have trouble with the differences between Marty and
De Tienne's outlines. 

Edwina 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: And notice the difference between this and the outline by De Tienne,
where we are told that 'pure mathematics plays freely with forms,
unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience' but then, he
also says that 'phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through corrective
suggestions, observational clues, theoretical validation'.


The two outlines are different because they have different purposes.
Robert's post as nicely summarized below primarily aims to describe what he
calls "the chronological order of discovery" *within *phaneroscopy, which
includes the *application *of mathematics, while André's slides seek to
distinguish phaneroscopy from *pure *mathematics in accordance with
Peirce's classification of the sciences. As the latter states in the four
quotations that I provided Friday (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00168.html),
phaneroscopy draws general regulating principles from mathematics, while
mathematics draws data, instances, special facts, and new applications from
phaneroscopy (as well as the other positive sciences). Again, it seems like
we might have finally landed on some common ground here.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 15, 2021 at 9:35 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Robert, list
>
> And here is the scientific method as outlined by Robert - and, in my view,
>  Peirce.  It seems different from that outlined by De Tienne. And I have
> several questions about these differences.
>
> Robert's Outline of the Scientific Method:
>
> 1] the abstract observation of phenomena  [this is mere physical and
> mental observation of 'facts']
>
> 2]the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
> correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
> mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). --> a Poset
>
> 3]the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with this
> abstract form, [and testing its validity]
>
> 4]In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms with all
> guarantees of universality
>
> Notice how embedded this method is in BOTH matter-and-mind; how the two
> continuously work together to understand the real world. Notice how
> abduction generates an hypothesis and model [poset], which is then tested
> within induction, which is then set up as a deductive premise.
>
> And notice the difference between this and the outline by De Tienne, where
> we are told that 'pure mathematics plays freely with forms, unconcerned
> with whether they play any part in experience' but then, he also says that
> 'phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through corrective suggestions,
> observational clues, theoretical validation'.  [Question: When does this
> interaction happen?]
>
> Because he also tells us that we have: 'The Urge to transition out of
> mathematics', for 'we cannot count on mathematicians to help figure out
> what goes on in experience"and insists on this irrelevance,  despite
> mathematics being 'the first' stage of research '.He writes: ".How do we
> transition out of it into a concern no longer detached  from but attached
> to the conditions sustaining the cosmos, the world, nature, life in
> general, our life?"
>
> A. My first question- is, so what is the point of mathematics if you have
> to transition out of it?
>
> B My second question is: What is the definition of Mathematics? De Tienne
> seems to redefine mathematics - moving it from what I understand as an
> Argument - i.e., an intellectual process in Thirdness, capable of offering
> rhematic symbols [those Posets]….. into a purely detached abstract
> 'feeling' in a mode of Firstness!  That is, are 'Posets' or Forms really
> similar to what I understand as Qualia? Or are they Rhematic Symbols?
>
> As Rhematic Symbols, I can see Posets as explaining the Real World. I
> don't see how a 'possible' - which to me is Qualia - can explain the Real
> World.
>
> That's where I have trouble with the differences between Marty and De
> Tienne's outlines.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I think that we might have finally landed on some common ground here, as I
have no major objections to what is described below as "the *chronological
order* of discovery," especially since the poset (3→2→1) is rightly
described as "a *candidate *to be the 'skeleton-set' of phenomenology"
(emphasis mine). I look forward to seeing what is forthcoming in the
subsequent "parts."

My biggest quibble so far is the ongoing attribution to André De Tienne of
*hostility *towards mathematics and mathematicians, which I believe is a
misreading of his actual stance. I understand his motivation (and that of
this slow read) to be simply calling attention to phaneroscopy as a
distinct practice, such that it is neither overlooked completely nor *conflated
with* mathematics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 15, 2021 at 4:51 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
>
> My initial comment was to salute Jon Alan's message (Peirce-l - Re:
> [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23 - arc (iupui.edu)
> , with a
> single quote from Peirce that I thought particularly adapted to introduce
> the objectivity necessary to understand the current debate started with
> André de Tienne's slow read bellicose towards mathematics and
> mathematicians... I wanted to exploit the general scope, but this finally
> led me to a too-long text, the basis of a future article and/or book
> chapter. So I propose it to the debate in several parts ... a quick read,
> so to speak ... Here is the quote from JAS and then the part (A):
>
>
>
> *"The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the
> universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the
> force of facts. But it finds, at once--I am partially inverting the
> historical order, in order to state the process in its logical order--it
> finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call
> upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find
> Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume
> naturale. But in so far as it does this, the solid ground of fact fails it.
> It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must
> then find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find
> confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon the
> bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground
> seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.*
> (CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898)[emphasize mine]
>
>
>
> Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's Semiotics.
>
> Chronological, logical and sociological aspects.
>
>
> A- the *chronological order* of discovery is:
>
>
>
> 1- the abstract observation of phenomena; it suggests that three
> categories in relation of "involvement" are candidates for a complete
> description of phenomena (this is the work of the "phaneroscopists" with
> Peirce at the forefront, of course)
>
>
>
> 2- the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
> correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
> mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). We find a very simple object
> which fulfils these conditions. It is a candidate to be the "skeleton-set"
> of phenomenology. It is a very simple structure of order called (Poset).
>
>
>
> 3 - the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with this
> abstract form, one verifies in each particular field [such as Experience
> (see Houser), relative predicates, psychology, etc], the relevance and the
> correctness of the abstract observation made in point 1. It is an
> implementation phase which verifies that the formal structure is well
> inscribed in each field of knowledge. This verification is possible thanks
> to the mathematical language provided in point 2, which is stripped of
> substance from the specificities of each of the fields in which the
> abstractions have been made. It is a common language that allows us to
> verify the universality of the first extraction (realized more than a
> century ago by Peirce).
>
>
>
> 4 - In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms with
> all guarantees of universality since they are independent of any real
> existence. As we have a Poset, we can in this (algebraic) category of
> Posets, not only generate new Posets, but also benefit from all the
> possibilities of linking them to other mathematical structures (graphs for
> example). One can then proceed to"natural" (formal) extensions and then
> return to the abstract observations of the "phaneroscopists", starting with
> those of Peirce, in order to "see" (sometimes literally by observing
> various mathematical diagrams: Veen or representations with poin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

And here is the scientific method as outlined by Robert - and, in my
view,  Peirce.  It seems different from that outlined by De Tienne.
And I have several questions about these differences. 

Robert's Outline of the Scientific Method: 

1] the abstract observation of phenomena  [this is mere physical and
mental observation of 'facts']

2]the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). --> a Poset

3]the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with
this abstract form, [and testing its validity]

4]In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms
with all guarantees of universality 
 Notice how embedded this method is in BOTH matter-and-mind; how the
two continuously work together to understand the real world. Notice
how abduction generates an hypothesis and model [poset], which is
then tested within induction, which is then set up as a deductive
premise.

And notice the difference between this and the outline by De Tienne,
where we are told that 'pure mathematics plays freely with forms,
unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience' but then,
he also says that 'phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through
corrective suggestions, observational clues, theoretical validation'.
 [Question: When does this interaction happen?]

Because he also tells us that we have: 'The Urge to transition out
of mathematics', for 'we cannot count on mathematicians to help
figure out what goes on in experience"and insists on this
irrelevance,  despite mathematics being 'the first' stage of research
'.He writes: ".How do we transition out of it into a concern no longer
detached  from but attached to the conditions sustaining the cosmos,
the world, nature, life in general, our life?"

A. My first question- is, so what is the point of mathematics if you
have to transition out of it?

B My second question is: What is the definition of Mathematics? De
Tienne seems to redefine mathematics - moving it from what I
understand as an Argument - i.e., an intellectual process in
Thirdness, capable of offering rhematic symbols [those Posets]…..
into a purely detached abstract 'feeling' in a mode of Firstness! 
That is, are 'Posets' or Forms really similar to what I understand as
Qualia? Or are they Rhematic Symbols? 

As Rhematic Symbols, I can see Posets as explaining the Real World.
I don't see how a 'possible' - which to me is Qualia - can explain
the Real World.

That's where I have trouble with the differences between Marty and
De Tienne's outlines. 

Edwina
 On Sun 15/08/21  5:50 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
 List,
My initial comment was to salute Jon Alan's message (Peirce-l - Re:
[PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23 - arc (iupui.edu),
with a single quote from Peirce that I thought particularly adapted to
introduce the objectivity necessary to understand the current debate
started with André de Tienne's slow read bellicose towards
mathematics and mathematicians... I wanted to exploit the general
scope, but this finally led me to a too-long text, the basis of a
future article and/or book chapter. So I propose it to the debate in
several parts ... a quick read, so to speak ... Here is the quote
from JAS and then the part (A): 
"The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the
universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to
the force of facts. But it finds, at once--I am partially inverting
the historical order, in order to state the process in its logical
order--it finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in
desperation to call upon its inward sympathy with nature, its
instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn of modern
science making his appeal to il lume naturale. But in so far as it
does this, the solid ground of fact fails it. It feels from that
moment that its position is only provisional. It must then find
confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find
confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon
the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this
ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins
to give way. (CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898)[emphasize mine] 
Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's Semiotics. 

Chronological, logical and sociological aspects.  
A - the chronological order of discovery is: 
1- the abstract observation of phenomena; it suggests that three
categories in relation of "involvement" are candidates for a complete
description of phenomena (this is the work of the "phaneroscopists"
with Peirce at the forefront, of course) 
 

[PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[robert marty]

List,

My initial comment was to salute Jon Alan's message (Peirce-l - Re:
[PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23 - arc (iupui.edu)
, with a
single quote from Peirce that I thought particularly adapted to introduce
the objectivity necessary to understand the current debate started with
André de Tienne's slow read bellicose towards mathematics and
mathematicians... I wanted to exploit the general scope, but this finally
led me to a too-long text, the basis of a future article and/or book
chapter. So I propose it to the debate in several parts ... a quick read,
so to speak ... Here is the quote from JAS and then the part (A):



*"The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the
universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the
force of facts. But it finds, at once--I am partially inverting the
historical order, in order to state the process in its logical order--it
finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call
upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find
Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume
naturale. But in so far as it does this, the solid ground of fact fails it.
It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must
then find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find
confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon the
bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground
seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.*
(CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898)[emphasize mine]



Modeling in Humanities: the case of Peirce's Semiotics.

Chronological, logical and sociological aspects.


A- the *chronological order* of discovery is:



1- the abstract observation of phenomena; it suggests that three categories
in relation of "involvement" are candidates for a complete description of
phenomena (this is the work of the "phaneroscopists" with Peirce at the
forefront, of course)



2- the search in the mathematical repository for an object in strict
correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) with these observations (otherwise
mathematicians can create new ad-hoc objects). We find a very simple object
which fulfils these conditions. It is a candidate to be the "skeleton-set"
of phenomenology. It is a very simple structure of order called (Poset).



3 - the inductive phase: by going back to the phenomena provided with this
abstract form, one verifies in each particular field [such as Experience
(see Houser), relative predicates, psychology, etc], the relevance and the
correctness of the abstract observation made in point 1. It is an
implementation phase which verifies that the formal structure is well
inscribed in each field of knowledge. This verification is possible thanks
to the mathematical language provided in point 2, which is stripped of
substance from the specificities of each of the fields in which the
abstractions have been made. It is a common language that allows us to
verify the universality of the first extraction (realized more than a
century ago by Peirce).



4 - In the purely mathematical field, we can now generate new forms with
all guarantees of universality since they are independent of any real
existence. As we have a Poset, we can in this (algebraic) category of
Posets, not only generate new Posets, but also benefit from all the
possibilities of linking them to other mathematical structures (graphs for
example). One can then proceed to"natural" (formal) extensions and then
return to the abstract observations of the "phaneroscopists", starting with
those of Peirce, in order to "see" (sometimes literally by observing
various mathematical diagrams: Veen or representations with points and
arrows) if there is the possibility of finding other skeleton-sets which
would be endowed with the same utility and the same universality. This is
notably the case for the 10 classes of signs, which are not only generated
but are also naturally classified in a particular structure of Poset called
Lattice. Peirce did not have this structure at his disposal, since it only
really became established in the mathematical field in 1940 (Birkhoff).
However, he had the intuition of it by identifying "affinities" (CP 2.264)
between classes, thanks to which he traced diagrams which it is easy to
show that they are inscriptions of the mathematical lattice in Peirce's
semiotic theory.One can easily spend time on the hexadic signs and discover
that this is not possible for the decadic sign as long as new observations
have not shown how to classify the four new trichotomies with relations of
determination.





Everyone will realize that this chronological order is the one I have
personally followed. But I used the "on" and not the "I", because I claim
without fear of being contradicted, that any other mathematician,
connoisseur of Peirce's