Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
> depends upon what we mean by the terms.
> 
> Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of 
> possibilities until about 1896.

I confess it’s been so long that I had to check my notes. I know that the 
Monist article of 1897 refers to his nominalistic view of possibility the prior 
year. Although Short dates the change to a year earlier on the basis of 1.420. 
It’s after then that every sign has an interpretant but allows it to be 
possible. This then changes signs to the possibility of being interpreted 
rather than being interpreted. (Which seems relevant for Edwina’s points)

Even though Peirce’s realism about modalism isn’t until the mid 1890’s, he was 
a realist about generals before then. The key move in the 1890’s is to relate 
modalism with generals.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40321020?seq=1

I’m trying to understand Edwina’s objections and I think it’s to the 
actual/potential distinction. (Please correct me if I’m wrong Edwina)  Most 
platonists treat both as real (and often even treat possibilities as more real) 
but I think Edwina rejects modal realism. 

I confess it’s due to Peirce’s view on modalism prior to his mature phase that 
keeps me primarily reading his later works. That said I think the ground work 
and elements of his later modal realism is within his earlier work. It’s 
honestly surprising it took so long for him to change on that point. After all 
his account of truth seems to lead logically to modal realism.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts?

Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After 
all there are numbers that have never been formally thought yet it’s pretty 
common today to think them real. Even Quine says that so long as you can 
quantify over it then it’s real. So were fractional numbers real say 50,000 
years ago? I’d say yes simply because they could *potentially* be embedded. 
That is their reality isn’t due to their embeddedness but their potential 
embeddedness.

> My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.

Ah, sorry. I assumed it was. (Mine is actually physics but I minored in 
philosophy in school and philosophy was easier to keep up with than physics 
once I left formal academics)

> I don't have 6.612 in my collection.  Those few pages are missing!

https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf

The passage is primarily about the existence of chance and explanations. It’s a 
fantastic if long passage dealing with a lot of Peirce’s foundational ontology 
including the relationship of consciousness to chance (swerve). He also makes a 
fascinating argument against the conservation of energy. (With no reference to 
Noether although she didn’t publish her theorem until 1918 so that makes sense)

> And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or 
> whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, 
> as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do 
> so - within the semiosic triad.

I don’t recall how Peirce deals with time on this matter. Typically the way 
this is dealt with (and this goes back to antiquity) is to say there is a 
logical order and not a temporal order. So emanations within Platonism are 
logical emanations not a temporal creation. While he doesn’t really formally 
discuss this, I’d say 6.12-6.18 is also primarily a discussion of logical order 
and not temporal cosmology. I’d add it’s worth reading on where Peirce 
discusses Being and Nothingness.

> Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of 
> 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the 
> womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by 
> the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle 
> of habit there would have been a second flash
>  
> Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was 
> real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, 
> therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere 
> indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.  
> 

I think Peirce would agree with that. But then so too would the platonists I’m 
familiar with. Peirce says in 6.612 "I go back to a chaos so irregular that in 
strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of 
being…” 

> The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have 
> nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy.  And Firstness 
> cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy’.

Well I was with you up until you said they “have nothing to do with the 
pre-matter/mind state-of-indeterminacy.” I think they have lot to do with it. 
But they aren’t the same thing. Firstness is a type of indeterminacy but it is 
not the same indeterminacy as the earlier nothing.

Equally hasty is his oft-repeated objection that my absolute chance is 
something ultimate and inexplicable. I go back to a chaos so irregular that in 
strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of 
being; and here I reach a region in which the objection to ultimate causes 
loses its force. But I do not stop there. Even this nothingness, though it 
antecedes the infinitely distant absolute beginning of time, is traced back to 
a nothingness more rudimentary still, in which there is no variety, but only an 
indefinite specificability, which is nothing but a tendency to the 
diversification of the nothing, while leaving it as nothing as it was before. 
What objectionable ultimacy is here? The objection to an ultimate consists in 
its raising a barrier across the path of inquiry, in its specifying a 
phenomenon at which questions must stop, contrary to the postulate, or hope, of 
logic. But what question to which any meaning can be attached am I forbidding 
by my absolute chance? If what is demanded is a theological backing, or 
rational antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is 
a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, 
it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded 
into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in
a mode of Firstness] that are never actualized ... Firstness, as a 'set' of
categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - *when
operational within a triadic morphology* ... The same with Thirdness ... it
functions only within the triad.


Thank you for clarifying this.  However, similar to Clark's comments
earlier, I do not fully understand what you mean by "operational," "triadic
morphology," and "functions" in this context.  As far as I know, Peirce did
not use any of these particular terms as qualifiers when affirming the
reality of Firstness (possibility, qualities) and Thirdness (generality,
habits).  I suspect that we still have a disconnect over Peirce's careful
distinction between reality (all three categories) and existence
(Secondness only).

Furthermore, there are many passages where he discusses the
categories--including the reality of all three--without saying much (if
anything) about signs or "the triad."  For example, this is true of most of
the cosmological/cosmogonic texts, which were the initial jumping-off point
for this thread.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon - list
>
> First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as
> 'unlike Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something
> like: 'My reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce
> as ...
>
> No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities  [i.e. in a
> mode of Firstness]  that are never actualized. I do NOT think that
> Firstness only exists *when a single possibility is actualized. *Firstness,
> as a 'set' of categorical possibilities is real - all of those
> possibilities - *when operational within a triadic morphology*. After all
> - the very essence of a possibility is that it is NOT particularized but
> remains unarticulated but possible. However, I consider that this
> 'state' of Firstness is operational only within the triad.
>
> The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness
> operational outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a
> basic category, does indeed provide continuity within the morphological
> articulation of specific Signs, but it isn't *in itself* prior to and
> underlying actuality. Again, it is a mode of organization that provides
> habits-of-continuity, generalizations...that mediate and form specific
> triadic Signs. BUT - it functions only within the triad.
>
> I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that
> the categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the
> Triadic Sign. You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].
>
>
> I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I
> essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that
> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike
> Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never
> actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects,
> a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as
> represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of
> which emerged this universe of actual existence.  Or have I misunderstood
> you all along?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Clark, Jon, list:
>>
>> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
>> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
>> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
>> within the particular.
>>
>> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
>> non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures
>> [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete
>> separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist
>> names'  but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within
>> a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*].
>> And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, Edwina, List:

CG:  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a
lot depends upon what we mean by the terms.


Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality
of possibilities until about 1896.

ET:   And Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'.


But that is precisely one of Peirce's definitions--just a few paragraphs
before CP 1.412!

CSP:  Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and hæcceity, or pure
secondness, are facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. (CP
1.405, EP 2.475; 1887-1888)


Elsewhere he noted that both Firstness and Thirdness are forms of
indeterminacy, because only Secondness is fully determinate.  Firstness is
vague, and thus not subject to the law of contradiction; while Thirdness is
general, and thus not subject to the law of excluded middle (CP 5.505).
Secondness, by contrast, is subject to both.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Clark, list
> My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.
>
> Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within
> matter/concepts?
>
> I don't have 6.612 in my collection.  Those few pages are missing!
>
> And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or
> whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The
> categories, as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of
> Matter-Mind and do so - within the semiosic triad.
>
> Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state
> of 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of
> the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come
> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then
> by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash
>
> Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or
> 'was real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original
> chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of
> mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.
>
> The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have
> nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy.  And
> Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy'.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
> with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
> least after about 1896.
>
> I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot
> depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the
> disagreement.  (see below)
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>
>
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
> within the particular.
>
> Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would
> necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in
> both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived
> of intellectual objects.
>
> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
> non-embedded reality.
>
> I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to
> something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with
> instead of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call
> the triadic sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.
>
> ...they do not function outside of their being embedded *within a triadic
> Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triad

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - list

First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as 'unlike 
Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something like: 'My 
reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce as ...

No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities  [i.e. in a mode 
of Firstness]  that are never actualized. I do NOT think that Firstness only 
exists when a single possibility is actualized. Firstness, as a 'set' of 
categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - when 
operational within a triadic morphology. After all - the very essence of a 
possibility is that it is NOT particularized but remains unarticulated but 
possible. However, I consider that this 'state' of Firstness is operational 
only within the triad.

The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness operational 
outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a basic category, 
does indeed provide continuity within the morphological articulation of 
specific Signs, but it isn't in itself prior to and underlying actuality. 
Again, it is a mode of organization that provides habits-of-continuity, 
generalizations...that mediate and form specific triadic Signs. BUT - it 
functions only within the triad.

I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that the 
categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the Triadic Sign. 
You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way.

Edwina






  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Edwina, List:


ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].


  I did not say within Secondness, I said with Secondness; and I essentially 
meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike Peirce, you deny 
that there are real possibilities that are never actualized, real qualities 
that are not instantiated in any actual objects, a real continuum that is prior 
to and underlies all actuality as represented by the blackboard, and real 
Platonic worlds out of only one of which emerged this universe of actual 
existence.  Or have I misunderstood you all along?


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Clark, Jon, list:

Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.

Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures 
[Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete separation 
and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist names'  but 
they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign. 
[Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree that 
Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e., 
not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they 
have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded 
within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of 
Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Clark, List: 


CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he 
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of 
the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


  Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:

I’ve changed the subject 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].


I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I
essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that
Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality."  Unlike
Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never
actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects,
a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as
represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of
which emerged this universe of actual existence.  Or have I misunderstood
you all along?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Clark, Jon, list:
>
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be
> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics.
> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded
> within the particular.
>
> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
> non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures
> [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete
> separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist
> names'  but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within
> a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*].
> And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that
> generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again,
> that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as
> real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have
> such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the
> triadic format that is vital.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
>
> Clark, List:
>
> CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he
> admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side
> of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.
>
>
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
> with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
> least after about 1896.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>
>> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
>>
>> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
>> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
>> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
>> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>>  matter and mind; causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as
>> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>>
>> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and
>> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that
>> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main
>> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were
>> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the
>> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed
>> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me
>> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism.
>>
>> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by
>> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to num

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, list
My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong.

Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts?

I don't have 6.612 in my collection.  Those few pages are missing!

And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or whatever 
term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, as I 
understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do so - 
within the semiosic triad. 

Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of 
'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the 
womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the 
principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of 
habit there would have been a second flash

Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was 
real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, 
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere 
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411.  

The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have nothing 
to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy.  And Firstness cannot be 
defined as 'indeterminacy'.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:05 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism




On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:


Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the 
disagreement.  (see below)




On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:



Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.


  Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would 
necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in 
both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of 
intellectual objects. 


Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality.


  I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to 
something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead 
of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic 
sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.


...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic 
Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree 
that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', 
i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean 
that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as 
embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a 
mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.


  I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong 
parallels. 


  My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic 
here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to 
earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which 
firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the 
firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think 
the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them 
again before giving a firm opinion)





--



  -
  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that 
> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and 
> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation 
> with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket 
> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an 
> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with 
> Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at least 
> after about 1896.

I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the 
disagreement.  (see below)


> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
> Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
> difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
> particular.

Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would 
necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in 
both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of 
intellectual objects. 

> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
> non-embedded reality.

I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to 
something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead 
of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic 
sign as being ‘matter’ as it were.

> ...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic 
> Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I 
> agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 
> 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to 
> me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational 
> only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign 
> totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is 
> vital.

I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong 
parallels. 

My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic here 
so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to earlier in 
1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which firstness 
“occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the firstness 
there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think the texts 
could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them again before 
giving a firm opinion)

 
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark, Jon, list:

Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a 
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The 
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the 
particular.

Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have 
non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures 
[Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete separation 
and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist names'  but 
they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign. 
[Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].And, I agree that 
Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e., 
not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they 
have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded 
within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of 
Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism


  Clark, List:


CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he 
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of 
the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


  Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My 
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she 
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness 
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with 
Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as 
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore 
not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he 
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
  On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:
  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:
  As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I 
find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle 
vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very 
convincing.
I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and 
embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that 
particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main 
neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were 
they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the oversized 
role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed from Plato you 
said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me neoPlatonism is a 
subset of Platonism.


As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by that. 
After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as 
Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as it 
informs.


It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits 
generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the 
nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was 
important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we 
quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating 
nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic 
emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas in 
late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a 
stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. 


I rather like Smyth’s arguments in Reading Peirce Reading where he notes 
several neoplatonic parallels. 


  If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is 
understandable enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined 
logicians, it remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and 
why Peirce should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic 
tradition. I propose to explore this subject by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

CG:  It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side
of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.


Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions.  My
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that
she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and
Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation
with Secondness (actualities, facts).  In fact, her usual blanket
rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an
Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist.  On the other hand, I agree
with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at
least after about 1896.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>  matter and mind; causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as
> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>
> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and
> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that
> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main
> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were
> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the
> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed
> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me
> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism.
>
> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by
> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as
> Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as
> it informs.
>
> It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits
> generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the
> nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was
> important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we
> quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating
> nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic
> emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas
> in late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a
> stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection.
>
> I rather like Smyth’s arguments in *Reading Peirce Reading* where he
> notes several neoplatonic parallels.
>
> If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is understandable
> enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined logicians, it
> remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and why Peirce
> should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition. I
> propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures that will
> subsequently be seen to have a bearing on his argument in "Faculties." The
> nine are grouped in three sets, each of which deals with an aspect of our
> scientific knowledge. The first set concerns the ontology of knowledg
> itself; the second concerns the subjects of knowledge-the 'I' or the 'v of
> 'I know' or 'we know' (when these expressions are used in the conte of
> scientific inquiry); and the third set of leading ideas concerns the
> objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will become clear in connection
> with the first set why it is important to distinguish generic Platonic
> Neoplatonism.  (57)
>
> I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering.
>
> None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from
> it. But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought.
>
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
> earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
> left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
> writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
> explain and does not even attempt to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

[Clark Goble]

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
> 
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find 
> Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle vs 
> Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
> ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
> causality; so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very 
> convincing.

I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and 
embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that 
particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main 
neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were 
they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the oversized 
role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed from Plato you 
said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me neoPlatonism is a 
subset of Platonism.

As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by that. 
After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as 
Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as it 
informs.

It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits 
generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the 
nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was 
important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we 
quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating 
nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic 
emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas in 
late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a 
stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. 

I rather like Smyth’s arguments in Reading Peirce Reading where he notes 
several neoplatonic parallels. 

If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is understandable 
enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined logicians, it remains 
unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and why Peirce should be 
attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition. I propose to 
explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures that will subsequently be 
seen to have a bearing on his argument in "Faculties." The nine are grouped in 
three sets, each of which deals with an aspect of our scientific knowledge. The 
first set concerns the ontology of knowledg itself; the second concerns the 
subjects of knowledge-the 'I' or the 'v of 'I know' or 'we know' (when these 
expressions are used in the conte of scientific inquiry); and the third set of 
leading ideas concerns the objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will 
become clear in connection with the first set why it is important to 
distinguish generic Platonic Neoplatonism.  (57) 

I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering.

None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from it. 
But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought.

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued that 
> Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not contradict his earlier 
> ones; rather, they clarify some details that he had previously left vague.  
> By contrast, Edwina seems to reject the later writings--especially "A 
> Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot explain and does not even 
> attempt to explain--as incompatible with the earlier ones, which she favors.  
> She also seems to bristle at any suggestion that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist 
> in any sense whatsoever.  Of course, these are my impressions of her 
> positions, and I hope that they are accurate; if not, I would welcome her 
> correction/clarification.

I confess I missed a week of the list when it was particularly active. I mean 
to go back and read those posts. So forgive me if I assign things incorrectly.

As I’ve said I’m not sure what ultimately to make of the NA either beyond it 
being an excellent way to understand abduction.

I do think Peirce is very nePlatonic in certain ways though. Again Kelly Parker 
and Richard Smyth are worth reading here. For a while Smyths book was available 
for free as a PDF but it appears that now it’s only for sale as hardcover or 
paperback — I have the paperback version along with the PDF if people need 
excerpts.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go