Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments --"The union of the units unites the unity"

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

The issue of the meaning of the term "representamen" is critical from a wider 
perspective.

In the 1860's, CSP formed the triad:

Thing - representation - form.  (W1:257, see also W1:472-473)

Thus, mental forms can be a consequence of the choice of representations of the 
antecedent "things".

As a mathematician / chemist, it is probable that CSP considered not only 
symbols of the alphabet as representations of things (nouns, proper names) but 
also mathematical representations of things, (physical intensities of 
attributes as variables) as well as chemical structural formula and their forms.

By introducing the term "representamen" CSP's glides into the singular (later 
as sin-sign) without specifying which symbol system the thing is being 
represented in.  

Today, more than a century later, as a consequence of further inquiries, 
mathematics, physics, chemistry and genetics use distinctive units of 
representations and different semantic meanings for one and the same "thing."  
These are known as "notations" in the scientific community and are essential to 
the specification of scientific thought. (These notational differences seem to 
perplexify many philosophers and many scientists as well.  They are fact of 
life, live with it!)

I addressed the logical coherence intrinsic to multiple symbolic representamen 
earlier with the highly abstract metaphysical assertion: 

"The union of the units unites the unity"   (see  W1:472-473 for hints of 
origins of meaning)

which is expressed, roughly speaking, in terms of utterances but refer to any 
system of units and any system of inferences, that deductive, synductive, 
inductive, abductive, ...   such that the "union" of symbols forms a species, a 
unity.

Cheers

jerry



 

On Nov 25, 2015, at 8:33 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> Edwina,
>  
> Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen 
> is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce 
> is saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a 
> correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a 
> “triad” or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and 
> a Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce 
> quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please 
> stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as 
> Peirce’s.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
> 
> Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it, on 
> its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is analyzing 
> the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen without a 
> 'mental process'.  …
>  
> Edwina
> - Original Message -
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca
>  
> Frances, Edwina, list,
>  
> Just to straighten out the terminology here …
> For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
> “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be 
> representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to 
> say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:
>  
> CP 2.242, EP2:290:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
> relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible 
> Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the 
> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same 
> triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A 
> Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. 
> Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied.
>  
> CP2:274, EP2:273:  A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. 
> Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a 
> sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully 
> capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in 
> precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same 
> reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. 
> Butthought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark - see my comments below - and Happy Thanksgiving.
- Original Message - 
From: "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>

To: "PEIRCE-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 5:35 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


A few comments then I’ll have to go silent for a while - I’m hoping others 
chime in on my questions although perhaps they are just unanswerable with 
Peirce’s corpus.



On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

1) EDWINA:>  'Pure feeling' isn't simply the sign/Representamen in a mode of 
Firstness. It would be the FULL triad - Object-Representamen-Interpretant in 
a mode of Firstness.


CLARK:I think some disagree with your terminology here. I’ll leave that 
issue alone and simply say pure feeling in this sense is consciousness and 
consciousness is a type of thirdness if I have Peirce right. However as I 
said I don’t think he consistently used the terms “pure feeling” or 
“consciousness.” So interpreting him requires context to any particular 
quote.


EDWINA: Actually, no, pure feeling is not the same as being conscious of 
that feeling. A pure feeling is, in a sense, 'pre-conscious'. It is only 
when one moves into a phase of 'otherness' to that sensation that one is 
conscious of the sensation. Thirdness is not simply consciousness and in 
many cases, Thirdness has nothing to do with consciousness. A plant, 
operating within its organization mode (Thirdness) is not conscious of this 
operation.


2) EDWINA> Yes, habit-taking and generalization defines the category of 
Thirdness. When you refer to Thirdness in a mode of Firstness this refers 
only to the category of Thirdness, which has three modes: pure and two 
generate modes. [3-3, 3-2, 3-1]


 Yes, Pure Feeling, which has ALL THREE relations 
(Object-Representamen-Interpretant] in a mode of Firstness is not similar 
to Thirdness in a mode of Firstness. Again, the categories are not the 
same as the triad (O-R-I).


CLARK: Could you perhaps make your terminology a bit clearer here? You 
earlier said that by mode you mean category and use the terms synonymously.


EDWINA: Yes, to me, 'mode' and 'category' are the same.

3) CLARK: I’m confused as to how you are terminologically distinguishing 
between “three relations” and thirdness in your statement above. I don’t 
want to comment until I’m sure what you mean. You’re shifting between sign, 
representamen, thirdness, and “all three relations” in a fashion that I 
confess confuse me a little. Ignore the debate about Peirce and his 
terminology. I’d just like you to define these in your own understanding so 
I can understand.


EDWINA: 'Thirdness' is the categorical mode. A Relation - for instance, that 
between the Representamen and the Object, can be in a mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. Or the Relation of the Representamen-in-itself, can 
be in any of the three categorical modes. And, the Relation between the 
Representamen and the Interpretant can be in any of the three categorical 
modes. Check out 2.256 and 8.335, 8,337.



I’ll confess I don’t find the terminological debate that interesting except 
to the degree it relates to the exegesis of certain passages. I’m more just 
hoping to be sure I understand your philosophical content which is the only 
reason I ask. I’m more than willing to use whatever terminology a person 
wants for discussion.


When we see something Other than ourselves - it is, as Peirce says, 
'matter'. But when we are aware of it, in our mind, we are 'conscious' of 
it.


Hmm. I’m not quite sure that works. I’ll have to think about it more. For 
one I think Peirce distinguishes between mind and matter more than that. 
Part of the problem is that of course English is quite equivocal with the 
terms mind and consciousness. Even in philosophy of mind it seems they get 
used a lot of different and incompatible ways. Since apparently under the 
influence of James even Peirce moved away from “consciousness” in his latter 
years it might be useful to translate to some other terminology. Of course 
figuring it out seems difficult.


I admit my preference, however error bound it might be, is to think of 
consciousness as the inner part of chance or swerve. This avoids 
unfortunately the issue of how Peirce related chance and probability. I’ve 
looked but haven’t found him discussing that issue clearly. (Admittedly I’ve 
not looked that hard)


This seems an issue in contemporary philosophy of freedom. In the 
contemporary debates libertarian free will is usually taken to be other than 
determinism or chance with the latter meaning random in some formal sense 
along a frequentist interpretation. Of course for any particular event it’s 
impossible by its nature of distinguish choice from chance. At best we can 
look at general repeated phenomena and the distribution of the frequency of 
types of events. Figuring out how or eve

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 25, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> 
> Is it possible that, by "habit", Peirce was trying to "philosophize" (or 
> abstract the 'thirdness" out of) the phenomenon of biological evolution know 
> to the late 19th century ?

He’s definitely influenced by Darwinian ideas although also Hegelian idealism. 
(Even though through his earlier periods he seems rather negatively inclined 
towards Hegel although he has a much more Hegelian feel in his mature phase) I 
think Habit owes a lot to both movements in broad terms.

> It seems to me that this statement would be true for those experiences of 
> ours that can be represented symbolically (e.g., poems), indexically (e.g., 
> music), or iconically (e.g., mimicry), but not all our experiences may be so 
> representable.  Sometimes "silence" can represent our feelings  more truly 
> than any representation.
> 
> As I remember, Peiice said somewhere, in  agree with Clark, that every 
> phenomenon, X, has three fundamental aspects that Peirce refer to as Fistness 
> (1ns, to use Gary's notation), Secondness, and Thirdness.  So if X = 
> "feeling", then the following inferences may be drawn:

That’s what the quotes from Ben were supposed to be getting at. The problem is 
as Ben in that post noted the word “of” gets quite a workout. At a certain 
point it’s hard to keep track what’s actually going on.

I suspect I’ll take a few days off from thinking about all this to enjoy the 
turkey and then come back to it. I think what the real questions are about end 
up being about the basic ontology/cosmology as Peirce conceives it. Of course 
Peirce’s more neoplatonic cosmology not to mention his pantheism, panentheism, 
panpsychism, or however one wants to call its aspects are pretty controversial. 
Even if one is attracted to them because of the fruitfulness of his semiotics 
in other areas, I’m not sure his arguments are necessarily terribly convincing. 
I don’t know how others feel there.

As interesting as basic ontology is, one quickly runs into terminological 
questions and problems of how on earth one argues for such things. Especially 
if one isn’t a Rationalist. Even Peirce’s neglected argument for God only gets 
one so far and is a fairly weak argument. (Admittedly stronger than most 
theistic arguments in my opinion) Yet that argument still gets us little about 
fundamental ontology/cosmology.




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Edwina, lists,

You wrote:

". . . from what I can tell habits are just habits - a common term he
applies to both the regular  (112515-1)
phenomena of everyday life as well as fundamental ontology. If you’re aware
of a place where
he makes a clear distinction in his use of the term I’d be very interested.
I admittedly didn’t do
a thorough search but my preliminary search found nothing. Rather I think
he sees this as
phenomena that applies at all levels of existence. Which is why he uses the
same term. . . . "

Can "habits" be one of those "simple concepts applicable to every subject"
that Peirce was after ?

“*The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy
like *






*that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive
that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in
philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in
physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other
department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details.
The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every
subject.*“ [1]



If so, to find out what Peirce really meant by "habits", it may be helpful
to first find out what examples may

be out there of the "simple concepts applicable to every subject".  If we
refer to such concepts as
Peirce's simple concepts (PSC), the following items may qualify as examples
of PSC:


(1) yin-yang opposites (or complementarity)
(112515-2)

(2) ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
(3) sign
(3) waves

(4) information

(5) entropy

(6) energy

(7) gravity

(8) Fourier theorem

(9) habits

(10) chance

(11) continuity
(12) discontinuity
(13) Planckian distributions [2]

.

.

.


If we can apply the yin-yang doctrine itself to the PSC list, we can
anticipate that all of the concepts listed in it are not only "simple" when
viewed in one way but also "complex" when viewed in another, just as a
forest looks simple from far up in the sky but looks complex when looked at
a close distance whence one can observe all the detailed morphology of
trees and the messiness surrounding them.


Think of the concept of "gravity" that Newton discovered upon watching an
apple fall from a tree (which embodies ITR in my opinion; see h in Figure 1
below) and compare it with Einstein's general relativity which he
discovered while watching a man falling from a roof (which also embody ITR;
see f and g in in Figure 1).  Newton's "gravity" is a simple concept that
even elementary school children can understand: Apples do fall.  But it
also has a complex aspect that requires for its complete description the
use of the mathematical languages of tensor algebra and Riemann geometry.


   f g

 Matter  --->  Spacetime > Motion

  |
^
  |
 |
  |_|
h


Figure 1.  The postulate that "gravity" embodies an ITR (Irreducible
Triadic Relation).

 f = "matter tells spacetime how to curve" [3, 4] ; g =
"curved spacetime tells matter how to move" [3, 4];

 h = "matter in part controls or determines its own motion"
(my comment).



Another example of PSC, I suggest, is PDE (the Planckian Distribution
equation) that applies GLOBALLY to most, if not all, long-tailed histograms
generated from a wide range of disciplines including


(1) atomic physics (i.e., blackbody radiation spectra),

(2) protein folding,

(3) single-molecule enzyme catalysis,

(4) gene expression,

(5) protein size frequency distributions in cells,

(6) mRNA metabolism in whole cells,

(7) mRNA metabolism in human breast tissues,

(8) fMRI from the human brain,

(9) human speech,

(10) musical tones (to be published),

(11) linguistic texts,

(12) decision making in both human and animals,

(13) econometrics, and
(14) polarized cosmic microwave background radiation [2].


As you can see PDE is simple when applied to GLOBAL features of the
biophysical, biomedical, economic, linguistic and cosmological processes as
summarized in the form of long tail histograms, but the mathematical
equation describing the local features of these processes are most likely
very complex.  For example, the mathematical equation that applies LOCALLY
to the blackbody radiation spectra took decades of intense work to be
derived by many scientists (including 3 Nobel Laureates) in the latter part
of the 129th century [5].


Based o these observations, I am inclined to suggest the following
generalization:


"The Simple Concepts of Peirce are simple when viewed globally
(112515-3)
but complex when viewed locally."


I am hopeful that Statement (112515-3) will be helpful in clarifying the
debates currently on-going about the nature of "habits" that play such a
basic role in Peircean 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

A few comments then I’ll have to go silent for a while - I’m hoping others 
chime in on my questions although perhaps they are just unanswerable with 
Peirce’s corpus.

> On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
>  'Pure feeling' isn't simply the sign/Representamen in a mode of Firstness. 
> It would be the FULL triad - Object-Representamen-Interpretant in a mode of 
> Firstness.

I think some disagree with your terminology here. I’ll leave that issue alone 
and simply say pure feeling in this sense is consciousness and consciousness is 
a type of thirdness if I have Peirce right. However as I said I don’t think he 
consistently used the terms “pure feeling” or “consciousness.” So interpreting 
him requires context to any particular quote.

> Yes, habit-taking and generalization defines the category of Thirdness. When 
> you refer to Thirdness in a mode of Firstness this refers only to the 
> category of Thirdness, which has three modes: pure and two generate modes. 
> [3-3, 3-2, 3-1]
>  
>  Yes, Pure Feeling, which has ALL THREE relations 
> (Object-Representamen-Interpretant] in a mode of Firstness is not similar to 
> Thirdness in a mode of Firstness. Again, the categories are not the same as 
> the triad (O-R-I).

Could you perhaps make your terminology a bit clearer here? You earlier said 
that by mode you mean category and use the terms synonymously. 

I’m confused as to how you are terminologically distinguishing between “three 
relations” and thirdness in your statement above. I don’t want to comment until 
I’m sure what you mean. You’re shifting between sign, representamen, thirdness, 
and “all three relations” in a fashion that I confess confuse me a little. 
Ignore the debate about Peirce and his terminology. I’d just like you to define 
these in your own understanding so I can understand.

I’ll confess I don’t find the terminological debate that interesting except to 
the degree it relates to the exegesis of certain passages. I’m more just hoping 
to be sure I understand your philosophical content which is the only reason I 
ask. I’m more than willing to use whatever terminology a person wants for 
discussion.

> When we see something Other than ourselves - it is, as Peirce says, 'matter'. 
> But when we are aware of it, in our mind, we are 'conscious' of it.

Hmm. I’m not quite sure that works. I’ll have to think about it more. For one I 
think Peirce distinguishes between mind and matter more than that. Part of the 
problem is that of course English is quite equivocal with the terms mind and 
consciousness. Even in philosophy of mind it seems they get used a lot of 
different and incompatible ways. Since apparently under the influence of James 
even Peirce moved away from “consciousness” in his latter years it might be 
useful to translate to some other terminology. Of course figuring it out seems 
difficult.

I admit my preference, however error bound it might be, is to think of 
consciousness as the inner part of chance or swerve. This avoids unfortunately 
the issue of how Peirce related chance and probability. I’ve looked but haven’t 
found him discussing that issue clearly. (Admittedly I’ve not looked that hard) 

This seems an issue in contemporary philosophy of freedom. In the contemporary 
debates libertarian free will is usually taken to be other than determinism or 
chance with the latter meaning random in some formal sense along a frequentist 
interpretation. Of course for any particular event it’s impossible by its 
nature of distinguish choice from chance. At best we can look at general 
repeated phenomena and the distribution of the frequency of types of events. 
Figuring out how or even if one can know there is libertarian free will seems 
quite problematic.

Getting back to Peirce most of what he calls mind seems mind-like phenomena 
seen from an external perspective. The places he talks about consciousness are 
a bit confusing. Sometimes he’s speaking of awareness of an event. Sometimes 
he’s speaking of conscious feeling (and I assume thirdness in some sense). 
Sometimes it’s something else. I occasionally half wonder if this near-dualism 
isn’t akin to Leibniz’ monads or at least Whitehead.





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Check out the ten signs 2.256.
>  
> Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , 
> which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in 
> a mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].
>  
> There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates as 
> Firstness; 1-1.

We must be talking past one an other if you think I’m saying something against 
that. I’m unfortunately pressed for time with the holidays and can’t say much 
more. Undoubtedly this is my fault as I usually only have moments to write and 
am not always as careful in crafting responses as I should be.

I’ll try and say more later.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Edwina, lists,

You wrote:

". . . everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most
certainly a sign; it can be, (112515-1)
all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness."

It seems to me that this statement would be true for those experiences of
ours that can be represented symbolically (e.g., poems), indexically (e.g.,
music), or iconically (e.g., mimicry), but not all our experiences may be
so representable.  Sometimes "silence" can represent our feelings  more
truly than any representation.

As I remember, Peiice said somewhere, in  agree with Clark, that every
phenomenon, X, has three fundamental aspects that Peirce refer to as
Fistness (1ns, to use Gary's notation), Secondness, and Thirdness.  So if X
= "feeling", then the following inferences may be drawn:

(1) Feeling as IS = the 1ns of feeling; a feelign or "sadness"
(2) Feeling as EXPERIENCE = the 2ns of feeling; "I felt sad before I
uttered this fact."
(3) Feeling as REPESENTED represented or THEORIZED = the 3ns of feeling; I
told my wife the fact that "I felt sad" all day today; "When a person feels
sad, the endorphin level in his/her brain is known to decrease."

I wonder if this approach can be applied to the case where X = habits ?

(1) Habit as IS; ? ? ?
(2) Habit as EXPERIENCED; ? ? ?
(3) Habit as REPRESENTED/THEORIZED; ? ? ?

All the best.

Sung





On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 5:52 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is
> most certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of
> Firstness.
>
>
> Not sure what you mean by “mode of firstness” here. If you mean the
> category of firstness of a third then I agree. If you mean a thirdness of a
> first then I disagree. I think Peirce is explicit on that point.
>
> All thoughts are thirds. Not all feelings are. The representation of a
> feeling is a sign. The pure feeling is not. Peirce is quite clear on this.
>
> By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which
> involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in
> whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness
> is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which
> consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it
> may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a
> lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that
> time . To reduce this description to a simple definition, I will say that
> by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of consciousness
> which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else.
> A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass, . . . a
> feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as
> long as it endures (1.306).
>
>
> As such it’s simply not a sign. I recognize you likely disagree upon this
> point so I won’t push it as it’s tangental to the question at hand. We can
> talk of a feeling as it is in itself. We can more loosely talk of a feeling
> in terms of force and a feeling in terms of mediated effects in thought.
> Those latter two simply aren’t pure feeling though.
>
>
> I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a
> feeling or a an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, " The
> Interpretant of that sign can be a feeling or action.
>
> And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in
> terms of a new sign." Yes, agreed.
>
>
> When we talk about interpretants we have the three categories of
> interpretants. When we talk of a sign in a particular way we have to be
> clear how we’re talking of it. In a certain way the interpretant of the
> sign includes all interpretants and effects related to that sign. So yes,
> that’s right. But when we talk about a sign more narrowly we can talk of
> the immediate interpretant separate from the dynamic or final
> interpretants. I think keeping clear that chain is important. So again we
> have to be careful of how we speak. So any effect of a sign can always be
> called an interpretant.
>
> I also disagree that a sign must have an association of feeling and action
> (Firstness and Secondness). You can see in the ten classes of signs 2.264,
> the Argument, which is in all its triadic aspects, just Thirdness.
>
>
> I’ll not debate this as I know you have made this point in the past here.
> I just disagree with you. I think when talking of any actual phenomena all
> three categories are always at play. When speaking of any particular
> *analysis* we may exclude parts due to the focus of our analysis. Which
> is fine. We just shouldn’t assume that the fact we can narrow our analysis
> says anything about the world.
>
> CLARK wrote: I probably should draw the distinctions a bit 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know of 
any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please inform us.

Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his insistence 
on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic relation' - which 
means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You can also read his 
discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And of course, since his 
semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this perspective all through his work.

You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the mediate part of 
the triad, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the word 
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the 
interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the 
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.  

" A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called its 
object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being such 
that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the  same 
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541.

Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the 
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.

Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the 
Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad.  Again, 

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274.

Again- it's in a  triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on its 
own. 

Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course implies 
relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of the ten 
Signs.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
  To: 'PEIRCE-L' 
  Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Edwina,

   

  Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen 
is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce 
is saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a 
correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a “triad” 
or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce 
quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please 
stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as 
Peirce’s. 

   

  Gary f.

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 



  Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it, on 
its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is analyzing 
the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen without a 'mental 
process'.  …

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 

 

Frances, Edwina, list,

 

Just to straighten out the terminology here …

For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
“sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be 
representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to 
say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:

 

CP 2.242, EP2:290:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third 
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible 
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic 
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a 
representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are 
the only representamens that have been much studied.

 

CP2:274, EP2:273:  A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. 
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, 
in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without 
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely 
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive 
power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is 
the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.

 

Gary f.

 



--



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PEIRCE-L t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Edwina, lists,

You wrote:

"Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking
about is acquiring(112515-1)
habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of taking
habits. In a certain
sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are reversed by definition
they are not longer
called a habit. Perhaps that’s all Peirce means although my sense is he
means something
deeper."


Is it possible that, by "habit", Peirce was trying to "philosophize" (or
abstract the 'thirdness" out of) the phenomenon of biological evolution
know to the late 19th century ?

All the best.

Sung

On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 12:24 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the
> output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor
> premise - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign
> [1-2-3]..where the Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness.
>
> I didn't say that a belief was pure secondness [2-2-2].
>
>
> OK, I certainly don’t deny that. I’d say that’s still a type of thirdness
> in each of those cases as they are all classes of signs. That’s what I
> meant by "a particular belief is always still thirdness although it may
> have an aspect of secondness to it.”
>
> In any particular discussion of something in the world firstness,
> secondness and thirdness are all active. Even signs will have feeling and
> action associated with them.
>
> My point is more that a habit as a habit is general in that it has an
> essential feature of replicability. That is a habit must always include, if
> only potentially, the ability to repeat.
>
> Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking
> about is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the
> habit of taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since
> if they are reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit.
> Perhaps that’s all Peirce means although my sense is he means something
> deeper.
>
> It seems undeniable though that Peirce accepted habits (and belief) could
> become stronger or weaker. He didn’t see them only as becoming stronger.
>
> After thinking about this quote in 8.318 I suspect he simply means the
> habit of taking a particular habit makes it stronger until it’s permanent.
> The habit of rejecting a particular habit does the opposite until the habit
> is destroyed. One has to assume a middle ground as well although perhaps
> it’s just accidence he doesn’t deal with that in the quote in question.
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark - See my comments below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 12:41 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Clark - mode is a synonym for category.

Check out the ten signs 2.256.

Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , 
which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in a 
mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].

There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates 
as Firstness; 1-1.

The pure feeling IS a sign. Check out  the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. All 
three parts of the triad are in a mode of Firstness.



  1) CLARK: Part of the issue is we can distinguish between firstness of sign, 
firstness of object, and firstness of interpretant. That’s probably a better 
way of putting the distinction I’m trying to get at.
  EDWINA: The Sign, the triad, is made up of the Relations of 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant. I am presuming that your use of 'sign' is 
equal to my use of Representamen. Peirce frequently used BOTH terms (sign and 
Representamen) to refer to this mediate relation between the Object and 
Interpretant. Yes, all three 'nodes' (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) can be 
functional in a mode of Firstness. Again, see the outline of the ten classes of 
 Signs 2.256.


  2) CLARK:I did a bit a of a literature search and you’re right that Peirce 
does sometimes use “pure feeling” for firstness of a sign, which confuses 
things as he also uses the term when speaking of firstness of object in his 
foundational ontology of cosmic origins. 
  EDWINA: 'Pure feeling' isn't simply the sign/Representamen in a mode of 
Firstness. It would be the FULL triad - Object-Representamen-Interpretant in a 
mode of Firstness.


  Peirce demands that the universe be permeated with pure Firstness separate 
from awareness/consciousness in a human sense. This gets back to the issue 
Soren and I were discussing relative to Buddhism. This idea of pure firstness 
as foundational is very similar to certain Buddhist ideas. (To the degree I 
dare say I understand Buddhism - which I admit isn’t a lot)


  What I am thinking of is the analysis in “Man’s Glassy Essence” where Peirce 
writes


Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and 
reaction with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, 
looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness. 
These two views are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing 
but acquired habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency 
to take habits, itself; and that this action of habit is nothing but 
generalization, and generalization is nothing but the spreading of feelings. 
(6.258)


  3) CLARK: It is this habit taking and generalization that Peirce says is 
Thirdness. Yet we have pure feeling underneath this which is different from 
firstness of thridness. Thirdness Peirce says is “the very being of the 
General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events.” (1.615) So 
what I am suggesting is that we keep separate pure feeling as absolute 
firstness from firstness which is the consciousness in terms of awareness of 
feeling due to its spread. It is that iconic relationship to pure firstness.

  EDWINA: Yes, habit-taking and generalization defines the category of 
Thirdness. When you refer to Thirdness in a mode of Firstness this refers only 
to the category of Thirdness, which has three modes: pure and two generate 
modes. [3-3, 3-2, 3-1]

   Yes, Pure Feeling, which has ALL THREE relations 
(Object-Representamen-Interpretant] in a mode of Firstness is not similar to 
Thirdness in a mode of Firstness. Again, the categories are not the same as the 
triad (O-R-I).




  It’s unfortunate that Peirce doesn’t use consistently “pure feeling” or even 
“consciousness.” Although to be fair few of us (myself included) do either. It 
leads to this talking past one any other at key moments. 


  4) CLARK:Now I may be getting this wrong, since it just doesn’t appear as a 
place where Peirce is as clear as he could be. After all he sometimes talks of 
mind as this outward appearance and consciousness as the inward, with mind 
being thirdness and consciousness firstness. My sense (perhaps incorrect) is 
that these are both technically thirdness.

  EDWINA: When we see something Other than ourselves - it is, as Peirce says, 
'matter'. But when we are aware of it, in our mind, we are 'conscious' of it.


  I’d love to hear people who might have a better handle on this to attempt to 
clarify this though.




--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary F, Edwina, Frances, lists,

I am am not a Peircean expert, but this much I have learned from my limited
readings of Peirce:

(i) The sign is an irreducibly triadic relation among object, representamen
(also called 'sign' by Peirce, apparently for convenience, since 'sign' is
much shorter than 'representamen' ), and interpretant.

(ii) Thus, the term 'sign' has a dual usage in Peirce's writings -- The
sign as an irreuducible triad, and the sign as one of the three correlates
of the sign triad.


This is why I often use diagrams to "pin down" the slippery sign relations:




*Representamen*

   |

   |
  The sign is a 4-node network:  |

*Sign*

  /\

/\

  /\
  *Object
 Interpretan*t

 Figure 1.  A 4-node network representation of
the Peircean sign.




The sign is a commutative triangle:


   *f
 g*
   *Object* ---> *Representamen* >
*Interpretant*
   |
 ^
   |
 |
   |
 |
   |__|
*h*

Figure 2.  The Peircean sign as a commutative triangle or a 'mathematical
category'.
 *f* = "Object determines the sign"; *g *= the sign has an
effect on the mind of the interpreter';
* h* = "the information about the object is transferred to
the mind of the interpreter".


So, based on these diagrams, I am of the opinion that the ideas about the
nature of the sign expressed by Edwina, Clark, and Gary F all  have certain
degrees of validity, although suffering from the limitations of the
linguistic expressions (as compared to diagrams).

All the best.

Sung




On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 9:33 AM,  wrote:

> Edwina,
>
>
>
> Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the
> Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying,
> but what *Peirce* is saying in these quotes is that “A *Sign* is a
> representamen,” which is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does
> *not* say that a Sign is a “triad” or a “triadic relation”: it is a
> *correlate* of a triadic relation, and a Representamen (though perhaps
> not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce quote saying that a sign is a
> “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please stop claiming that your
> peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as Peirce’s.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>
> Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it,
> on its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is
> analyzing the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen
> *without* a 'mental process'.  …
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca
>
>
>
> Frances, Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Just to straighten out the terminology here …
>
> For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a
> “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be
> representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little
> to say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this
> clear:
>
>
>
> CP 2.242, EP2:290:  A *Representamen* is the First Correlate of a triadic
> relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object,* and the
> possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant,* by which
> triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First
> Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some
> possible Interpretant. A *Sign* is a representamen of which some
> interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens
> that have been much studied.
>
>
>
> CP2:274, EP2:273:  A *Sign* is a Representamen with a mental
> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs.
> Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act
> fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which
> turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with
> the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of
> the sun. But *thought* is the chief, if not the only, mode of
> representation.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark - mode is a synonym for category.
>  
> Check out the ten signs 2.256.
>  
> Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , 
> which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in 
> a mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].
>  
> There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates as 
> Firstness; 1-1.
>  
> The pure feeling IS a sign. Check out  the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. All 
> three parts of the triad are in a mode of Firstness.
>  

Part of the issue is we can distinguish between firstness of sign, firstness of 
object, and firstness of interpretant. That’s probably a better way of putting 
the distinction I’m trying to get at.

I did a bit a of a literature search and you’re right that Peirce does 
sometimes use “pure feeling” for firstness of a sign, which confuses things as 
he also uses the term when speaking of firstness of object in his foundational 
ontology of cosmic origins. 

Peirce demands that the universe be permeated with pure Firstness separate from 
awareness/consciousness in a human sense. This gets back to the issue Soren and 
I were discussing relative to Buddhism. This idea of pure firstness as 
foundational is very similar to certain Buddhist ideas. (To the degree I dare 
say I understand Buddhism - which I admit isn’t a lot)

What I am thinking of is the analysis in “Man’s Glassy Essence” where Peirce 
writes

Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and 
reaction with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, 
looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness. 
These two views are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing 
but acquired habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency 
to take habits, itself; and that this action of habit is nothing but 
generalization, and generalization is nothing but the spreading of feelings. 
(6.258)

It is this habit taking and generalization that Peirce says is Thirdness. Yet 
we have pure feeling underneath this which is different from firstness of 
thridness. Thirdness Peirce says is “the very being of the General, of Reason, 
consists in its governing individual events.” (1.615) So what I am suggesting 
is that we keep separate pure feeling as absolute firstness from firstness 
which is the consciousness in terms of awareness of feeling due to its spread. 
It is that iconic relationship to pure firstness.

It’s unfortunate that Peirce doesn’t use consistently “pure feeling” or even 
“consciousness.” Although to be fair few of us (myself included) do either. It 
leads to this talking past one any other at key moments. 

Now I may be getting this wrong, since it just doesn’t appear as a place where 
Peirce is as clear as he could be. After all he sometimes talks of mind as this 
outward appearance and consciousness as the inward, with mind being thirdness 
and consciousness firstness. My sense (perhaps incorrect) is that these are 
both technically thirdness.

I’d love to hear people who might have a better handle on this to attempt to 
clarify this though.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary, Jeff, list,

I see that the thread count got to 100, so I suppose this is why the thread
(in my email account, anyway) seems to have moved over to the one started
by Jeff (accidentally?) awhile ago. I would have thought a new 100 count
would have started rather than the mail move to a similarly named thread
that hadn't reached 100 yet. Somewhat bizarre really.

With respect to the nomenclature and divisions of triadic relations, I was
certainly aware that terms, propositions, and arguments are all symbols; I
thought I had mentioned that at some point, maybe not. I tend to reference
Liszka's book, "A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S.
Peirce", which makes it easier for me to pay attention to that kind of
detail. It's a fine book, especially for speculative grammar, though not so
much for logical critic.

Anyway, that quote and the info from Turrisi is certainly interesting,
Gary. It does help somewhat, with respect to propositions. In the case of
arguments, I'm not sure. Perhaps, since an argument could be considered a
conditional proposition, and it could be supposed there is a conditional
proposition which includes within itself two other conditional propositions
as its predicate and subject, that in such a case arguments could be
considered as terms. Of course, this would mean that propositions and
arguments could be referred to as predicates or subjects. I'm not sure how
I feel about that, and whether it would make sense to consider them as such
with respect to logical quantities of characters and real objects, or
whether it would make more sense with respect to what Peirce says in 1893
about the informed depth and breadth of propositions and arguments.

-- Franklin



On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:28 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, Franklin, list,
>
>
>
> I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come
> across a couple of things that may be of use to it.
>
>
>
> In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition
> of pragmatism:
>
> “Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible
> in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose
> only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a
> corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having
> its apodosis in the imperative mood.” Turrisi, in her edition of the
> Harvard lectures, provides a note on this (p. 257) which throws some light
> on the relationship between “terms” and propositions:
>
>
>
> [[*Apodosis* is, in the most conventional, contemporary sense, according
> to Webster, the clause expressing the conclusion or result in a conditional
> sentence, as distinguished from *protasis*, the clause that expresses the
> condition in a conditional sentence. The *Oxford English Dictionary*
> defines apodosis as “the concluding clause of a sentence, as contrasted
> with the introductory clause, or *protasis*; now usually restricted to
> the consequent clause in a conditional sentence as ‘If thine enemy hunger, 
> *feed
> him*’.” It is important to remember that the “clause” which has evolved
> in modern definitions as the grammatical form of *apodosis* was
> understood initially as a “term” which was itself an entire proposition.
> Richard Whateley, whom Peirce professed to have read in one sitting at the
> age of twelve, discussed conditional propositions in his *Elements of
> Logic*, saying, “we must consider every Conditional Proposition a
> universal affirmative categorical Proposition, of which the Terms are
> entire Propositions, viz., the antecedent answering to the *Subject* and
> the consequent to the *Predicate*, e.g., to say “if Louis is a good king,
> France is  likely to prosper,” is equivalent to saying, “the case of Louis
> being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper.” It is more
> useful to think of “apodosis” in this way, as a categorical proposition of
> a universal kind, as in Whateley. And it is more consonant with the meaning
> of pragmatism which Peirce engenders insofar as pragmatism is a device of
> logic.]]
>
>
>
> This might help to explain Peirce’s 1893 statement that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term.
>
>
>
> If we move on to the ten sign types defined in Peirce’s “Nomenclature and
> Divisions of Triadic Relations,” we find that the Tenth is the Argument,
> the Ninth is the Proposition (i.e. the Dicent Symbol), and the Eighth, the
> Rhematic Symbol, “either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a
> General Term” (EP2:295). So term, proposition and argument are all symbols,
> the difference among them being that the term is a Rheme, the proposition a
> Dicisign, and the argument of course an Argument.
>
>
>
> Perhaps you were already aware of all this, but at least it helps to clear
> up my own confusion.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a
> continuum of 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[gnox]

Frances, Edwina, list,

 

Just to straighten out the terminology here …

For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
“sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be 
representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to 
say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:

 

CP 2.242, EP2:290:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third 
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible 
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic 
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a 
representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are 
the only representamens that have been much studied.

 

CP2:274, EP2:273:  A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. 
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, 
in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without 
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely 
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive 
power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is 
the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 24-Nov-15 19:15



 

Frances. I'm not sure of your focus.

 

There is no such thing as a 'representamen' all by itself, so, no such thing as 
a 'representamen that is not a sign'. The representamen is the mediate term or 
phase in the semiosic triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. It can 
function in any of the three modes of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Check 
out 2.256 for the ten classes of Signs.

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca <mailto:frances.ke...@sympatico.ca>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Clark Goble' 
<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>  ; 'PEIRCE-L' <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 6:45 PM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

 

Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- 

To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as 
"primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a 
representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by any 
mechanism of matter or organism of life could also be a representamen that is 
an object and a sign, with some categorial status say of at least firstness. 
This muse of course assumes metaphysically that there are representamen in the 
vast "phaneros" of phenomena that are not signs or that have not yet evolved as 
continuent things or existent objects to become and behave as signs to signers. 

 

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Frances - again, I think that your use of the Peircean terms needs 
clarification. As I said, the Representamen is the mediate term in the Peircean 
Sign triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant and doesn't, as you use it, 
function on its own.

So, your comments of a Representamen not yet a sign' etc - to me, at least, is 
unclear. The Representamen doesn't exist on its own but embedded within the 
triad.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Clark Goble' ; 'PEIRCE-L' 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 11:26 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Frances to Edwina and others--- 

  (This topic threads away from the current subject.) 

   

  It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that 
at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such representamen 
that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal guess that there may be 
representamen that are felt as phenomena but not even as objects. It is 
therefore assumed by me that for Peirce all stuff that may be felt in the 
objective or subjective world is inaccessible and can only be indirectly 
accessed by any phanerism through hazy phenomena, some phenomena of which may 
not even be representamen and some of which may indeed be representamen. 

   

  This guess entails that the stuff of the world can only be realized by 
phanerisms as phenomena, so that phenomena representationally stands for the 
whole world as a kind of analogous surrogate, including that of the phenomenal 
world. For advanced phanerisms who can not only feel, but who can also feel 
they sense and will and think and know and remember and learn and reason, then 
to dispel doubt about what phenomena is given uncontrolled to them, they can 
use phenomena that are representamen and even phenomenal representamen that are 
signs. 

   

  In the vast hazy world felt by phanerisms as being of continuent phenomenal 
thingness, there may seem to be phanerons that are not representamen and there 
may seem to be phanerons that are representamen; and furthermore there may seem 
to be representamen that are not signs and there may seem to be representamen 
that are signs. The likely process that makes phenomenal representamen of any 
kind outside or inside semiosis is that of phenomenal representation. 

   

  My reading of Peirce is that any representamen that emerges must seemingly be 
felt as a phenomenon, and cannot be other than a phenomenon nor solely alone on 
its own independent of phenomena; but the phenomenal representamen need not be 
an object or a sign, to be either continuent or existent. 

   

  What is felt sensed or felt known of the world to enabled phanerisms is the 
seeming phenomenal haze of likely represented stuff that is inaccessible yet is 
guessed indirectly to be a real true fact. The feeling phanerism furthermore 
could presumably be a mechanism of matter like an atomic neutrino, or an 
organism of life like a biotic microbe and a scientific thinker. 

   

  Assuming that all this fuss about the various states of feeling and phenomena 
is so, then the issue here might turn on the role of the phenomenal categories 
in being the very observable but hazy stuff of feeling and phenomena. If a 
phaneron is felt by a phanerism to not be a representamen, or alternatively to 
be a representamen that is not a sign, just exactly what phenomenal category is 
to be assigned to that hazy stuff becomes hazy. Any emerging continuent 
phenomena not felt by a phanerism to be a representamen or a sign would 
possibly be felt as a fleeting firstness only, and thus would be like a closed 
triune that is not further divisible externally by the categories, but as 
phenomena and thus as categorial it might nonetheless be an evolving internal 
trichotomy that continues to evolve. 

   

  Icons as phenomenal representamen that exist as objective signs for example 
would seem to eventually be in semiosis and in semiotics a closed triune. An 
icon is classed as a hypoicon and then as an appearance and then say as a 
similarity, but it is not divisible any further externally. At this point it 
becomes a closed triune, and also preparatory to indexes. The iconic triune 
internally however is classed as a growing trichotomy in waiting as an image 
and diagram and metaphor. The last class of any phenomenal category would 
likely be felt as a closed triune and felt as pure firstness, whether the 
phenomena of feeling is a sign or an object or a representamen or a mere 
phaneron. 

   

  It is likely that signing permeates most of the represented phenomenal world 
that is felt by most phanerisms. Whether feeling however permeates the whole 
wide world of felt phenomena is unclear to me. It may be that feeling alone at 
its broadest might further be of the inaccessible stuff of the world beyond 
hazy phenomena and categoria, but such "nomenal" or &quo

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen is 
a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce is 
saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a 
correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a “triad” 
or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce 
quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please 
stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as 
Peirce’s. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 



Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it, on 
its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is analyzing 
the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen without a 'mental 
process'.  …

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca   

 

Frances, Edwina, list,

 

Just to straighten out the terminology here …

For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
“sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be 
representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to 
say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:

 

CP 2.242, EP2:290:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third 
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible 
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic 
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a 
representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are 
the only representamens that have been much studied.

 

CP2:274, EP2:273:  A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. 
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, 
in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without 
further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely 
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive 
power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is 
the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.

 

Gary f.

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most 
> certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness.

Not sure what you mean by “mode of firstness” here. If you mean the category of 
firstness of a third then I agree. If you mean a thirdness of a first then I 
disagree. I think Peirce is explicit on that point. 

All thoughts are thirds. Not all feelings are. The representation of a feeling 
is a sign. The pure feeling is not. Peirce is quite clear on this.

By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves 
no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in 
part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from 
another, which has its own positive quality which consists in nothing else, and 
which is of itself all that it is, however it may have been brought about; so 
that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and 
equally present at every moment of that time . To reduce this description to a 
simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort 
of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, 
regardless of anything else. A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a 
coming to pass, . . . a feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every 
moment of time as long as it endures (1.306).

As such it’s simply not a sign. I recognize you likely disagree upon this point 
so I won’t push it as it’s tangental to the question at hand. We can talk of a 
feeling as it is in itself. We can more loosely talk of a feeling in terms of 
force and a feeling in terms of mediated effects in thought. Those latter two 
simply aren’t pure feeling though.
 
> I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a feeling or 
> a an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, " The Interpretant of 
> that sign can be a feeling or action.
>  
> And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in 
> terms of a new sign." Yes, agreed.

When we talk about interpretants we have the three categories of interpretants. 
When we talk of a sign in a particular way we have to be clear how we’re 
talking of it. In a certain way the interpretant of the sign includes all 
interpretants and effects related to that sign. So yes, that’s right. But when 
we talk about a sign more narrowly we can talk of the immediate interpretant 
separate from the dynamic or final interpretants. I think keeping clear that 
chain is important. So again we have to be careful of how we speak. So any 
effect of a sign can always be called an interpretant.

> I also disagree that a sign must have an association of feeling and action 
> (Firstness and Secondness). You can see in the ten classes of signs 2.264, 
> the Argument, which is in all its triadic aspects, just Thirdness.

I’ll not debate this as I know you have made this point in the past here. I 
just disagree with you. I think when talking of any actual phenomena all three 
categories are always at play. When speaking of any particular analysis we may 
exclude parts due to the focus of our analysis. Which is fine. We just 
shouldn’t assume that the fact we can narrow our analysis says anything about 
the world.

>> CLARK wrote: I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. 
>> Habits aren’t always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes 
>> not. So if we discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true 
>> and sometimes not. How strong the habit is consists of how often it is 
>> operational. When not operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That 
>> means that the development of the habit in question (say going to be on 
>> time) isn’t strengthened. It may be weakened.
>  
> EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'absolute habit' or 'sometimes 
> operational'. Or 'taking habits...will be true/sometimes not". If a habit is 
> not operational..then, is it a habit?
>  
> And I have a problem with your notion of 'higher order habits' developing 
> another habit. I can certainly see that habits of organization, eg, in the 
> physico-chemical realm will constraint the habits of organization of the 
> biological world.
 
The term is mine but the notion was explicit in the quotes I gave from Peirce. 
It makes sense that we have habits of habit formation. So I’m not quite sure 
what your objection.

As to habit being operational in a particular moment, of course it can and be a 
habit. I brush my teeth nearly every night. It is a regular habit to do before 
bed. If one night I neglect to brush my teeth because I come home late it 
doesn’t follow that somehow I don’t have the habit. This is a semantic point 
about the term habit. But it’s also rather key for many of Peirce’s terms to 
which he applies the notion of degree.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[frances.kelly]

Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- 

To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as
"primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a
representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by
any mechanism of matter or organism of life could also be a representamen
that is an object and a sign, with some categorial status say of at least
firstness. This muse of course assumes metaphysically that there are
representamen in the vast "phaneros" of phenomena that are not signs or that
have not yet evolved as continuent things or existent objects to become and
behave as signs to signers. 

 

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Tuesday, 24 November, 2015 6:06 PM
To: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

 

Clark - mode is a synonym for category.

 

Check out the ten signs 2.256.

 

Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate ,
which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating
in a mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].

 

There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates as
Firstness; 1-1.

 

The pure feeling IS a sign. Check out  the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. All
three parts of the triad are in a mode of Firstness.

 

I suspect that you think of signs only as cognitive forms. That's not
Peirce.

 

Edwina

 

 

- Original Message - 

From: Clark Goble <mailto:cl...@lextek.com>  

To: PEIRCE-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:52 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

 

 

On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:

 

No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is
most certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of
Firstness.

 

Not sure what you mean by "mode of firstness" here. If you mean the category
of firstness of a third then I agree. If you mean a thirdness of a first
then I disagree. I think Peirce is explicit on that point. 

 

All thoughts are thirds. Not all feelings are. The representation of a
feeling is a sign. The pure feeling is not. Peirce is quite clear on this.

 

By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in
whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is
distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which
consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it
may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a
lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time
. To reduce this description to a simple definition, I will say that by a
feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is
all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. A
feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass, . . . a
feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long
as it endures (1.306).

 

As such it's simply not a sign. I recognize you likely disagree upon this
point so I won't push it as it's tangental to the question at hand. We can
talk of a feeling as it is in itself. We can more loosely talk of a feeling
in terms of force and a feeling in terms of mediated effects in thought.
Those latter two simply aren't pure feeling though.

 



I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a feeling
or a an action but that's separate from the sign itself, " The Interpretant
of that sign can be a feeling or action.

 

And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in
terms of a new sign." Yes, agreed.

 

When we talk about interpretants we have the three categories of
interpretants. When we talk of a sign in a particular way we have to be
clear how we're talking of it. In a certain way the interpretant of the sign
includes all interpretants and effects related to that sign. So yes, that's
right. But when we talk about a sign more narrowly we can talk of the
immediate interpretant separate from the dynamic or final interpretants. I
think keeping clear that chain is important. So again we have to be careful
of how we speak. So any effect of a sign can always be called an
interpretant.

 

I also disagree that a sign must have an association of feeling and action
(Firstness and Secondness). You can see in the ten classes of signs 2.264,
the Argument, which is in all its triadic aspects, just Thirdness.

 

I'll not debate this as I know you have made this point in the past here. I
just disagree with you. I think when talking of any actual phenomena all
three categories are alway

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark - mode is a synonym for category.

Check out the ten signs 2.256.

Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , 
which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in a 
mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].

There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates as 
Firstness; 1-1.

The pure feeling IS a sign. Check out  the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. All three 
parts of the triad are in a mode of Firstness.

I suspect that you think of signs only as cognitive forms. That's not Peirce.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:52 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is 
most certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of 
Firstness.


  Not sure what you mean by “mode of firstness” here. If you mean the category 
of firstness of a third then I agree. If you mean a thirdness of a first then I 
disagree. I think Peirce is explicit on that point. 


  All thoughts are thirds. Not all feelings are. The representation of a 
feeling is a sign. The pure feeling is not. Peirce is quite clear on this.


By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which 
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in 
whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is 
distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which consists 
in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have 
been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, 
it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time . To reduce this 
description to a simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an 
instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it is 
positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. A feeling, then, is not an 
event, a happening, a coming to pass, . . . a feeling is a state, which is in 
its entirety in every moment of time as long as it endures (1.306).


  As such it’s simply not a sign. I recognize you likely disagree upon this 
point so I won’t push it as it’s tangental to the question at hand. We can talk 
of a feeling as it is in itself. We can more loosely talk of a feeling in terms 
of force and a feeling in terms of mediated effects in thought. Those latter 
two simply aren’t pure feeling though.
   

I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a feeling 
or a an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, " The Interpretant of 
that sign can be a feeling or action.

And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in 
terms of a new sign." Yes, agreed.


  When we talk about interpretants we have the three categories of 
interpretants. When we talk of a sign in a particular way we have to be clear 
how we’re talking of it. In a certain way the interpretant of the sign includes 
all interpretants and effects related to that sign. So yes, that’s right. But 
when we talk about a sign more narrowly we can talk of the immediate 
interpretant separate from the dynamic or final interpretants. I think keeping 
clear that chain is important. So again we have to be careful of how we speak. 
So any effect of a sign can always be called an interpretant.


I also disagree that a sign must have an association of feeling and action 
(Firstness and Secondness). You can see in the ten classes of signs 2.264, the 
Argument, which is in all its triadic aspects, just Thirdness.


  I’ll not debate this as I know you have made this point in the past here. I 
just disagree with you. I think when talking of any actual phenomena all three 
categories are always at play. When speaking of any particular analysis we may 
exclude parts due to the focus of our analysis. Which is fine. We just 
shouldn’t assume that the fact we can narrow our analysis says anything about 
the world.


  CLARK wrote: I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. 
Habits aren’t always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes 
not. So if we discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true and 
sometimes not. How strong the habit is consists of how often it is operational. 
When not operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That means that the 
development of the habit in question (say going to be on time) isn’t 
strengthened. It may be weakened.

EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'absolute habit' or 'sometimes 
operational'. Or 'taking habits...will be true/sometimes not". If a habit is 
not operational..then, is it a habit?

And I have a problem with your notion of 'higher order habits' developing 
another habit. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Frances. I'm not sure of your focus.

There is no such thing as a 'representamen' all by itself, so, no such thing as 
a 'representamen that is not a sign'. The representamen is the mediate term or 
phase in the semiosic triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. It can 
function in any of the three modes of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Check 
out 2.256 for the ten classes of Signs.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Clark Goble' ; 'PEIRCE-L' 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 6:45 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- 

  To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as 
"primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a 
representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by any 
mechanism of matter or organism of life could also be a representamen that is 
an object and a sign, with some categorial status say of at least firstness. 
This muse of course assumes metaphysically that there are representamen in the 
vast "phaneros" of phenomena that are not signs or that have not yet evolved as 
continuent things or existent objects to become and behave as signs to signers. 

   

   

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Tuesday, 24 November, 2015 6:06 PM
  To: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

   

  Clark - mode is a synonym for category.

   

  Check out the ten signs 2.256.

   

  Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , 
which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in a 
mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2].

   

  There is no such thing as a degenerate Firstness. Firstness only operates as 
Firstness; 1-1.

   

  The pure feeling IS a sign. Check out  the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign. All 
three parts of the triad are in a mode of Firstness.

   

  I suspect that you think of signs only as cognitive forms. That's not Peirce.

   

  Edwina

   

   

- Original Message - 

From: Clark Goble 

To: PEIRCE-L 

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 5:52 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

 

 

  On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

   

  No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is 
most certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of 
Firstness.

 

Not sure what you mean by "mode of firstness" here. If you mean the 
category of firstness of a third then I agree. If you mean a thirdness of a 
first then I disagree. I think Peirce is explicit on that point. 

 

All thoughts are thirds. Not all feelings are. The representation of a 
feeling is a sign. The pure feeling is not. Peirce is quite clear on this.

 

  By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which 
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in 
whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is 
distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which consists 
in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have 
been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, 
it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time . To reduce this 
description to a simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an 
instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it is 
positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. A feeling, then, is not an 
event, a happening, a coming to pass, . . . a feeling is a state, which is in 
its entirety in every moment of time as long as it endures (1.306).

 

As such it's simply not a sign. I recognize you likely disagree upon this 
point so I won't push it as it's tangental to the question at hand. We can talk 
of a feeling as it is in itself. We can more loosely talk of a feeling in terms 
of force and a feeling in terms of mediated effects in thought. Those latter 
two simply aren't pure feeling though.





  I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a 
feeling or a an action but that's separate from the sign itself, " The 
Interpretant of that sign can be a feeling or action.

   

  And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in 
terms of a new sign." Yes, agreed.

 

When we talk about interpretants we have the three categories of 
interpretants. When we talk of a sign in a particular way we have to be clear 
how we're talking of it. In a certain way the interpretant of the sign includes 
all interpretants and effects related to that sign. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most 
certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness.

I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a feeling or a 
an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, " The Interpretant of that 
sign can be a feeling or action.

And you write: "although we can then talk about this feeling or action in terms 
of a new sign." Yes, agreed.

I also disagree that a sign must have an association of feeling and action 
(Firstness and Secondness). You can see in the ten classes of signs 2.264, the 
Argument, which is in all its triadic aspects, just Thirdness.

CLARK wrote: I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. Habits 
aren’t always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes not. So if 
we discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true and sometimes 
not. How strong the habit is consists of how often it is operational. When not 
operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That means that the development 
of the habit in question (say going to be on time) isn’t strengthened. It may 
be weakened.

EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'absolute habit' or 'sometimes 
operational'. Or 'taking habits...will be true/sometimes not". If a habit is 
not operational..then, is it a habit? 

And I have a problem with your notion of 'higher order habits' developing 
another habit. I can certainly see that habits of organization, eg, in the 
physico-chemical realm will constraint the habits of organization of the 
biological world.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 4:05 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) 
into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. 

Not all signs have feeling and action associated with them [see the ten 
classes of signs]


  Again it’s important to be clear on our distinctions here. A feeling or an 
action are not the same as a sign. Typically in analysis of any particular 
phenomena (material or mental) we can break down our analysis in terms of 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness and then each of those categories further. 
So an effect of a sign can be a feeling or a an action but that’s separate from 
the sign itself, although we can then talk about this feeling or action in 
terms of a new sign.


  So for instance I may love my wife (a sign). I have a feeling of love (the 
feeling, firstness). My loving my wife (sign) leads to this feeling but should 
be distinguished from it.




  I think if I take Peirce’s discussion of swerve right that a sign can’t be a 
sign without there being an associated phenomena of feeling and action. They 
are essential for the sign to function as a sign but in terms of analysis 
should be distinguished from the sign.


  This seems one of those places though where our language becomes muddled 
quickly and keeping distinctions distinct can be difficult. My sense is we’re 
largely agreeing. This all seems somewhat tangental to the question at hand.


  "Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking 
about is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit 
of taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are 
reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s all 
Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. "




I'm not sure that reversibility can be equated with acquiring habits. The 
passage that we've been referring to 8.318, denies that habits include 
reversibility, and assigns reversibility to the purely mechanical realm.


  I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. Habits aren’t 
always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes not. So if  we 
discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true and sometimes not. 
How strong the habit is consists of how often it is operational. When not 
operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That means that the development 
of the habit in question (say going to be on time) isn’t strengthened. It may 
be weakened. 


  So I’m suggesting one way to read the quote is in terms of these first and 
second order habits. I think if I have Peirce right here (no guarantee) that 
habits to be habits are always about acting in that particular way. It’s not 
that they are reversible but merely they are in play or not. 


  What we might call the reversal of a habit isn’t really a reversal but is the 
non-functioning of this higher order habit in terms of developing the habit in 
question.


  I’m not saying this is necessarily what Peirce means. Just that now that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) 
> into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. 
>  
> Not all signs have feeling and action associated with them [see the ten 
> classes of signs]

Again it’s important to be clear on our distinctions here. A feeling or an 
action are not the same as a sign. Typically in analysis of any particular 
phenomena (material or mental) we can break down our analysis in terms of 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness and then each of those categories further. 
So an effect of a sign can be a feeling or a an action but that’s separate from 
the sign itself, although we can then talk about this feeling or action in 
terms of a new sign.

So for instance I may love my wife (a sign). I have a feeling of love (the 
feeling, firstness). My loving my wife (sign) leads to this feeling but should 
be distinguished from it.


I think if I take Peirce’s discussion of swerve right that a sign can’t be a 
sign without there being an associated phenomena of feeling and action. They 
are essential for the sign to function as a sign but in terms of analysis 
should be distinguished from the sign.

This seems one of those places though where our language becomes muddled 
quickly and keeping distinctions distinct can be difficult. My sense is we’re 
largely agreeing. This all seems somewhat tangental to the question at hand.

>> "Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about 
>> is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of 
>> taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are 
>> reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s 
>> all Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. "
>> 
>> 
> I'm not sure that reversibility can be equated with acquiring habits. The 
> passage that we've been referring to 8.318, denies that habits include 
> reversibility, and assigns reversibility to the purely mechanical realm.


I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. Habits aren’t 
always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes not. So if  we 
discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true and sometimes not. 
How strong the habit is consists of how often it is operational. When not 
operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That means that the development 
of the habit in question (say going to be on time) isn’t strengthened. It may 
be weakened. 

So I’m suggesting one way to read the quote is in terms of these first and 
second order habits. I think if I have Peirce right here (no guarantee) that 
habits to be habits are always about acting in that particular way. It’s not 
that they are reversible but merely they are in play or not. 

What we might call the reversal of a habit isn’t really a reversal but is the 
non-functioning of this higher order habit in terms of developing the habit in 
question.

I’m not saying this is necessarily what Peirce means. Just that now that I’ve 
thought about it for a while that’s the only interpretation that makes much 
sense to me.





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[frances.kelly]

Frances to Edwina and others--- 

(This topic threads away from the current subject.) 

 

It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that
at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such
representamen that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal guess that
there may be representamen that are felt as phenomena but not even as
objects. It is therefore assumed by me that for Peirce all stuff that may be
felt in the objective or subjective world is inaccessible and can only be
indirectly accessed by any phanerism through hazy phenomena, some phenomena
of which may not even be representamen and some of which may indeed be
representamen. 

 

This guess entails that the stuff of the world can only be realized by
phanerisms as phenomena, so that phenomena representationally stands for the
whole world as a kind of analogous surrogate, including that of the
phenomenal world. For advanced phanerisms who can not only feel, but who can
also feel they sense and will and think and know and remember and learn and
reason, then to dispel doubt about what phenomena is given uncontrolled to
them, they can use phenomena that are representamen and even phenomenal
representamen that are signs. 

 

In the vast hazy world felt by phanerisms as being of continuent phenomenal
thingness, there may seem to be phanerons that are not representamen and
there may seem to be phanerons that are representamen; and furthermore there
may seem to be representamen that are not signs and there may seem to be
representamen that are signs. The likely process that makes phenomenal
representamen of any kind outside or inside semiosis is that of phenomenal
representation. 

 

My reading of Peirce is that any representamen that emerges must seemingly
be felt as a phenomenon, and cannot be other than a phenomenon nor solely
alone on its own independent of phenomena; but the phenomenal representamen
need not be an object or a sign, to be either continuent or existent. 

 

What is felt sensed or felt known of the world to enabled phanerisms is the
seeming phenomenal haze of likely represented stuff that is inaccessible yet
is guessed indirectly to be a real true fact. The feeling phanerism
furthermore could presumably be a mechanism of matter like an atomic
neutrino, or an organism of life like a biotic microbe and a scientific
thinker. 

 

Assuming that all this fuss about the various states of feeling and
phenomena is so, then the issue here might turn on the role of the
phenomenal categories in being the very observable but hazy stuff of feeling
and phenomena. If a phaneron is felt by a phanerism to not be a
representamen, or alternatively to be a representamen that is not a sign,
just exactly what phenomenal category is to be assigned to that hazy stuff
becomes hazy. Any emerging continuent phenomena not felt by a phanerism to
be a representamen or a sign would possibly be felt as a fleeting firstness
only, and thus would be like a closed triune that is not further divisible
externally by the categories, but as phenomena and thus as categorial it
might nonetheless be an evolving internal trichotomy that continues to
evolve. 

 

Icons as phenomenal representamen that exist as objective signs for example
would seem to eventually be in semiosis and in semiotics a closed triune. An
icon is classed as a hypoicon and then as an appearance and then say as a
similarity, but it is not divisible any further externally. At this point it
becomes a closed triune, and also preparatory to indexes. The iconic triune
internally however is classed as a growing trichotomy in waiting as an image
and diagram and metaphor. The last class of any phenomenal category would
likely be felt as a closed triune and felt as pure firstness, whether the
phenomena of feeling is a sign or an object or a representamen or a mere
phaneron. 

 

It is likely that signing permeates most of the represented phenomenal world
that is felt by most phanerisms. Whether feeling however permeates the whole
wide world of felt phenomena is unclear to me. It may be that feeling alone
at its broadest might further be of the inaccessible stuff of the world
beyond hazy phenomena and categoria, but such "nomenal" or "epiphenomenal"
stuff of the "menal" world would extend infinitely beyond phenomenal
sentience and experience and intelligence. 

 

The state of reality may only be available and limited to able humans in the
form of existent phenomenal objects. If this is a fact, then for any object
or phenomena to be felt as real to them, at least some part of it must be
felt to be sensed; so that phenomena is only as real as sense, and only hazy
phenomena can be felt sensed as real. Extending feeling beyond the surrogacy
of phenomena may simply not be realistic or necessary. 

 

PS--- 

It might be clearer to hold representamen that are sign vehicles within
"grammatic" or informative semiosis and semiotics to be say "representants"
rather than 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the 
> output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise 
> - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign [1-2-3]..where 
> the Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness.
>  
> I didn't say that a belief was pure secondness [2-2-2].

OK, I certainly don’t deny that. I’d say that’s still a type of thirdness in 
each of those cases as they are all classes of signs. That’s what I meant by "a 
particular belief is always still thirdness although it may have an aspect of 
secondness to it.”

In any particular discussion of something in the world firstness, secondness 
and thirdness are all active. Even signs will have feeling and action 
associated with them.

My point is more that a habit as a habit is general in that it has an essential 
feature of replicability. That is a habit must always include, if only 
potentially, the ability to repeat.

Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about is 
acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of 
taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are 
reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s all 
Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. 

It seems undeniable though that Peirce accepted habits (and belief) could 
become stronger or weaker. He didn’t see them only as becoming stronger.

After thinking about this quote in 8.318 I suspect he simply means the habit of 
taking a particular habit makes it stronger until it’s permanent. The habit of 
rejecting a particular habit does the opposite until the habit is destroyed. 
One has to assume a middle ground as well although perhaps it’s just accidence 
he doesn’t deal with that in the quote in question.




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[gnox]

Jeff, Franklin, list,

 

I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come 
across a couple of things that may be of use to it.

 

In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition of 
pragmatism:

“Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a 
sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only 
meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding 
practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in 
the imperative mood.” Turrisi, in her edition of the Harvard lectures, provides 
a note on this (p. 257) which throws some light on the relationship between 
“terms” and propositions:

 

[[Apodosis is, in the most conventional, contemporary sense, according to 
Webster, the clause expressing the conclusion or result in a conditional 
sentence, as distinguished from protasis, the clause that expresses the 
condition in a conditional sentence. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
apodosis as “the concluding clause of a sentence, as contrasted with the 
introductory clause, or protasis; now usually restricted to the consequent 
clause in a conditional sentence as ‘If thine enemy hunger, feed him’.” It is 
important to remember that the “clause” which has evolved in modern definitions 
as the grammatical form of apodosis was understood initially as a “term” which 
was itself an entire proposition. Richard Whateley, whom Peirce professed to 
have read in one sitting at the age of twelve, discussed conditional 
propositions in his Elements of Logic, saying, “we must consider every 
Conditional Proposition a universal affirmative categorical Proposition, of 
which the Terms are entire Propositions, viz., the antecedent answering to the 
Subject and the consequent to the Predicate, e.g., to say “if Louis is a good 
king, France is  likely to prosper,” is equivalent to saying, “the case of 
Louis being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper.” It is 
more useful to think of “apodosis” in this way, as a categorical proposition of 
a universal kind, as in Whateley. And it is more consonant with the meaning of 
pragmatism which Peirce engenders insofar as pragmatism is a device of logic.]]

 

This might help to explain Peirce’s 1893 statement that every proposition and 
every argument can be regarded as a term.

 

If we move on to the ten sign types defined in Peirce’s “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations,” we find that the Tenth is the Argument, the 
Ninth is the Proposition (i.e. the Dicent Symbol), and the Eighth, the Rhematic 
Symbol, “either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a General Term” 
(EP2:295). So term, proposition and argument are all symbols, the difference 
among them being that the term is a Rheme, the proposition a Dicisign, and the 
argument of course an Argument.

 

Perhaps you were already aware of all this, but at least it helps to clear up 
my own confusion.

 

Gary f.

 

} Our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum 
of uncertainty and of indeterminacy. [Peirce] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 7:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, 
> strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise 
> dealing with a similar situation.
> Habits are Thirdness and thus, generalities.
>  
> A belief is not necessarily a habit; it can be in a mode of Secondness, a 
> specific particular belief.

It would seem to me a particular belief is always still thirdness although it 
may have an aspect of secondness to it. I don’t see how a belief could be pure 
secondness. Even a particular belief is always still a general. I think you 
want to say a moment of belief but then as belief it’s still thirdness but 
there will be both secondness (action) and firstness (feeling) in the moment of 
belief.

Even if we consider a belief in terms of its secondness I’m not sure that 
resolves the issues in the quote at hand.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the output/Interpretant 
is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise - which is a belief. 
[2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign [1-2-3]..where the Interpretant is in 
a mode of Firstness.

I didn't say that a belief was pure secondness [2-2-2]. 


  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 11:19 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 24, 2015, at 7:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, 
strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise 
dealing with a similar situation.
Habits are Thirdness and thus, generalities.

A belief is not necessarily a habit; it can be in a mode of Secondness, a 
specific particular belief.


  It would seem to me a particular belief is always still thirdness although it 
may have an aspect of secondness to it. I don’t see how a belief could be pure 
secondness. Even a particular belief is always still a general. I think you 
want to say a moment of belief but then as belief it’s still thirdness but 
there will be both secondness (action) and firstness (feeling) in the moment of 
belief.


  Even if we consider a belief in terms of its secondness I’m not sure that 
resolves the issues in the quote at hand.






--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Clark:

On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:19 AM, Clark Goble wrote:

> Even a particular belief is always still a general.

Is this a logical assertion?

If so, what are premises?

Is it a deductive argument?

Is it an inductive argument?

Is it an abductive argument?

Or, could is be a conditional statement?

I bring these question to the discussion because this (philosophical?) 
assertion appears to negate the possibility of an individual belief and the 
belief of the chemists in the concept of an organic identity.  The concept of 
an organic identity appears to one of the cornerstones of CSP beliefs.

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) into 
an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. 

Not all signs have feeling and action associated with them [see the ten classes 
of signs]

Does a habit enable continuity (replication)? Yes; that's its function.

You write:
"Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about is 
acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of 
taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are 
reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s all 
Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. "

I'm not sure that reversibility can be equated with acquiring habits. The 
passage that we've been referring to 8.318, denies that habits include 
reversibility, and assigns reversibility to the purely mechanical realm. 

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:24 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the 
output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise - 
which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign [1-2-3]..where the 
Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness.

I didn't say that a belief was pure secondness [2-2-2].


  OK, I certainly don’t deny that. I’d say that’s still a type of thirdness in 
each of those cases as they are all classes of signs. That’s what I meant by "a 
particular belief is always still thirdness although it may have an aspect of 
secondness to it.”


  In any particular discussion of something in the world firstness, secondness 
and thirdness are all active. Even signs will have feeling and action 
associated with them.


  My point is more that a habit as a habit is general in that it has an 
essential feature of replicability. That is a habit must always include, if 
only potentially, the ability to repeat.


  Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about 
is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of 
taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are 
reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s all 
Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper. 


  It seems undeniable though that Peirce accepted habits (and belief) could 
become stronger or weaker. He didn’t see them only as becoming stronger.


  After thinking about this quote in 8.318 I suspect he simply means the habit 
of taking a particular habit makes it stronger until it’s permanent. The habit 
of rejecting a particular habit does the opposite until the habit is destroyed. 
One has to assume a middle ground as well although perhaps it’s just accidence 
he doesn’t deal with that in the quote in question.








--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, 
strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise 
dealing with a similar situation.
Habits are Thirdness and thus, generalities.

A belief is not necessarily a habit; it can be in a mode of Secondness, a 
specific particular belief. 

Only when beliefs are general underlying modes - without any particularity- can 
we define them as 'habits'. Beliefs that are concrete and specific - even if 
longlasting (like a stone!) are not, in my view, the same as habits because 
they lack generality. Exactly as you say, a habit has to be general and deal 
with a range of contexts.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: CLARK GOBLE 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 12:00 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:50 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> 
wrote:

My recall may be wrong, but it is that CSP introduced the notion of 
"habits" in distinction to the notion of "regularity."



  Yes I think habits imply regularities but regularities aren’t always habits.

  I think that’s somewhat what Edwina is getting at with the question of what 
level we’re speaking of. (See below)



On Nov 23, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Clark- just type into google, the whole line from Peirce, and you'll find 
the selection in the Collected Papers (ed. Hartshorne)...and it will give you 
more of what he was writing than that sentence.

   
  I had tried that but wasn’t having much luck. Google Books kept cutting off 
the surrounding pages for me. The page it was on talks about the evolution of 
time in fundamental ontological cosmology. (The origin of firstness) But I 
wasn’t able to see a date.


  Also what came up was apparently the same quote in CP volume 4. Yet the top 
of the page read “Ladd-Franklin, Cosmology 8.318” and I wasn’t quite sure what 
to make of that. Is it saying that what Google scanned is volume 8 but listed 
as volume 4 or something else? I wasn’t confident enough to say much about it. 
The Chronological Edition also came up which gave about half the paragraph 
prior to the quoted text, suggesting it was relating law and habit but again 
not enough to really give sufficient context. This is all I could find.


…law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly o the 
increase owing to the growth of habit. The tendency to form habits or tendency 
to generalize, is something which grows by its own action, by the habit of 
taking habits itself growing. Its first germs arose from pure chance. There 
were slight tendencies to obey rules that had been followed, and these 
tendencies were rules which rules which were more and more obeyed by their own 
action. There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and 
these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would sometimes be strengthened by 
the opposite tendency, but the stronger they became the more they would tend to 
destroy themselves. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity 
which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries.


  Now that’s still pretty confusing to me. The Chronological Edition quote is 
in volume 8 (1890-1892) so that gives a bit more about the time period. Also 
this quote does have the two directions but this weird enigmatic bit about 
destruction. Also there’s the distinction between 1st and 2cd order habits. 
(Habits and the habit of taking habits)


  So while this clearly is in the period when Peirce would be familiar with 
statistical mechanics I just am unsure his logic here or what phenomena he’s 
looking at to arrive at these conclusions.


  I’m open to any explanations.


I acknowledge your point that human beliefs are 'habits of thinking' but - 
the question is, do they actually 'cause' a morphological existential reality, 
in the same way as habits-of-formation cause a zebra to be, morphologically, 
...a zebra.  So- I don't really see cognitive habits of thinking ..as having 
much to do with this..

   
  Well that’s one way to deal with it - to distinguish habits in fundamental 
ontology from other habits. I’m not sure he’s making that move. Certainly the 
passage in question is cosmological. However from what I can tell habits are 
just habits - a common term he applies to both the regular phenomena of 
everyday life as well as fundamental ontology. If you’re aware of a place where 
he makes a clear distinction in his use of the term I’d be very interested. I 
admittedly didn’t do a thorough search but my preliminary search found nothing. 
Rather I think he sees this as phenomena that applies at all levels of 
existence. Which is why he uses the same term.


  Also I’m not sure we can make the distinction between “psychic” and 
“cognitive” in how he speaks. It seems 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of the 
> quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits being 
> reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually be 
> thinking thermodynamically here and the problem of reversibility there. Yet 
> it seems to me this runs up agains the problem of thermodynamics (in the 
> statistical mechanics version) being due to pure chance. Yet I’m not sure 
> Peirce’s adopting of the Epicurean swerve is pure chance in the same way. 
> That is mind traditionally was seen as something between determinism and pure 
> equally distributed chance. I’ll confess that I can’t recall of a place 
> Peirce addresses this though.

I’m trying to find something on this. Unfortunately none of my resources I have 
at hand discusses this. Although Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle 
of Life discusses the issues somewhat starting around page 88. They try and 
frame it in terms of quantum decoherence. It doesn’t seem to quite address the 
quote at hand though.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely
based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be
updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences ?  If so, it
would be a great challenge to discern what, if any, impact the "updated"
concept of "habits" might have on the metaphysics of Peirce.

All the best.

Sung

On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 23, 2015, at 6:30 AM, Jon Awbrey >
> wrote:
>
> On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:05 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
> Clark, Søren, lists,
>
> Peirce said:
>
> " . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of
> the law of mechanics,(112315-1)
> the law of habit forbids such reversal. '  (CP 8.318)
>
> I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on
> it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find
> it again.
>
> It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false
> even based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back
> into a bottle.  As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal
> of evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there
> developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on
> such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to
> the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel
> Prize in 1977.
>
>
> Peirce is using “mechanics” advisedly there to refer to classical
> mechanics as distinguished from thermodynamics.
>
>
> I took him to just be referring to basic mechanics rather than a more
> holistic treatment of mechanics that includes thermodynamics or statistical
> mechanics. I’m afraid I don’t know my 19th century physics history well
> enough to recall when people started thinking of thermodynamics in terms of
> statistical mechanics. I’m assuming it was Boltzman and thus around the
> time of Peirce’s formative years. But I might be wrong. I think recognition
> of reversibility problems despite the laws being reversible would have been
> known to Peirce. But again we have to distinguish the law from it’s impact
> on systems in practice.
>
> Anyone know the date for CP 8.318? (Or if it’s one of his better known
> papers, the title?)
>
> It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of
> the quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits
> being reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually be
> thinking thermodynamically here and the problem of reversibility there. Yet
> it seems to me this runs up agains the problem of thermodynamics (in the
> statistical mechanics version) being due to pure chance. Yet I’m not sure
> Peirce’s adopting of the Epicurean swerve is pure chance in the same way.
> That is mind traditionally was seen as something between determinism and
> pure equally distributed chance. I’ll confess that I can’t recall of a
> place Peirce addresses this though.
>
>
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:46 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> 
> Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely 
> based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be 
> updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences ?  If so, it 
> would be a great challenge to discern what, if any, impact the "updated" 
> concept of "habits" might have on the metaphysics of Peirce.
> 

I honestly don’t know the speculative influences on Peirce’s notion of habit. 
It seems a key concept early on in his intellectual history. My sense is that 
he picked up the idea from observing how we learn and extending it from there. 

It may be that he then made the connections with chemistry and physics. But I 
just don’t know when he was first exposed to the ideas of statistical 
mechanics. Certainly a lot of key aspects of statistical mechanics are from the 
1870’s. Certainly in “On a New List of Categories” (1868) "Questions Concerning 
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868) he doesn’t use the term habit. In 
"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868) he uses the term but it is 
clearly used in terms of humans.

Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects are habits, 
or nervous associations. A habit arises, when, having had the sensation of 
performing a certain act, m, on several occasions a, b, c, we come to do it 
upon every occurrence of the general event, l, of which a, b and c are special 
cases. […] Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore 
necessarily connected with attention or abstraction. Voluntary actions result 
from the sensations produced by habits, as instinctive actions result from our 
original nature.

Without doing a real literature search I’d guess that the connection to 
statistical mechanics comes later as that theory is developed in the 1870’s and 
1880’s.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung- in reply to your question: No.

I know that it is a constant refrain of yours that Peirce is 'old 19th century' 
(despite your not having read him with any thoroughness) - and needs to be 
updated (based, it seems, on your own contributions)but...I think I'll 
stick with Peirce.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:46 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Hi,


  Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely 
based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be 
updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences ?  If so, it would 
be a great challenge to discern what, if any, impact the "updated" concept of 
"habits" might have on the metaphysics of Peirce.


  All the best.


  Sung


  On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:



  On Nov 23, 2015, at 6:30 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:


  On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:05 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:


Clark, Søren, lists,


Peirce said: 


" . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation 
of the law of mechanics,(112315-1)
the law of habit forbids such reversal. '  (CP 8.318)


I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment 
on it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find 
it again.


It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false 
even based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back into 
a bottle.  As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal of 
evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there 
developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on such 
processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to the 
establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
1977.   


  Peirce is using “mechanics” advisedly there to refer to classical 
mechanics as distinguished from thermodynamics. 


I took him to just be referring to basic mechanics rather than a more 
holistic treatment of mechanics that includes thermodynamics or statistical 
mechanics. I’m afraid I don’t know my 19th century physics history well enough 
to recall when people started thinking of thermodynamics in terms of 
statistical mechanics. I’m assuming it was Boltzman and thus around the time of 
Peirce’s formative years. But I might be wrong. I think recognition of 
reversibility problems despite the laws being reversible would have been known 
to Peirce. But again we have to distinguish the law from it’s impact on systems 
in practice.


Anyone know the date for CP 8.318? (Or if it’s one of his better known 
papers, the title?)


It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of the 
quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits being 
reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually be thinking 
thermodynamically here and the problem of reversibility there. Yet it seems to 
me this runs up agains the problem of thermodynamics (in the statistical 
mechanics version) being due to pure chance. Yet I’m not sure Peirce’s adopting 
of the Epicurean swerve is pure chance in the same way. That is mind 
traditionally was seen as something between determinism and pure equally 
distributed chance. I’ll confess that I can’t recall of a place Peirce 
addresses this though.






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  -- 

  Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

  Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
  Rutgers University
  Piscataway, N.J. 08855
  732-445-4701

  www.conformon.net


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:50 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> My recall may be wrong, but it is that CSP introduced the notion of "habits" 
> in distinction to the notion of "regularity."
> 

Yes I think habits imply regularities but regularities aren’t always habits.

I think that’s somewhat what Edwina is getting at with the question of what 
level we’re speaking of. (See below)


> On Nov 23, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark- just type into google, the whole line from Peirce, and you'll find the 
> selection in the Collected Papers (ed. Hartshorne)...and it will give you 
> more of what he was writing than that sentence.
 
I had tried that but wasn’t having much luck. Google Books kept cutting off the 
surrounding pages for me. The page it was on talks about the evolution of time 
in fundamental ontological cosmology. (The origin of firstness) But I wasn’t 
able to see a date.

Also what came up was apparently the same quote in CP volume 4. Yet the top of 
the page read “Ladd-Franklin, Cosmology 8.318” and I wasn’t quite sure what to 
make of that. Is it saying that what Google scanned is volume 8 but listed as 
volume 4 or something else? I wasn’t confident enough to say much about it. The 
Chronological Edition also came up which gave about half the paragraph prior to 
the quoted text, suggesting it was relating law and habit but again not enough 
to really give sufficient context. This is all I could find.

…law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly o the increase 
owing to the growth of habit. The tendency to form habits or tendency to 
generalize, is something which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking 
habits itself growing. Its first germs arose from pure chance. There were 
slight tendencies to obey rules that had been followed, and these tendencies 
were rules which rules which were more and more obeyed by their own action. 
There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and these 
destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would sometimes be strengthened by the 
opposite tendency, but the stronger they became the more they would tend to 
destroy themselves. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity 
which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries.

Now that’s still pretty confusing to me. The Chronological Edition quote is in 
volume 8 (1890-1892) so that gives a bit more about the time period. Also this 
quote does have the two directions but this weird enigmatic bit about 
destruction. Also there’s the distinction between 1st and 2cd order habits. 
(Habits and the habit of taking habits)

So while this clearly is in the period when Peirce would be familiar with 
statistical mechanics I just am unsure his logic here or what phenomena he’s 
looking at to arrive at these conclusions.

I’m open to any explanations.

> I acknowledge your point that human beliefs are 'habits of thinking' but - 
> the question is, do they actually 'cause' a morphological existential 
> reality, in the same way as habits-of-formation cause a zebra to be, 
> morphologically, ...a zebra.  So- I don't really see cognitive habits of 
> thinking ..as having much to do with this..
 
Well that’s one way to deal with it - to distinguish habits in fundamental 
ontology from other habits. I’m not sure he’s making that move. Certainly the 
passage in question is cosmological. However from what I can tell habits are 
just habits - a common term he applies to both the regular phenomena of 
everyday life as well as fundamental ontology. If you’re aware of a place where 
he makes a clear distinction in his use of the term I’d be very interested. I 
admittedly didn’t do a thorough search but my preliminary search found nothing. 
Rather I think he sees this as phenomena that applies at all levels of 
existence. Which is why he uses the same term.

Also I’m not sure we can make the distinction between “psychic” and “cognitive” 
in how he speaks. It seems to me it’s all just mind for him.

> As to whether they are 'reversible' - in the mechanical sense, I might 
> quibble with that. We can arrive at a belief, and then, change back to a 
> former  belief, but I'm not sure if this return is as 'pure' as it originally 
> was. Let's say, I believe that unicorns do exist; then, I decide that they do 
> NOT exist; and then, I revert back to my first belief that they do exist. I 
> think this third belief is tainted, by its having been 'vetted' so to speak, 
> against the comparison with the belief in unicorns NOT existing. So, the 
> superficial belief might seem similar, but, not with that comparison clinging 
> to it. These changes have nothing mechanical and reversible about them..They 
> are, really, 'evolutionary'..even though the final phase is similar, 
> somewhat, to the first phase.

In a follow up email that may have come after you wrote this I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Clark:

On Nov 23, 2015, at 11:00 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:

> Also (and I think this is important) I think Peirce might say that the nature 
> of the habit is wrapped up in his pragmatic maxim. That is a habit’s meaning 
> consists not of an index to a particular context but of its counterfactual 
> possibilities in all the ways we’d measure it. That is habit to be a habit 
> has to be general and deal with a range of contexts. Presumably then the 
> strength of habit would be tied to its properties across those contexts. Much 
> like hardness is tied to the range of things we might scratch an object with. 
> (To use Peirce’s own example)

If one approaches the concept of habit as a form of consistency of behavior or 
repetition of processes, then one can analyze a chemical reaction as a habit of 
nature.

Is it a habit of nature to form the same products from the same reactants?  

>From the Leibnizian view of truths of reason and the legisigns of physics, 
>such a habit of nature can be observed with great regularity for a specific 
>set of physical circumstances.  The propositional logic for the reaction is 
>consistent if and only if the circumstances are consistent.

>From the Leibnizian view of truths of facts and the legisigns of physics, if 
>the physical circumstances are substantially changed, the 'habit of nature' 
>may not occur.  No reaction may occur only different circumstances.  

Further, under one set of circumstances a particular proposition of chemistry 
may be true while under a different set of circumstances, say a change in 
catalyst, a radically different proposition may be true. 

These examples are common in living organisms where cybernetic switches in 
pathways can be rapid.  The inductive logic of the "lac operon" is a simple 
example of changes of habits in a cell, such as E coli.  

Organic logic and organic mathematics are perplex relative to the simplicity of 
traditional function-argument logic of the set theory.  A critical distinction 
is the inclusion of quantifiers with the concept of set of atomic numbers such 
that molecular weights and molecular formula are individual propositions with 
identity.

Cheers

jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Clark:

My recall may be wrong, but it is that CSP introduced the notion of "habits" in 
distinction to the notion of "regularity."

In this context, I read the text as a simple recognition that the "regularity" 
(of geometry?, mathematics? and physical laws?) were not universal features of 
either nature or logic.  Rather, CSP was using the propositional term 'habit' 
as a concept that included both regularity and irregularity.  

One read this quote as a rejection of the universal physical laws, if one is so 
inclined.

The exact source of this quote is probably known to some of the posters here.

Cheers

Jerry.



On Nov 23, 2015, at 3:11 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

> 
>> On Nov 23, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits 
>> are reversible? I would consider that they are non-reversible. To have 
>> reversible habits -  whew- that would deny adaptation, evolution, Thirdness 
>> as Mindit would make everything almost pure mechanics…
> 
> 
> Beliefs are habits. Beliefs change and it’s not at all uncommon to return to 
> an original belief after being persuaded of a different conclusion.
> 
> Now one way to deal with this is to make a distinction between Peirce’s early 
> period and his conception of habit (say up through the late 1870’s) as 
> compared to his mature thought in the late 1890’s onward. 
> 
> My own view is that we have to think of habit as a matter of degree and thus 
> reversibility as a matter of degree. Quite concrete habits are thus far less 
> likely to be reversed. 
> 
> This makes sense considering habits not just at the individual level but at 
> the social level. Thus the mechanistic conception of physics was rather 
> congealed and took a while to really shift with the rise of quantum 
> mechanics. One might say though that perhaps we should distinguish between 
> epistemology where reality is acting upon us to lead us to permanence and 
> ontological conceptions of basic cosmology where laws are developing in 
> nature itself. While that is a natural distinction to raise, I’m not sure 
> Peirce ultimately makes it.
> 
> I’m open to being wrong on habits, but I confess I can’t see how to square 
> that circle without either rejecting the reversibility thesis or rejecting 
> the equating of beliefs as habits.
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits are 
reversible? I would consider that they are non-reversible. To have reversible 
habits -  whew- that would deny adaptation, evolution, Thirdness as Mindit 
would make everything almost pure mechanics...

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:24 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments




On Nov 23, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:


It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of the 
quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits being 
reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually be thinking 
thermodynamically here and the problem of reversibility there. Yet it seems to 
me this runs up agains the problem of thermodynamics (in the statistical 
mechanics version) being due to pure chance. Yet I’m not sure Peirce’s adopting 
of the Epicurean swerve is pure chance in the same way. That is mind 
traditionally was seen as something between determinism and pure equally 
distributed chance. I’ll confess that I can’t recall of a place Peirce 
addresses this though.


  I’m trying to find something on this. Unfortunately none of my resources I 
have at hand discusses this. Although Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the 
Riddle of Life discusses the issues somewhat starting around page 88. They try 
and frame it in terms of quantum decoherence. It doesn’t seem to quite address 
the quote at hand though.






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits are 
> reversible? I would consider that they are non-reversible. To have reversible 
> habits -  whew- that would deny adaptation, evolution, Thirdness as 
> Mindit would make everything almost pure mechanics…


Beliefs are habits. Beliefs change and it’s not at all uncommon to return to an 
original belief after being persuaded of a different conclusion.

Now one way to deal with this is to make a distinction between Peirce’s early 
period and his conception of habit (say up through the late 1870’s) as compared 
to his mature thought in the late 1890’s onward. 

My own view is that we have to think of habit as a matter of degree and thus 
reversibility as a matter of degree. Quite concrete habits are thus far less 
likely to be reversed. 

This makes sense considering habits not just at the individual level but at the 
social level. Thus the mechanistic conception of physics was rather congealed 
and took a while to really shift with the rise of quantum mechanics. One might 
say though that perhaps we should distinguish between epistemology where 
reality is acting upon us to lead us to permanence and ontological conceptions 
of basic cosmology where laws are developing in nature itself. While that is a 
natural distinction to raise, I’m not sure Peirce ultimately makes it.

I’m open to being wrong on habits, but I confess I can’t see how to square that 
circle without either rejecting the reversibility thesis or rejecting the 
equating of beliefs as habits.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 23, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Nov 23, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky > > wrote:
>> 
>> Clark - i'm quite confused by this. Where do you get the idea that habits 
>> are reversible? I would consider that they are non-reversible. To have 
>> reversible habits -  whew- that would deny adaptation, evolution, Thirdness 
>> as Mindit would make everything almost pure mechanics…
> 
> 
> Beliefs are habits. Beliefs change and it’s not at all uncommon to return to 
> an original belief after being persuaded of a different conclusion.

To add, I think we need to be careful not to equivocate. Reversibility in the 
quote seems reasonable to associate with thermodynamics either 
phenomenologically arrived at or by the 1870’s conceived of through statistical 
mechanics. In this case reversibility is really a question of likelihood. It’s 
not that reversals are impossible. It’s that they quickly become extremely 
unlikely. 

Reversibility in a particular habit is slightly more complex. I’m suggesting 
that for a given fixed system it’s possible they’d reverse but unlikely. Yet if 
the underlying system changes then of course there are different forces that 
could easily change the habit. So of course merely changing habit needn’t imply 
formal reversibility if the system changes.

What Peirce means in the quote in question I’m not sure without knowing the 
context for the quote. My guess is that there is that connection to 
thermodynamics because otherwise it makes no sense.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 12:50 PM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> I think it is questionable whether Chomsky was really a rationalist, since 
> he, like Pinker, often spoke of syntax as something that evolved, and 
> therefore contingent. Mark Bickhard has argued that given a rich enough form 
> of language we can derive Chomsky’s syntactic rules. The rules would still be 
> contingent, though. It gets a bit muddy from there, since there are various 
> views of law-like necessity available.
> 

I don’t claim to have read all of Chomsky (and a lot not since college) so I’m 
not at all qualified to say what his philosophy is. (I didn’t even know about 
the Peirce influence) That said I’ve read a lot of the debate between Pinker 
and him and he certainly doesn’t come off as a Rationalist to me. If anything 
I’d think both would be open to evolution selecting for rules precisely because 
of structures inherent in the universe. (Although I can’t remember if either 
said anything along those lines) 

That view of evolution might raise the question of what we mean by contingent. 
Certainly it’s contingent in certain ways but not in others. (Much like vision 
is contingent but what it’s selected for is to deal with phenomena that isn’t 
contingent in any straightforward way — ignoring the symmetry breaking in the 
early moments of the universe)

> I would agree, but most rationalists would not, I think. I should have made 
> it clear that I was restricting to a priori truths. Synthetic a priori 
> truths, which rationalists accept the existence of, are typically taken by 
> rationalists to have only conventions as an alternative. But even then there 
> is a problem. The problem is that naturalist approaches make some a priori 
> truths consequences of the discoverable nature of things, and not a result of 
> reason alone. We don’t intuit them on this account, in the rationalist sense.

Right. This to me is a problem with the Rationalists. It’s really that they 
want two epistemological capabilities: intuition and sense. I just think that 
that intuition is either unconscious judgements developed over time empirically 
or else are a result of genetics that developed evolutionarily in a similar 
way. I’m dubious of some absolute unmediated intuition ala how Plato saw 
mathematics. (Of course Plato at least had a satisfactory explanation for how 
this would work via recollections - it’s been a while but I don’t recall the 
Rationalists having good explanations along those lines)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

524-558)
>
> A.B. Kempe on the mathematical theory of relations :
> a. 1886 A Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
> b. 1887 Note to a Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
> c. 1889-90 “On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the
> Geometrical Theory of Points”
> d. 1890 “The Subject Matter of Exact Thought”
> e. 1894 “Mathematics”
> f. 1897 “The Theory of Mathematical Form.  A Correction and Explanation”
>
> Peirce’s notes and responses to Kempe
> g. Notes on Kempe 1889-90 (MS 1584)
> h. Notes on Kempe’s Paper in Vol XXI… (MS 709)(undated)
> i. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MS 710: 2-8)
> j. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MSS 711: 2-5, 712: 2, 712s :2-3; 713:2-3)
> k. Notes on Kempe’s Paper on Mathematical Form (MS 714)
> l. Reply to Mr. Kempe” (MS 708: 2-19)
> m. Notes on “A.B. Kempe, ‘On the Relation Between the Logical Theory of
> Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Point’” (MS 1584: 17-24)
> n. Annotations in his copy of Kempe 1886.
>
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> 
> From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L
> Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions,
> Arguments
>
> Jeff, list,
>
> Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
> thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
> thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.
>
> I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
> to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
> your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
> Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
> Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
> and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
> particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
> details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
> relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
> extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
> thought I'd ask.
>
> I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> 
>
> Franklin, List,
>
> Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
> earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some
> additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your
> questions are in quotes.  Short responses follow.
>
> A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
> object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
> is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
> belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
> suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
> but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point
> made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said,
> let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
> a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
> Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
> Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between
> kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
> immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
> Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
> that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
> classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
> account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant.  In my
> efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
> 66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
> here.  After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
> is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
> interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.
>
> B.  "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used
> for the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and
> perceptual judgment."  I should have made it clearer that I was trying to
> point out that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the
> qua

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> 
>> Peirce just doesn’t see the whole universe in those terms unlike Leibniz or 
>> Spinoza.
> 
> Your judgment is hard for me accept.
> 
> I could argue that CSP not only sees the whole universe, but he see's it with 
> the exquisite details available only to those that have mastered the chemical 
> symbol system, it's logic and its extension to life itself. 

I was more thinking in terms of his fairly explicit writing on fundamental 
ontology. While I confess it’s these areas I find Peirce most speculative and 
hardest to take seriously, they are there.

Again I’d point people to Kelly Parker’s work on this in “Peirce as 
neoPlatonist.” While there are one or two places I have some problems with the 
paper, overall it’s hard to argue with that this forms an important aspect of 
Peirce’s cosmology.

http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html 


The key passage from Peirce I think relevant to your questions is this one:

Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come 
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by 
the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would 
not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because 
resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and 
more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into 
something like a continuous flow. 

The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from time 
in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. Different 
flashes might start different streams, between which there should be no 
relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one stream might branch into 
two, or two might coalesce. But the further result of habit would inevitably be 
to separate utterly those that were long separated, and to make those which 
presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect union. Those that were 
completely separated would be so many different worlds which would know nothing 
of one another; so that the effect would be just what we actually observe. (CP 
1.412)

Again we needn’t accept Peirce on this but I don’t think we can dismiss it as a 
part of Peirce’s thinking. (Recognizing we need to keep clear dates for the 
various writings)

Now whether we take this as quanta obtaining continuum or in other phenomena 
continuum achieving quanta seems a slightly different issue. Peirce sees habits 
as the ontological underpinning of what we’d call matter and I’d call the 
measurable. Whether we can as a practical matter relate this more neoPlatonic 
ontology to the practical requirements of contemporary quantum field theory is 
yet still an other matter.

I should note that this paper of Parker’s is tied to his book on Peirce, The 
Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s an interesting introduction to Peirce as 
well as a focus on Peirce’s notion of continuity. I find it very good although 
not as technical as some others on the same subject (like say Zalamea’s)
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> I should note that this paper of Parker’s is tied to his book on Peirce, The 
> Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s an interesting introduction to Peirce as 
> well as a focus on Peirce’s notion of continuity. I find it very good 
> although not as technical as some others on the same subject (like say 
> Zalamea’s)

One anticipation of response is in order. I recognize Paker makes a fairly 
controversial claim in the above. He thought key to Peirce’s continuity in all 
periods were the claims that there are no ultimate parts and that 
infinitesimals are real. However certainly in his mature period in the late 
1890’s onward he did hold to the Aristotilean ideal of there being no ultimate 
parts. (Contra Leibniz) Also in this mature period he breaks more with Cantor 
partially due to a reengagement with Aristotle.

Alas I’ll confess it’s been some time since I last studied all this. So I’d not 
feel comfortable saying much beyond that without reviewing my notes. (And 
perhaps checking to see what’s been done since)
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments and "The union of units unites the unity."

[Clark Goble]

Just to add to that discussion of the problem of metaphysical origins of 
continuity and quanta (integers). It’s from Jerome Havenel’s “Peirce’s 
Clarifications of Continuity.” First a quote from Peirce.

In Spencer’s phrase the undifferentiated differentiates itself. The homogeneous 
puts on heterogeneity. However it may be in special cases, then, we must 
suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a more general 
continuum, a continuum of higher generality . . . If this be correct, we cannot 
suppose the process of derivation, a process which extends from before time and 
from before logic, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than in the utter 
vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potential- ity. (RLT, p. 
258)

Note how here Peirce is still keeping with the basic ontology of neoplatonic 
emanations. This is prior to time and thus not cosmology in a physical sense. 
Time itself is regularity and thus has to develop before we can speak of time.

Quoting from Havenel:

Now, how could the universe have arisen from “nothing, pure zero, . . . prior 
to every first”? (CP 6.217, 1898). Contrary to Hegel’s logic of events, Peirce 
considers that no deduction “necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless 
freedom” (CP 6.219), but that the “logic may be that of the inductive or 
hypothetic inference” (CP 6.218).

But at which stage did the “nothing, pure zero”, becomes a continuum? Whereas 
the zero is mere “germinal possibility” (NEM 4.345), the continuum is 
“developed possibility” (ibid). According to Floyd Merrell, before any existing 
thing could have arisen in the universe, the nothingness has become: “the 
continuous flux of Firstness”. Indeed, Peirce states that:

The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which 
this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential Secondness of 
Existence, a discontinuous mark . . . There is room in the world of possibility 
for any multitude of such universes of Existence. (NEM 4.345)

Peirce thinks that the “original potentiality is the Aristotelian matter or 
indeterminacy from which the universe is formed” (RLT, p. 263), and this 
“original potentiality is essentially continuous” (RLT, p. 262). Since the 
definitions of otherness and “. . . the principle of excluded middle, or that 
of contradiction, ought to be regarded as violated” (NEM 3.747).

Although for Peirce the dimension of a continuum may be of any discrete 
multitude, there is an exception for the original continuum, whose number of 
dimensions is no longer discrete.

If the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there cease to 
be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained a logi- cally distinct 
conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I iden- tify it with the uralt 
vague generality of the most abstract potentiality. (RLT, p. 253–254)

Havenel then turns to the issues I think John is getting at.


Yet, Douglas R. Anderson has pointed out the following difficulty: how can 
evolution be a continuous process if chance and spontaneity are discontinuous 
events82? According to Peirce’s Tychism, there can be no rational continuity 
between past events and spontaneity. The answer is that discontinuity is not 
absolute but is relative. For example, if one draws a new curve on a 
blackboard, it is a discontinuity. Nevertheless, “although it is new in its 
distinctive character, yet it derives its conti- nuity from the continuity of 
the blackboard itself ” (RLT, p. 263).

Moreover, Peirce’s theory of evolution involves the notion of a final 
continuum. The universe evolves not only by chance and necessity, but also 
towards a final continuum, which is final less as a result than as a principle. 
For Peirce, “continuity is Thirdness in its full entelechy” (RLT, p. 190), and 
as a final cause, there is an end of History, but as a final result there is 
not. Thus, the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process but not in 
individual reactions in their isolation; it lies in the growth of sympathy with 
others.

Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becom- ing 
continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general 
ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of 
reasonableness. (CP 5.4, 1902)

Havenel sees a period of further development from 1908 to 1913 which he calls 
Peirce’s topological period. 

Peirce changes his mind about what is a “true” continuum. Although he maintains 
the idea of potentiality, the notion of continuity does not mainly rest on the 
notion of multi- plicity anymore, but mainly on topological considerations and 
on the relations between the parts of a continuum. Such a change explains why I 
call this last period “topological”.

Going on about changes, he says,

He left aside his previous distinction between the pseudo- continuum and the 
true continuum, for a new distinction between a perfect 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Ed,

Thanks for your response.
You wrote :

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a
product of the human brain,(111815-1)
and therefore it is not logical."

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is
not surprising(111815-2)
that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens
in the Universe."

All the best.

Sung






On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote:

> Sung,
>
> You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true.
> "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a
> product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its
> language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational
> language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD).
> Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really
> there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the
> art of calculating, refers to "what *could be* there" (cf. my 2012 essay
> "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website
> www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an
> "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is
> "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the
> reality and measurability of space and time)
>
> Ed.
>
> --
> *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im
> Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji
> *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29
> *An:* PEIRCE-L
> *Cc:* biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian;
> Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
> *Betreff:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>
> Hi,
>
> A correction:
>
> Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*)
> with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".
>
> Thanks.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
> To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov <
> spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E.
> Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu>
>
>
> (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)
>
> Franklin, Gary R, lists,
>
> In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be
> published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed
> in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would
> appreciate hearing from you.
>
> There are several points that need explanations:
>
> (*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to
> facilitate discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with
> what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.
>
> (*2*)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics
> to biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own
> references here despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only
> justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists
> that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my
> published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants
> on these lists.)
>
> (*3*)  When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell
> biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation"
> (see the second row, *Table 1*)  in order to account for some of the
> cellular metabolism and processes.  I then decided to export this concept
> back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the
> distinction between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple
> syllogisms.  This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that
>
> 1) *words denote  *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic
> signs that I listed in my previous post)
>
> 2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs)
>
> 3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.*
>
>
>
> __
>
> *Table 1*.  The common structures of the languages at

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

A correction:

Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*)
with "nucleotides,
A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".

Thanks.

Sung



-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov <
spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E.
Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu>


(The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)

Franklin, Gary R, lists,

In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be
published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed
in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would
appreciate hearing from you.

There are several points that need explanations:

(*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to
facilitate discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with
what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.

(*2*)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to
biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own references
here despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only justification I have
for doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the
statements that I make on these posts are supported by my published
research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants on these
lists.)

(*3*)  When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology,
I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the
second row, *Table 1*)  in order to account for some of the cellular
metabolism and processes.  I then decided to export this concept back to
humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction
between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple syllogisms.
This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that

1) *words denote  *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs
that I listed in my previous post)

2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs)

3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.*



__

*Table 1*.  The common structures of the languages at three levels --
'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].'

__


   *1st articulation 2nd articulation  '3rd
articulation'*

__

'humanese'  wordsletters
 sentences
| |
|
   VV
V
 sentenceswords
 syllogisms/texts
___

'cellese'   1-D biopolymers   monomers  3-D
biopolymers
  | |
 |
 VV
  V
3-D biopolymers  1-D biopolymers chemical
waves [8]



'cosmese' terms  X
  propositions
(or logic ?)|   |
  |
V  V
V
propositions  terms
arguments
_


(*4*)  You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row.  I
was led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry consideration
with respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am at  a loss
what this may be.  Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce discussed
something related to this ?  Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups of signs
(i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign,
and argument) ?  If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to the monomers
in biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA, and 20
amino acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in human languages.
This may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups and 10 classes,
which I referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite signs",
respectively, in [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from
Franklin in his recent 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then 
thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis 
precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented 
which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, 
that is to say, its having parts consists in this, that the mind afterward 
recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not in the first 
idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of 
destructive distillation. When, having thus separated them, we think over them, 
we are carried in spite of ourselves from one thought to another, and therein 
lies the first real synthesis. An earlier synthesis than that is a fiction. The 
whole conception of time belongs to genuine synthesis and is not to be 
considered under this head.  

What does this tell us about the way the different kinds of 
sign-object-interpretant triads might be related as parts of a larger semiotic 
process of interpretation?

--Jeff




Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 3:10 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list,

Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were attached to 
the email.   The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete.  There are a large 
number of divisions that need to be considered, and the labels on the diagrams 
I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions about how we might 
understand a relatively small number of the different classes of signs/.

Oh, certainly. The task is really monumental, and you have my sympathy and 
support with trying to get it all worked out.

My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was to ask 
how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of cognition 
are related to those at another higher level of cognition.  As such, I asked 
how the relations between the percept, qualisign and immediate interpretant on 
the left part of the diagram fit with the relations between the sinsign, 
dynamical object and dynamical interpretant in the middle, and I then ask the 
same kind of question about the relations between legisign, dynamical object 
and final interpretant on the right.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'higher' level of cognition. Do you mean 
a cognition, more fully developed? Or do you mean two cognitions occurring at 
the same time, in which the lower one somehow is serving or participating in 
the higher one? I wonder about that because of the way you split things up. I 
am somewhat curious about it and why you did it the way you did. But then I see 
you go on to remark about that.

In doing so, was trying to ask the following question:  When an interpretant at 
a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, is it only the 
interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the whole complex of 
sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of the sign?  One reason 
I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that the interpretant itself 
involves the triadic relation between its object and the sign it is 
interpreting.  As such, if only the interpretant is serving as the sign at the 
next higher level, then we are leaving out of the picture an essential part of 
what makes the interpretant the kind of thing it is.

This is tricky. We know that the (original) sign is supposed to determine the 
interpreter to be determined in such a way as to be in relation to the object 
in the way in which the sign is itself determined by the object. So there is a 
question there: If the interpreter becomes so determined, is there any 
necessity for the original sign now? Since the interpreter (new sign) is 
determined to the object in the same way the original sign was, perhaps this is 
enough, and the interpreter doesn't need the original sign. To take an example 
for explaining this, we could consider how often we hear arguments in favor of 
a certain conclusion, the conclusion becomes adopted, we now act upon that 
conclusion as a proposition believed, but then we forget about the arguments 
that originally brought us to this believed proposition. Also consider the case 
of perceptual judgment. Typically, we just won't remember all the various 
percepts that determined the judgment in us; we just remember the judgment. It 
simplifies things, and it's supposed to, because such simplification 
facilitates the work of thought, and consequently action.

Now, I take it you are suggesting that from the standpoint of conscious 
awareness, this might all be true; but really, the original signs never go 
away. That might be a tough argument to make. Could you come up with some 
examples that make this case seem likely? I could see on

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

ter putting a lot of thought into this
> reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and
> signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in
> which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any
> sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of
> being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce
> meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever.
>
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> ---
>
> On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Franklin, my responses inserted below.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on
>> Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread,
>> of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
>>
>>
>>
>> I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word
>> "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think
>> that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply
>> propositions.
>>
>> GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of
>> signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies
>> characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign,
>> *A*, then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*.
>> If a sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole
>> of the objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a
>> *subject* (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these
>> are definitions of *predicate* and *subject*?
>>
>>
>>
>> Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of
>> predicates and subjects:
>>
>> “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the
>> characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical
>> *depth*. … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the
>> totality of the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.”
>> Now, when you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and
>> not simply propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and
>> breadth? According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have depth only
>> if it has predicates and signifies characters. Do all signs do that?
>> Likewise, in order to have breadth, a sign must have subjects and real
>> objects. Do all signs have those? If not, how can you claim that the
>> referent of the term “a sign” in those definitions can be *any* sign at
>> all? Peirce’s definitions specify that a sign that has depth *and*
>> breadth (and thus can convey information) must have predicate(s) *and*
>> subject(s). Does that apply to all kinds of sign?
>>
>>
>>
>> But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain
>> the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be
>> somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where
>> Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms,
>> and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments.
>> Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments
>> may be regarded as propositions.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign
>> cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to
>> form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).
>>
>>
>>
>> In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear
>> that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man"
>> have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is
>> true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no
>> meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the
>> information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic
>> propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;*
>> its informed depth and breadth is d

[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

e mind.

For now, I'll hold onto the initial suggestion that the percipuum is a term for 
a continual process of interpretation, where the percept and perceptual 
judgments are parts of that process.  What parts are they?  Well I am tempted 
to think of the percept as a kind of starting point and the perceptual judgment 
as a kind of terminal or resting point for the process of interpretation.  What 
might we learn from the definitions above, and the remark that Peirce makes to 
the effect that praecipuum was taken as a model for the terms percipuum, 
antecipuum and ponecipuum?  Let's consider some textual evidence that Peirce 
might be drawing out a point that is more legal in character--just as 
praecipuum draws its meaning from the Roman law tradition.  Here is an oft 
quoted passage about the nature of assertion:  "§5. SIGNS [January 22, 1905] 
Now an assertion belongs to the class of phenomena like going before a notary 
and making an affidavit, executing a deed, signing a note, of which the essence 
is that one voluntarily puts oneself into a situation in which penalties will 
be incurred unless some proposition is true." (CP 8.313)

If this is true of assertions generally, then shouldn't we conceive of 
perceptual judgments on this legal model?  This certainly has a Kantian ring to 
it.  Here is a telling passage:  "Form of cognition, in Kant's doctrine, is 
that element of knowledge which the matter of experience must assume in order 
to be apprehended by the mind. Kant seems to have been thinking of legal forms 
which must be complied with in order to give standing before a court. So an 
English sovereign, in order to be crowned, must, as a "matter of form," swear 
to an intensity of loathing for Romish dogmas which he probably regards with 
great coolness." (Krit. d. Reinen Vernunft, 1st ed., p. 20)." (CP 6.362)

Notice that, on Peirce's account, the percept is largely characterized in 
negative terms:  "The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind"; 
"it does not stand for anything"; "it obtrudes itself upon my gaze, but not as 
a deputy of something else, not as anything"; "it would be useless for me to 
say 'I don’t believe in the chair'"; "I can’t dismiss is, as I would a fancy"; 
"it does not pretend to any right to be there".  Even here, in the account of 
the percept, things are put in legal terms.  If the percept does not pretend to 
any "right" to be there, then how does the perceptual judgment put us in a 
position to make an assertion--even if the judgment only consists in an 
assertion to oneself?  The key, I suspect, is that the percipuum is an 
immediate interpretation that consists of a skeleton set--a diagram of 
sorts--that articulates the formal relations between the parts of what is being 
perceived.  This is the point that Peirce stresses in the first definition he 
offers after noting Kant's account of the form of cognition:  "Kant's 
definitions are chiefly the following:  'In the phenomenon, that which 
corresponds to the impression of sense, I call the matter of it; while that 
which constitutes the fact that manifoldness of the phenomenon is intuited as 
ordered in certain relations, I call the form of the phenomenon."  As such, it 
is the manifold of the phenomena that we observe that stands in need of some 
conception so that it might be brought into unity. 

So, if percipio means "to understand, to be aware of the meaning of, observe, 
take possession of," then we might understand the percipuum as the process of 
interpreting what is present to mind so that one gains a right to assert what 
is expressed in the perceptual judgment as a matter of fact.  When the right is 
conferred on the subject who is making the judgment, the possession becomes a 
matter of property--personal or public.  Having explored just this much of the 
analogy between the legal meaning of praecipuum and the things that Peirce 
explicitly says about perceptual judgments, I think there is good reason to 
believe that he might very well have been suggesting that we can understand the 
meaning of 'percipuum' by drawing on these kinds of legal terms.  This kind of 
reading fits with a number of suggestions that Richard Smyth makes in .  In particular, look at his interpretation of the "negative" 
defense that is offered for the assertions that made in perceptual judgments.  
The defense or justification of the claims made in such judgments takes the 
form:  don't blame me, I couldn't help but draw that judgment--I not making 
this up.

--Jeff 


Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
____________
From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:55 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list,

I changed 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

n't mind, would you please be so kind as to
offer a page reference for me that makes the point?


> In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce
> defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a
> cognition of a mind.”


FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as
"a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind."


> Then in 1909 he writes that:
> “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the
> nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living
> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as
> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of
> being” (CP 6.341, 1909).
> What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say
> that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that?


FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly
the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign
that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed
to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage
that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a
proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject,
that does not make it any less true that a term can have something
predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated
(and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process
by which this happens.


I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are
the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to
statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information,
and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes
sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say
about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously
that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to
believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this would
contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly
suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this
reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and
signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in
which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any
sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of
being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce
meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever.


-- Franklin


---

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Franklin, my responses inserted below.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on
> Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread,
> of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
>
>
>
> I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign"
> instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that
> Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions.
>
> GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of
> signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters
> that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*,
> then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a
> sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the
> objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject*
> (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these are
> definitions of *predicate* and *subject*?
>
>
>
> Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of
> predicates and subjects:
>
> “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the
> characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*.
> … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of
> the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” Now, when
> you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply
> propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth?
> According to Peirce’s definition here, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Franklin, list,

You asked:  Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 
1896-1902 and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations?

For my money, I think the clearest explanations of how relations are formed 
between other relations is in “The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop 
my categories from within” (CP 1.417--520).  Here is a list of resources I'm 
drawing on to sort out what Peirce is doing in this essay.  The last on the 
list (#12) is a good place to look next.  For an explanation of how to clarify 
our understanding of relations, see #5.

1. Remarks on Kempe’s Memoir on the Theory of  Mathematical Form (1888-?) [see 
references below] (several of these MS are in NEM, vol. 3)
2. Critic of Arguments (1892)
3. Grand Logic  (1893)
4. The Regenerated Logic (1896)
5. The Logic of Relatives (1897)
6. The Elements of Mathematics (1896-8)
7. The New Elements of Geometry (1896-8)
8. Minute Logic:  dichotomic and trichotomic mathematics (1902)
9. Harvard Lectures on “Phenomenology” and the “Universal Categories” (1903)
10. Two Essays on the nomenclature and division of dyadic and triadic relations 
(1903)
11. Telepathy (1903, CP 7.597-688)
12. "Consciousness" from "Some Logical Prolegomena", in "On Topical Geometry, 
In General" (CP 7.524-558)

A.B. Kempe on the mathematical theory of relations :
a. 1886 A Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
b. 1887 Note to a Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form
c. 1889-90 “On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the 
Geometrical Theory of Points”
d. 1890 “The Subject Matter of Exact Thought”
e. 1894 “Mathematics”
f. 1897 “The Theory of Mathematical Form.  A Correction and Explanation”

Peirce’s notes and responses to Kempe
g. Notes on Kempe 1889-90 (MS 1584)
h. Notes on Kempe’s Paper in Vol XXI… (MS 709)(undated)
i. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MS 710: 2-8)
j. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MSS 711: 2-5, 712: 2, 712s :2-3; 713:2-3)
k. Notes on Kempe’s Paper on Mathematical Form (MS 714)
l. Reply to Mr. Kempe” (MS 708: 2-19)
m. Notes on “A.B. Kempe, ‘On the Relation Between the Logical Theory of Classes 
and the Geometrical Theory of Point’” (MS 1584: 17-24)
n. Annotations in his copy of Kempe 1886.


Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list,

Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a thread 
already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that thread. I've 
brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.

I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need to 
spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in your last 
two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy". Actually, 
that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post: Would you be 
willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902 and others that 
you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In particular, you had 
said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the details of what he says 
about the way relations are formed between other relations in the essays 
(written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more extended discussions of 
phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just thought I'd ask.

I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.

-- Franklin



Franklin, List,

Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your 
earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some additional 
thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your questions are in 
quotes.  Short responses follow.

A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object 
is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is 
identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. 
Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the 
particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a 
little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point made. I was trying 
to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said, let us go back and ask 
this question: How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has 
for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which is a 
Pheme? For that is not the usual way with Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In 
all cases, the divisions are between kinds of signs, so I was not trying to 
suggest that the either the immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in 
themselves, rh

Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,
>
>
Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.

I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
thought I'd ask.

I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.

-- Franklin



Franklin, List,

Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some
additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your
questions are in quotes.  Short responses follow.

A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point
made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said,
let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between
kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant.  In my
efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
here.  After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.

B.  "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for
the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment."  I should have made it clearer that I was trying to point out
that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the qualisign is,
taken as a token instance, the sinsign that stands in relation to the
dynamical interpretant.  The curved line was meant to show that it is
carried over--along with its relation to qualisign and immediate object
(percept) into the open blank.

C.  A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation."  There are diagrams at
work in many places.  In the case of the immediate interpretant in relation
to the antecept, it is a vague diagram of future possibilities.  In
relation to the ponecept, it is a diagram of past memories of those
qualities we notice in the qualisign.  The immediate interpretant of the
percept is a limiting case of what I actually see now--as that is
interpreted in relation to the near past and present.  As such, it is a
skeleton set of skeleton sets (i.e., a diagram of diagrams).

I have reasons for thinking that this way of diagramming the basic
relations between signs, objects and interpretant is a reasonable
approach--and that is more enlightening than other kinds of diagrams that
have been offered in the secondary literature.  That, however, will require
a longer explanation.

With that much said, let's turn to the interpretation of the term
"percipuum."  Here are the definitions of the Latin terms:
1.  Praecipio:  to advise, give 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The
idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of
collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of
the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had
some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what
the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through
experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge
itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information
we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or
the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to
determine the dynamical object being signified.

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the
object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because
we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it
through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an
index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common
knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise,
the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a
symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless
it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of
whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of
physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human
body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't
know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal
at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the
symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to
something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later
through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous
experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes
the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this
collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a
disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.

Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been
before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place
signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have
been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of
objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and
signs. So our collateral information, or common knowledge, gives us an
indirect experience of the place by its connection with other objects, like
certain kinds of landmarks and signs, that we have experienced before, and
when we come upon those landmarks and signs, we will understand their
physical connection to the place. And that understanding will begin with
the giving of directions, which references one's starting point as having
certain physical connections to follow to those landmarks and signs, that
will in turn lead to the place. Once we have visited the place, it will now
be a part of the real objects we have experienced; and when we learn new
information about the place, we will now have the direct collateral
experience or information to understand which object the new information is
about.

To put the point more generally, there are all manner of physical
connections in nature. But we are not in a position to understand each and
every one of those connections, because there are many things we have not
experienced. As we gain experience of more things, we become able to
interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not
true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of
inquiry, or scientific community.

-- Franklin

---

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Franklin,
> right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical
> object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of
> self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like
> autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under
> the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding
> as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much
> for your friendly counseling!
> Best,
> Helmut
> 15. November 2015 um 23:55 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.
>
> I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a
> word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or
> 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

Franklin,

I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course, this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought, whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is good also for everybody else in this list.

Best,

Helmut


 


16. November 2015 um 17:34 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 


Helmut,
 

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to determine the dynamical object being signified.

 

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

 

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it.

 

Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place signified, we have to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Franklin, List,

Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were attached to 
the email.   The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete.  There are a large 
number of divisions that need to be considered, and the labels on the diagrams 
I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions about how we might 
understand a relatively small number of the different classes of signs/.

My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was to ask 
how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of cognition 
are related to those at another higher level of cognition.  As such, I asked 
how the relations between the percept, qualisign and immediate interpretant on 
the left part of the diagram fit with the relations between the sinsign, 
dynamical object and dynamical interpretant in the middle, and I then ask the 
same kind of question about the relations between legisign, dynamical object 
and final interpretant on the right. 

In doing so, was trying to ask the following question:  When an interpretant at 
a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, is it only the 
interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the whole complex of 
sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of the sign?  One reason 
I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that the interpretant itself 
involves the triadic relation between its object and the sign it is 
interpreting.  As such, if only the interpretant is serving as the sign at the 
next higher level, then we are leaving out of the picture an essential part of 
what makes the interpretant the kind of thing it is.

The example I was considering draws on the formation of perceptual judgments 
from percepts.  You cite a passage that is telling:  "Perhaps I might be 
permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both percept and perceptual 
judgment." (7.629)  In what sense does the percipuum include the other two?  My 
hunch is that the percipuum is taken to be a continuous process of 
interpretation--and that percept and perceptual judgments are taken to be parts 
of that process.  In order to spell out how that process might take shape, we 
would need to consider the relations between antecipuum, ponecipuum and 
percipuum.  Towards this end, let's consider what Peirce means by this 
technical term.  He tells us, in a footnote, that he formed each of these terms 
on the model of how Praecipuum was formed from Praecipio.

Here are the definitions of the Latin terms:
1.  Praecipio:  to advise, give counsel, give rules, instruct, teach
2.  Praecipuum  (Roman law):  a portion received from an inheritance before 
general distribution

What does this teach us about the relationships between the following 
definitions and the definition of the percipuum?

3.  Percipio:  to understand, to be aware of the meaning of, observe, take 
possession of

4.  Perceive:  1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of some 
object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; to come 
to know by a real action of the object on the mind (commonly upon the senses); 
though the knowledge may be inferential

5.  Percept:  the immediate object in perception 

6.  Perception:  1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of the 
18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the operation 
or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or resulting 
construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue of a real 
action of an object upon the mind.

The last three definitions are given by Peirce in the Century Dictionary.  So, 
how should we understand Peirce's technical term "Percipuum?"


Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 1:55 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, list,

I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any 
reply is made to what I have to say.

After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments. I 
would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much about this 
subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with the subject 
matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here.

One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object is, in 
brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is identified in 
brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. Relation of 
Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the particular 
examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a little 
confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we are talking 
about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many other things with each other.




Franklin,

I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course, this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought, whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is good also for everybody else in this list.

Best,

Helmut


 


16. November 2015 um 17:34 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 


Helmut,
 

To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to determine the dynamical object being signified.

 

This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or points to.

 

So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a disease, and now recognize the symptoms as 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

The unicorn issue is one that I am uncertain about. There's not much more
to say about it at this point, as I don't recall what CSP had to say about
such things, and I haven't put much thought into it with respect to the
semiotic point of view. One thing I could mention is that Peirce
distinguished between natural classes and artificial classes, and I think
it is safe to say that unicorn is an artificial class. This leaves in doubt
whether there is any genuine information about it, or whether there is a
dynamical object. I don't really like the suggestion that there is no
dynamical object in this case, but I suppose it's something to consider. In
any case, it is possible to have logical quantity--intension and
extension--without it being informed logical quantity. To be candid with
you though, these are just some stray thoughts, and I don't have a
considered answer at this time. It's quite possible that Peirce gave a
considered answer, but I don't recall it at this time.

The argument becoming a proposition when understood or believed is an idea
that might be worth considering. I wouldn't exactly say that it becomes a
proposition. It has already been mentioned in recent discussions in the
recent discussion on the list that an argument can be considered as a
proposition, and how that would work. Whether there is some special
consideration with respect to the argument becoming understood or believed,
I remain hesitant to say.

I'm not sure what you meant about the "level of source of collateral
information" and how it relates to the definition of the dynamical object,
or the possible connection with the final interpretant.

-- Franklin

-

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have
> confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many
> other things with each other.
> Franklin,
> I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a
> dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then
> Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the
> concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course,
> this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least
> not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like
> that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an
> intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people
> thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in
> Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of
> the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought,
> whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real
> nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about
> aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they
> cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in
> nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this
> argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a
> knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an
> argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or
> even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the
> immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is
> easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that
> electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that
> there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at
> which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the
> dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the
> dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might
> be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a
> character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in
> real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged
> to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by
> reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is
> good also for everybody else in this list.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

-
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Sungchul, list,

First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it
said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one
list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that
out.

Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with you, Sungchul. Your
reply to me seems to be on topic and just the sort of thing that I am
inclined to consider and respond to. But, I have seen many, many of your
posts, and almost always I simply move on as soon I see that it is from
you. I have noted from reading previous discussions you have had on the
list that you seem to have a couple of problems. One is that you haven't
really read much of Peirce, and don't seem inclined to correct this
problem. The other is that you have a funny way of constantly quoting
yourself, and have a habit of adding attachments to your posts. I don't
know if you have changed your ways and actually dug into some of Peirce's
texts; if you have, great, and you can disregard what I have said about
that. I just want to be perfectly clear and open here with you: If I sense
that what you have to say is the result of willful ignorance on your part
by choosing to not read Peirce, I will not reply. If you start adding
quotes from previous posts of yours from years ago, I will not reply (which
means, of course, if you do it again, I will not reply). If you start
adding attachments, I will not reply. I don't want to be rude, but I'm not
here to discuss the philosophy of Sungchul. I'm here to engage in
meaningful dialogue with others who have a sincere interest in Peirce's
philosophy. So long as I observe that to be in evidence, I will be more
than happy to discourse with you.

Moving on...

I don't really like these two lines:

Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which
> would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>


> Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
> if there were no interpretant."


My problem is that I am given to understand that Peirce wanted to use the
term 'interpretant' to cover the possibility that a sign might not be
interpreted. So the idea is that even if the sign were not actually being
interpreted at just this moment, it would still have an interpretant. I can
only guess that you got your quotes from Peirce, somewhere, somehow,
although you don't mention specifically where. All I can say is that
sometimes Peirce says things that I find upsetting, and this is one of
those cases. I maintain the view that the interpretant is there, regardless
of whether the sign is interpreted or not. There is no sign that does not
have an interpretant. In the case of a symbol needing to be interpreted, I
would say that so long as a symbol has been interpreted, it does not need
to be interpreted at just this moment in order to have an interpretant. It
is enough that the symbol has already been interpreted and has the real
possibility of being interpreted again.

I find your distinction between elementary and composite signs unfortunate
and undesirable. The nine 'elements', as you identify them, are not signs
in their own right. When we discuss a sign from the point of view of the
determination of a particular trichotomy, it is because it is not important
to consider other aspects of the sign class for the purpose of a given
analysis. If there were 'elementary' signs, it would probably have to be
those signs which other signs require in order to allow them to signify, as
when rhematic icons and rhematic indices are required by a dicentic symbol
(a proposition) in order to signify at all. This might be somewhat
misleading though, since as Stjernfelt points out in Natural Propositions
(p.77-78) with respect to terms, propositions, and arguments, a
'compositional' theory of signs is probably counter to what Peirce had in
mind.

Now as for the confining of the discussion, I disagree. So far as I see it,
the issue of the presentative aspect of the sign is not at issue. Would it
be possible to have a finer grained discussion if we discussed the ten
classes? Certainly. It would also be possible to have an even finer grained
discussion if we discussed the sixty-six classes. But what's the point? I
don't see it. If you think there is a point to discussing the matter in
such detail, then it is up to you to show the relevance of the finer points
introduced by considering the ten classes. If you can do that, I would
certainly be thankful. But I have only so much intellectual effort I can
expend, and I'd rather not waste my time and effort unless a consideration
is given that shows it is not a waste of time.

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, lists,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

Franklin,

thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given.

Best,

Helmut

 

14. November 2015 um 23:52 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom" 
 


Helmut,
 

I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.

 

If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.

 

Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number of things to say.

 

When you say "The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is about" and then "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well", it's unclear here what you mean by this. So let me give two guesses on my part. First of all, there is the presentative aspect of the sign. That is, we consider an object, and in what sense that object serves as a sign. In Peirce's semiotic, this will mean that it either serves as a medium according to a, or the, quality the object embodies (Firstness), the brute existence of the object (Secondness), or the object as having some kind of habit (Thirdness). This is what the trichotomy dealing with qualisign, sinsign, and legisign is about. It deals with the sign in its presentative aspect, what the basis is for its power of mediation. Then besides this kind of presenting, there is the dynamical/immediate object distinction. There is the object in itself, independent of what we think of it, and this is the dynamic object; I believe this fits with your thought that one aspect is "the meaning of the sign, what the sign is about". Then there is the object as represented by the sign within the sign, and that is the immediate object. As the quote from Frederik's book shows, the idea is that the immediate object is not only about the dynamic object, but also the sign itself. So you say, "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well." This seems to be exactly what the immediate obect accomplishes. So I think you have been misunderstanding, and this distinction between dynamical and immediate is what you are looking for. It is simply misleading because it is referred to as immediate object rather than, say, immediate sign, or self-representing sign. This is my guess.

 

Then there is what you have to say about arguments and propositions, and here I think you have some confusion. The issue was not whether an argument contains a proposition and a term; everyone takes that for granted, and in fact probably more than one term, and more than one proposition. The issue is whether the original argument itself could be regarded as a term, and likewise whether a proposition could be regarded as a term. This is different from the idea of containing. We haven't been discussing whether arguments contain propositions and terms, but whether an argument can itself, just as the argument it is, be regarded as being itself a term in some way? That's the issue which has been discussed.

 

Okay, now about some remarks you made about arguments and propositions. You said "[t]he dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason." I'm not so sure about this. It 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you.

I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word
of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or
'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is
going on there is highly experimental for Peirce. I understand the
sentiment to want to jump in right there (I did that myself some years
ago), but it's not a good place to begin. The primary benefit of those
letters (so it seems to me) is their suggestiveness of ideas. but that's
not very helpful if one doesn't have a more basic understanding in place to
test.

It's sort of like the common layman attempt to talk about abstract
theoretical physics without knowing any of the basic ideas of physics, how
they're defined, and how calculus applies to them. Many people can't help
it, because everyone experiences time and space and such, and so each
person thinks they have a sense of the subject matter and can kind of grasp
what's being said (no matter how abstract the idea and the real need for
understanding the mathematics that goes with it). But really, a layman's
understanding is no understanding, and sometimes directly contradicts the
truth. I would say it is similar with the semiotics discussed in the
letters. We all think about signs and meaning, so we can't help wanting to
understand it all right away; but if one isn't well-prepared, it won't be
very helpful, and may actually prove harmful, for genuine understanding.
Even those early papers I suggested can be challenging (especially "On a
New List of Categories)", but at least they're not so experimental as the
letters to Welby, and they will make clear certain elementary ideas in
Peirce's semiotic, because that is the purpose of those papers.

Well, just a word of caution regarding the letters. If you think you can
handle it, by all means, have at it. But if you start feeling the need for
some rules of navigation to help you out on that open sea, I would just
suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of
them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the
letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now.

-- Franklin



On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Franklin,
> thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how
> many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was
> based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself
> too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on
> this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby
> are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 14. November 2015 um 23:52 Uhr
>  "Franklin Ransom" 
>
> Helmut,
>
> I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable
> to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected
> Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they
> stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going
> around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for
> under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very
> unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't
> portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The
> commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary
> literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.
>
> If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there
> are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that
> if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a
> link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself
> usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance
> to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of
> Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is
> important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain
> Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"
> would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be
> thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are
> invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that
> Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.
>
> Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number
> of things to say.
>
> When you say "The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is
> about" and then "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as
> well", it's unclear here what you mean by this. So let me give two guesses
> on my part. First of all, there is the presentative 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

Franklin,

I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have read much more by Peirce.

Best,

Helmut

 

14. November 2015 um 04:10 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 


Helmut,
 

I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for discussing these ideas.

 

-- Franklin

 

-


 
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 

Franklin, Gary, list,

I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody.

Best,

Helmut


13. November 2015 um 21:01 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 




Gary F, list,
 

Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
 

I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. 

 


But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions.

 

In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).

 

In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking it
up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to
gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it
original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both?

I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though
reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your
interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with
in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into
Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture
over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of
interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to
read a lot more before participating.

I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1,
"Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a
proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself,
this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this,
if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that
matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the
thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a
sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a
triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly
represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from
the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that
there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of
representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it
represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents
its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object
itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would
be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all
then, but simply the thing itself.

But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements",
p.321, Peirce writes:

"It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at
least in the only sense in which a thing that has no *real being* but
only *being
represented*, and which exists in *replica*, can be said to be identical
with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a map of itself;
that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. But this does
not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example of a symbol
of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is expressed in
words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol whatever must
denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol considered as denoting
the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; and in denoting it, it
*is* that very thing, or a fragment of it taken for the whole. It is the
whole taken so far as it need be taken for the purpose of denotation; for
denotation essentially takes a part for its whole."

Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced
than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is
saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the
symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this
case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's
as if we took the symbol "pencil" and then instanced an actual pencil as a
replica of the symbol. I don't think this makes the symbol able to
represent itself though; after all, if the map has a replica that is the
object mapped, how does the object mapped qua replica of the map represent
in turn the map? We could say there is a likeness of the object to the map.
But that would be as an icon, not as the symbol that the map is.

In the case of "the Truth" or "Universe of Being," I take it that the
symbol in some sense represents itself, but it is not the whole of what it
represents; it is a fragment or part of the whole that is represented.

For a more developed account of the matter, consider an argument given by
Frederik Stjernfelt in his Natural Propositions, which book was discussed
on the list at length some months ago. I'll finish with this quote from the
text, and only offer it since it seems you are interested in this issue.
NP, p.68 (italics and brackets from the original):

"The syntax of the proposition is also the starting-point of the
investigation of its interpretant in *Syllabus*. The object of the
Dicisign, of course, is the entity referred to by the subject. The
interpretant is not merely the predicate, but the claim, made possible by
the syntax, that the predicate actually holds about an existing object:

'...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or genuine
Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Helmut,

I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable
to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected
Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they
stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going
around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for
under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very
unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't
portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The
commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary
literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort.

If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there
are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that
if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a link
to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself
usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance
to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of
Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is
important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain
Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"
would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be
thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are
invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that
Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic.

Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number of
things to say.

When you say "The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is
about" and then "the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as
well", it's unclear here what you mean by this. So let me give two guesses
on my part. First of all, there is the presentative aspect of the sign.
That is, we consider an object, and in what sense that object serves as a
sign. In Peirce's semiotic, this will mean that it either serves as a
medium according to a, or the, quality the object embodies (Firstness), the
brute existence of the object (Secondness), or the object as having some
kind of habit (Thirdness). This is what the trichotomy dealing with
qualisign, sinsign, and legisign is about. It deals with the sign in its
presentative aspect, what the basis is for its power of mediation. Then
besides this kind of presenting, there is the dynamical/immediate object
distinction. There is the object in itself, independent of what we think of
it, and this is the dynamic object; I believe this fits with your thought
that one aspect is "the meaning of the sign, what the sign is about". Then
there is the object as represented by the sign within the sign, and that is
the immediate object. As the quote from Frederik's book shows, the idea is
that the immediate object is not only about the dynamic object, but also
the sign itself. So you say, "the sign has to present itself, so, be about
itself as well." This seems to be exactly what the immediate obect
accomplishes. So I think you have been misunderstanding, and this
distinction between dynamical and immediate is what you are looking for. It
is simply misleading because it is referred to as immediate object rather
than, say, immediate sign, or self-representing sign. This is my guess.

Then there is what you have to say about arguments and propositions, and
here I think you have some confusion. The issue was not whether an argument
contains a proposition and a term; everyone takes that for granted, and in
fact probably more than one term, and more than one proposition. The issue
is whether the original argument itself could be regarded as a term, and
likewise whether a proposition could be regarded as a term. This is
different from the idea of containing. We haven't been discussing whether
arguments contain propositions and terms, but whether an argument can
itself, just as the argument it is, be regarded as being itself a term in
some way? That's the issue which has been discussed.

Okay, now about some remarks you made about arguments and propositions. You
said "[t]he dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like
this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason." I'm not
so sure about this. It seems to me the reason is expressed in the final
interpretant, unless by reason you mean efficient cause, and then it would
be the dynamical object. Also, the dynamical object will not be the common
knowledge about the reason. Knowledge is of the nature of an interpretant,
not the object. As for the immediate object being an idea, the 'why it is
like this', conveyed by the sign, I don't think there is necessarily a
'why' expressed in the immediate object; in general, I'm not sure there
ever is such a case.

You also said the proposition is formed by abduction, 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,

I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that
any reply is made to what I have to say.

After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments.
I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much
about this subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with
the subject matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here.

One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object
is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is
identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong
to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose
the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it
is a little confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we
are talking about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call
it) is shown as part of the third triad, then it does not seem like we can
have a rheme and a dicent in the other two triads, since neither of those
include the I-relation. So some explanation is required to make sense of
these bracketed identifications.

A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the
second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment. There is the percept and then there is the perceptual judgment
which judges the percept. If we look to "Telepathy" from the seventh volume
of the CP (I googled and got a pdf from commens.org that collects the
statements about percipuum), we find such statements as the following:

"Perhaps I might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both
percept and perceptual judgment." (7.629)

"...I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately interpreted in
the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 'percipuum.'" (7.643)

It's not clear that the percipuum acts as medium between percept and
perceptual judgment, or exactly how the percipuum could be understood as a
medium. In the diagram, it is asserted to be a sinsign, but does this
really make sense? The percipuum, in its Secondness, serves as medium
between the percept and the perceptual judgment? I don't find this
intuitive. I'm not saying that I necessarily have a better idea of how to
think of percept and perceptual judgment. But it is true that in EP2,
"Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction," Peirce compares the perceptual
judgment to an abductive inference, so that the perceptual judgment would
be considered the interpretant of an argument sign, and thus of a legisign,
not sinsign.

A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation. I could be wrong here, but
I thought I should mention it.

In general, I'm not sure the diagrams are a fair depiction of the idea in
question. I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes
are incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
But I'm not convinced that the diagrams really show how this might work. I
don't think rhemes typically deal with the immediate object and immediate
interpretant while a dicent typically deals with the dynamic object and
dynamic interpretant, and so on. Rather each one will have to account for
each of the ten trichotomies. I guess that the idea in, for instance,
making a rheme nest in a dicent that way, is to suggest that the dynamic
object and/or the dynamic interpretant fulfill the role of filling in the
blanks (or new bonding sites), while when a proposition or group of
propositions is nested into an argument, the (new?) dynamic object and/or
the final interpretant fulfills that role of filling in or new bonding. It
seems to me that this is probably wrong. But, if something else was meant
to be shown, it would be helpful if some further explanation were offered.
Otherwise, I'm missing it.

Having said all this, I still very much approve of the original idea. It is
simply its explication through the proposed diagrams that I find
problematic.

-- Franklin

-



On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Jeff, Gary F, Ben,
>
> I like Jeff's suggestion very much. It seems to me a a more developed
> interpretation of the point that Ben had suggested, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Franklin:



On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:

> I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are 
> incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into 
> arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent by 
> the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested in 
> an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.

The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to.

See: 
Greaves, M., 2002, The Philosophical Status of Diagrams, Stanford: CSLI 
Publications.

This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider a 
logical framework.

Cheers

Jerry
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry,

I am referencing the diagrams that Jeff attached to his last post, under
the subject thread "Vol. 2 of CP, On Induction" and never meant to be
saying anything theoretical about diagrams in general..

-- Franklin



On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:

> Franklin:
>
>
>
> On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are
> incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into
> arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent
> by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested
> in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own.
>
>
> The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to.
>
> See:
>
>- Greaves, M., 2002, *The Philosophical Status of Diagrams*, Stanford:
>CSLI Publications.
>
>
> This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider
> a logical framework.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F, list,

Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on
Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread,
of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.

I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign"
instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that
Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions.

But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain
the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be
somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where
Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms,
and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments.
Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments
may be regarded as propositions.

In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign
cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to
form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).

In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear
that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man"
have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is
true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no
meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the
information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic
propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;*
its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not
used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the case
of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case
of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears
as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term,
and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the
proposition as its subject.

Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to
supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth
given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are
such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that
are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very
practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies
what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with
respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general.

That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded
as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the
claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce
does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the
scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times
before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain
rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes
to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I
have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded
as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the
idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our
understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although
"[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it
is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by
being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to
determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the
absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So
here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has
consequences for how we should understand what all signs are up to, what
the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of whether it is the
interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign.

Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we
find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far
as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the
determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged
proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a
certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be
regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see
in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment
is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the
judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol
to 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Franklin, Gary, list,

I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody.

Best,

Helmut


13. November 2015 um 21:01 Uhr
 "Franklin Ransom"  wrote:
 


Gary F, list,
 

Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.
 

I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. 

 


But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions.

 

In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).

 

In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the proposition as its subject.

 

Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general.


 

That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all signs are up to, what the purpose of every