Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Edwina, List:

ET:  See also "To say that there was no action is to say there was no
actuality"...before which all was absolutely motionless and dead 1.275.


Once again, it is important to examine a larger excerpt in order to
understand the full context of these comments by Peirce.

CSP:  There are two distinct questions to be answered concerning time, even
when we have accepted the doctrine that it is strictly continuous. The
first is, whether or not it has any exceptional instants in which it is
discontinuous,--any abrupt beginning and end. Philosophers there have been
who have said that such a thing is inconceivable; but it is perfectly
conceivable to a mind which takes up intelligently and seriously the task
of forming the conception ... There is no difficulty in imagining that at a
certain moment, velocity was suddenly imparted to every atom and corpuscle
of the universe; before which all was absolutely motionless and dead. To
say that there was no motion nor acceleration is to say there was no time.
To say there was no action is to say there was no actuality. However
contrary to the evidence, then, such a hypothesis may be, it is perfectly
conceivable. (CP 1.275; 1902)


He was not describing *his own* position in what you quoted and
paraphrased; he was merely affirming that a discontinuity in
time--specifically, an "abrupt beginning"--is "perfectly conceivable," even
though it is "contrary to the evidence."  Furthermore, "motionless and
dead" does not mean "nothing" or non-existent; on the contrary, in this
account the beginning of time does not correspond to the moment when "every
atom and corpuscle of the universe" came into being, but rather the moment
when "velocity was suddenly imparted to" them.  What (or Who) created them
in the first place?  What (or Who) imparted velocity to them in that first
instant?

In my published essay, I discuss at some length Peirce's concept of
"nothing," including several of the other passages that you quoted below.
I argue that his later writings clarify that the "the womb of
indeterminacy" in CP 1.412 (1887-1888) is 3ns, rather than 1ns--an infinite
*continuum *of possibilities--and that the "boundless freedom" of this
"pure zero" or "germinal nothing" is what God as *Ens necessarium* exercised
in choosing which of them to actualize.  For Peirce, the hypothesis of
God's Reality begins as "a scientific proposition" (CP 6.215; 1898)--a
legitimate attempt to explain the surprising fact that there is something,
rather than nothing--and only later becomes a belief, a habit of conduct,
religious or otherwise.

CSP:  ... the N.A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in
a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie
in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life. (CP
6.480; 1908)

CSP:  ... the humble argument is the first stage of a scientific inquiry
into the origin of the three Universes, but of an inquiry which produces,
not merely scientific belief, which is always provisional, but also a
living, practical belief, logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with
all the freightage of eternity. (CP 6.485; 1908)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 3:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Stephen,  list:
>
> Peirce also said that 'nothing' existed before the 'flash' or Big Bang
> [he used the former not the latter, term]. 1.411, 412.
>
> See also "To say that there was no action is to say there was no
> actuality"...before which all was absolutely motionless and dead 1.275.
>
>  And "The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state
> of pure abstract being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at
> all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something. If we
> are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, we must, in order to
> account for the whole universe, suppose an initial condition in which the
> whole universe was non-existent, and therefore, a state of absolute
> nothing" 6.215.
>
> "You must not let this interfere with or be interfered with by any
> religious belief. Religion is a practical matter. Its beliefs are formulae
> you will go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely something you take
> up provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to try first and endeavor
> to refute"
>
> "We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of
> negationThe nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes
> second to, or after, everything.. But this pure zero is the nothing of not
> having been born. there is no individual thing, no compulsion outward nor
> inward, now law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is
> involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Matt Faunce]

Jerry, I think you're right. At the very least I overly precided two very
vague concept, viz., God and 'Being in general', by relating them to force
and acceleration which can be fairly precided.

CSP: "All the instinctive beliefs, I notice, are vague. The moment they are
precided, the pragmatist will begin to doubt them." (CP 6:499)

As for why Being should be understood as vague, I think John Venn puts it
very well.

John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
IV. The next question for discussion concerns the limits of Definition. In
other words, over what range of existences of any kind can we reasonably
ask for definitions, and where and why must we cease to do so? The answer
to this, enquiry turns in great part upon the kind of definition we propose
to offer.

(1) On the old scholastic view the limits assigned were quite definite.
Every class, except the widest, must be included in some genus, and be
marked off from it by a differentia, and must therefore possess the
elements of a complete definition. The point needing explanation here,
however, is as to what must be reckoned as the widest class. Some writers
speak as if this must always have been held to be *Being* in general. This
however was the view of none, or next to none, of the Aristotelian
logicians. They took the Categories as their standard, and looked no
further upwards than to the highest class in a Category. These ten
Categories were regarded as so radically distinct from each other, that it
was a misapplication of the process of abstraction to attempt to bring them
under one single head. Accordingly the upward limit of definition in each
category was reached at the highest class but one in that category. In the
other direction the limit was reached when we got down to *infima species*;
that is, one in which the members were separated by no essential, but only
by accidental characteristics.

One other exception must also be noticed. These Categories were by no means
intended, as sometimes stated, to be a 'list of all nameable things'. On
the contrary there were a number of things which were definitely excluded
from any category, and which were consequently incapable of technical
definition. They were generally summed up as follows:—

"Complexum, Consignificans, Privatio, Fictum, Pars, Deus, Æquivocum,
Transcendens, Ens Rationis, Sunt exclusa decem classibus ista novem."
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Matt


On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:23 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Matt:
>
> On May 17, 2018, at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce 
> wrote:
>
> in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of
> God the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for
> all we know, the same as the relation of force to acceleration?
>
>
> Physical mathematics is wed to geometry is a very very deep way.
>
>
> Thus, I do not see any logical possibility for a relation between a simple
> mathematical concept such as a symbol representing a variable with theology
> in general or a notion of God in particular.
>
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Edwina, List:

ET:  Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
the Reality of X,  depends on an individual existentiality of X, then isn't
this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism?


No, according to Peirce's pragmaticism, the Reality of X *does not* depend
on "an individual existentiality of X," or even any discrete collection (no
matter how large) of such individual existentialities.  *That *view--making
Reality coextensive with existence/actuality (2ns), rather than also
encompassing ideas/possibilities (1ns) and generals/habits (3ns)--is
nominalism.

CSP:  I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings,
not of all ideas, but only of what I call "intellectual concepts," that is
to say, of those upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective
fact may hinge ... Intellectual concepts, however,--the only sign-burdens
that are properly denominated "concepts,"--essentially carry some
implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being
or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any
feeling, but more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the "*would-acts*"
of habitual behavior; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever
completely fill up the meaning of a "would be." But that the *total *meaning
of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that,
under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the
predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,--that is, that it
either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential
circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken *as they would
occur *in experience) certain facts would exist,--*that *proposition I take
to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning of an
intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once
in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of
existential circumstances. (EP 2:401-402; 1907)


Peirce's insistence on the "would-be" nature of real generals is a
recurring point of emphasis in Lane's book.  A subjunctive conditional
proposition can be true even though the antecedent never comes to pass.  If
a particular diamond *were *to be rubbed by a knife, then it *would *resist
scratching.  Therefore, it *really *possesses the property of hardness,
even if it never *actually* gets tested in this way (cf. CP 5.457, EP
2:356-357; 1905).

ET:  But- when we say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in
it - then - heck - we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that
belief is held by a large population.


Stephen R. seems to be the only List member advocating anything like this
particular definition of Reality, which is directly contrary to
Peirce's--for him, the Reality of X is precisely its *independence *of
anyone's beliefs (or thoughts) *about it*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> John, list:
>
> My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than individual
> instantiations or existences of that generality.
>
> Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
> the Reality of X,  depends on an individual existentiality of X, then
> isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism?  But- when we
> say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then - heck -
> we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that belief is held by a
> large population.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> > My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that
> > to disclude things is to complexify.
>
> I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged
> in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham
> were students of John Duns Scotus. Ockham was a nominalist who rejected
> the realism of Scotus. But Chatton was a realist who defended Scotus
> in debates with Ockham. (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.)
>
> See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/
> 
>
>
> Brief summary of the anti-razor:
> If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence
> of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed.
>
> But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions,
> all of which imply my summary.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Matt, List:

Creation and causation are not exactly the same thing, especially since
Peirce consistently held that God's creative activity is *ongoing*.  In any
case, he drew a very specific analogy in the quoted passage between
becoming acquainted with a person by studying his works and becoming
acquainted with God through "contemplation and study of the
physico-psychical universe."  Therefore, unless we can say that the author *is
*the book, such that Aristotle *is* his works, we likewise cannot say that
God *is *"the physico-psychical universe."

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce 
wrote:

> Jon, are you warranted in saying "not", in "not 'the physico-psychical
> universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God the Creator to His Creation,
> viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we know, the same as the
> relation of force to acceleration?
>
> CSP: "Whether we ought to say that force *is* an acceleration, or that it
> *causes* an acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of language…"
>
> Matt
>
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:08 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Stephen R., List:
>>
>> Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully
>> clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how
>> he carefully distinguished that term from "external."  On Peirce's account,
>> the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*,"
>> while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks 
>> *about
>> anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3).  The upshot is that there are *internal
>> realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night;
>> but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real.  On the
>> contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my
>> (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not
>> *real (cf. CP 6.453).
>>
>> Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue
>> of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic
>> Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding
>> *that belief.  Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in
>> my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452),
>> he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was
>> explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is
>> (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
>> identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
>> attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453).
>> Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being,
>> creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence
>> (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility.
>>
>> Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater
>> length.
>>
>> CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
>> only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
>> deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
>> portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
>> enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
>> just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
>> so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
>> man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
>> works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
>> to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
>> means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict
>> *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we
>> cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
>> as it were.
>>
>>
>> Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of
>> nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by
>> "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created
>> it and is still creating it.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Stephen, list:
>>>
>>> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
>>> Fixation of Belief.
>>>
>>> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function
>>> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
>>> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
>>> presume that all of our 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Matt:
> On May 17, 2018, at 11:47 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
> 
> in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God 
> the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we 
> know, the same as the relation of force to acceleration?

Physical mathematics is wed to geometry is a very very deep way.


Thus, I do not see any logical possibility for a relation between a simple 
mathematical concept such as a symbol representing a variable with theology in 
general or a notion of God in particular.


Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Matt Faunce]

Jon, are you warranted in saying "not", in "not 'the physico-psychical
universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God the Creator to His Creation,
viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we know, the same as the
relation of force to acceleration?

CSP: "Whether we ought to say that force *is* an acceleration, or that it
*causes* an acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of language…"

Matt


On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:08 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, Stephen R., List:
>
> Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully
> clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how
> he carefully distinguished that term from "external."  On Peirce's account,
> the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*,"
> while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks 
> *about
> anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3).  The upshot is that there are *internal
> realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night;
> but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real.  On the
> contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my
> (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not
> *real (cf. CP 6.453).
>
> Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue
> of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic
> Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding
> *that belief.  Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in
> my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452),
> he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was
> explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is
> (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
> identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
> attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453).
> Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being,
> creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence
> (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility.
>
> Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater
> length.
>
> CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
> only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
> deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
> portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
> enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
> just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
> so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
> man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
> works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
> to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
> means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict
> *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we
> cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
> as it were.
>
>
> Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of
> nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by
> "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created
> it and is still creating it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen, list:
>>
>> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
>> Fixation of Belief.
>>
>> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function
>> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
>> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
>> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real?
>> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that
>> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of
>> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation?
>>
>> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN,
>> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
>> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
>> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
>> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
>> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
>> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Stephen R., List:

That is your own personal view about reality and truth, but it is obviously
different from Peirce's, for whom those concepts were two sides of the same
coin.

CSP:  Truth consists in the existence of a real fact corresponding to the
true proposition. (CP 2.652; 1878)

CSP:  ... a true proposition corresponds to a *real matter of fact*, by
which is meant a state of things, definite and individual, which *does not
consist merely in being represented (in any particular representation) to
be as it is*. For example, if I dream that I find I can float in the air,
this matter of dream is not matter of fact, for the reason that the only
sense in which I can float in the air is that so my dream represented the
matter. (CP 8.126; 1901)


CSP:  That which any true proposition asserts is *real*, in the sense of
being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432;
1905)

CSP:  Thus, the substance of a dream is not Real, since it was such as it
was, merely in that a dreamer so dreamed it; but the fact of the dream is
Real, if it was dreamed; since if so, its date, the name of the dreamer,
etc. make up a set of circumstances sufficient to distinguish it from all
other events; and these belong to it, *i.e.* would be true if predicated of
it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains them or not. (CP 6.453; 1908)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 10:15 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> A dream is a sign. A sign is anything that can be perceived. At this
> point, you perceive your dream and someone else or others know you had a
> dream. Reality has nothing to do with truth or falsehood. Nothing is unreal
> including dreams, lies, and raindrops and whatever becomes of them. This
> mode of seeing things seems to me to be semiotic and ordinary as I think
> Peirce is.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Stephen C. Rose]

A dream is a sign. A sign is anything that can be perceived. At this point,
you perceive your dream and someone else or others know you had a dream.
Reality has nothing to do with truth or falsehood. Nothing is unreal
including dreams, lies, and raindrops and whatever becomes of them. This
mode of seeing things seems to me to be semiotic and ordinary as I think
Peirce is.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:07 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Edwina, Stephen R., List:
>
> Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully
> clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how
> he carefully distinguished that term from "external."  On Peirce's account,
> the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*,"
> while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks 
> *about
> anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3).  The upshot is that there are *internal
> realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night;
> but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real.  On the
> contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my
> (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not
> *real (cf. CP 6.453).
>
> Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue
> of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic
> Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding
> *that belief.  Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in
> my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452),
> he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was
> explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is
> (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to
> identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
> attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453).
> Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being,
> creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence
> (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility.
>
> Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater
> length.
>
> CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
> only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
> deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
> portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
> enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
> just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
> so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
> man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
> works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
> to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
> means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict
> *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we
> cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
> as it were.
>
>
> Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of
> nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by
> "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created
> it and is still creating it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen, list:
>>
>> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
>> Fixation of Belief.
>>
>> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function
>> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
>> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
>> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real?
>> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that
>> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of
>> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation?
>>
>> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN,
>> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
>> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
>> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
>> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
>> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
>> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism',