subject:"Re\: Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars \(was Continuity..."

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

While I understand what you are asking and why, I think that it is an
inaccurate and unfair characterization of my List participation over the
years.  I have stated repeatedly that the issue for me is one of
*terminological
ethics*--in accordance with Peirce's own well-documented standards, we
should not use words that he coined in ways that clearly deviate from
*his *usage,
especially when doing so results in a different *conceptual *scheme from
anything that he actually outlined.  The goal is never to *close *the
discussion--I take very seriously Peirce's maxim, "Do not block the way of
inquiry," and share the desire that you and others have expressed to apply
his thought more broadly--but hopefully to *clarify *it; i.e., make
*our *ideas,
*Peirce's *ideas, and the *differences *between them clear.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 3:20 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> Just a brief comment. You wrote:
>
>   "He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of his
> own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once
> that he was counting on future generations to continue the work that he
> had started, especially in Semeiotic."
>
> My question then, is why do you so instantly rebuff other's postings and
> arguments about semiosic processes by declaring that their comments are
> 'not made by or found in Peirce'? That is, you don't discuss the
> functionality of their arguments; you just close the discussion by your
> rebuttal that the very notion wasn't 'made by or found in Peirce'.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Just a brief comment. You wrote:

  "He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of
his own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more
than once that he was  counting on future generations to continue the
work that he had started, especially in Semeiotic."

My question then, is why do you so instantly rebuff other's postings
and arguments about semiosic processes by declaring that their
comments are 'not made by or found in Peirce'? That is, you don't
discuss the functionality of their arguments; you just close the
discussion by your rebuttal that the very notion wasn't 'made by or
found in Peirce'.

Edwina
 On Mon 20/05/19  3:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 JFS:  But nothing in that argument that depends on the nature of the
creator as benign or malevolent, perfect or imperfect, necessary or
contingent. 
 I have not claimed otherwise, except to quote Peirce himself as
stating explicitly that God is Ens necessarium ("A Neglected
Argument") and possesses the attribute of Infinite Benignity
(manuscript drafts). 
 JFS:  You quoted Peirce, but you claim that the argument is
unavoidable.
 No, I do not.  For the third time, what I have said is that my
Semeiotic Argumentation provides what seems to me to be the
unavoidable answer to the question, "If the entire Universe is a
Sign, then what is its Object?"
  JFS:  The absence of any hint in any of his MSS raises a serious
doubt that Peirce would approve the reasoning that led to that
argument.
 As Peirce himself surely would have recognized, this is an argument
from silence, which is not logically valid.  He never claimed to have
worked out all of the ramifications of his own thought during his
lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once that he was 
counting on future generations to continue the work that he had
started, especially in Semeiotic.
 JFS:  Ideally, that would require a translation of each premise and
every step of the reasoning to existential graphs and an application
of the EG rules of inference.
 I thought that it was obvious that the form of my Semeiotic
Argumentation is  identical to Peirce's simple example of reasoning
with EGs in his letter to Mr. Kehler (NEM 3:168-169; 1911 June 22),
where S = the entire Universe, M = a Sign, and P = determined by an
Object other than itself.
 JFS:  1. The claim that the object of every sign must be in a
different universe of discourse than the physical sign of that object
...I'll accept the point that the object of a sign must be different
from the sign itself.
 I have never made the first claim, only the second--that the Object
of every Sign is external to, independent of, and unaffected by the
Sign itself, as Peirce himself explicitly stated.
 JFS:  2. The claim the Creator (God, Satan, or some demiurge) cannot
be in the same universe as the creation.  3. The claim that Peirce's
three universes (Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity) are
insufficient as a home for the Creator.
 The relevant claim is rather that the Creator of the three Universes
of Experience and "every content of them without exception" cannot be
within any or all of those Universes; i.e., God is "not immanent in"
them, as Peirce explicitly stated.
  JFS:  I forgot to mention that I had uploaded some of Peirce's
definitions to http://jfsowa.com/peirce/defs/ [1]  See sign1.jpg and
sign2.jpg .
 Thank you for the link; I agree that all of those 1890s definitions
apply only to Sinsigns/Tokens, presumably because Peirce did not
recognize the reality of Qualisigns/Tones and Legisigns/Types until
1903. 
 JFS:  CSP, Century Dictionary for 'universe'--1. The totality of all
existing things; all that is in dynamical connection with general
experience taken collectively--embracing (a} the Creator and
creation; or (b) psychical and material objects, but excluding the
Creator; or (c) material objects only.
 When I refer to "the entire Universe" in my Semeiotic Argumentation,
I mean all three Universes of Experience taken together; i.e., what
Peirce  himself called "the entire universe--not merely the universe
of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as 'the truth'" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).  That means
sense (b) above plus the first Universe of Ideas/Possibles, assuming
that we can take "material objects" to be the constituents of the
second Universe of Actuality/Existents and "psychical objects" to be
the constituents of the third Universe of Signs/Necessitants. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:56 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
 Jon,
 > Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

 of a triadic relation, the
> Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
> Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the
> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
> triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
> A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a
> mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP
> 2.242, EP 2:290-291)
>
>
> Peirce proceeded to use "Sign," rather than "Representamen," throughout
> the entire remainder of the text.  I do not see how he could have been any
> clearer, and I stand by my statement that he never--not once--used "Sign"
> for a triad.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 7:31 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since
>> the representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
>> semiosic set of O-R-I.
>>
>> Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
>> structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
>>
>> We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
>> contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
>> a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
>> his outline of these then classes. 2.254
>>
>> The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
>> cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral part
>> of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert actuality
>> into the mediative process of Mind.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
>> sent:
>>
>> Jon S, Edwina, List,
>>
>> I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely
>> triadic relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said
>> that, some signs have the character of necessitants. These include
>> legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs that have these three
>> characteristics, do they have the internal structure of a triadic relation
>> connecting its parts? I think the answer is "yes". As such, some signs
>> consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a
>> further triadic relation.
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>> --
>> From: Jon Alan Schmidt
>> Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars
>> (was Continuity...
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of
>> these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
>> Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or
>> "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--not
>> once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a relation, while
>> a Sign is always a correlate.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am
>>> talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
>>> Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between
>>> the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

g its parts'.

We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the
triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of
relations in his outline of these then classes. 2.254

The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral
part of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert
actuality into the mediative process of Mind.

Edwina
On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [4] sent:
Jon S, Edwina, List,

I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a
genuinely triadic relation with respect to its object and
interpretant. Having said that, some signs have the character of
necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs
that have these three characteristics, do they have the internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic
relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic
relation.

Yours,

Jeff Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation
wars (was Continuity... Edwina, List:
Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage
of these terms. Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903),
or "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905). He
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a
relation, while a Sign is always a correlate.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full
semiosic triad.

Edwina

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[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
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[4]
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[5]
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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Jeff, Edwina, List:

JD:  As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they are the
first correlate of a further triadic relation.

I think that *consist *is the wrong word here, because it implies that some
Signs are *nothing but* triadic relations.  However, I acknowledge that some
 Signs clearly *involve *relations, and some of those relations are
*triadic*.  For example, Symbols involve Indices and Icons that are
connected in some way, Propositions involve Semes married by continuous
predicates, and Arguments involve Propositions married by leading
principles; not to mention that the Universe as a Sign obviously involves
triadic (and other) relations.  However, the point of contention is whether
*any *Sign *is *a triadic relation--i.e., a triad--rather than *always *being
one correlate of a triadic relation.

ET:  ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants' ...

No, only Legisigns/Types are Necessitants; Qualisigns/Tones are Possibles,
and Sinsigns/Tokens are Existents.

ET:  Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.

No, the Object and Interpretant are *external* to the Sign, not *parts *of
the Sign.  The Sign, Object, and Interpretant are the three correlates of
the triadic relation of *representing *or *mediating*.

ET:  We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
his outline of these ten classes. 2.254

No, there is nothing whatsoever in that entire passage (NDTR, CP 2.233-272,
EP 2:289-299; 1903) that "contradicts" my claim; on the contrary, it
explicitly *confirms *that a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant--the First Correlate of a triadic relation, not *itself *a
triad or triadic relation.

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
A *Sign *is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP
2.242, EP 2:290-291)

Peirce proceeded to use "Sign," rather than "Representamen," throughout the
entire remainder of the text.  I do not see how he could have been any
clearer, and I stand by my statement that he never--*not once*--used "Sign"
for a triad.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 7:31 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since
> the representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
> semiosic set of O-R-I.
>
> Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
> structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
>
> We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
> contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the triad as
> a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of relations in
> his outline of these then classes. 2.254
>
> The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
> cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral part
> of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert actuality
> into the mediative process of Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> sent:
>
> Jon S, Edwina, List,
>
> I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely
> triadic relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said
> that, some signs have the character of necessitants. These include
> legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs that have these three
> characteristics, do they have the internal structure of a triadic relation
> connecting its parts? I think the answer is "yes". As such, some signs
> consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a
> further triadic relation.
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> ------
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt
> Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars
> (was Continuity...
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky

The point is, that the Peircean semiosic framework is generative;
that is, it doesn't simply tell us that 'this' means 'that' - which
is the Saussurian communicative framework. Instead, the Peircean
frame, by inserting the representamen/sign as mediation - which is
NOT the same as 'transmission' - but as mediation, creates a
generative framework.
Therefore, as an example, the representamen located in a plant, in
its function of mediative Mind, takes data from an external Object
[such as water, chemicals] and using the laws located in that
representamen, transforms that raw data into its own Interpretant,
the morphological form of leaves and flowers and seeds.
This morphological form, the full triadic sign, functions as an
Object to some other form. So, the leaves and flowers and seeds of
the plant become food [Interpretants] etc for some other
actuality...and so on.
But at no time is the triad reducible; all three parts function
interactively [O-R-I].
Edwina
On Sun 19/05/19 8:31 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.

Therefore, the whole set, which I call the Sign, has this 'internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts'.
We can see the examples in Peirce's ten classes of Signs - where, in
contradiction to the claim of JAS that Peirce never refers to the
triad as a Sign, he does just this, for he includes the full triad of
relations in his outline of these then classes. 2.254
The point is, the mediative semiosic process, the representamen/sign
cannot and does not function on its own. As 'Mind', it is an integral
part of an irreducible triad. The other two nodes of the triad insert
actuality into the mediative process of Mind.
Edwina
On Sun 19/05/19 1:28 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Jon S, Edwina, List,
I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a
genuinely triadic relation with respect to its object and
interpretant. Having said that, some signs have the character of
necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs
that have these three characteristics, do they have the internal
structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic
relations--even if they are the first correlate of a further triadic
relation.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation
wars (was Continuity... Edwina, List:
Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage
of these terms. Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903),
or "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905). He
never--not once--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a
relation, while a Sign is always a correlate.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

Edwina

Links:
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[1]
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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-19 Thread Edwina Taborsky

ALL representamens could be argued as 'necessitants', since the
representamen doesn't 'exist' on its own but only within the triadic
semiosic set of O-R-I.

Edwina

Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-18 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Jon S, Edwina, List,


I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely triadic 
relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said that, some 
signs have the character of necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, 
arguments. For signs that have these three characteristics, do they have the 
internal structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the 
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they 
are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was 
Continuity...

Edwina, List:

Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of these 
terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant (CP 
2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or "Sign" and 
"Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--not once--used "Sign" 
for a triad, since a triad is always a relation, while a Sign is always a 
correlate.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am 
talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the Representamen, 
of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between the two and even 
to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.

Edwina

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-18 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of
these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or
"Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--*not
once*--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a *relation*, while
a Sign is always a *correlate*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am
> talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
> Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between
> the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-18 Thread Edwina Taborsky

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full
semiosic triad.
Edwina
On Sat 18/05/19 7:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign.
It is not my definition, it is Peirce's. If you do not believe me,
then just read through the Commens Dictionary entry [1], or Robert
Marty's compilation [2] of "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S.
Peirce."
ET: My understanding of a Sign ... is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws.
This is not Peirce's definition--i.e., not any of his many
definitions--it is yours. I have repeatedly acknowledged our
longstanding disagreement about this, and have repeatedly expressed a
desire not to rehash it; so why keep bringing it up?
ET: I disagree with your reductionism.
I disagree with your characterization, which is a tiresome
rhetorical ploy with no basis in anything that I have actually
advocated.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS list
1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical
things can be signs"? In your specific example of a rock, the rock
is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily
construct a different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of
something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it. I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in
itself. No- not merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the
site of buried treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of
raw data [sand, chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as
mediatively formed by the laws which-form-rocksinto the
Interpretant which is that particular Rock.
2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails
that the entire Universe constitutes one Sign. For more on that,
please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact
that Peirce explicitly stated, "the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected"

I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires
connection; this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be
iconically [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the
Universe is also diverse and many instantiations do NOT share
commonalities. What is common to the Universe is the process of
semiosis - generating morphological instances within laws. But the
results are diverse and open to chance and differentiation.

Edwina

Links:
--
[1] http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/sign
[2] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-18 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign.

It is not *my *definition, it is *Peirce's*.  If you do not believe me,
then just read through the Commens Dictionary entry
, or Robert Marty's compilation
 of "76
Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce."

ET:  My understanding of a Sign ... is that it is a *morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws*.

This is not *Peirce's *definition--i.e., not *any *of his *many
*definitions--it
is *yours*.  I have repeatedly acknowledged our longstanding disagreement
about this, and have repeatedly expressed a desire not to rehash it; so why
keep bringing it up?

ET:  I disagree with your reductionism.

I disagree with your characterization, which is a tiresome rhetorical ploy
with no basis in anything that I have actually advocated.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS list
>
> 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can
> be signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the Sign,
> it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a different 
> scenario
> in which the rock is a Sign of something else--perhaps a treasure that is
> buried below it.  I have acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything
> is a Sign of itself in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something
> else (Object) to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between
> two other correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
>
> I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
> understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
> irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological instantiation
> of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in itself. No- not
> merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the site of buried
> treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of raw data [sand,
> chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as mediatively formed by
> the laws which-form-rocksinto the Interpretant which is that
> particular Rock.
>
> 2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
> Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails that the
> entire Universe constitutes one Sign.  For more on that, please see what
> I just posted in the other thread, including the fact that Peirce explicitly
> stated, "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought
> to be more or less connected"
>
> I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires connection;
> this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be iconically
> [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the Universe is also
> diverse and many instantiations do NOT share commonalities. What is common
> to the Universe is the process of semiosis - generating morphological
> instances within laws. But the results are diverse and open to chance and
> differentiation.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

2019-05-18 Thread Edwina Taborsky

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS
list
 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical
things can be signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock
is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily
construct a  different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of
something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it.  I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in
itself. No- not merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the
site of buried treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of
raw data [sand, chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as
mediatively formed by the laws which-form-rocksinto the
Interpretant which is that particular Rock. 

2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails
that the entire Universe constitutes one Sign.  For more on that,
please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact
that Peirce explicitly stated, "the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected"

I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires
connection; this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be
iconically [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the
Universe is also diverse and many instantiations do NOT share
commonalities. What is common to the Universe is the process of
semiosis - generating morphological instances within laws. But the
results are diverse and open to chance and differentiation.

Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  5:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
  JAS:  If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is
being taken out of context, then that person has the burden of 
showing that this is the case, not merely asserting it.
 JFS:  Absolutely!  That is an essential part of the methodeutic.
 I am glad that we agree about this, but then ...
 JFS:  No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full
context. 
 This is yet another bald assertion, with no supporting argumentation
from Peirce's writings
 JFS:  Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are
physical things. 
 Please provide a few of those examples to clarify and substantiate
this claim.
 JFS:  Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce
defined for the Century Dictionary. 
 I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote them.
 JFS:  Each one defines 'sign' as a physical thing.  None of them
mentions the word 'percept'. 
 That seems dubious, since Peirce clearly considered Qualisigns/Tones
and Legisigns/Types to be Signs, not just Sinsigns/Tokens; and he
stated quite plainly that a Seme is a Sign and a Percept is a Seme
(cf. CP 4.537-539; 1906), which entails that a Percept is a Sign.
  JFS:  Wait a minute.  In the paragraph above, you denied that
physical things can be signs.  And in this one, you claim that the
physical universe is a sign.  You can't have it both ways.
 Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can be
signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the
Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a 
different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of something
else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it.  I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign.
  JFS:  In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448).  The
word 'perfuse' is rare:  it only occurs once in CP.  The clause
beginning with 'if' is tentative, and being composed of signs is not
the same as being a sign. 
 I agree that Peirce did not assert in the quoted statement (CP
5.448n1p5, EP 2:394; 1906) that the Universe is composed of Signs,
only that it is perfused with Signs, although the sentence
construction implies that he would not have been surprised one bit if
it turned out to be "composed exclusively of signs" after all.  Note
also which universe Peirce had in mind--"not merely the universe of
existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as 'the truth.'"  That is

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

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