[peirce-l] Re: What
.Clark Goble wrote: I honestly don't recall Peirce addressing the problem of competing and contradictory beliefs. Does anyone know off the top of their head anything along those lines? The closest I can think of is the passage of 1908 to Lady Welby where he talks about the three modalities of being. Relative to the first, that of possibility, he talks of Ideas. One might say that the *idea* of infidelity, for example, can be accepted as well as its contradiction. So perhaps that's one way of dealing with it. Dear Clark, I'm tempted to say, facetiously, that Peirce often wrote of two fundamental laws of psychology. One of course being the law of association of ideas and the other beingwhat he calleda"general law of sensibility" or Fechner's psycho-phsical law.But I won't -). Fechner's law as you may recall states that the intensity of any sensation is proportional to the log of the external force which produces it. However, on page 294 of Vol III of _The Writings of Charles S Peirce, A Chronological Edition_ I did stumble accross something that may relate to what you have in mind. There Peirce writes that "It is entirely in harmony with this law [Fechner's] that the feeling of belief shoud be as the logarithm of the chance, the later being the _expression_ of the state of facts which produce the belief". He continues, "the rule for the combination of independent concurrent arugments takes a very simple form when expressed in terms of the intensity of belief, measured in the porposed way. It is this: Take the sum of all the feelings of belief which would b e produced separately by all the arguments pro, substract from that the similar sum for agruments con, and the remainder is the feeling of belief which we ought to have on the whole. This a a proceeding which men often resort to, under the name of balancing reasons". BTW, all of this occurs in his 1878 essay on Probability of Induction which apparently waspublished Popular Science Monthly. Cheers, Jim Piat The question then becomes how inquiry relates to these ideas. I'd suggest, as you do, that it would cut off inquiry, but not because of knowledge. Rather, as Joe said earlier, it is the individual doing what they can to stave off the loss of a threatened belief. I think this is that they don't *want* discussion to leave the world of possibility and move to the realm of facts (the second of the three universes). It is interesting to me how many people do *not* want to move from possibilities (how ever probable) to the realm of facts or events. I think rather that tenaciousness is, as Joe suggested, more closely related to appeals to authority and their weakness. I'd also note in The Fixation of Belief that Peirce suggests that doubt works by irritation. "Theirritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle *inquiry* though it must be admitted that it is sometimes not a very apt designation." (EP 1:114) To me that suggests something like a small boil or irritation on ones skin or small cut in ones mouth. One can neglect it but eventually it will lead to a change in action. As Peirce notes it may not seem like what we call inquiry. Thus his "sometimes not a very apt designation." But so long as it changes our habits, even if it takes time and is slow, then inquiry is progressing. It might be an error to only call a process of inquiry what we areconscious of as a more directed burden of will. Which I believe was Jim W's point a few days ago. Clark Goble ---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What
Dear Joe and Jeff, I looked at some of the drafts in the Chronological edition Vol III page 33-34 --.Could it be thatthe laws he may be referring to are the law of association andsomething like a law of sensory impressions? Also I got the impression he may have intended these two laws to also operate in the fourth method of fixing belief but that the method of tenacity was distinquished by its being mostly limited to emphasizingthese laws. Peirce referring to the laws as fundamental makes me wonder if he views them as operating in all methods of fixing belief. That what distinguishes the other methods form the method of tenacity is that in fixing belief the other methodsemphasizemodes of beingin addition to one's personal feelings and associationsof ideas related to them.So -- the method of tenancity emphasizes the law of sensory impression (something akin to the directperception or the felt impression of similarity) and one's almost instantenous ideational associations, whereas the other methods place greater emphasis on the additional modes of will, reason (and ultimately in the fourth method) a balance of the lst three. It's hard for me to suppose that even someone using the lst method is absent all influence from secondness and thirdness (will, and representation). Or that methods other than tenacity exclude feelings. After all, each method is a matter of representation. Don't mean any of this in a contentious way. Just trying toraise a questionon the fly. I know I'm rehashing my earlier bit about combining the lst three to form the fourth, but in this case I'm doing so just to suggest how the law of association and of sensory impression (if there is such a law) might apply.Maybe I'm just being overlycommited to what I feel is the case--unwilling toacknowledge either fact or reason. JimPiat - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2006 1:10 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What Jeff Kasser (JK) says:JK: First, I'm not sure what sort of special relationship the two psychological laws in question need to bear to the method of tenacity. If they're in fact psychological (i.e. psychical) laws, then it would be unsurprising if the other methods of inquiry made important use of them. I thought that the only special connection between the laws and tenacity is that the method tries to deploy those laws simply and directly.REPLY (by JR = Joe Ransdell):JR: Peirce says, of the tenacious believer: ". . . if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychological laws . . .". That seems to me plainly to be saying that the method of tenacity is based on two fundamental psychological laws. It would be odd for him to say "basing his method, like every other is based, on two psychological laws" in a passage in which he is explaining that method in particular. And if he wanted to say that this method is different from the others in that it applies these laws "simply and directly" whereas the others do not then I would expect him to say something to indicate what an indirect and complicated use of them would be like. Also, to say that use of such laws (whatever they may be) occurs in all four methods would contradict what he frequently says in the drafts of the essay and seems to think especially important there but which does not appear in the final version of the paper except in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", where it is not emphasized as being of special importance, namely, that in the fourth method the conclusions reached are different from what was held at the beginning of the inquiry. This is true in two ways. First, because in the fourth method one concludes to something from premises (the starting points) which are not identical to the conclusion with which the inquiry ends; and, second, because, sometimes, at least, the starting points of different inquirers in the same inquiring community in relation to the same question will be different because the initial observations which function as the basis for the conclusions ultimately drawn are different (as in the passage two or three pages from the end of "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" about investigation into the velocity of light.) Great weight is put upon that sort of convergence as at least frequently occurring in the use of the fourth method. Moreover, the third method is not one in which use of the two laws is characteristic since it depends upon a tendency for people to come to agreement in the course of discussion over some period of time though they do not agree initially. (There is no convergence toward truth but only toward agreement, since use of the third method in respect to the same question in diverse communities can result in the settlement of opinion by agreement in diverse
[peirce-l] Re: What
Dear Jim W, Thanks for these comments. Seemsfolks commonly suppose human behavior to intentional and the behavior of merely physical systems to be non intentional. I'm not convinced that human and so call mere physical behavior differ in this respect. I think the distinction between the human and the merely physical (the intentional vs. the non intentional) is more a matter of our level of analysis. Conceived as merely physical nothing is intentional but understood in the largerintentional context of the universe everything is intentional in the sense of tending toward some end. So in part my explorations with the notion of the things tending toward the average was an attempt to suggest some of the ways that thisconceptualdivide between the seemingly merely physical and mental could be bridged (starting from either direction). You also raise the matter of complexity and unpredictability of human behavior. Nosubstantialdisagreement from me on this one either. I meant my comments about the parallels between feeling, will, andreasoning to be merely suggestive and hopefully useful ways of exposing some aspects that might otherwise be overlooked -- or rather that I had been overlooking. As I think Joe was pointing out in one of his recent posts, observations have both an object related component and an observer related component. The observer variables are so complex and to often defy classification much less prediction. Human actions are the final product of a complex interaction of very subtle factors. The brain/mind has a way of multiplying the effects of certain variables in ways that make a seeming small physical difference (as measured in the merely physical world so to speak) have an enormous effect on the actual behavior produced. As a result predicting these behavior is extremely difficult. For example the response of billiard balls is not altered much by their history whereas one's stored memories can have an enormous effect upon how some physical event will effect our response. We have yet learned how to measure stored memories and their effects -- so there is this big unknown in predicting human behavior (or for that matter any complex system that would store information in a analogous way). Again, speaking loosely because of course I have insufficient facts and understandingto speak otherwise. Sobottom line -- yes, I agree with your comments and those of Joe. Just trying to process them a bit. Thanks again, Jim Piat Jim P, Thanks for the response.I think that if you allow for the evolution of the mean and stick to the scientific method, then there are strong parallels toPeirce's theory of truth in the "long run." There is a convergence towards the "least total error."This may work for scientific theories. (AlthoughPeirce's theoryhas in general come under a lot of criticism) But practical beliefs, and their supposed underlying psychological laws, which we have been considering lately, are an example where the distribution of behavioral patterns does not seem to have the "bite" that predicting the position of the planets has. If we suppose all men have real doubts and inquire at some time time or another, what does the distribution of behavioral "outputs" show? It would seem to show the preferred method of inquiry. We might then track which method is winning out in some domain of inquiry. But supposewe want is to assign a specific psychological law to a specific method of inquiry. We would have to have a set of descriptionsfor isolating the data into four groups.We could then take the "tenacious" individualsand try to explain their behavior. But we already have the set of descriptions in place for isolating the tenacious individuals. So, what we want to know is why some people "cling spasmodically to the views they already take." Answers to this question can be distributed with the "least total error" representing the winning answer. But are descriptive laws with respect to behavior as convincing as physical laws are with respect to the position of the planets? ! Are descriptive laws with respect to behavior just an illusion? Why do we take an "intentional stance" towards some systems and not others, disparaging the former as lacking theoretical "bite." Jim W-Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Thu, 5 Oct 2006 6:14 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What Dear Jim Willgoose, Opps,I goofed. I think you are right. In an earlier version of my post I had included the possibility that in an open system new energy, information and possibilities were being added (or taken away) that would change the mean of the system and thus account for evolution of the mean (and why variation about the mean is so importa
[peirce-l] Re: What
Dear Folks-- I'm trying to think of some sort of non psychologistic sounding way of describing or accounting for the drive to settle doubt. I'm thinking that doubt represents uncertainty (a measure of information) and uncertainty poses risk.In general, dynamic sytems tend toward equilibriums around their mean values. Perhapsthebehavior we call inquiry is a form of this "moderation in all things".The mean is the point in every distribution which yields the leasttotal errorif taken as the value for every member of the distribution.The mean is also the point of dynamic random equilibrium.Maybe doubt is a form of dynamic disequilibriumand inquiry a form of "regression to the mean". In a pluaralistic universe -- truth is the mean or that which mediates between extremes. Not the extremes that we imagineseparate our truth from the falsehood of others, but the extremes that actually exist each from another and of which our point of view of truth is but one. Truth is what drives consensus and is common to all POVs -- the lowly average. Thetenaciousthinkfeeling is truth, the authoritarian will, the rationalist reason and the scientist the 'average' of em all. MostlyI'm trying to get a better handle on some non psychologistic sounding ways of thinking about doubt, inquiry and belief. Maybe I've just substituted one set of mis-used words for another -- without any real progress in understanding. Curious what others might think of these borrowed (and probably misapplied) ideas. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Death of Arnold Shepperson
Arnold was always so kind, encouraging and enthusiastic in his post. And always bubbling with interesting ideas. Like so many others I will miss him. And remember him as an ideal to follow. Thanks for informing us John. My sympathies to you and Arnold's family and friends. A sad day. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Fw: Arnold Shepperson
Hi, Jim, I read at gmane about Arnold Shepperson's death. Would you do me a favor and tell peirce-l that I too am shocked and saddened by this. I've just re-read some off-list correspondence that I had with him back in February, and I'm not quite sure at the moment what either one of us was saying, but I have the impression, as I did at the time, a pleased impression that he was getting somewhere. Arnold was a genial and brilliant man with a future. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Joe, I agree with your characterization of the scientific method as including the distinctive elements of the other three. You have clarified the issue in a way that is very helpful to me. I agree as well thattakenindividually each of the lst three methods(tenacity, authority and reason) can lead to disaster. So, without going into all the details let me just sum up by saying I agree with you and that includes your cautions aboutmy misleading metaphors, etc. Thanks for two very helpful posts. Picking up onyour suggestion of a possible hierachical relationship between the methods I have been thinking about some of their possible connections with Peirce's categories. Again, my ideas on this are vague and meant only to be suggestive and I look forward to your thoughts. First, very roughly, it strikes me that iconicity is the crux of directapprehension of reality. In essence perceptionis the process by which one becomesimpressed with (or attunded to)the form of reality. In effect a kind of resonance is established by which subject and environment become similar. This I think accounts for the conviction we all have that in some fundamental way what we perceive "is" the case -- which Ithink is in part the explanation for the method of tenacity. Second is the notion of otherness or dissimilarity. The existance of resistance which we experience as the will of others or as the limits of our own wills. Third is the notion of thought or reason bywhich one is able to mediate between these two modes of existence. Unfortunately, as you point out,one canget lost in thought (or without it) andthus weare best served not by some form of degenerate representation (minimizing either the iconic, indexical --or mediativecomponent) but bya full blown common sense form ofreasoning or inquiry that has been formalized as the scientific method. So, to recap -- method one is a form of overly iconic settlement, method two a over-reaction in the direction of excessively referentiallysettlement, and method three an overlyrationalistic form of settlement at the expense ofthe other two. I think that Peirce did not intend that we take the lst three methods as examples of belieffixationwhichfolks actually employ in their pure form. By itself each method is not aexample of symbolic or representational thought but of something more akin toa degenerative form of representation. So, I thinkPeirce intended them asexaggerationsin order to illustrate degenerative ways ofrepresentation and inaequate ways of belief fixation or settlement of doubt. What he did wasto describe the three modes of being involved in representation (the fourth method) as isolated forms of belief settlement. The result of course was a bit of a stretch or caricature of the degenerative ways in which we distort common sense in the settlement of our doubts. Because we are in fact symbols using symbols we can in theory come up with all sorts of false possiblities -- which is part of what makes thinking about thinking so difficult. Even erroneous thinking or representation involves representation. Sometimes we build sand castles in the air and pretendwe are on the beach pretending the waves will never come. Again, just some vague notions --I can't help but feel that in the case of Peirce his categories areproperly and consistently the foundation of allhe says. Jim Piat --- Joe wrote: "But I would disagree with this part of what you say, Jim. Considered simply as methods in their own rights, I don't think one wants to speak of them as being incorporated AS methods within the fourth method. As a methodic approach to answering questions the method of tenacity is surely just a kind of stupidity, and it seems to me that the turn to authority, not qualified by any further considerations -- such as, say, doing so because there is some reason to think that the authority is actually in a better position to know than one is -- apart, I say, from that sort of qualification, the turn to authority as one's method seems little more intelligent than the method of tenacity, regarded in a simplistic way. The third method, supposing that it is understood as the acceptance of something because it ties in with -- coheres with -- a system of ideas already accepted, does seem more intelligent because it is based on the properties of ideas, which is surely more sophisticated than acceptance which is oblivious of considerations of coherence. But it is also the method of the paranoid, who might reasonably be said to be unintelligent to a dangerous degree at times. But I think that what you say in your other message doesn't commit you to regarding the methods themselves as "building blocks", which is a mistaken metaphor here. It is rather that what each of them respectively appeals to is indeed something to which the fourth method appeals: the value of self-identity, the value of
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Bill, As always I enjoyed your straightforward, informative and wise comments.You have a way of keeping my feet on the ground without destroying the fun of having my head in the clouds(to pick one of the nicer places I've been accused ofhaving my head).I hope I did not create the impression that I devalued any of the methods of fixing belief that Peirce described. I don't think he intended to devalue them either. Nor did I mean to put science on a pedestal.Not that it needs any commendation from me. I think science isa formalization ofthe method of common sense which (to borrow Joe's apt description) includes the distinctiveelements ofeach method.I believe that common sense is the way all humans in all cultureshave at all times represented and participated in theworld. We are all symbolic creatures and we all feel, will, andinterpretthe world with symbols whether wecall one another primitive or advanced.I attribute the sometimes horrors we do not to common sense but to a degenerate formofrepresentation that tries to treat therelational symbolic world as comprised of discrete unrelatedthings. A form with no feeling is a phantom, an other with no resistence does not exist and thought that does not mediate is empty verbiage. The danger arises out of our ability tomisrepresent. We are all fundmentally alike and cut from the same cloth.LOL--I'm of a mind to go off on a swoon about the commonality of humanity but I fear getting called on givingfacile lip service to something I don't practice. Oh, the feral children. Hell, I don't even believe the accounts. Well I should say I don't believe the labels. Most of them sound to me like accounts of severely retarded children who have been hidden away by families. Countless severely retarded children have grown up in relatively caring institutions with the same outcome. But I agree with your point, IF a child could survive past a weekalone in the woodsor a closet, the childstill would not develop language etc -- It's the preposterous IFthat makes me dismiss these as crack pot accounts that have somehow emerged from the tabloids for 15mins of manistream press. And occassionally the attention of some devoted researcherwho ends up wanting toadopt the child.But I don't mean to be cruel. Fact is, I don't know the detailed facts of any of these cases.And I digress --- unaccustomed as I am to public digressions Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Bill Bailey To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, September 29, 2006 2:42 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamental psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Jim, Joe, List: This discussion brought to mind the comparison by Claud Levi-Strauss of "primitive" thought and that of western science. I think the discussion is in The Savage Mind. Levi-Strauss argues that there is no real difference in terms of complexity between "primitive" and scientific thought; he found the primitive's categories and structurings in botany, for example, to be as complex as any western textbook might offer. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Bill, I included some comments in the middle -- Jim, I'd be the first to characterize the reports on the feral children as "iffy." But have you read the account of "Genie"? She was aCalifornia child who was kept in isolation in an upstairs room, strapped for hour to a potty (whether I spell it with a "Y" or an "IE," it doesn't look right)chair because her father was ashamed of her because of some deficit he assigned to her hip. I was fortunate enough to be in Arizona whenthe World Health Organization had its conventionthere, and it featured an earlyreport on Genieby the psychologist who was also a foster-family member for her. There followed a book by the language therapist, Susan Curtiss,who worked with Genie. As I recall, it was titledGenie. The professionals describing Genie's behavior and progress--or lack of it--are remarkably similar to the lay reports of "feral" children. I think there is a time frame for language learning. --- Dear Bill, I think you are probably right about there being a critical period for the acquisition of language. And I appologize for the flip tone of my comments onimpaired children and those who care about them. Everyone is precious and I admire those whoare devoted to helpingothers. Even while being a bit of a self centered SOB myself. I think you are also rightabout the dangers of a world view that doesn't repect the individual. However I'm not convinced that a high regard for what we all have in common (or mostly in common),is to blame forMao's or Hitler's horrific conduct. I think these folks suffered from a degenerate form of respect for the individual -- the only individuals they respectedwere themselves and to a lesser degree those others in whom they saw a reflection of themselves. I think they lacked a respect for humanity in general as well as for most other individuals.I think both the individual and the group are worthy of respect. We are individuals and members of a species. Neither aspect of us can survive without the other. I think I my earlier post was unbalanced. I just reread your comments below. I don't think preaching humility equates with condoning murder. Or that non westerners lack a concern for individual suffering. I think the key to peaceful relationsis respect for others -- individually and collectively. Westerner and non westerner alike. Still, to conclude on a balanced note -- I agree that I went too far in the direction of stressing our commonality in my last post. And that your comments here are awelcome corrective (intended as such or not). Thanks Bill for another interesting informative and fun post. Jim Piat As for your post, it wasn't my intention to provide any form of corrective; I'm not competent to do that. I was simply noting my response to the discussion andsaying that Peirce's "laws" made sense to me. However, I will question this statement in your response: "I attribute the sometimes horrors we do not to common sense but to a degenerate formofrepresentation that tries to treat therelational symbolic world as comprised of discrete unrelatedthings." One of the strong-holds of the unitive world-view you seem to prefer has been the traditional Orient, where lifehashistorically been cheaper than dirt and mass exterminations of humansnearly routine. A modern example is Maoistpurges and the rape and pillage ofTibet. Mao and Stalin each surpassed Hitler's atrocities. I would argue that it is the traditional value of the autonomous individual by the western world which causes us angst over an atrocity that would not raise an eyebrow even today in some "all is one" parts of the world.Where all is one, no aspect of the whole is of much consequence. For the human to assume responsibility is an act of hubris. Isn't that the message of the Bhagavad Gita?So kill away, oh nobly born, and forget this conscience thing, an obvious lapse into ego. Bill Bailey --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Joe, What you say below is all very interesting to me. I hope you do give another go at writing up how lst three methodsexemplify some of the major ways in which our problem solving goes astray. I think the three methods (while each having an attractive virtue) if used exclusively or even in some sort of mechanistic combination often cause more problems then they solve. They are pseudo solutions to lifes problems because each denies some fundamental aspect of reality -- either the self , the other or what mediates between the two. Or to put it another way -- feeling, will, or thought. In anycase you seem to be in an inspired mood and I hope you press on. Just now for example the whole country seems at a loss for what to do about the Mid East. I wonder how the approach you are thinking about might be applied intrying to solveproblems on that scale as well as in analyzing the problems of our individual lives. And not just interpersonal problems, the problems weface with our enviroment as well. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - I think we may be getting close to the rationale of the four methods with what you say below, Jim. I've not run across anything that Peirce says that seems to me to suggest that he actually did work out his account of the methods by thinking in terms of the categories, but it seems likely that he would nevertheless tend to do so, even if unconsciously, given the importance he attached to them from the beginning: they are present in the background of his thinking even in the very early writings where he is thinking of them in terms of the first, second, and third persons of verb conjugation (the second person -- the "you" -- of the conjugation becomes the third categorial element). But whether he actually worked it out on that basis, the philosophically important question is whether it is philosophically helpful to try to understand the four methods by supposing that the first three correspond to the categories regarded in isolation and the fourth can be understood as constructed conceptually by combining the three methods consistent with their presuppositional ordering. That remains to be seen. In other words, I do think we can read these factors into his account in that way, and this could be pedagogically useful in working with the method in a pedagogical context in particular, but it is a further question whether that will turn out to be helpful in developing his thinking further in a theoretical way. It certainly seems to be worth trying, though. If the overall improvement of thinking in our practical life seems not to have improved much from what it was in antiquity, when compared with the radical difference in the effectiveness of our thinking in those areas in which the fourth method has been successfully cultivated, it may be because we have failed to pay attention to the way we handle our problems when we take recourse to one and another of the other three methods, as we are constantly doing without paying any attention to it. I started to write up something on this but it quickly got out of hand and I had best break off temporarily and return to that later. I will just say that it has to do with the possibility of developing the theory of the four methods as a basis for a practical logic -- or at least a practical critical theory -- of the sort that could be used to teach people how to be more intelligent in all aspects of life, including political life -- and I will even venture to say, in religious life: two areas in which intelligence seems currently to be conspicuously -- and dangerously -- absent. One potentiality that Peirce's philosophy has that is not present in the philosophy and logic currently dominating in academia lies in the fact that he conceived logic in such a way that rhetoric -- the theory of persuasion -- can be reintroduced within philosophy as a theoretical discipline with practical application in the service of truth. One can expect nothing of the sort from a philosophy that has nothing to say about persuasion. Joe Ransdell[EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Folks, I notice that Peirces lst three methods of fixing believe are part of the fourth or scientific method.Science is basically a method that gathers multiplebeliefs and combines them with reason to produce warranted belief. Individual belief (without resort to any authority other than oneself) is the method of tenacity -- I belief X because it is believable to me. When individual beliefs are combined the authority of others is introduced as a basis for belief. When these multiple beliefs (or one's individual beliefs) are combined in some reasonsed or logical way (for example taking their average) then one has has achieved the a priori or method of taste. Finally if one bases all beliefs not merely on unexamined conviction but instead relies on observation of events -- and combines multiple such observational beliefs in a reasoned way, the method of science has been achieved. Inother wordsthe three issues being juggledas a basis for belief are (1) single vs multiple beliefs (2) observation vs spontaneous conviction (3) reasoned vs unreasoned combining of beliefs. I haven't said this well but what I'm trying to get at is that the scientific method relies on multiple observation combined in a reasoned way. And this method incorporates all the essential aspect of each of the three prior methods. Science rests ultimately on combined unwarranted beliefs of individuals. At some point there must be an observation taken as face valid and this is the core of the individual observation. We know however that individual observations are inadequate because they only include one POV. So we combine multiple individual observations. I say observation, butthe term observationis just a way of directing individual beliefs to a common focus. The reasoned part of the scientific method has to do with the manner in which beliefs or observations are combined. Basically this is the logic of statistics. The simplest example being taking an average. I notice too that Peirce's discussion of knowledge provided by Joe touches on some of these same issues. BTW I don't mean for my sketchy account to be definitive -- just suggestive. So in conclusion I would say the FOB paperdescribes thethe components of the scientific method -- mulitple,individual observations or beliefs comined in a reasoned way. The basic foundation of all individual beliefs or observation is a kind of unexamined individualrealism takenat face value (tenacity).Countered bythe beliefs of others (based on the same tenacity) provides the method of authority. Combining these beliefs in a reasoned way adds the third "a priori" method. And finally insisting that these combined three methods focus on the same question introduces the notion of objectivity vs subjectivitywhich completes the elements of the scientific method for fixing belief. Sorry for the repitition. Don't have time just now to clean this up but wanted toput my two cents in the discussion. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamental psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Folks, Part of what I'm trying to say is that its not as though the scientific method were an entirely independent alternative to the other three methods. On the contrary the scientific method is built upon and incorporates the other three methods. The lst threeare not discredited methods they are the building blocks of the scienfic method. What gives sciences its power is that in combining the three methods (plus the emphasis upon observation -- which can or can not be part of the method of tenacity)it gives a more reliable basis for belief than any of the other three methods alone. But as for one and two -- yes I'd say they are the basis of the whole structure. Tenacity and authority can both include reason and observation. So if we include reason and observation in the lst two then we have all the elements of the scientific method. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
REPLY: I would say that his theory of representation has to be capable of articulating that distinction or there is something wrong with it, but I don't think that it is to be looked for merely in the distinction between the dyadic and the triadic but rather in something to do with the different functions being performed by icons, indices, and symbols, and that the distancing or detachment you are concerned with is to be understood especially in connection with the understanding of the symbol as involving an "imputed" quality. What this says is, I think, that we do not interpret a symbol as a symbol unless we are aware both that the replica we are interpreting is one thing and that what it means is something other than that, namely, the entity we imagine in virtue of its occurrence. Explicating that will in turn involve appeal to the functioning of a quality functioning as an icon of something the replica indexes. Dear Joe, Thanks for the thoughtful and suggestive reply. I'm looking forward to thinking about it duringthe coming week. In the meantimehere are some initialimpressions just by way of saying thanks -- One, I very much like the idea of expanding the issue to include the icon. I think you are right that the phenomenon of observation (for the lack of a better word) is one of representation and involves all three categories. And yes as well to the suggestion of looking at the notion of imputation. I take "imputation" as another word for representation. To impute is to represent the sign forwhat it is -- the functional mode of being. Pretending, playing, taking an"as if" stance and the like -- all examples of the process of representation or seeing the world triadicly. I'm not looking to introduce something new. It's more like housekeeping -- trying to tidy up some notions, put all the same colorsocks together and separatethe things to do list from the things themselves. Also hope to pick up Black Elk's contemplative book from Amazon. Watching the news these days onehungers for just such an account.Current worldeventsareupsetting enough in their own right, but it's the hectoring account of them that is truly driving me crazy. Cherry picking the facts and premisesto fit a preconceived conclusion --on both sides of the political spectrum. More later after I've had more time to digest your post and the comments for Martin and Arnold. Thanks again, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Pragmatic inquiry == the love of learning
My six year old daughter (who posed a question about "nothing" some time ago) has been reading at a six year olds level for about a year now (thankfully unremarkable). She came to me recently and said "I learned that words are made of letters at school today". I said "Grace, you have been reading for some time now, and you have known the alphabet for three years, you knew that letters were in words". She replies "But, I didn't know that words were made (I am unsure how she perceives "made")of letters". Knowing that words have letters does not, in the eyes of a six year old, necessarily mean that words are made of letters. Dear Darrel, This is a priceless exchange. Your daughter strikes me as a born philosopher and so does her dad. Not that I know either what makes or is in a philosopher. Inquiry maybe. Best wishes and thanks for keeping us Peirce listers posted, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Pragmatic inquiry == the love of learning
And finally, a related perceptual matter. You've probably seen this before, but it's always somewhat amazing to me (does anyone have a theory as to why it's iprmoatnt taht the frist and lsat ltteer be in the rghit pclae? Dear Gary, There is a lot of research showing the importancethat primacy (coming first) and coming last (as in the last word) have uponthe general significance we attach to events in a series, which events we recall, and how we act in response tothem. This is makes sense does it not? First impressions and last impression are the most important. First impression orient and last impressions conclude.Our attitudes and actions are mostly based upon our orientations and conclusions.Moreover inthe case of recognizing words, first and last letters set their visual boundariesand the number of letters betweenseem to serve mainlyas a way of sorting words into important (short) and bullshit (long). Try this: I b_ty_u c_n r_ _ d e_ _n t_ _s s_ _ _ _ _ _ e. OK -- maybe not LOL. Right now I'm writing a rather too longish response to Joe! Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: "reduction of the manifold to unity" Dear Martin, Thanks for these comments. You may well be right that I am introducingan unnecessarypsychological overlay to my account of representation.What follows aresome of my initialthoughts as I beginthe process ofstudyingyour very interesting and helpful comments. Could it be that,although it is not necessary to be conscious in order to interpret a symbol,it is, nevertheless, the triadic nature of symbols (or thirdness in general) that makesobservation possible? I'm thinking about the distinction between reacting and interpreting. Reaction, it seems to me, affects both the acting and reacting participants in equal but opposite ways. OTOH interpretation is asymetrical in thatit affects the interpretant without any corresponding affect on the symbol or the object. Interpretation is more like what we call observation and reaction is more like what we call participation. I am not offering the notions ofparticipation and observation as psychological explanations or causesof dyadic and triadic relations but rather the opposite. I'm saying that a dyadic relation is at the root of what we call theeveryday experience of raw (ie un-observed) participation and that a triadic relation is atthe rootof of observation. So often theact of observation is mis-taken as something thatis independent ofthe objectand itssign (or measurement), but as quantum physics teaches they are an irreducible triad and can not be built from or reduced to any combination of participations in dyadic reactions. That said I'm still very unsure of myself on this and you may be right that I am mostly just putting unneccessary psychological clothes on the naked truth. (Not your words I know but I couldn't resist oncethey popped into my head). But still, there is something about a concern for modestythat physics and logic lack in a way that psychology as the study of humans' being can not. What I take Peirce (a notable psychologist in his own right) to have rejected about the some of the psychologizing of his day was the tendency of some to suppose thatlabelingapuzzling phenomenawith afamiliar psychological name somehow provided an adequate explanation. But I am not trying to give a psychological account of representation. On the contrary I am trying to give a semiotic account ofthe psychologicalexperience ofobservation. Ah, a quickaside on consciousness as awareness of interpretation. It seems to me that there is something fundamentally faulty about the sorts of explanations that attempt to account for consciousness by a series of reactions to reactions (responding to responding, knowledge of knowledge etc). Off hand I can't think of a term for this sort of analysis but it smacks of an infinite regress and I don't find it persausive as an argument either for or against some explanation. The point is a triadic relation is the basis for all these supposed infinite regressions and triads only go three levels deep before they cycle back and repeat the same process. Not as an infinite regression but as a cycle completed. I say three levels deep on a intuitive hunch. There are only three elements involved and the analysis can only take three POV. If a phenomenon is triadic that is enough said about its recursive nature. Talk of an infinite regression neither adds nor detracts from the analysis. Butthese comments arejust an speculative aside.Ha, who am I kidding, my whole post is just a speculative aside! In any case, Martin, thanks very much for your comments. I'm will continue toponderthem. And I look forward to Joe's take as well.I'm wondering in particular how this issue might relate to the distinction between the act of assertion andthat which is asserted.Seems to me a mere fact is dyadic whereas an asserted fact is triadic. The problem is we assume that what we observe are "mere"facts but we have no access to mere givens without representation/observation. We are trying to build the explanation of a phenomenausing building blocks that include the phenomena itself. Which is why I am so often talking in circles. On a good day. Best wishes, Jim Piat Jim, At first glance, your comment gives me the impression that you are "psychologizing" semiosis by introducing the sign user (and his consciousness) into the equation. (Something Charles Morris will do). I don't have ready access to the CP right now, but I recall that Peirce later criticized the fact that NL can lead to a psychological understanding, though this was not his intent at the time. Considering that sign processes take place in nature (the Universe's growth being the unfolding of an Argument) we cannot reduce semiosis to psychology (though psychological facts are semeiotic) which concerns only the human mind, not Mind in general. What would it mean, therefore, to say that nature "obser
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: "reduction of the manifold to unity" Dear Folks --I apologizefor mistakenly including all those prior posts in my last post! Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Dear Joe, Thanks for your informal and very helpful response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the New List.So I have a few more questions.First some background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the meaning of objects. In standing for objectssignscan beuseful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about.It seems to methatin defining signs as referring to objects part of what this definition implies is thatthe sign user is in the position of standing outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect to the object that is beyonda mere indexical relationship. That being an "observor" or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in "participation with" or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or giving voice toone's sub or pre-representationalunderstanding of an object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance. Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent isthefoundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects as opposed tobeing merely a reactive participant in existence.. Actually, as I think about this a bit more, maybe it is notsimply the sign's function of "referring" but also the signs function of"standing for" that creates, presumes or makes possible the "observor" POV. But however one cuts it I don't see how a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is functionally distinct fromthe role of mere participant. So anyway that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK -- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial question that started this exchnage but Ifor me the questions are very much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise tothe feeling we have of being not simply participants in a world (like colliding billiard balls) but of also being observors of this participation -- aware of our nakedness and so on. The notion that in the beginning (of awareness) was the word. Thanks again -- I look forward to any comments, adviceand suggestions you or others might have. I am very eager to get clear on this point. So drop whatever you are doing ... Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 12:23 AM Subject: [peirce-l] "reduction of the manifold to unity" Jim and list: This is just a repeat of my previous message,spell-checked and punctuated correctly, with a couple of interpolated clarifications, and minus the unphilosophical paragraphsat the beginning and end: (I will try to state it better in a later message.) As regards your question: I will try to respond to it, but I can only talk about it loosely and suggestively here, in order to say enough to convey anything at all that might be helpful, and you will have to tolerate a lot of vagueness as well as sloppiness in what I am saying. If I bear down on it enough to put it into decently rigorous form it will not get said at all [because of the length], I'm afraid. But then this is just a conversation, not a candidate for a published paper. Okay, that self-defense being given in advance, I will go on to say that I think that one of the things that is likely to be misleading about the New List is that it is easy to make the mistake of thinking of the Kantian phrase "reduction of the sensuous manifold to unity" which Peirce uses at the very beginning of the New List to be talking about a unification of sense-data in the technical sense of "sense-datum" developed by philoso
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Great question, Jim!I can't even get started on an answer today, but I will be at work on it tomorrow and try to get at least a start at an anwer before the day is out. Joe Oh thanks Joe. I'm relieved to hear that! Reflecting a bit more I see that I should have focused primarily on the triadic (standing for to) aspect of the sign and not the dyadic indexical (referential) aspect. But I'm glad you found my question worth addressing and I'm looking forward to your comments. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Dennett
Jeffrey Grace wrote: It struck me as Peirceian because, if I'm not mistaken, Peirce denied that there was such a thing as "introspection". He also seemed to affirm the idea that individuals are "less real" than generality... or rather that all individuals are instances of general categories and therefore less real as individuals. I also get the impression that what we call mind or subjective experience is more objective or public than we realize... and this seems to coincide with Dennett's heterophenomenology...the idea that an objective observer might be able to read someone's subjective experience better than the subject him/herself. Dear, Jeffrey, I can't find the Justice Holmes quote about the plain meaning of words vs one's subjective intent that I thought was so apt to your comments -- but do want to say I think you make a very good point. In fact, recently I was thinking about Dennett's homunculus/theater of the mind metaphor in conjunction with the "infinite regression" criticism sometimes leveled against Peirce theory of signs. My idea was that a theater of the mind need only go three levels deep to cover all the possiblities (but that's for another discussion andonly tangentially related to the pointyou are making). Just now I merely want to say that I think you capture something very important about Peirce's viewsandalso maybe somethingabout Denett'sthat he may not realize himself.Surely Peirce's ideas on pragmatismgave impetus tothe objective thrust that so captured law, psychology and philosophy in the early 1900s. And Dennett is indebted tothis tradition. All said withrespect and admiration for thecounterpoints of Steven and Gary. That's part of what I find so appealing and impressive about Peirce -- that heidentified both what is best and what is worst in behaviorism. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Pragmatic inquiry == the love of learning
Dear Gary, I like what you've said about teaching and learning from a Peircean POV. My best teachers were those who encouraged learning by setting a good example of it themselves and also showed a genuine interest in my desires. The teacher and the student are much the same. I also think one can neither teach nor learn without love and it'skissin-cousin enthusiasm. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Dennett
Dear Steve, I did not meant to convey that I thought Dennett favored the theater of the mind metaphor, but it would not surprise me if Peirce found Dennett's view simplistic. Personally I mostly have to content myself with just the surface of the debate though I'm always hoping to grasp the issues on a deeper level. So I appreciate your raising some of those issues and challenging me to think more deeply about them. I find the Peirce-L endlessly fascinating, butsee myselfparticipating more as one of itskibitzer/gadflies than as one ofits heavy lifters. A legitimate, albeit small and sometimes annoying, role in the grand scheme --I hope. But four posts is enuff of me fornow so, with thanks and best wishes to all, I'll shut up forawhile. Cheers, Jim Piat I do not believe that comparing theories by abstracting their general statements about reality is sufficient. Dennett's theater of the mind argument argues against the homunculus and the theater. IMHO, Dennett makes arguments against which Peirce would rebel fiercely - in both its content and methodology. In particular, I do not see Peirce accepting heterophenomonology which argues naively that being objective is the best we can do in science. Dennett does not take experience seriously as a phenomenon of the world, and therein lies the core of the problem - which is theoretical and has more to do with his ability to reason than it does with objective observation. In short, Dennett simply denies his ability to make any observation. With respect, Steven On Sep 8, 2006, at 7:43 AM, Jim Piat wrote: Jeffrey Grace wrote: It struck me as Peirceian because, if I'm not mistaken, Peirce denied that there was such a thing as "introspection". He also seemed to affirm the idea that individuals are "less real" than generality... or rather that all individuals are instances of general categories and therefore less real as individuals. I also get the impression that what we call mind or subjective experience is more objective or public than we realize... and this seems to coincide with Dennett's heterophenomenology...the idea that an objective observer might be able to read someone's subjective experience better than the subject him/herself.Dear, Jeffrey, I can't find the Justice Holmes quote about the plain meaning of words vs one's subjective intent that I thought was so apt to your comments -- but do want to say I think you make a very good point. In fact, recently I was thinking about Dennett's homunculus/theater of the mind metaphor in conjunction with the "infinite regression" criticism sometimes leveled against Peirce theory of signs. My idea was that a theater of the mind need only go three levels deep to cover all the possiblities (but that's for another discussion andonly tangentially related to the pointyou are making). Just now I merely want to say that I think you capture something very important about Peirce's viewsandalso maybe somethingabout Denett'sthat he may not realize himself.Surely Peirce's ideas on pragmatismgave impetus tothe objective thrust that so captured law, psychology and philosophy in the early 1900s. And Dennett is indebted tothis tradition. All said withrespect and admiration for thecounterpoints of Steven and Gary. That's part of what I find so appealing and impressive about Peirce -- that heidentified both what is best and what is worst in behaviorism. Cheers, Jim Piat---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC
Dear Steven, Your questions are very interesting to me as well. I view the conceptions Peirce speaks of as signs and was just about to write something to that effect to Ben and might yet. I read Peirce as saying their are various sensations that impinge upon uswhich we organize in such a way as to constitute signs of objects -- these signs being conceptions. And that we ourselvesare signs standing for a point of view or object we call ourselves. I don't mean by this to imply that this is all just a matter of neurology -- I think coordination with other signs is fundamental to the process by which signs are established and do their work. So I take it that the most complete organization of being is as signsand that this triadic being (of which we partake as signs) can at least conceptually be understood as comprised of a nesting of signs within which are signs, reactions and qualities. So I would say primacy belongs to the sign of which quality, reaction (distinction) and continuity are inherent parts.Sensations I take to bereactions. Of course I'm not sure any of what I'm saying here is correct. I amjoining you incalling for a discussion of the New List and the questions it raises.So, I'm not really clear on the question you are asking (the difference between the two interpretations you are putting forth), but I think the theory Peirce is referring to is the work of Kant in his critique of Pure Reason but I'm not at all sure. In any case if you are taking on The New List paragraph by paragraph and are interested in discussing each paragraph as you go I'd like to join you and hope others will as well --- I've been hoping for a systematic review of this work on the list for some time. It would be very helpful to me. Best wishes, Jim Piat From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 8:34 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC Dear List, I want to make sure that I have interpreted Peirce correctly from his statements in On A New List of Categories (NLC). I am comparing this argument with the notion of epistemological primacy put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his The Logical Structure of the World. In the first paragraphs of NLC Peirce says: (CP1.545) Sec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. (CP1.546) Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on. Here are my questions: Carnap argues that the entire experience of an individual holds epistemological primacy.This could be taken to concur with Peirce's argument in CP1.545 but there appear to be two interpretations possible. The source of my doubt is Peirce's use of the term "unity" in the above paragraph and his comments in the following paragraph. I want to be sure that I understand how he is using the term "unity." He may mean that concepts are differentiated in the landscape of experience and that the "manifold of sensuous impressions" is a whole and not constituted of distinctions, that distinctions in that "manifold" are what he calls "the function of conceptions." These distinctions fit my definition of "signs" and so an interpretation of CP1.545 could read that the "function of conceptions" are signs (i.e., differentiated experiences). An alternative point of view would argue that Peirce is saying the opposite of what I have said before and that he means that distinct "sensuous impressions" are brought to together as a function of conceptions. In this last case he would need an integrative mechanism for semeiosis and give epistemological primacy to "conceptions." This provides significant problems. Finally, where is the theory "already established" to which Peirce refers- in his own work or is he referring to someone else? Sincerely, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith INSTITUTE for ADVANCED SCIENCE ENGINEERING Sunnyvale, California http://iase.info ---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Dear Folks-- poking about I found that much of what Peirce says about perceptionrelevant to our discussion of verification. (I think what makes verification possible within representation is that the capacity to respond to secondness is inherent in representation -- Peirce didn't say that but I think it's so). But Peirce did say this: "Whatever Comte himself meant by verifiable, which is not very clear, it certainly ought not to be understood to mean veifiable by direct observation, since that would cut off all history as an inadmissile hypothesis. But what must and should be meant is that the hypothesis must be capable of comparing perceptual predictions deduced from a theory with the facts of perception predicted, and in taking the measure of agreement observed as the provisional and approximative, or probametric, measure of the general agreement of the theory with fact. It thus appears that a conception can only be admitted into a hypothesis in so far as its possible consequences would be of a perceptual nature; which agrees with my original maxim of pragmatiism as far as it goes." (Source EP II page 225 -The Nature of Meaning) Well, whether the observation is direct orotherwise it does seem that Peirce views verification as comparing an prediction with an "observed" outcome. And elsewhere in discussions of perception/observation he seems to make it clear that secondness is involved in perception and perception is involved in cognition. And also from EP II pages 24 and 26 respectively: "It thus appears that all knowledge comes to us from observation. A part is forced upon us from without and seems to result from Nature's mind; a part comes from the depths of the mind as seen from within, whcih by an egotistical anacoluthon we call 'our' mind".. . . "The remark that reasoning consists in the observation of an icon will be found equally important in th theory and the practice of reasoning". None of the above intended as proof of anything -- just an interesting line of inquiry. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Dear Ben, Folks-- Thanks for the reassuring clarification, Ben. Here's my thought on the matter for today. The distinction between the knowledge we gain from direct acquaintance with an object verses the knowledge we gain of the same object through a symbolic sign of that object is that direct aquaintance is mediated by an actually indexed icon of the object whereas indirect symbolic aquaintance is mediated by an imputed icon of the object. The meaning of symbols depends in part upon the reliability of linguistic conventions, customs and habits. The meaning of icons depends primarily upon the reliability of direct observation. Ideally the meanings we assign to our symbols are rooted in aquaintance with the actual objects to which they refer, but customs take on a life of their own and are notoriously susceptible to the distorting influence of such factors as wishful thinking, blind allegiance to authority, tradition and the like. Science and common sense teach us that it is useful to periodically compare our actual icons with our theories and symbolic imputations of them. Symbols provide indirect aquaintance with objects. Actual observation of objects provides direct aquaintance. However in both cases the aquaintance (in so far as it provides us with a conception of the object) is mediated by signs. In the case of direct aquaintance the sign is an icon. In the case of indirect aquaintance the sign is a symbol with an imputed icon. Whenever we make comparisons we do so with signs. Mere otherness is basically dyadic. Comparison is fundamentally triadic. A is not B is not a comparison but merely an indication of otherness from which we gain no real sense of how A compares to B. On the other hand the analogy that A is to B as B is to C is a comparison which actually tells us something about the relative characters of the elements involved. Comparing a collateral object with a symbol for a collateral object is really a matter of comparing the meaning of an actual icon with the meaning of an imputed icon. We are never in a position to compare an actual object with a sign of that object because we have no conception of objects outside of signs. Sometime I think, Ben, that you are just blowing off the notion that all our conceptions of objects are mediated by signs. You say you agree with this formulation but when it comes to the collateral object you seem to resort to the position that direct aquaintance with the collateral object is not really mediated by signs but outside of semiosis. But what Peirce means (as I understand him) is that the collateral object is not actually iconized in the symbol that stands for it but is merely imputed to be iconized. To experience the actual icon we must experience the collateral object itself. That is the sense in which the collateral object is outside the symbol but not outside semiosis. One of the recurring problems I personally have in understanding Peirce is that I am often unsure in a particular instance whether he is using the term sign to refer to a symbol, an icon or an index. Morevover when it comes to icons and indexes I am often unclear as to whether he means them as signs or as degenerate signs. Maybe this is where I am going astray in my present analysis of the role of the collateral object in the verification of the sign. In anycase I continue to find this discussion helpful. Best wishes to all-- Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Dear Bill, I did not mean to suggest that direct aquaintance with an object was unmediated by signs . I was trying to make just the opposite point -- that all meaningful conceptions are mediated by signs whether we are in direct contact with the object or indirectly as when the object is represented by a symbol. My further point was that direct contact permitted actual iconization of the object based upon direct observation whereas the symbol only provided an imputed icon which depended in part upon community conventions. So I think I am more in agreement with your position that I made clear in my earlier posts. I even agree with the thrust of your argument that meaning guides perception rather than vice versa. We do not perceive truly unknown objects that are meaningless to us. An unfamiliar object that is a member of a familiar class is of course not instance of a meaningless object becuase we have a framework in which to perceive its broad outlines. But a truly unknown object would escape our notice because it has no meaningful contours. As to firstness -- I seem to be in a mininority around here as to what constitutes a feeling, a quality or a firstness. I say we have no conception of firsts (other than as firsts of thirds) because without the sign we have no conception of anything. In the beginning is the word. Sorry I have not responded more directly to your comments. I find them interesting as always but just now I'm in a big rush. Still I could not resist a comment or two of my own. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions direct acquaintance or direct experience if those terms mean unmediated, or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called objective. Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn't dodge the predator's charge until after you'd named the predator, the attack and what to do. For most of our lives, the subject-object relationship analysis only enters when things go wrong, when the ride breaks down and we have to get off to fix it. The rest of the time the perceptual information/data that we treat as objective is submerged in our comparatively mindless states of feeling and doing. We write or type instead of moving our fingers and hands to produce selected results. We drive three quarters of the way to work and wake up to realize we've no memory of the prior two miles. Or we come home angered by someone at work and yell at spouses and kids. That's the everyday world we live in, and in that world the organic unity of the sensory system means responses to environmental impingments (exteroception) are inherently conditioned by what we are feeling and doing--by interoception and proprioception. I understand this primary level of information processing to be essentially what Peirce means by firstness. I don't think we can get to secondness until
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Dear Ben, Joe, Folks -- Ben, are you saying that Peirce's categories (including representation) are inadequate to account for comparisons betweenknowledge gainedfrom direct aqauintance with a collateral object andknowledge gainedfrom a signofa collateral object? That when we make these sorts of comparisons weengage insome category of experience (such as checking, recognition. verification or the like) that is not accounted for in the Peircean categories? Is that basically what you are saying or am I missing your point? I want to make sure I'm stating the issue to your satisfaction before I launch into further reasons why I disagree with that view.I fear wewe may be talking past one another if we don't share a common understanding of what is at issue.So I want to make sure I'm correctly understanding what you take to be at issue. When and if you have the energy and interest, Ben. I admire your stamina and good cheer. And yours, too, Joe.I think that dispite its frustrating moments this has been a worthwhile discussion.For me the notion of what we can know and how we know it is atthecore of Peirce's philosophy.Each timethe listrevisits this issue in one form or another I gain a better understandingof what is a stake-- and also of someerroneous assumptions or conclusions that I have beenmaking.Thanks to all -- Jim Piat Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, September 01, 2006 3:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, list, [Joe] I was just now rereading your response to Charles, attending particularly to your citation of Peirce's concern with verification, and I really don't see in what you quote from him on this anything more than the claim that it is the special concern for making sure that something that someone -- perhaps oneself -- has claimed to be a fact or has concluded to be so (which could be a conviction more or less tentatively held) really is a fact by putting the claim or acceptation of that conclusion to the test, in one way or another. This verificational activity could involve many different sorts of procedures, ranging from, say, reconsidering the premises supporting the claim as regards their cogency relative to the conclusion drawn to actively experimenting or observing further for the same purpose, including perhaps, as a rather special case, the case where one actually attempts to replicate the procedure cited as backing up the claim made. Scientific verification is really just a sophistication about ways of checking up on something about which one has some doubts, driven by an unusually strong concern for establishing something as "definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing more than an ideal of checking up on something so thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be raised again. But it is no different in principle from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make sure" of something that we think might be so but about which we are not certain enough to satisfy us. The purpose (http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01288.htmlalso at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1344) of my quoting Peirceon verification was to counter Charles' claim that verification amounts to nothing more than one's acting as if a claim were true, and Charles'making it sound like there's something superfluous about verification, that it's somehow meaningless to think of really verifying or disverifying a claimed rule like "where there's smoke, there's fire," meaningless insofar as it supposedly involves indulging in Cartesian doubt and insofar one has already done whatever verificationone can do, by acting as if the claimed rule were true -- as if the way to understand verification were to understand it as a piece of symbolism about a rule only hyperbolically doubtable, understand verification as an act which stands as symbol (or, for that matter, as index or whatever) to another mind,rather than as an observing of sign as truly corresponding to object, and of interpretant as truly corresponding to sign and object. Verification does not need to be actually public and shared among very distinct minds, though it should be, at least in principle, sharable, potentially public in those ways. (Of course, _scientific_ verification has higher standards than that.) I quoted Peirce on verification to show that, in the Peircean view,the doubting of a claimed rule is not automatically a universal, hyperbolic, Cartesian doubt of the kind which Peirce rejects, especially rejects as a basis on which (a la Descartes)only deductive reasoning will be allowed to build -- a Cartesian needle's eye of doubt through which all philosophica
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Charles Rudder wrote: That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize"objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosicallyevaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores. Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge does seem to be a popular view oftheissue of how reality is accessed or known. But I think this is a view Peirce rejected in the New List. However this is not to say that there is no practical distinction betweenwhat is meant by an object and what is meant by a representation of an object. An object is that which is interpreted as standing for (or representing) itself. A sign is something that is interpreted as standing for something other than itself. Thus one can compare one's interpretation of a sign of a collateral object with one's interpretation of the referenced collateral object itself even though both theobject of the sign and the collateral object are known only through representation. The collateral object and the object of some discussion of it are in theory the same object.The distinction is between one's direct representation of the object vs it's indirect representationto one by others. In both cases the object is represented. There are no inherent distinctions between those objects we interpret as objects and those we interpret as signs -- the distinction is in how we use them. The object referred to by a sign is always collateral to the sign itself unless the sign is referring to itself in some sort of convoluted self referential fashion. The distinction between direct (albeit mediated) knowledge of an object and the sort of second hand knowledge one gains from the accounts of others poses no special problems. There is nothing magic about direct personal knowledge that gives it some sort of specialobjective validity over the accounts ofothers.What makes such personal aquaintance valuable is nottheir imagined "objectivity" buttheir trustworthiness (in terms of serving one's own interests as opposed to the interests of others). OTOH multiple observation gathered from different "trustworthy" POVs do provide a more complete and thusmorereliable and useful (or"true"as some say) account of reality. And finally, verification (conceivinga manifold of senuous impressions ashaving some particular meaning) IS representation -- at least for Peirce (as I understand him). Just some thoughts as I'm following this discussion. Best, Jim --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
ses. And I willsupport (to the last parenthetical remark-) your right to pursue them --just as you have so often and patiently indugled my own explorations. Thanks again and Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
Jim, I said, The only time that one properly splits them without an intervening word is when one indicates vocal stress of "other" by itself apart from "an" along with the syllabification "an-other" -- as in "an other thing." I guess that that does approximate to the situation that you're talkingabout, where one wants a different serving rather than an additional serving. However "an other" just looks like sloppy English, which Claudio wouldn't want if he knew how it looks. Italicization or underlining would be mandatory: "an other serving" or "an other serving" -- in order to represent that somebody was actually speaking with that stress on "other" and clearly pronouncing the "an" separately from "other." Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
Dear Ben, Wilfred-- Ben, I'm no grammarian and you may well be correct as to whento use other vs another. In any case I did not mean to dispute your use of "another". I was mostlygoing off on a tangentinspired by Wilfred's speculations as to what the distinctions might imply. I defer to you on the grammar. Yourcomment below raises another related thought: I agree about nummbers as othernesses. "Other" isnot unlikean ordinal form of the phrase "more". What I meant to suggest in my earlier remarks was that "other" was akin to the notion of quantityas expressed in cardinal numbers and that the notion of sequence or order as expressed in ordinal numbers was perhaps more akin to the notion of thirdness, mediation, continuity and time. Otherness I associate with secondness which I was trying to suggest might be associated with the notion of quantity. Thesenotions are far from clear in my mind but I think their interdependence (if in fact they are interdependent) may in part be explicated by Peirce's categories (as also be the source of somethedisagreement as to whether or when a sign is a first or a third). ButI have no quarrel withyour choice of "another" over "an other" for Claudio's graph. I was just going off on a tangent sparked by Wilfred's comments. Sorry for the the resending your lastpost whichI sent by mistake. But yes, the example you provided in that post, illustrated thedistinction or emphasis I had in mind. Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] The Age of Fallibility
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Dear Folks, Thought some might be interested in George Soros new book_The Age of Fallibility_. A review by Michael Maiello on the Fobes website states, "On one hand, Soros argues, the way we understand the world in large part depends on what preconceptions we bring to our inquires and on what narratives we choose to follow and metaphors we employ to describe the world around us. That sounds pretty post-modern but unlike the PoMos, Soros assumes that there is an objective reality out there that, althought it defies complete description, can certainly prove us wrong". Sounds about right to me but I've not read the book. From an earlier book I'd say Soros was left of center politically and by his own account heavily influenced by Popper philosophically. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: the quality of good
Dear Charles, Alwaysworthwhile for meto read your comments. I've interspersed some responses. Charles Rudder wrote: Jim Pait, list, Jim's comments on ethics and aesthetics brought to mind some things I have thought about but not thought through which include: 1. Is anything like Rousseau's pre-social human existence possible, which, for reasons, among others,like Lester Frank Ward sets out in his objection to Laissez Faire theories of social movement, I doubt. RESPONSE: I, also, doubt the possibility of pre-social human existence. But I fear that such an argument wouldbe difficult to distinguish between an argumentover what onepresupposes to be the nature of socialverses what one presupposes to be the nature of humanity. In other words can the nature of what it is to be human be separated from the nature of what it is to be social. I think social is part of what it is to be human (and probably other species as well). The constructs would have to be conceptually independent to properly ask whether one could exist without the other. Then supposing they were independent conceptually one could ask if human existence were dependent upon the existence of the social. I haven't said this well. What I'm trying to say is that we need to distinguish betweenthe question of whether being social is part of being human human and the question of whetherexisting as a human depends upon the support of society. Still not quite right but the best I can do just now. END 2. Isit possible for individual members of social groups to act as if we have no freedom of choice--that human conduct includes nononmechanical consequences of selecting oneamong two or more available options? RESPONSE: I like the way you have inverted the way the question is typically posed, Charles. You rascal. END 3. If it is impossible for individual members of social groups to act as if we have no freedom of choice, is it possible for us to act as if no choices lie on a continuum between worst and best? Is it possible for members of social groups to avoid acting as if we mustmake ethical decisions about what is and doing what is right or best? RESONSE: I'd say the answer to #3 above is: No it is not possible to act in good faith and at the same time avoid considering the ethical consequences of anything we do.I believe that all our actions have ethical consequences. I think in general your questions above encompasstwo big issuesthat almost alwaysarise indiscussions of ethics:(1) Can there be ethical choices withoutso-called free will.(2) How oughtconcerns for the individual be balanced against concerns for the society-- given that the survival of each is interdependent. Despitethe enormous valueallsocieties (not just some societies) place on individual life and liberty, no society (not just some societies)allowsits individual members to havetotally free reign norplaces more value on the life ofan individualthan upon the life of the society. But it is interesting to seethe degree in which someindividual's lives are more highly valued than other individuals -- again, probably in allsocieties. I'm talking about comprehensive societies (such as tribes or nations) thataddress the overall needs of their members --not such limited social groups or institutions that address only one aspect of life. Just Wondering, RESPONSE: Me too, and thanks for the doing so. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: the quality of good
Wilfred wrote: I did not respond. But actually would have said the same. That I would not know. In some situations I actually would have no problem at all putting the car at full speed and driving the man dead. While at other I would refuse to drive whatever the consequences might be as long the two subjects in front would stay alive. We could have this kind of discussions here. I would regard it very interesting. But think they should then better take place on some separate list probably. For discussion about applicability of the Peirce notions. And maybe getting the anothernesses into the discussions also. Dear Wilfred, Folks- Thanks for the interesting response and my apologies for taking some of it out of context in the interest of saving list space. One of the reason I was not yet ready to post my comments was because I wanted to tie them in specifically to Peirce. I believe he takes the view that his whole theory of logic and signs derives from the twin notions of aesthetics and beauty. That the good and the beautiful are themselves related and that both are more fundamental than the idea of truth. In his essay dealing with the classification of the sciences (page 62 of Buchler's Philosophical Writing of Peirce) I found the following quote of Peirce: "Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without and ulterior reasons. I am not well acquainted with this science; but it ought to repose on phenomenlogy. Ethics or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in determining the *summum bonum*. It is the theory of self controlled, or deliberate conduct. Logic is the theory of self controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such , must appeal to ethics for its principles". I agree with Peirce that we begin with the admirable (the given of what is desireable) but I think I would draw or emphasize a distinction between conduct thatis desireable for the individual (or as perceived from a limited perspective) versus that which is desireable for the group (or from the broader persepective of the species or life itself). Ultimately I think beauty resides in survival of the group not the individual. And indeed when it comes to beauty folks tend to hold the group average as the best example. For example,instudies I can't cite off hand, folks tend to ratefacial and bodily featuresmost nearly approximating the group mean as most attractive. Well, now that I think of it, I believe Peirce does make the point that communityfeeling is a more admirable ethical principle than individual interests. So I think the notion of good I was trying to develop in my initial post was more or less derived from Peirce. I could not find a Peirce reference to Nietzsche. Do you or others know where Peirce offers an opinion on Nietzsche? Thanks again for your interesting and encouraging comments, Wilfred. Personally I think we could have a fun andpertinent discussion of ethics right here on the Peirce list if there is sufficient interest and participation. Trouble is, it usually take some emotionally charged current event issue to arousefolk's interests,and often such discussions tend to get mired down in disputes over the factswhich end up overshadowing discussion of the of ethical principlesand considerations. This, it seems to me, is even more the case with real lifeethical conflicts(as opposed to discussions of hypothetical situations). Can a consideration of facts be made independent of a consideration of the beautiful and ethical and some logicians suppose? I'm not convinced. And not just because folks get upset over such disputes but rather because such attempts to separate fact and value are inherently false and upsetting! Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Dear Patrick and Arnold Enjoyed your exchange! Not the least your spirited defense and encouragement of the desire and right to inquire no matter how humble or meager one's resources. In my experience when someone shares a tale or experience they hold dear it's almost always interesting. We humans are tellers of tales -- it may be our crowning glory. OK, its a holiday here in the states (and from what some of my British friends tell me for them as well ;) so I'll sign off for the day and give all my list friends a break. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Ben wrote: A 3-D object can be so rotated in 4-D space as to turn it opposite-handed. I remember an episode of the original _Outer Limits_ about it -- some man ended up with two right hands :-). My response: Thanks, Ben. I'm not surprised to hear from you on this issue four-most importance. But so quickly -LOL. Well if you are right (and I imagine you are) it seems to me that this would shed some doubt on the universality of Peirce's claim regarding the nature of triads being sufficient to account for all higher order relations. Still I think the result holds for three dimensional space (especially with respect to the issue of sterio-isomers requiring in principle only three groups to establish their handedness. Would you agree with this latter more limited conclusion? I recall a similar discussion on list years back when the question of whehter Peirces conclucions regarding the sufficiency of triads was merely an artifact of the the fact that we lived in three dimensional space and someone said that the issue had been addressed by some mathematicians and apparently "those" mathematicians felt Peirce was correct. But I'm in no position to judge. Seems its a fairly straightforward issue that I would think topologist have,or could, address. Thanks again. Ben.Would my blaming my breaking ofmy vow of holiday silence on you be a some sort of degenerate third or just a plain old garden variety lame excuse. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Jerry Chandler wrote: "But, my point is that if four different groups are necessary to construct an optical isomer of carbon such that it distinguishes between the logic of polarized light, then it is mathematically impossible to achieve this logical distinction with any notion of 'threeness". Optical isomers are not a question of trichotomies and triadicies. They are questions of tetrachotomies and tetraadicies. I would welcome arguments to the otherwise". Dear Jerry, Actually,handednessandmaterials that polarize lightare amongthe very examples Peirce gives of his notion of Thirdness. The notions of left verses right (which distinguished between mirror image optical stereo-isomers) Peirce pointa out require the consideration of thetriadic relation of three directions (up-down, front back, left right). It may well be thatdifferent carbon groups are involvednaturally occuring steroisomers but in fact only three conjoined points are required to achieved the distniction beween left and right. Triadic examples of handedness Left Right A---B B--A l l l l CC Verses "redundant" tetradic examples of handedness Left Right A--B--D DB-A l l I I C C I don't mean to bepresent the above as authoritative -- this is merely my understanding of the issue. Best wishes and good luck witht he conference, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] the quality of good
Dear Folks, I've long been sceptical about the notion of good and evil. So as an exercise of self discipline I thought I'd give a go at trying to develop a general idea of the notion of good and ask for others to share some of their views as well. Seem to me that good is an evaluation we make about the consequences or meanings ofevents.That in general we judge good event to be those who outcome is generally agreedupon as increasing the satisfaction and well being of folks. But how is the process of generally agreeing achived (in other words what specifically do I mean by general agreement) and what is meant by the notions of satisfactiona nd well being of folks. Beging with the latter I'd say that the satisfaction and well being of folks refers to thoseoutcomes or consequencesfolks would choose for themselves. The issue of general agreement is more difficult. The problem with moral choices is not deciding between good and bad or better and worse but choosing between who is to get the better and whom the worse. The simple choice between good and bad is not by itself a moral choice. A moral choice involves a choice in whichwhat is good forone person or group is achieved at the expense of what is good for another. A choice between six of one and a half a dozen of the other in which no one gains or loses at the expense of another is not a a choice involing a moral decision. Good is inextricably tied to the notion of moral choices. In general we consider an outcome good to the extent it is the outcome folks would choose for themselves. The distinction between a good and a moral outcome is that thequality of beinggoodrefers tothat which one would choose for hirself where as the the moral choice is the one which one would select if he or she did not know which outcome --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: the quality of good
Dear Folks, Sorry about that last post on the qaulity of good -- I was working on a draft which I meant to save but sent instead. I had just got to the point of realizing I had nothing to say other than I think Rawls had it about right in so far as I can tell from the blurb on the cover of his book! So that's my conclusion -- or good enough and the moral thing is for me to shut up and ask for the opinions of others. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP 5.407 Joe Ransdell Dear Folks, Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence. I take the above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those opinions (signs) refer. An opinion that is true represents an object that is real. But what is the relation between real and existance? Can a first (such as a quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself real? A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere firsts. I guess what I wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts. I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere qualities (as firsts). For example, if one were to express a true opinion as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical objects of those opinions) would be real.One could also express false opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in which case the qualities referred to would not be real. And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now think it is) then I would say that real is a property of all modes of being (potential, actual and general). To be, is to be real. However true or false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects that are falsely represented. Anything that has potential or actual being is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or interpreted) that quality or object is not real. So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the hallucination are not real. Similarly possible objects do not necessarily exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible objects are not. And so on... I think that sovles the problem for me. My basic conclusion is that all modes of being are real. An object need not exist to be real but it must be possible. Some representations are true and some are false. Objects represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true. I wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions, contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs. I think the above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Dear Patrick, Folks-- Whitehead, yes-- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and resist our attempts to pigeon hole them.OTOH contrasting mere intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the inward attractions of the feeling or representations themselves, nor by a transcendental force of haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that is, in the interests of the the synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which they would not otherwise have had". Later in that same paragraph (fromA Guess at the Riddle) Peirce continues with a further good word for those who attempt to sort and categories experience saying "Intuition is regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought would that e and so well in accord with the spriit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently". Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick wrote: However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms. Jean-Marc responded: Not at all. Peirce was a three-category realist, acknowledging the reality fo Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness is just another word for nominalism in that context. Peirce was not a nominalist. Dear Patrick, Jean-Marc, Folks-- I have a bit of trouble keeping track of the similarities and differences among the notions of true, real and existent as Peirce uses them. I am especially unclear about the the application of the term real to his category of Firstness.Are firsts real but non existent? Seems to me the notion of real qualities (as opposed to illusory ones) only has meaning in the context of qualities coupled with secondness as they are embodied in objects. In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are related. Best wishes Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Dear Steven, I think Crick of DNA fame was also seeking consciousness in the microtubials. What troubles me most about the search for the neural basis of consciousness is our lack of a coherent and satisfying working definition of consciousness. I doubt we will find the neurological basis of something we can't identify in the first place. The effort begs the question. Moreover neurons may be a necessary without being a sufficient condition for consciousness. Just one layman's opinion. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Dear Gary. Thanks foryourgenerous and kind words.You inspire me to try to follow your example of courage and good will. Cheers, Jim Piat PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Dear Gary, Folks-- Oh I was just trying to be funny -- you know, with all the troubles in the world ours are just tempests in teapots. But I am serious about your good will being a great example and inspiration. I was just reading this moment about the Israeli tanks on the Gaza border -- wondering if this might not be an opportunity for them to pull back, extend an olive branch and say to Hamas "Hey wait, this isn't working --- what say we pause, regroup and try as brothers to find a common way -- or maybe for Hamas to make such a gesture. Seems all the drums everwhere beat mostly for war and conflict --- Where are the voices for peace? Blessed are the peacemakers. I'm only saying I wish we had more folks seeking common ground and I want to cheer on and express my gratitude to those who are -- as in your note to Jean-Marc and the list. Conflict, fearand animosity needs no encouragment from me. Nor criticism either. I'm just hoping good will trumps distrust, fearand animosity. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 10:05 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc. Jim, Thanks for your lovely notes. But what in the hell does this mean? PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead!Best,Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, Jim and others I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines. In French language we have a phrase Appellation d'Origine Controlee (A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the phrasing would have to be Protected Designation of Origin (P.D.O.). I am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue. I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of them is the First, the Second and which is the Third? Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering. Bernard Dear Bernard, You mean who's on First? Well, per my most recent take on this issue I'd say that, first of all, it all depends on what you mean by First. The sign it seems is the universal conceptual tool -- if it can be thought, the sign can accommodate it. Ah, yes ---and that too! Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Gary Richmond wrote: So, finally, is a sign a First or a Third? It seems to me at this point in my reflection that it functions as both, transmuting itself as the sign grows in the continuation of a semiotic process.GaryDear Gary, Folks-- Yes, Gary, what you say in the above post seems corrrect to me in so far as my present understanding of this complex issue goes. Now, if we allow that even an object (if taken as part of triad of objects) can serve as a first or third I think we have come full circle and in some sense also merged with the position put forth by Jean-Marc. Could it be that Peirce's classifications of signs accommodates (my word for the day) both points of view-- The key being (in my view) that to serve as a first (quality or monad), second (object or dyad) or third (mediator or triad) is to function (or be construed/interpreted as functioning) in aspecific relational way. IOWs allare signs and our discussions of objects, first and thirds (as well as categories verses ordinal positions)arise from our prescissions not from the givens. What makes thought possible (including all the nesting and reframing of ideas) is the fact that all is thought. We begin with thought. We swim in a continuum of thought and are ourselves thought. Slice it however you want it comesout an irreducible triad of form, substance and function. Maybe ... Thanks for sticking with me in this discussion.For me it has at times been a bit frustratingbut even more so it has also beenextremely helpful.For the record, I conclude thatI was wrong or at best had a very limited understanding of the issues. Stilllimited, but better than before. Thanks to all, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben wrote: Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Dear Ben, Folks-- Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented. So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak of mere firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes sense to me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a second... Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds. Furthermore, no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking that leads me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the interpretation of this particular quote is concerned. The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories. As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress. All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce. * I'm working from Peirce's discussion Three Trichotomies of Signs as presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_ Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Joe and Frances, This is not directly to your concerns but may be of some related interest: On page 106 of Volume 1 of the Essential Peirce (chapter 6 --On a New Class of Observations, Suggested by the Principles of Logic) I find the following Peirce QUOTE: It is usually admited that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions. CLOSE QUOTE The caps are not mine. Best wishes, Jim Piat Where does Peirce talk about an immediate representamen (or an immediate sign)? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Jim, List, I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes: 1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuinetriadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274) and 2. "A sign is a thirdmediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281 Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third] as an apparent contradiction. Dear Claudio, Folks-- I've omitted the meat and best part of your post for the sake of brevity, but I like your synthesis better than my own one sided insistence that signs are thirds (in the categorical sense). I look forward to what others make of your suggestions. But as for me --bravo and thanks. You've helped me to see the fuller picture that somehowI couldn't seem to grasp. That said I don't mean to repudiate Jean-Marc's position which I do not think depends upon my insistence that signs were thirds. But having enough difficulty with my own misunderstandings I'llleave thatdiscussion to Jean-Marc et al. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] The logic of disagreement
Dear Folks, Seems I've read somewhere that the rules of logic are in some way truth preserving. I suppose this mean that these rules allow us to follow the various ways true statements can be combined to form additional true statements. Which for me makes logic very close to a form of truth presevering syntax. But the trouble is most disagreements involve not merely syntax but semantics. Ultimately the debate hinges on what one means by the terms that traditional logicians assume preserve their meaning no matter their syntactical context. If meaning is related to conceivable consequences we need to ask what the term consequence means. Seems to me a conceivable consequence is not merely what follows but what results what follows has upon the conceiveable present actions of whoever or whatever is conceiving those consequences. The logic of disagreement is that every POV has its own interests and thus its own personal meanings even though these are tied to the common interests and meanings of other POVs. IOWs every POV is to some extent unique as well as sharing something in common with other POVs.Meaning is to some extent tied to one's POV and personal interests. Despite logicians attempts to dismiss this as an ad hominen fallacy. The conceivable consequences of a given event are not necessarily the same for all those affected. In my view, meaning is not something that is fully independent of context or one's POV as some logicians seem to suppose. It seems to me that almost all lasting disagreements are the result not of faulty logic on the part of one or another of the parties involved but of a difference in meaning attached to issues being debated. The solution to such semantic disagreements is to find a meaning in common. This is called a common understanding and (in my opinion) almost always leads to agreement about the points being contested. So I take discusions (even heated ones) involving attempts to seek a common definition of terms to be a good thing and generally much more productive than most debates about the logic of one another's position. In my view a common definition ultimately depends upon a common POV or shared interest. To me conflict resolution is more about finding common ground than about attempting to deny the legitimacy of another's POV on the basis of some supposed logical inconsistancy. Which is finally to say that I admire both Ben and Jean-Marc and the discussion they are having (as well as Joe's attempts to keep it from getting overheated and de-railed). Best to all, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Dear Joe, In my Websters the meaning of D.C.L. is given as doctor of civil law, but I don't find it in Black's Law dictionary. Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 9:33 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science Ben: I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the significance/signification distinction, but you'll find below the definitions of sign, significance, and signification in the Century Dictionary. I've included only the statements of definition in the entries since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here, given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few comments in brackets that might help. What I find remarkable is that Peirce amde no attempt whatever to convey even so much as a hint as to how he would define any of these terms for technical philosophical purposes. One could not possibly infer his own view even hypothetically from the definitions he provides. Do the definitions he provides correspond to his own colloquail rather than technical understanding of these terms? Presumably yes, so we can perhaps learn something from them if we bear in mind that they do not purport to be anything more than a report of what orinary or common usage is. And even there we should also bear in mind that the entries in the Century are often based largely upon the entries in a still older dictionary, the Imperial, as I believe it is called. So what we find here is apparently provided by Peirce but perhaps -- to some extent at least -- only approved of by him rather than created by him. I am not well acquainted with the Century as a whole. I had simply neglected its importance until quite recently. But my understanding is that he does in some cases do some fairly extensive creative work, going beyond mere approval of pre-existing accounts of popular usage; yet there is no trace of that sort of thing in his definitions of sign. I assume his refusal to take advantage of the opportunity to grind his own axe in these definitions is due to and indicative of his commitment to an ethics of terminology, Joe Ransdell SIGN [used as a noun] 1. A visible mark or impress, whether natural or artificial, accidental or purposed, serving to convey information, suggest an idea, or assist inference; a distinctive guiding indication to the eye. [NOTE BY JR: It seems odd that the first sense listed would be restricted to visual signs.] 2. An arbitrary or conventional mark used as an abbreviation for a known meaning; a figure written technically instead of the word or words which it represents, according to prescription or usage: (as, mathematical, astronomical, medical, botanical, or musical signs; occult signs; an artist's sign. [NOTE BY JR: The examples he gives suggest that this would also include as a special case what we we now think of as being acronyms. At any rate, what he has in mind seem all to be special cases of symbols.] 3. Something displayed to announce the presence of any one; a cognizance; a standard; a banner. [NOTE BY JR: again, a remarkably narrow sense.] 4. An inscribed board, plate, or space, or a symbolical representation or figure, serving for guidance or information, as on or before a place of business or of public resort, or along a road: as, a merchant's or shopman's sign; a Swinging Sign, style of 18th century. tavern-sign; a swinging sign; a tin sign; a sign-board. 5. A symbolical representation; a symbol; hence, in absolute use, symbolical significance; allusive representation: [NOTE BY JR: as sometimes used with in, e.g. And on her head a crowne of purest gold Is set, in sign of highest soveraignty] 6. A representative or indicative thing; a tangible, audible, or historical token, symbol, or memento; an exponent or indicator: as, words are the signs of thought; the ruin is a sign of past grandeur. [NOTE BY JR: His first example of philosophical usage occurs here. It is a quotation from John Locke: This would be to make them [words] signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas. (Locke, Human Understanding III, ii, 2.) All of the examples seem to suggest that he means things that are construed as symbols in their occurrence, even when they are natural occurences construed theologically, functioning evidentially, hence indexically.] 7. In general, anything which serves to manifest, stand for, or call up the idea of another thing to the mind of the person perceiving it; evidence of something past, present, or future; a symptom. [NOTE BY JR: This seems to be the most general sense of the word he provides, but note that it seems to be emphasizing the evidential value of it as an actually occurring entity.] 8. In Biblical use: (a) That by which a person or thing is known, especially as divinely
[peirce-l] Re: If a valence of four had been known to Peirce, would he have constructed a logic of firstness, secondness, thirdness and fourthness?
Jean-MarcOrliaguet quoted Peirece: "Thus, the relation between the four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic relations". Dear Jean-Marc, Earlier I characterized the Carbon Hydrogen bonds in Methane as dyadic and suggested Peirce would have done the same. Clearly, the Peirce quote above does not seem to support my contention. To say the least -LOL Nonetheless I think the C-H bond in Methaneis inherently dyadic, though, of course, as "represented" is triadic. Anything which is a respresentation of a dyadic state of affairs is, as a representation, a triadic relation. But it seems to me that C and H are held together not in a tiadic state but in a merely correlative or reactive state. What do you personally think about the nature of the carbon hydrogen bond in Methane? I mean your view as to the adicity of the actual bond itself -- not our symbolic representation of the bond. Quoting Peirce again below: "Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come "firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third". With this I agree. I'm just not convinced that the C-H bond in Methane is an example of an inherently triadic relation -- unless one is taking the radical position that all relations are triadic and that both monads and dyads are mere abstractions. Which, come to think of it, may actually be Peirce's position. Cheers, Jim Piat Since the demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state it problematically, as a surmise to be verified by observation. (...) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
. Why do you consider form a quality? Form is a kind of medium displaying all kinds of things -- rhythms, temporal things, and energy and vibrance as well. But basically, a shape in space looks like a balance of motion(s) and/or force(s). And when one looks not at loose forms -- patterns of bubbles on water, etc. -- but integral, cohesive forms, one sees structures, with structural integrities amidst their very flexibilities. To point to a thing with a certain quality is one thing, but to point at a thing which is a complex of things pointing at one another -- that seems another thing. The line of one's pointing can get caught up into the cross-woven richochets of indexicality in such a complex. Response: I think Peirce himself may use the term *form* to refer to qualities. I think folks, including Peirce, take this use as similars to the way Plato spoke of forms. At least in the sense of these forms being something intagible and whose state of being is more potential than actual. But I am wanting to extend this metaphor a bit to the potential ogranization of matter in space and time. Potential in the sense that matter (an actual existant) can potentially take many forms. I think it is a demonstrable matter of psychophysical experiments that many sensory qualities such as color, smell etc are the result of how an object's mass is structurally organized. More abstract qualities such as musical rhythms melodies and various patterns over time (taken as wholes) are again matters of how a sound (object with mass) is organized in space and time. That is what gives a quality what we call its feeling -- how it is organized in time and space (ie its form). I don't mean to be insisting I'm right Ben. I'm by no means convinced of that. I'm just trying to find a way of making as clear as possible what it is that I'm hypothesizing. What makes qualites seem so hard to put on finger on is the fact that they arise not out of the intrinsic property of the object's substance but rather as a result of the fact that the continuum (or represention) in which all objects swim (namely space and time) allows for different ways for matter to be organized or formulated.This might also account in part for the reason that qualities have both a monadic and triadic feel. They are in one sense forms unto themselves with no inherent relation to anything outside of themself (ie offer no resistance and no correlation) but at the same time are (in a manner of speaking) potentials of the continuum and therefore have a universal applicability. Each location (though dyadic) is unique but forms (though monadic) are potentially universally applicable. This duality of sorts lends a paradoxical feel to monadic qualities that real dyadic existents do not have. Maybe --- Thanks for your comments, Ben. I hope I'm not slipping into some sort of reductionist materialism which I don't want to do. I think the space time continuum which allows for representation is something apart from and beyond mere materialism. Not that it necessarily requires the notion of supernatural being but that it does require something beyond mere materialism. But just now I'd better get my material ass to work and make some money! Best wishes as always, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Folks-- I came across this definition of Entelechy among the words Peirce is reputed to have defined for the Century Dictionay in 1886 (page 404 of Writings of Charles S Peirce A Chronological Edition Volume 5 1884-1886) -- I was looking for a definition of form. BEGIN QUOTE ENTGELECHY, n. CGr entelecheia, word invented by Aristotle, from en telei echon, having atained the end.) Literally, attainment, realization; opposed to power, potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The idea of entelechy is connected with that of FORM (caps from piat), the idea of power with that of matter. Iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made from must be worked. When this is done, the iron exists in entelechy. The passage from power to entelechy takes place by means of change (kinesis). This is the imperfect energy, the perfected energy is the entelechy. Tirst entelechy is being in working order, second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be first entelechy, that is, a thing precisely like a mani in every respect, except that it would not feel, would b e body without a sould; but a soul once infused is not lost whenever the man is asleep. This is the Aristotelian sense, but Cudworth and others have used entelechy and firt entelechy somewhat diferently. Cudworth calls his plastic nature or vital principle the first entelechy, and leibniz terms a monad an entelechy. END OUOTE My apologies if I'm repeating previously posted material. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Gary,
Man!
As in no man is an island, there is nothing new under the sun and in one
sense nothing is ever used alone because every thing and every usage is
embedded in some context. So, Peirce's own context dependent arguments
notwithstanding (from page 309), I think one can also make the argument that
for every utterance or object there is a context in which it functions as a
sign and one in which it does not. That said, it may well be as you suggest
that in the context of a sentence (which I think you and I both agree is a
sign) prepositions and conjunctions (at least in some cases) function not a
signs but merely as fragmentary signs or structural elements that are only
meaningful in the context of the full sign or sentence itself. Seems to me
Frege made a similar point about the meaning of words but I may well be
mistaken about this.
So, following your helpful comments, where I find myself at this point is
toying with the notion that everything can be interpreted as a sign or
object depending upon the context just as everything can be interpreted as
part or whole depending upon context. Another of the great dualities I
suppose -- text vs context. Perhaps it is the resolution of this duality
(when context becomes text) that is the moment of conception, consciousness
and representation --- to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to
unity.
Thanks again Gary. Very interesting and helpful. I always enjoy your
remarks and love those post script aphorims. Recently read a collection of
Wittgensteins myself. -- which naturally I can't lay my hands on just now
when I want it. Something like Cultural Investigations -- Mostly remarks
(gatherered from various lecturers etc) about doing philosophy, being jewish
and what not.
}The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Folks-- I looked up escatology (which I though is at least a remotely related notion) and entelechy in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy. I found the entry below for Entelechy. I think it adds a fun slant that is consistent with the picture you folks are painting. I especially like the religious teleological (from the Greek word for goal task completion or erfection -- also according to the Oxford Companion) movtives that I think are implicit in this notion. BEGIN QUOTE: entelechy. Hans Driesch (1867-1941) this century's leading neovitalist, was much impressed with his discovery that, despite extreme interferene in the early stages of embrological development, some organisms nevertheless develop into perfectly formed adults. In a thoroughly Aristotelian fashion, therefore, he became convinced that there is some life-element, transcending the purely material, controlling and promoting such development. Denying that this 'entelechy' is a force in the ususal sense, Driesch openly argued that it is end-directed. In his later writing, Driesch moved beyond his Greek influences, starting to sound more Hegelian, as he argued that ll life culminates ultimately in a 'supra personal whole'. END QUOTE the artical ends with a cross reference to vitalism which reminds me that Peirce was himself an investigator of spritualism. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION)
Dear Ben, Joe, Folks-- Ben, I can't always follow your mercurial explorations, elaborations, counter arguments and interesting asides so I'm just going to quote Peirce from the penultimate paragraph of the New List (which you may have already quoted yourself in which case I beg your apology while I wipe the egg off my face). BEGIN QUOTE: The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments arise from the distinction of extension and comprehension. I propose to treat this subject in a subsequesnt paper. But I will so far anticipate that, as to say that there is, first, the direct reference of the symbol to its objects, or denotation; second the reference of the symbol to ground, through its object, that is, its reference to the common characters of its objects, or its connotations; and third, its reference to its interpretants through its object, that is , its reference to all the synthetical propositions in which its objects in common are subject or predicate, and this I term the information it embodies. And as every addition to what it denotes, or to what it connotes, is effected by means of a dinstinct proposition of this kind, it follows that the extension and comprehension of a term are in an inverse relation, as long as the information remains the same, and that every increase of information is accompanied by in increas of one or other of these two quantities. It may be observed that extension and comprehension are very often taken in other senses in which this last proposition is not true. END QUOTE: Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
(and not mere modification) of comprehension_, and an accordant alteration of denotation. Not makes not blue out of blue. The comprehension is flipped, likewise the denotation is shifted from one portion of the universe to the rest of the universe excluding that portion. You're saying that we do not directly witness or represent representational relations, but have to do mockups in terms of comprehension and denotation. We certainly have to give concrete examples, but after a while one grasps words like if and not. I think that we directly and unabstractly represent representational and logical relations with words like not. Adverbs (though not adverbs of manner) and conjunctions are their most appropriate grammatical form. You have the word not denoting everything and therefore comprehending (=connoting in your sense) nothing; then you shift and have it having qualities and location in abstract, higher-order senses. We can spin some pretty find garb out of qualities and locations for representational relations, which make them more tractable, let us discuss them as objects. But we already see them plain in simple 1st-order words like not which, in fact, remain indispensable in all higher-order structures. We still end up talking about belonging and _not_ belonging to a class, etc. And there's never any getting away from that need for words like not. So what is this not, as such, in its first-order sense, which is indeed indispensable at all higher orders or levels? We're not going to build reaction and quality out of purely representational relations, but we won't do the opposite either. My response : Whew! Ben wrote: Now, Peirce actually says that there is a third category, that of representational relations. And it seems to be represented not by a dimension of information like comprehension and denotation, but rather by transformations of information. Symbols like not determine the interpretant to perform those transformations. Then it appears that information is conveyed sometimes more efficiently by those transformations than by always spelling things out, which can't always be done. Something's not blue? I can't even say it's red or orange or yellow or green or -- purple! because or is another logical-relation word. All I could do is say what color the thing _is_, which will make clear that it isn't blue. I may not know what color it is. The logical-relation words allow tons of useful vagueness. So, those transformations do amount to another element or aspect, if not a dimension (as in the formula comprehension x denotation = information), of information. We just don't have a name for it. When we isolate it, its bearer, its sign, may look like a mere gesture, but that doesn't mean that it is in fact empty. That it must ultimately be connected to icons indices doesn't mean that there is no representational mode for it other than comprehension and denotation. In fact icons indices won't get far without some help from symbols, and it likewise appears that there is a mode of representation which works through transformations of information and which is neither comprehension nor denotation. My response: I find all this very interesting. I think I'm more satisfied with the notion of information as representation than I take you to be. But I agree that representation is more than just refering which is the main function of either illustrating (connoting) or pointing to (denoting). I think representation ALSO includes the notion of standing for which is in my mind something more than merely referencing or indicating what is being indexed or iconized. A lot more. And I look forward to more discussion of just how standing for to or interpretation occurs. I think it needs the same sort of detailed analysis as the notions of refering which are achieved through icons and indexes (or their imputed functions reflected in our communal habits of symbol usage). As for Jon's earlier insistance that pure symbols did not perform the functions of icons or indexes (if indeed this was his position), I thought that he had abstracted and saved the bathwater from the baby rather than vice versa. As the old starkist add used to remind us, we want tuna that tastes good; not tuna with good taste. Thanks for your comments -- I look forward to more. Best wishes as always, . Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION)
- Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 7:16 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION) CORRECTED VERSION OF PREVIOUS POST : Ben quotes Peirce as follows: 66~ A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- 1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it represents; 2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters of those objects; 3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts known about its object. What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- 1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; 2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. ~99 And then says: Information may in some sense incorporates that which involves representational relations, but I don't think that that's the dimension of represenational relations per se. MY RESPONSE: Well, why not, Ben? Think of information in terms of an informing of something, or of becoming informed by something or about something; .think of it as an impression of form on something that thus becomes informed by it, i.e.takes on a certain form in virtue of that. (I am reminded of the locution It impresses me (or him or her)-- or perhaps he or she is impressed by such-and-such.) The predicate brings form to the subject, in-forms the subject. Infomation could be regarded as a certain aspect of representation, i.e. the dimension of representation as regarded in a certain special way. Predication is a synthesizing of predicate and subject, as information is a synthesizing of breadth and depth, an informing of breadth with depth. I'll continue with your response later, Ben.. But this seemed worth remarking by itself. (Sorry for the sloppiness of the uncorrected copy originally posted.) Joe Dear Joe, Ben-- I'm talking too much and promise to make this my last comment for the day -- but I want to say that I think representation of meaning is a commonly held implicit definition of information though it may seldom be expressed in those words. I look in the dictionary and find information: something told or facts learned; news or knowledge. To me all of these definitions imply the meaning of some event has been represented to someone. I think that for Peirce to represent is to inform. And I might add I think Peirce in some ways also anticipated Shannon's measure of information when he analyzed the fixation of belief in terms of removing doubt or reducing uncertainty.I look forward to your further exchanges. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Ben Udell wrote: But first, on a general note, let me say that among the issues driving my current display of confusion error, is the question: if comprehension is for quality predicate, while denotation is for objects (resistances/reactions), then what dimension is for representational and logical relations themselves? Words like not, probably, if, etc. do not designate either qualities or objects, nor do they represent objects as having this or that quality. What, then, do they connote? What do they denote? Dear Ben, Here's my take on the questions you raise above. I would say that symbols convey information and that they represent or stand for the meaning of objects. Objects (which may be tangible or abstract) have both qualities (forms) and locations (centers of gravity). The meaning of an object (its consequence for other objects) depends upon both the objects qualities and location. One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form is not a matter of the object's location but of how the object is organized in space and time. However one can illustrate the form or quality of an object by providing a copy of another object that has similar properties. An object that performs this function is called an icon. To adequately represent or stand for an object's meaning we must refer to both its connotation and location. Moreover, I think it is a mistake to restrict the notion of objects to concrete tangible entities -- An object is anything that can be represented. Abstract objects such as relations also have forms and locations that can be connoted and denoted as discussed below. It is my view (and I think Peirce's) that words or symbols such as not, probably, if etc refer to and stand for abstract objects (relations) that have that do indeed have specifiable forms and locations. Not, for example can, perhaps, be loosely defined as the abstract quality of lacking membership in a particualar class. Many, perhaps all, objects can participate in the abstact relational quality of not being a member of some class. And these sorts of abstract relations can be illustrated and pointed to. What makes not and all other abstractions difficult to conceive and illustrate is that abstractions are not forms or qualities of concrete objects themselves but are forms of the way in which concrete objects relate to one another.Logical relationships are abstact properties of the time/space continuum in which all concrete objects swim. To illustrate them we need to point to actions (and their consequences) over time and involving more than one concrete object. That's why math is not for all of us -- me for example. A symbol that does not perform the iconic and denotative function is like a gesture without movement -- sound and fury signifying nothing. Again, myself a good example. But most of all -- Thanks for all the interesting observations and references. Much food for thought in what you've provided. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Category Theory CSP
Bernard Morand wrote: Nice Jim! I had the feeling that I was blundering just at the time of writing that the categories in the sense of maths have no denotation nor connotation . However I could not see where the blunder was. So I decided to let the idea as it was and see what will happen. The underlying problem is I think the relationship between maths and other sciences, the most developed and interesting of them to observe being physical sciences. I suspect them to use mathematics as a convenient language in order to work physics but not for the very mathematical properties of this language. There is only a very basic arithmetics in the formula : e=mc2. J. Chandler suggests a similar shortcut in a previous message for chemistry: Suppose I construct an abstract algebra for chemistry / biology that is not expressible in category theory. And this looks to be the problem of the admissibility of Gary's vectors too. In this line of thought, I wanted to convey that mathematical theory of categories does not presuppose any arrangement of the real (no denotation) nor any purpose for its internal organisation. What would be added to this even if we were agreeing that it is self denoting and connoting? Now, the fact that such mathematical systems really tell something to us, and very accurately, is always a divine surprise to me. Dear Bernard, Didn't mean to suggest you are blundering and I am not -- just wanted to join you and the interesting discussion. Unfortunately too often I let pass without comment the information I agree with or that helps me. A great deal of which I get from your always interesting posts. So, just to say thanks again for the friendly response and interesting comments. Many times I write something and in doing so realize I'm either mistaken or what I've produced is too confused to be worth posting. Sometimes I post them anyway hoping someone will have a helpful comment. And I find that almost always someone does. It's what we are doing here I suppose. Having a discussion of topics of mutual interest. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Category Theory CSP
Grary Richmond wrote: I agree with your assessment of the relational nature of Peirce's categories at least in the sense that at least in 'genuine' trichotomies that each of the three has a relation to the other two. But in another sense your comments seem to me to perhaps mix apples and oranges. As Bernard Morand pointed out in his message of 4/29:BM: As regards the relevance to Peirce one has to consider first that the word category in mathematics has nothing to do with the same word as it was used by Aristotle, Kant or Peirce.The mathematical category is an abstract construct which has no denotation nor connotation in itself. Dear Gary, Bernard, Folks-- Thanks for the comments. I don't know anything about mathematical category theory but I wonder what sort of construct (abract or otherwise) has no denotation nor connotation in itself.Isn't a construct's location in time/space in effect a self denotation? And isn't a constructs propertiesor formits self connotation? Aren't all constructs defined in terms of either their qualities or locations. My guess is that these so called mappings, transformations and such of category theory are in some fashion an elaboration of the meaning of such terms as connotation and denotation -- or alternatively form and location. The ways in which these categories are preserved under variouslogical, syntactical or mathematicaloperations. I don't know the differences among these operations but they seem related to me. Inmyview, following Peirce, there are three basic categoriesunder which all conceivable modes of being fall: qualities or form, otherness or location (others must occupy different locations) and the contrual of the two producing a third which is representation.I cant quite imagineoperations on hypothetical categories that have neither properties nor locations. Categories whose specific properties and locations are notat issue yes, but not categories absent these relations. Ah, it finally occurs to me that thismay bejust what you and Bernard mean by abstract categories.Abstract categores are thosewhose *particular* connotations and denotations are not at issue -- not categories without qualities or locations per se. Is this what you mean?However, if that is your meaning then I would still arguethat the rules establishing how these categories relate to one anotherare in effectdefinitions of the general properties of the categories themselves. And further, that Peirce's categories are abstract or general in just that sense. Which is to say that form, substance and function are inseparable relations in the sense of being inextricableaspects of the same thing-- being itself. They are defined in terms of one another and there is no way around it. The most fundamentalconstituentsof any system must be all defined in terms of one another (all in terms of all) or else they are not fundamental. I'm not sure how much senseany of this makes, Gary, but I'veworked too hard on it to just give it the heave.So I'm posting it in hopes someonemight either agree or point out some problems with it --if they have the time and inclination. Thanks again for interesting and helpful comments. I too, btw, would like further discussion of Robert Marty's work if others are interested. I tried to follow it on my own a few years ago but was unable to make much progress andneed help. Cheers, Jim Piat There has been the beginning of some discussion of category theory in relation to knowledge representation at ICCS the past few years and I have noticed that the mathematicians and logicians who attend the conference ( Bernhard Ganter, John Sowa, Rudolph Wille, etc.) do not conflate mathematical category theory with philosophical discussions of categories. In a certain sense this surprised me as these same folk at first resisted the use of 'vector' to describe 'movement through' a trichotomy of Peircean categories--for example in evolution, sporting (firstness) leads to new habit formation (thirdness) leads to a structural change in an organism (secondness)--and there are both temporal and purely logical 'vectors' considered by Peirce. Mathematicians especially would seem to get quite territorial as regards their terminology so that even Parmentier's precedent use of 'vector' to describe the sort of 'movement' I just described had to be reinforced by arguments concerning the use of the term in biology, genetics, medicine, etc. for them to somewhat grudgingly accept it for trichotomic (as I use it in my trikonic project). But, again, this is because category theory (perhaps badly named) has no direct relation to the categories of Kant Aristotle, etc. which philosophical categories are, of course, well-known.But it seems to me that it indeed may be possible to use mathematical category theory as Marty has
[peirce-l] Re: Conceptual Structures Tool Interoperability Workshop
Dear Gary, Auke -- Which suggests to me the related notion that the consequences of actions involving objects aresometimes more efficiently determined by thinking them through with signs. Signs are tools for forcasting the outcomes of events -- affording all those who have them a great evolutionary advantage over those who do not. Jim Piat Gray Richmond wrote: Auke,Thank you for your interesting comments and for the quite pertinent Peirce quotation reminding us "that the essential function of a sign is to render inefficient relations efficient." --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Dear Folks, Some thoughts on this issue and interesting discussion: Something, it seems to me, performs an indexical function in so far as it serves to point to the spatial temporal location of something other than itself. That which displays a form is an icon. So, a name, as for example Ben is not an index. because a name does not have a physical (spatial temporal) connection with the object it names. A true index functions as an index whether or not we interpret it as such. For example a reaction is an index of an action. And a part is an index of the whole. Or one side an index of the other. Indexes are necesarry results of the continuity of space and time coupled with the fact that locations in either are specific rather than universal. Icons, on the other hand, are reflections of the fact that forms (as Plato said -- I think;) are universals and independent of time and place. An icon tells one nothing about the location of what it depicts but is does provide something about the depicted objects form, quality or essence. Indexes indicate locations. I would say a name is a symbol and like all symbols has both iconic and indexical functions. But a name is not an index per se. There is no necessary actual or existent connection between ones name and one's location in space and time. A name like all symbols are imputed indexes. That there is not a necessary/actual indexical connection between a name or symbol and its object is what makes symbols so useful for representing objects. The symbol can be manipulated (in thought) without having to actually move the object. Further, a symbol, depending upon its material properties can be either iconical, indexical or more purely symbolic. For example the spoken word bow-wow is an iconic symbol. The arrow on an exit sign is an indexical symbol and the word in is an almost purely symbolic symbol. But how man alone (if indeed it is man alone) achieved the capacity to impute (or partake of imputation) is the great puzzle of symbolization. I see where we got the idea of the importance of forms and locations -- but I don't know how we grasped the notion of using other objects to impute them. The discovery of symbols (as imortalized in the garden of eden tree of knowledge myth) was the begining of man's history as man. I guess what I'm saying is that names are symbols not indexes. As for what specificically is meant by subindex I'm not sure. Just couldn't resist jumping in -- as I am trying to follow this interesting discussion through its backs and forths. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce, Emerson, Whitman
and how Whitman's poetic practice might profit from a Peircean reading. Dear Jeff, This caught my attention. So I says to myself, what is a Peircean reading. And just now all I can think of is an attention to quality (form), reaction (such as a poke in the ribs) and continuity. And what is the quality of being Whitmaneque if not a poke in the ribs and the continuity of all things? I'm trying to think of that passage from song of myself where Whitman exalts the sign democracy. I do think there was something in the language and culture of times that animated a common spirit in these three contemporaries. And that each in his own way celebrated the form, substance, and continuity of what is best in the American way. Plus each exhibited an intense pragmatistic mindfulness of the consequences of one's acts. Seen from a distance they were soul mates, profoundly ethical, robust, spritual souls -- emblematic of the American soul. We know this because these are the aspirations they stir in us. But facts I ain't got any. All of the above just an attempt to share some of my enthusiam and support for your project. I hope you keep us posted. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
Hi, Jim, I don't know which blog you visited! If the scrollbar doesn't show up, I've got a problem. Is your computer a Mac? This link shoud take you directly to the blog post with the quotes. http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html There, you should be able to at least use the arrow keys to scroll up down. I'm working on an answer to Jim Wilgoose right now. I'll get back to your post later. Best, Ben Ben, I get to the blog site but can not find a way to scoll up or down to read the quotes -- I use a windows system. No rush. I'm probably overlooking something and will keep trying. Thanks, Jim --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce invented the electric switching computer?
Dear Steven, In Ken Ketner's book "His Glassy Essence" it is mentioned on page 196 that Peirce's brother, Ben "met Charles Babbage to discuss mechanized computing"... For whatever that's worth. I believe Ken Ketner is an electrical engineer as well as philosopher, biographer, etc and may have spoken elsewhere aboutPeirce andelectric switching computers. Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson Zenith To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, March 04, 2006 3:30 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Peirce invented the "electric switching computer?" Dear List,There is a very nice and copyright free bio of Peirce from NOAA that I have copied into Panopedia for reference here: http://www.panopedia.org/index.php/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#NOAA_Giants_of_ScienceThe article is unattributed and makes the following claim, that Peirce was: " ... first to conceive the design and theory of an electric switching computer"Now, I am not familiar with this claim - can anyone justify it with references? Better still, can anyone identify the author?With respect,Steven---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Are there authorities on authority?
and perhaps awareness of the possibility that they might be doing so. The spotlight of attention regarding bias is perhaps Wikipedias greatest virtue -- it knows its limitations. An sincere acknowledgment of one's limits is far more valueable than false modesty about fallibity while one comits gross blunders. Who on the TV millionaire quiz show would choose to call an all purpose expert (even one they know well) when they can poll the anonymous audience. So yes, know the source -- but the issue is getting a representative sample of POVs --not that some, many or perhaps even most authorities are notorious liars and propagandists. That we are all lieing to one degree or another most of the time is, I thought, the one small concession to the truth that we all made. So what we seek is representative scientific sampling of the data obtained from mulitple points of view -- whether we are sampling the data directly or indirectly by sampling the knowledge of experts. Ultimately what authorizes a so called authority as an accepted authority is the effectiveness of the so called authority (in the hearts and minds of those who take it as such) in accomplishing what it purports to accomplish. We act upon what we believe. What we merely suppose or perceive but do not yet act upon is apparently what we do not quite yet believe. And what we say, I suspect, is some strange waystation between thought and action designed to persuade, recruit and sometimes at least delay if not outright deceive both ourselves and others as we engage in that communal experience of being a part of the human organism we call society. And thought -- thought, I imagine, is what societies do. Strickly a group activity not to be confused with the private individual stirrings we mistake for it.Or so it all seems to me just now ... Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What's going on here?
Now this is not a proof in the sense that we are familiar with today - and one might argue that it is the observation of an axiom and not a proof at all. IOW, it is not constructive but a base observation.This is a rather like Rudolf Carnap's later (and more systematic) assertion of his "Basic Relation" as "the recognition of similarity" in semeiosis (in LSotW), if you accept that premise and conclusion present a tautology.With respect,Steven Dear Steven, Folks-- Theconception of similarity (whether perceived through an icon or imputed in a symbol) seemsto carry a good bit of the burden by which representation is achieved.As I understand the term, similar means almost, but not exactly, the same.More specifically I would saythat what makes any twoobjects or functions similar is the degree to which they share the very same qualities. So the notion of similarity isnot something that we merelyrecogonize intuitively but can not define, but rather something that is at the core of our idea of identity. Objectsthat simultaneously share qualities but not the same space are called copies.Copies share the same essence so to speak. When we represent theessence of things we have finally got to the heart of the matterand havebegun to deal with the truth of what is going on-- I don't mean to suggest that you disagree with this view Steven, although you may. It's just that your comments reminded me of the importance of the notion of similarity in Peirce's account of representation and semiosis and I am curious as to how folks view its role and definition. BTW, the only vagueness I associate with the concept of similarity is the arbitrariness of assigningmore than a relativedegree of similarity sincedoing so, it seems to me, would depend upon counting the abosolute number of qualities in common which I'm not convinced is something that is fixed from one situation to another.It seems to me that what counts as a quality depends in part upon what is being attended to and the purpose at hand. It's as though qualities can only be compared quantitatively within an arbitrary framework. Change or expand the frame of reference and qualities can be expanded indefinately -- or so our ever expanding world of partical physics seems to be indicating. So for me its no mystery that folks respond to similar objects as though they were the same. In so far as the are the same they elicit the same response. The mystery would be why the same quality elicited a different response. To the extent thatcopies sharesimilarity of form or qualitiesthey both represent the same essence and are interchangeble in this regard.A tree growing in the forest is as much an iconic symbolof the word tree as vice versa. Though one is better for building houses and the other for communicating -- due not to what they have in common, but to what other properties they don't share(mass for example). Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Ben , Folks-- Ben wrote: But, again,why is the interpretant's separate leg to the object "part" of the semiosis, but the recognition's separate leg to the object _not_ "part" of the semiosis in question? That's just inconsistent.If the interpretant's separate leg to the object is essential to making the semiosis triadic, then why isn't the collaterally based recognition's separate leg to the object essential in making the semiosis tetradic? In fact, that'sessential to why semiosis is tetradic. And then, Ben, you answer your own question (at least to my satisfaction) by saying: At no stage does semiosis happen in a vaccuum.The criterion of whether something is or isn't part of the semiosis in question is,simply that the thing arise in the course of the semiosis in question and as determined by the semiosis in question at least up to that point, and contribute semiotic determination from its point onward to any further development of the semiosis in question. The recognitionarises as determined by the semiosis and in the course of the semiosis, it is determined by the semiosis and by the object and other semiotic elements through the semiosis and collaterally by the object of the semiosis, and from that point onward _any and all_ further development in the semiosis in question is also determined, logically, semiotically,by that recognition.That recognition isa decision point in the semiosis in question. It's part of the semiosis in question, very much so indeed. What follows, Ben, are just some thoughts on the issues you raise. Not refutations of your thoughts -- just collateral. Part of the same thread and thus something we have, I think, in common. Perhaps, when a person first learnsthe meaning of a symbol (for example a young child first symbolizes the object tree) what that person acquires is a habit which is continually being modified or learned anew. From start to finish the process of learning the meaning of a symbol is the same -- a process of acquiring the habits of use of a community of sign users. The first exposure to the use of the word treeinvolves the modification ofold habitsand this continues throughout ones participation in semiosis. We never learn a totatly new habit even when we first acquire the use of a new symbol. We are a symbol or creature of habit from the get goand all learning or interpretation is a modification of some prior habit. The winowing of alternative interpretations or modification of prior habits based upon collateral experience occurs with every use or exposure to a symbol -- from begining to end. And we don't learn or acquire new symbols outside of a community of folks who already use that symbol or some close approximation of it. And all conscious perception is a matter of symbolization. (I'll just assert that -;) Collateral experience of an object is not some sort of priviledge experience that is more fundamental than the symbolic experience of or reference to an object. They are the same sort of experience. In both cases what constitutes our conception of the object is not some entitity existing outside of semiosis but rather a "habit of reference or use" that is embedded in that collective community activityof coordinatingour behavior toward a common goal of group survival.Objects are known only through our shared communal habits of reference. And these habits are continually being modified individually and collectively -- whether they involve children just learning them or old folks trying desparately to recall them. We don't live in a a world ofsymbols along side a world of objects.The world of objects exists for us only within our world of symbols. This is not to say we have invented the objects by some feat of imagination but merely that we have no access to them other than through symbolization. Symbolization is our window to what we commonly call being aware of or perceiving objects.To perceive a tree is to symbolizea tree -- to acquire a habit of referencecommon to one's language community. All of our habits from start to finish are embedded in a context that is continually shifting. Adjusting our habits to this shifting context is what we call learning. Just some thoughts, Ben. Enjoying your discussion with Gary Joe and others. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Existent vs Real
Irving Anellis wrote (in part): To be able to formulate the judgment that 'The present King of France is bald' meant for Meinong that the present King of France must have being at some ontological level or another (i.e have some sort of ontological status, even if he does not exist) in order to be able to formulate the judgment, and assert it, that he's bald. The same must hold, Meinong would argue, even if one were to deny the existence of the present King of France, or the round square. Just being able to take it as a subject of a judgment , to be able to represent it, gives it, ipso facto, some ontological status. Thus Meinong. ... And what Moltke Gram once alliteratively called (if I can remember back to 1970) 'Meinong's muddled metaphysical mire'. Dear Iving, Thanks for those observation. I hope it was clear that I side with Meinong on this issue. I think it is better to sort through the ways we actually do deal with various kinds of objects rather than trying to dismiss them by closing our eyes and insisting they don't exist -- as if existence were the only real mode of being. (All the while knowing full well that we have not only the potential to open our eyes but that even while we deny their existence we are mindful of them even with our eyes closed.) So no, I'm not a nominalist. Though I salute the nominalists for first calling to my attention that there was a problem with some of my unexamined assumptions about certain types of objects. Faulty assumptions that later Wittgenstein and Peirce helped me to clarify and to begin to rise above. Or so it seems to me just now. And for the first time in this particular way -- not to put too fine a point on it. Part of my wacky (often exasperating) take on most issues is due to my lack of a historical persepective. My exposure to philosophy and its concerns has been very spotty and is full of large gaps about subjects commonly known to most who have studied philosophy sytematically. Passion refusing to submit to discipline. But I must say that most who have studied philosophy systematically are amazingly tolerant of those of us who have not. The famed philosophical openness is definitely alive and well on the Peirce list. And the passion. And yes the discipline too -- as collectively we strive toward truth. Perhaps passion and error are an individual matter while discipline (in the best dialogical sense) and truth are a communal matter. Thanks again, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Existent vs Real
Dea Folks, I'm thinking it might be helpful to try to distinguish between the notions of real and true. One can contrast real with imaginary and true with false. Some further preliminary thoughts below. As in maybe--- Peirce proposes that being comes in three modes -- the potential, the actual and the tending toward. He calls all three modes real -- as opposed to mere fictions, figments of the imagination, or as some might say nominally real or real in name only. So then what is a fiction? Fictions, in my view, are category mistakes. As when when we mistake one catergory of reality for another. For example, when we miscategorize something that is potentially real as something that is actually real. Mistaking one form of reality for another is the sort of category mistake we call a fiction. However if we examine the sort of error we can make within each category of being we come upon the notion of truth vs falshood. For example to mistake the impossible for the potential is a falsehood within the potential mode of being. Likewise to mistake what has occured for what has not occured is a falsehood within the actual/perceptual mode of being. Finally to mistake the tending toward for what is not being tended toward is a falsehood within the category of science. The distinction between real and true, that arises from the above viewpoint, becomes a matter or how both the real and the true are established. Real is established by dtermining not whether something conforms to fact or reason but whether or not it has been rightly classified as potential, actual or tending toward. True, on the other hand, is a matter that depends upon determining whether something conforms to observation and logic. Put still another way -- Being is divided into three kinds of reality and within each of these real modes of being (feeling, reactions, and thoughts) truth can be established by appeals to observation and logic. To say something is unreal is to say it has been miscatergorized. To say something is untrue is to say it has been mistakenly observed or reasoned. Maybe-- Cheers, Jim Piat And Ben -- I would still want to argue that all of these errors are at root instances of the general rule that all error is a matter of mistaking the whole for the part. Error lies not in misperception but in drawing a false conclusion. And overgeneralizing from one's personal limited experience to god's will is in my limited experience the universal error underlying all errors. In this way all we experience is both true but not the whole truth. No one is wrong -- but neither is any individual by his or herself entirely correct. By its very nature of affording more than one POV the ultimately truth of reality is a property of the whole and error of the part. Perhaps. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Ben, Just to let you know that I've been reading and enjoying your many recent comments. I haven't commented because I can't keep up with your pace -- but hopefully I will catch up some in time. I especially enjoying your persistent examination of what it means to interpret something. The way I confuse myself on this issue is to repeatedly disregard the notion that all is interpretation (ie we begin with the given of interpretation as the means by which we experience the world) and instead fall into what I consider the trap of begining with objects as existing apart from our semiotic experience of them and then to somehow try to make sense of a objects that do not exist as I have mistakenly posited them. I must remind myself that its signs all the way down. An infintitude of signs (which are interpretants) within which are objects as one pole of a tri-polar infinitely nested or enfolded reality of signs -- unfolding behind us and we stumble backwards into the future, eyes firmly fixed on the past searching for clues as to where we might be tending. The present (as I understand it) is the continuous unfolding of the potential (which is the future) into the actual (which is the past). This continuous circular ever expanding and informing process or re-presentation of the present I understand to be semiosis -- however it's spelled.None of which do I take to be a refutation of any that you've said -- just my way of paying my respects to what you are saying as part of what seems to me a list wide attempt to sort it all out. A common interest. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Stauss on Interpretation
Dear Folks, As promised, a quote from Leo Strauss' essay on Spinoza in Persecution and the Art of Writing. Not at all the elitist view of reading the greats that I had mistakingly come to think Strauss might have been advocating. In any case I thought it might be fun to read in light of the discussion of what Peirce was about in the New Elements. QUOTE: To understand the words of another man, living or dead, may mean two different things which for the moment we shall call interpretation and explanation. By interpretation we mean the attempt to ascertain what the speaker said and how he actually understood what he said, regardless of whether he expressed that understanding explicitly or not. By explanation we mean the attempt to ascertain those implication of his staements of which he was unaware. Accordingly, the realization that a given statement is ironical or a lie, belongs to the interpretation of the statemnt, whereas the realization that a given statement is based on a mistake, or is the unconscious expression of a wish, an interest, a bias, or a historical situation, belongs to its explanation. It is obvious that the interpretation has to precede the explanation. If the explanation is not based on an adequate interpetation, it will be the explanation, not of the statement to be explained, but of a figment of the imagination of the historian. It is equally obvious that , within the interpretation, the understanding of the explicit meaning of a statement has to precede the understanding of what the author knew but did not say explicitity: one cannot realize, or at any rate one cannot prove, that a statement is a lie before one has understood the statement in itself. The demonstrably true understanding of the words or the thoughts of another man is necessarily based on an exact interpretation of his explicit statements. But exactness means different things in different cases. In some cases exact interpretation requires the careful weighing of every word used by the speaker; such careful consideration would be a most inexact procedure in the case of a casual remark of a loose thinker or talker. In order to know what degree or kind of exactness is required for the understanding fo a given writing, one must therefore first know the author's habits of writing. But since these habits become truly known only through the understanding of the writer's work, it would seem that at the beginning one cannot help being guided by one's preconceieved notions of the author's character. The procedure would be more simple if there were a way of ascertaining an author's manner of writing prior to interpreting his works. It is a general observation that people write as they read. As a rule, careful writers are careful readers and vice versa. A careful writer wants to be read carefully. END QUOTE Hey ain't this a joy! I could go on but I'm getting tired of typing and there really is no good stopping point. Elsewhere he points out that writers do not always state their views in the most pointed or blatant way because throughout history ideas that run counter to the powers that be are not tolerated. This does not in my view endorse some elitist interpretation of any of the great writer's of the past. On the contrary -- just an honest commmon sensical acknowledgement of the tendency of those in charge to punish and therebye suppress the expression of opposition views. In my view there can be no justice without equality of power -- there can be a temporary peace achieved by supression, but this is neither just nor lasting. As the doctors say the above is has been signed but not read -- in this case typed but not checked for errors. That's a great one isn't it -- signed but not read. The ability to deny responsiblity should be so easy. But in fairness to the doctors I don't think they ought to be held repsonsible for what others might make of a mere procedural note -- really I don't. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
some insight into Strauss. He comes off to me as not so sinister as I'd feared -- and in fact rather straight forward. This secret/privledged reading stuff is merely a common sense admonition to be mindful of the context in which a writer is or was expressing his views. Minorities are of necessity generally more aware of this than those whose consciousness is limited by being of the majority opinion. As Peirce has said all development is a matter of eliminating options. On that which everyone agrees -- interpretation, development and consciousness stops. Which is the danger of mistakenly supposing agreement determines truth rather than truth being one factor that tends to promote agreement over the long haul. Perhaps truth is the only factor that promotes lasting agreement, but the trouble here is that lasting is a very long time so mere agreement by itself (without consideration of the time element) turns out to be a very poor measure of truth. Actually I think our individual perceptions (even including illusions and delusions) are excellent and indeed the only measure of personal truth -- but we must be ever vigilent not to mistake our narrow individual truths (limited across time and space) as the whole truth. But anyway I will try to post a short Strauss passage later. Just musing as usual. I'm greatly enjoying this New Elements and related discussion. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS (KAINA STOICHEIA) available at Arisbe
Dear Gary, Yes that seems so to me -- symbols like laws are general. They are what binds the ephemeral here and now. I'm trying to come up with a thoughtful reponse to Dr Berendsen's earlier comment that we are the engines of interpretation. In one sense I agree and in another I'm not so sure. Without myself being a sign of the universe (sort of a universal sign of life) I certainly could not interpret other signs and yet the signs as principles operate with or without me. I think you have a better handle on this and might be better able to respond to the issues he raises. And I'd be interested too! Thanks for the further comments. I am looking forward to the Kaina discussion. Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, January 22, 2006 1:58 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS (KAINA STOICHEIA) available at Arisbe Jim, list,I've moved my comments from the Research Learning vs Teaching to this thread since most of the text I've quoted below is from the New Elements. Responding to a Peirce snippet I copied, viz. In order to convince ourselves that all learning is virtually reasoning, we have only to reflect that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not learning. That is only something from which something can be learned, by interpreting it. The interpretation is the learning. [CSP]You wrote: [Jim Piat] I have often wondered what drove interpretation. I think now I had the cart before the horse. Interpretation is the engine. I am not the engine of interpretation. Thought, of which we partake, is what drives the universe. I may isuppose signs are dormant when I am not interpreting them -- but it dawns on me reading the above that it is I who is unaware not the universe. Time, thought and the universe does not depend upon me alone. It is I who am fully dependent upon it. What I take to be myself is a mere passing eddy in the continuum.I agree with you that "interpretation is the engine." Indeed, it's a kind of entrenched dyadic, nominalistic and materialistic thinking which denies that "there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" and attempts to make all such assertions appear "mystical and mysterious." That's where the life, the entelechy (borrowing Aristotle's _expression_ and modifying it significantly) of the cosmos may be found, in thirdness, "continuity, regularity, and significance.". As Peirce argues it in the New Elements. "A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, it is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself." Finally, one can begin to see that "[a] symbol is an embryonic reality endowed with power of growth into the very truth, the very entelechy of reality." [The following two excerpts are cut and pasted from the version of the New Elements Joe placed on the Arisbe site, with the pages in the Essential Peirce added in brackets.] [B]ut a symbol could not be without that power of producing a real effect. The symbol represents itself to be represented; and that representedness is real owing to its utter vagueness. For all that is represented must be thoroughly borne out. For reality is compulsive. But the compulsiveness is absolutely hic et nunc. It is for an instant and it is gone. Let it be no more and it is absolutely nothing. The reality only exists as an element of the regularity. And the regularity is the symbol. Reality, therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols. A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself. For its whole signification consists in its determining an interpretant; so that it is from its interpretant that it derives the actuality of its signification. [EP2, 323]It seems to me that Peirce is elsewhere somewhat more careful in distinguishing the existential aspect of reality from Reality in its fullness (although he does speak here of the symbol as "the very entelechy of reality"), but the present point is that what is mere secondness and so compulsively hic et nunc is in itself "absolutely nothing." Peirce continues near the end of the essay to reflect on the living power, the potential for growth inherent in the symbol. . . . It is of the nature of a sign to be an individual replica and to be in that replica a living general. By virtue of this, the interpretant is animated by the original replica, or by the sign it contains, with the power of representing the true chara
[peirce-l] Re: Research Learning vs Teaching (was Peircean Prayer)
In order to convince ourselves that all learning is virtually reasoning, we have only to reflect that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not learning. That is only something from which something can be learned, by interpreting it. The interpretation is the learning. Dear Gary, Interesting passage. I have often wondered what drove interpretation. I think now I had the cart before the horse. Interpretation is the engine. I am not the engine of interpretation. Thought, of which we partake, is what drives the universe. I may isuppose signs are dormant when I am not interpreting them -- but it dawns on me reading the above that it is I who is unaware not the universe. Time, thought and the universe does not depend upon me alone. It is I who am fully dependent upon it. What I take to be myself is a mere passing eddy in the continuum. Maybe- Enjoyed your comments. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
