Florian Weimer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> * Perry E. Metzger:
>> This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
>> consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
>
> Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy har
at would be more hardy
against "economic attacks" -- can you design the system so that slow
key revelation is not an economic disaster while still maintaining an
offline delivery model with offline players entirely in the enemy's
control? I don't think you can, but it wo
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney") writes:
> The interesting thing is that publishing a processing key like this does
> not provide much information about which device was cracked in order
> to extract the key. This might leave AACSLA in a quandary about what to
> revoke in order to fix the problem
Currently,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%2209+f9+11+02+9d%22&btnG=Search
reveals order of 50,000 hits. Doubtless soon it will be many times
that number.
When you treat the whole world, and especially your own customers, as
the enemy, eventually everyone will come to reciprocate.
Perhap
Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>Your wish has been granted
>>
>>http://www.cafepress.com/09f9
>
> This would be a lot more popular if the t-shirt and mug said something
> a bit more fetching above the hex such as "Ask me about HD-DVD".
I'd like one with "Wearing an integer is not circu
[Moderator's note: Manually forwarded because of a software glitch. --Perry]
From: Gary Ellison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 128 bit number T-shirt?
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 01 May 2007 17:30:10 -0700
.
I sometimes filter commercial announcements, but I will happily
forward the URL to a Cafe Press shop featuring such a shirt.
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egal authority and not from a
> copyright owner. So it's not clear that AACSLA has any power to enforce
> these demands, other than trying to get some government agency involved.
That would indeed seem to be the case from me as well. Takedown
notices are only for copyrighted materi
precedent.
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will work for at least a few days I imagine:
http://cryptome.org/cryptome-shut.htm
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The following is a real email, with minor details removed, in which
J.P. Morgan Chase works hard to train its customers to become phishing
victims.
I've left in the name that the email was sent under -- I see no reason
to protect the guilty. The original version of the email was multipart
alterna
Apparently the latest issue of Cryptologia will carry an article that
has done yet another statistical analysis of the Voynich manuscript,
and which claims that the manuscript's text statistics are consistent
with it being a hoax.
http://www.cs.keele.ac.uk/km/blog/?p=18
--
Perry E. Me
Not that WEP has been considered remotely secure for some time, but
the best crack is now down to 40,000 packets for a 50% chance of
cracking the key.
http://www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/aircrack-ptw/
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED
I'm happy to forward more messages on security and email, but the
messages just on email vs. IM etc. are way off topic.
Perry
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;articleID=BD4EFAA8-E7F2-99DF-372B272D3E271363
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. Extended validation
did not help users identify either attack. Additionally, reading
the help file made users more likely to classify both real and fake
web sites as legitimate when the phishing warning did not appear.
http://www.usablesecurity.org/papers/jackson.pdf
--
Perry E. Metzger
Forwarded message:
From: "Jack Cole" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: IEEE 1667 Approved December 5, 2006
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2007 13:57:15 -0500
Reply-To: "Jack Cole" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
IEEE Press Release at
http://standards.ieee.org/announcements/pr_IEEE1667_new.html
IEEE 1667, "Standard Protocol
In addition to the URL Steve sent earlier, there is a web page up for
the NIST hash competition:
http://www.csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/index.html
Perry
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Derek Atkins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I'll just point out that you CAN go to:
>
> https://chaseonline.chase.com/
>
> And that works, and should be secure.
And for the six people that know to do that, it works great. :)
It used to be that Verizon (my local phone company, sadly) had this
gen
For years, I've complained about banks, such as Chase, which let
people type in the password to their bank account into a page that has
been downloaded via http: instead of https:.
The banks always say "oh, that's no problem, because the password is
posted via https:", and I say "but that's only
John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> There is only one technical definition of entropy,
Oh?
So you're saying Chaitin-Kolmogrov information and other ways of
studying entropy are "wrong"? I think that's a bit unreasonable, don't
you?
There are different definitions that are useful at differ
Jonathan Thornburg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> A further point: Do you really want the granularity of your encryption
> to be "one key per disk"? I much prefer a cryptographic file system
> which lets me have separate keys for separate categories of information
> (eg one key for my tax forms,
As many people here are aware, one of my least favorite banks,
especially in terms of system security, is Chase.
Today I received an email message from Chase informing me that I'd
gotten a brand new hotel rewards program branded Visa card from them,
and inviting me to click on various links to se
Handheld "Chip & Pin" terminals for reading credit cards in the UK are
required to be tamperproof to avoid the possibility of people
suborning them. Here is a report from a group that has not merely
tampered with such a terminal, but has (as a demo) converted it into a
tetris game to demonstrate t
The Wikipedia sections on crypto are getting quite interesting. See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Cryptography
Members of this list who know a lot on the subject might want to lend
a hand on some of the articles.
Perry
[I was asked to forward this anonymously. --Perry]
From: [Name Withheld]
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: How important is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cert?
Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 11:25 AM -0500 12/21/06, Saqib Ali wrote:
> >If two products have exactly same feature set,
The New York Times has an article on the coming automatic
declassification of most US government documents over 25 years old. I
wonder if some interesting nuggets in the history of DES might become
available:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/washington/21declassify.html
--
Perry E. Metzger
rown away their money investing in
this technology go bankrupt.
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approved by top
U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against members of a
New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional
surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping
him.
http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-6140191.html
--
Perry E. Metzger
"James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Before computers, people had a lot of procedures that they routinely
> and ritualistically followed to prevent fraud, faithfully following
> the required procedures without ever thinking much about why things
> were done that way. It seems that some
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
> "Cid Carlos" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>>Citibank e-mail looks phishy
>
> I think "Citibank aims at foot and lets loose with both barrels,
> then reloads and shoots a second time" would be a better title.
> This is a really scary example of what Perr
Dear list members;
A "recruiter" going by the name of "Doug Kelly" (email address is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] but headers indicate the use of what are
euphemistically called "mass mailing services") appears to be mining
our mailing list archives and systematically sending out unsolicited
mass commercial
Just got this note from the ias-opportunities list...
Return-Path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [ias-opportunities] Balloting Information Assurance Standards
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2006 23:15:21 -0400
From: "Cole, John (Civ, ARL/CISD)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
<[EMAIL PROTE
"Some of the world's top crypto minds shared the stage at the Thirty
Years of Public-Key Cryptography anniversary event at the Computer
History Museum[...]"
http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=3847
--
Perry E. Metzger[
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On 10/12/06, Leichter, Jerry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Beyond that: Are weak keys even detectable using a ciphertext-only
>> attack (beyond simply trying them - but that can be done with *any* small
>> set of keys)?
>
> Yes, generally, that's the defi
http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/319
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin
Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC,
both of which are hash-based mess
LONDON (Reuters) - A code-cracking machine that enabled Britain to
read Nazi military ciphers during World War Two has been rebuilt by
enthusiasts after a 10-year project.
http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=1318542006&format=print
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTE
"Ondrej Mikle" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I conjecture that for every permutation on 1..N there exists a
> function that compresses the permutation into a "short"
> representation.
Provably false, indeed, trivially proven false.
In other messages you back off and say you just meant some kinds
Fugitive executive is tracked down by tracing his Skype calls...
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060824-7582.html
Perry
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e chips they've made so they can figure out
process problems, and the "key injection" equipment Certicom is making
could easily be suborned as well.
I'd be interested in other people's thoughts on this. Can you use DRM
to protect something worth not eight dollars
Steve Bellovin forwarded me the following links (which he got from
Eric Rescorla). Note the bit at the end about a path to second
preimage attacks:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/187
On the Security of HMAC and NMAC Based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1
Jongsung Kim and Alex Biryukov and B
The list was moved from one mail server to another today. No one
should notice any change at all, but if you do, please get in touch
with me privately.
--
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ure/2006/06/21/att_nsa/index_np.html
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via Bruce Schneier's blog:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90_DRBG_June2006.pdf
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Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Following the links from a /. story about a secure(?) mobile phone
VectroTel in Switzerland is selling, I came across the fact that this
firm sells a full line of encrypted phones.
http://www.vectrotel.ch/
The devices apparently use D-H key exchange to produce a 128 bit AES
key which is then use
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/legal/0,39020651,39270045,00.htm
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Excerpt:
The UK Government is preparing to give the police the authority to
force organisations and individuals to disclose encryption keys, a
move which has outraged some security and civil rights experts.
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/0,39020330,39269746,00.htm
Perry
-
http://www.ucomics.com/tomtoles/2006/05/18/
Hat tip again to Steve Bellovin.
Perry
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Cartoon of the day:
http://www.ibiblio.org/Dave/Dr-Fun/df200605/df20060517.jpg
[Hat tip to Steve Bellovin for pointing it out to me...]
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One of ABC News' reporters says that he's been warned that call
records, possibly even the ones that the major telecom companies are
now routinely turning over to the NSA, are being used to track down
the sources for reporters at several major news services.
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter
The following message is, sadly, real. The URLs have been altered a
bit to conceal some personal information of the bank customer. (The
HTML version, naturally, just provides click throughs instead of
saying "copy and paste this into your browser".)
I would comment on it, but really, what more ca
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> While I agree with you, the public does not,
> so far as I can tell, find itself willing to
> risk insecurity for the benefit of preserving
> privacy, as this article in today's Boston
> Globe would tend to confirm.
I'm sure. On the other hand, I think it is our place,
An interesting article in USA Today:
NSA has massive database of Americans' phone calls
Updated 5/11/2006 10:38 AM ET
By Leslie Cauley, USA TODAY
The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone
call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided
The person who sent this asked that I forward it anonymously.
From:
Subject: Re: Get a boarding pass, steal someone's identity
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
(If you want to post this, please make it anonymous. Thanks.)
Have you noticed that airline tickets ar
real. Certainly I've
found similar issues in the past.
These days, I shred practically anything with my name on it before
throwing it out. Perhaps I'm paranoid, but then again...
--
Perry E. Metzger[
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On 5/1/06, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Not if you design it correctly. Disk encryption systems like CGD work
>> on the block level, and do not propagate CBC operations across blocks,
>
> So
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Does anyone have any experience with disk or filesystem encryption,
> especially with regard to unclean shutdowns and power failures? Normal
> file systems are designed to fail in ways that are easy to
> clean up with fsck, but when you start to throw encr
wherever it liked.
The New York Times is also covering the story:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/29/us/29nsa.html
Though sadly that link will stop working soon as part of the
New York Times's effort to lose market share.
--
Perry E. Metzger
rs in
Langley, Va. This week, the sculptor gave them an unsettling but
hopeful surprise: part of the message they thought they had
deciphered years ago actually says something else.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/22/us/22puzzle.html
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROT
ius Caesar more than 2,000 years ago, according to a
biography of Italy's most wanted man.
http://dsc.discovery.com/news/briefs/20060417/mafiaboss_tec.html?source=rss
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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T
actually displayed.
http://news.com.com/2100-7355_3-6059276.html
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http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/nationalspecial3/13nsa.html
April 13, 2006
Documents Show Link Between AT&T and Agency in Eavesdropping Case
By JOHN MARKOFF
and SCOTT SHANE
SAN FRANCISCO, April 12
Mark Klein was
oice to give the government
secret, direct access to millions of ordinary Americans' Internet
communications is a threat to the Constitution itself. We are asking
the Court to put a stop to it now."
http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_04.php#004538
--
P
straightforward as
possible, and yet it must fail to perform at its apparent function. To
be more specific, it should do something subtly evil.
http://www.brainhz.com/underhanded/
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED
Forwarded from ias-opportunities
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2006 09:26:43 -0400
From: Marina Blanton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ias-opportunities] International Conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
(VietCrypt) 2006
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type:
Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2006 22:27:14 -0400 (EDT)
Message-Id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Yvo Desmedt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ias-opportunities] CFP
Reply-To: Yvo Desmedt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
The 5th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
http://cis.sjtu.ed
"Erik Zenner" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Shannon entropy is the one most people know, but it's all
>> wrong for deciding how many samples you need to derive a key.
>> The kind of classic illustration of this is the probability
>> distirbution:
>>
>> 0 occurs with probability 1/2
>> each o
A while ago, you may recall that members of the Greek government were
wiretapped, and at the time, I speculated that the bad guys may have
abused the built in CALEA software in the switch to do it. Well, it
now appears that that was precisely what happened. Unfortunately, the
article below is shor
Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Actually calculating the entropy for real-world functions and generators
> may be intractable...
It is, in fact, generally intractable.
1) Kolmogorov-Chaitin entropy is just plain intractable -- finding the
smallest possible Turing machine to gene
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> | Let me rephrase my sequence. Create a sequence of 256 consecutive
> | bytes, with the first byte having the value of 0, the second byte the
> | value of 1, ... and the last byte the value of 255. If you measure
> | the entropy (according to Shannon) of that sequ
Aram Perez <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Mar 22, 2006, at 9:04 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
>>
>> Aram Perez <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>>> Entropy is a highly discussed unit of measure.
>>>
>>> And very often confused.
>>
Aram Perez <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Entropy is a highly discussed unit of measure.
>
> And very often confused.
Apparently.
> While you do want maximum entropy, maximum
> entropy is not sufficient. The sequence of the consecutive numbers 0
> - 255 have maximum entropy but have no randomnes
"We live in a world where the technology exists that the government or
other technically sophisticated group is able to monitor and analyze a
substantial fraction of the communications of the world's population,
or can track their movements throughout the day, or keep tabs on their
f
The project to crack three remaining unsolved WWII era Enigma messages
has now completed two of them...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4808882.stm
Perry
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There is a project out there to crack a few of the remaining Enigma
intercepts from the second world war that were never cracked the first
time around...
http://www.bytereef.org.nyud.net:8080/m4_project.html
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED
I've often commented about how awful Chase's "send our customers
emails telling them to click on links" policy is, but tonight I got
one from them exhorting me to sign up for an identity theft protection
plan.
The irony is delicious.
Perry
--
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> I hate to play clipping service, but this story is too important not to
>> mention. Many top Greek officials, including the Prime Minister, and
>> the U.S. embassy had their mobile phones tapped. What makes this
>> interesting is how it was d
intercepted 165,174 messages from these targets, "an
increase of approximately 37,000 on the 84/85 figure. Reporting on the
Soviet target increased by 20% on the previous year".
Hat tip to Bruce Schneier's blog for reminding me about it.
--
Perry E. Metz
According to President Bush, the illegal NSA domestic espionage
program he ordered was narrowly targeted against people known to have
Al Qaeda links. However, it appears that, as with his previous false
claims that espionage only happened with a warrant, that this claim
was on its face untrue:
Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>
>>>Travis H. wrote:
>>>
>>>>I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
>>>>GPG and I'm w
on-crypto threats than to encryption
> keys. In practice, the attack envelope
> is much smaller, less likely.
I call "bull".
You have no idea what his usage pattern is like, and you have no idea
what the consequences for him of a forged signature key might be. It
is therefore unr
The Chicago Sun Times reports that, for the right price, you can buy
just about anyone's cell phone records:
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-privacy05.html
Quite disturbing.
Perry
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Un
I was unaware the National Cryptological Museum even had a "Hall of
Honor", but apparently it keeps one on behalf of the NSA:
http://www.nsa.gov/releases/relea00101.cfm
Perry
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The latest round of "SSL and X.509 certs in browsers are broken" has
gone on too long. I kept hoping after weeks people might get bored,
but they haven't. I'm cutting it off for at least a little while.
I'll entertain new postings only if they propose actual solutions
rather than long philosophic
Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Jack Lloyd wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote:
>>> 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a
>>> permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose
>>> way to create a N-bit permutat
Bill Stewart <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> At 10:58 AM 12/18/2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>>The President claims he has the prerogative to order such
>>surveillance. The law unambiguously disagrees with him.
>>
>>There are minor exceptions in the law, but they cl
"Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> A small editorial from your moderator. I rarely use this list to
> express a strong political opinion -- you will forgive me in this
> instance.
A couple of people have written to ask if they can forward on this
message e
A small editorial from your moderator. I rarely use this list to
express a strong political opinion -- you will forgive me in this
instance.
This mailing list is putatively about cryptography and cryptography
politics, though we do tend to stray quite a bit into security issues
of all sorts, and
ng the Microsoft addresses from being
unsubscribed from the list for excess bounces but I'm going to stop
doing that shortly -- it is too much work. Sorry.
I would forward examples of the messages that are bouncing to the
folks at MS but unfortunately, it is impossible to do so for obvious
reasons.
equipment, said the lead
researcher, Matt Blaze, an associate professor of computer and
information science at the University of Pennsylvania.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/national/30tap.html
original paper at:
http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretapping/
--
Perry E. Metzger
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating
> link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf
> It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and
> encryptor designs.
Very interesting indeed. I was unaware t
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in
IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:
http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.html
I haven't been following the IPSec mailing lists of late -- can anyone
who knows details expla
Apparently there's an event at The New School on November 17th
entitled "The Secret World of Global Eavesdropping" -- one of the
panel is John Young of Cryptome fame.
http://worldpolicy.org/calendar/2005/fall/05nov17.html
--
Perry E. Metzger[
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> How does one properly use a symmetric cipher as a cryptographic hash
>> function? I seem to be going around in circles.
>
> Isn't this is like asking a mechanic how to use a screwdriver as a hammer?
Not in the least. Building new strong tools by using ol
Bruce Schneier is liveblogging from the NIST Halloween Hash Bash:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/
(Credit: Steve Bellovin directed me at the web page.)
Perry
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rcepted by the N.S.A., the secretive
eavesdropping and code-breaking agency, were falsified so that they
made it look as if North Vietnam had attacked American destroyers
on Aug. 4, 1964, two days after a previous clash.
--
Perry E. Metzger
[I'm posting the whole thing because the New York Times rapidly expires
all their articles, making it impossible to refer to them over the
long term. --Perry]
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/technology/23college.html
October 23, 2005
Colleges Protest Call to Upgrade Online Systems
By SAM DILLO
criminals to exploit.
Bank Web sites are expected to adopt some form of "two-factor"
authentication by the end of 2006, regulators with the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council said in a letter to
banks last week.
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL
Cisco used a particularly smart
design for this.
--
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/Privacy/printers/docucolor/
Perry
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