On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:31 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 1 Mar 2018 10:51:04 +
> Ben Laurie via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> > Seems to me that signing something that has nothing to do with certs
> > is a safer option - e
On Thursday, March 1, 2018 at 11:08:58 AM UTC-5, RSTS wrote:
> On Thursday, March 1, 2018 at 1:51:16 PM UTC, Michel Gre wrote:
> > > I'd postulate there's
> > > nothing wrong with Trustico holding the private keys if they were hosting
> > > the site or providing CDN services for all of these sites.
On Thursday, March 1, 2018 at 1:51:16 PM UTC, Michel Gre wrote:
> > I'd postulate there's
> > nothing wrong with Trustico holding the private keys if they were hosting
> > the site or providing CDN services for all of these sites.
>
> I manage one of the affected domains. I can tell that in no wa
On Thu, 1 Mar 2018 10:51:04 +
Ben Laurie via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Seems to me that signing something that has nothing to do with certs
> is a safer option - e.g. sign random string+Subject DN.
That does sounds sane, I confess I have not spent much time playing with
easily available t
I agree with Eric, I would call storing the customers private keys (without
their knowledge!!) as an immediate compromise and a clear breach of trust.
On Thursday, March 1, 2018 at 1:04:54 AM UTC+1, Eric Mill wrote:
> Trustico doesn't seem to provide any hosting or CDN services that would
> make
> I'd postulate there's
> nothing wrong with Trustico holding the private keys if they were hosting
> the site or providing CDN services for all of these sites.
I manage one of the affected domains. I can tell that in no way does Trustico
hosts the site, nor provide us any CDN service.
We just
On 01/03/18 10:51, Ben Laurie via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 28 February 2018 at 21:37, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
On Wed, 28 Feb 2018 20:03:51 +
Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
The keys were emailed to me. I'm trying
On 28 February 2018 at 21:37, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Feb 2018 20:03:51 +
> Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> > The keys were emailed to me. I'm trying to get a project together
> > where we self-sign a ce
t; Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 11:58 AM
> To: Jeremy Rowley
> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:37 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy &l
Trustico doesn't seem to provide any hosting or CDN services that would
make use of the private key, nor do they appear to explicitly inform users
about the storage of this private key.
In their statement, they say they keep the private keys explicitly to
perform revocation as necessary:
https://w
On Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 4:44:50 PM UTC-6, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> 1) Not all of the certificates being revoked use the Symantec hierarchy.
> There are some certs that use the DigiCert replacement hierarchy. Not many
> though.
> 2) Sorry my wording was strange. It almost always is. What
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 3:23 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
On Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 3:55:37 PM UTC-6, Ryan Duff wrote:
> >From what I've read, it appears the situation here is that Trustico
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 5:23 PM, Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 3:55:37 PM UTC-6, Ryan Duff wrote:
> > >From what I've read, it appears the situation here is that Trustico
> wanted to revoke all their cu
On Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 3:55:37 PM UTC-6, Ryan Duff wrote:
> >From what I've read, it appears the situation here is that Trustico wanted
> >to revoke all their customer certs from Digicert so they could do a mass
> >migration to another CA (which is not a proper reason to revoke). When
; Date: February 28, 2018 at 2:33:41 PM MST
> To: Ryan Sleevi mailto:sle...@google.com>>, Geoff
> Keating mailto:geo...@apple.com>>
> Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List mailto:pu
> b...@cabforum.org>>
> Subject: RE: [cabfpub] How do you handle mass revocation
Of urijah--- via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 2:24 PM
To:
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org<mailto:mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
Is Trustico's storage of private keys relate
>From what I've read, it appears the situation here is that Trustico wanted to
>revoke all their customer certs from Digicert so they could do a mass
>migration to another CA (which is not a proper reason to revoke). When asked
>for proof by Digicert that the certificates were compromised and ne
ent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 2:24 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
>
> Is Trustico's storage of private keys related to this security report from a
> few months back (which did not appe
owser Forum Public Discussion List
mailto:pub...@cabforum.org>>
Subject: RE: [cabfpub] How do you handle mass revocation requests?
Here’s 10 CSRs that people can correlate with the CT logs. I’ll create another
100 or so to dispel any doubt.
-B
Yep - that was you. Thanks a ton. We posted 10 CSRs so far. Is this what you
were thinking?
-Original Message-
From: Nick Lamb
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 2:37 PM
To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
Cc: Jeremy Rowley
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests
y was compromised).
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
On Behalf Of urijah--- via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 2:24 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
Is Trustico's storage
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 4:23 PM, urijah--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Is Trustico's storage of private keys related to this security report from
> a few months back (which did not appear to ever have been fully
> investigated...)?
>
It was fully inve
On Wed, 28 Feb 2018 20:03:51 +
Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> The keys were emailed to me. I'm trying to get a project together
> where we self-sign a cert with each of the keys and publish them.
> That way there's evidence to the community of the compromise without
> simply l
Is Trustico's storage of private keys related to this security report from a
few months back (which did not appear to ever have been fully investigated...)?
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/CEww8w9q2zE/F_bzX1guCQAJ
Does Digicert have (or will it have) some sort of proc
It’s absolutely incredible that Trustico has 23k private keys, and just
attached them to an email. This suggests serious flaws in the CA/reseller
relationship.
___
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozi
Did this whole thing start because someone at Trustico wanted to accelerate the
process of getting their resold Symantec certificates reissued under a DigiCert
trust path?
And somehow some misinformed soul imagined creating a revocation crisis would
somehow help achieve that goal without signi
I would echo Mr. Gaynor's point.
While it's perhaps a pedantic distinction, the private keys are definitely
compromised now and were the moment that Trustico provided the keys to
Digicert, even if Trustico is defined to be the original authorized
recipient.
The CA is explicitly not to be in posse
On Wednesday, February 28, 2018 at 11:56:04 AM UTC-8, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> Assuming Trustico sent the keys to DigiCert, it definitely sounds like even
> if Trustico was authorized to hold the keys (which is a troubling argument,
> given all things), they themselves compromised the keys of their cus
ity-policy
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:13 PM, timx84039--- via dev-security-policy
wrote:
>
>>
>> Regarding to our investigation they were only
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 2:40 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> The end user agreed to the subscriber agreement, not Trustico. Our
> analysis follows what Peter B. posted – the subscriber is the “natural
> person or Legal Entity to whom a Ce
om of the
community in what we do.
I’m happy to share any of the details I can.
Jeremy
From: Ryan Sleevi
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 11:58 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:13 PM, timx84039--- via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Regarding to our investigation they were only able to send the private
>> keys for those certificates where the CSR / private ke
I would say that at the point that Trustico emailed them to DigiCert they
necessarily became compromised -- while Trustico may (or may not) have been
authorized to escrowing the keys by the subscriber, the subscriber did not
authorize them to be emailed around, presumably.
Alex
On Wed, Feb 28, 20
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:13 PM, timx84039--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> Regarding to our investigation they were only able to send the private
> keys for those certificates where the CSR / private key pair were generated
> within their online priv
---
From: Peter Bowen
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 12:14 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Once we were alerte
PM
To: google.mana...@trustico.com; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: RE: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
I believe transparency is the best policy. I think it'd be helpful to the
community if we could post the email exchange about the revocation. We can
e your permission to post those
emails?
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
On
Behalf Of google.manager--- via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2018 11:54 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: How do you handle mass revocation requests?
We have purchased thousands of certificates using Trustico as a reseller within
the last years.
Back in these days Trustico created CSR / Private Key pair within their online
platform (Yes, you read it right - you can create CSR/Private Key on their
webpage !!!) which was the default at this ti
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Once we were alerted, the team kicked
> off a debate that I wanted to bring to the CAB Forum. Basically, our
> position is that resellers do not constitute subscribers under the Baseline
> Requirement's definitions (Se
On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:37 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On February 2nd, 2018, we received a request from Trustico to mass revoke
> all certificates that had been ordered by end users through Trustico.
> Unfortunately, the email was
Jeremy,
Today many of our customers experienced lengthy delays when attempting to
contact us via phone, e-mail and live chat. The reason for the delays were due
to an unexpected e-mail that DigiCert sent to our customers containing some
inaccurate information. We were not informed that the e-ma
On Wed, 28 Feb 2018 17:37:25 +
Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Hi everyone,
> On February 2nd, 2018, we received a request from Trustico to mass
> revoke all certificates that had been ordered by end users through
> Trustico.
Is this date (2 February, so almost four weeks ago)
On 28 February 2018 at 11:37, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> What kind of transparency would the Mozilla community like around this
> issue? There aren't many more facts than I shared above, but there is a lot
> of speculation. Let me know what I can share to help alleviate confusi
Hi everyone,
I wanted to share an incident report regarding the revocation of certain
certificates ordered through a reseller.
On February 2nd, 2018, we received a request from Trustico to mass revoke
all certificates that had been ordered by end users through Trustico.
Unfortunately, the e
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