Hi Anders,
Thanks for your mail. Is there any proprietary solution that's
named Message Pro or so??
On Apr 6, 5:26 pm, Anders Rundgren anders.rundg...@telia.com wrote:
Hi,
Since there are no standards in this space most banks and e-governments
use proprietary (but cross-browser) Java
Hi Sunny,
I haven't heard about Message Pro.
Here is an open source (free) applet plugin:
http://www.openoces.org/index.html
It is used in Denmark and maybe somewhere else as well.
In Sweden the government has spent some $30M over the years on:
http://nexussafe.com/en/Products/Nexus-Personal
Matt McCutchen wrote:
On Apr 6, 5:54 am, Jean-Marc Desperrierjmd...@gmail.com wrote:
Matt McCutchen wrote:
An extended key usage of TLS Web Server Authentication on the
intermediate CA would constrain all sub-certificates, no?
You are here talking about a proprietary Microsoft
On Apr 7, 4:54 am, Jean-Marc Desperrier jmd...@gmail.com wrote:
Matt McCutchen wrote:
On Apr 6, 5:54 am, Jean-Marc Desperrierjmd...@gmail.com wrote:
Matt McCutchen wrote:
An extended key usage of TLS Web Server Authentication on the
intermediate CA would constrain all
On 2010-04-07 01:54 PST, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
Matt McCutchen wrote:
On Apr 6, 5:54 am, Jean-Marc Desperrierjmd...@gmail.com wrote:
Matt McCutchen wrote:
An extended key usage of TLS Web Server Authentication on the
intermediate CA would constrain all sub-certificates, no?
You
On Apr 3, 9:45 am, Jean-Marc Desperrier jmd...@free.fr wrote:
It's the sites that need to catch on those updates.
And web developers can have power to influence those sites to update.
FWIW, I am a DreamHost customer and I just submitted a support ticket
with them to close the vulnerability for
On Apr 4, 6:48 am, Eddy Nigg eddy_n...@startcom.org wrote:
It's trivial from the logical point of view.
That's easy for you to say. Even things that are logically trivial
are easy to miss unless one goes carefully over every single step of
the process. For instance, I used a little script to
On Apr 7, 12:47 am, Kurt Seifried k...@seifried.org wrote:
What about www.paypal.com[NULL].yourcompany.com? I assume that would
be allowed by the name constraint with respect to fixed software, but
still hit some older software that has the NULL certificate bug.
I think
On 4/4/2010 10:41 PM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
On 4/3/10 9:30 AM, johnjbarton wrote:
If the *users* of Firefox are truly in jeopardy, then this alert should
be provided to *users*. Since this alert is not shown to users I can
only assume that in fact there is no practical threat here. You're
On Wed, 2010-04-07 at 09:55 -0700, johnjbarton wrote:
On 4/4/2010 10:41 PM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
On 4/3/10 9:30 AM, johnjbarton wrote:
If the *users* of Firefox are truly in jeopardy, then this alert should
be provided to *users*. Since this alert is not shown to users I can
only assume
Hi,
While going through fixing memory leaks in CHASM[1], I fixed some leaks
within NSPR and NSS. Here's a list of the leaks that CHASM exposed
(doing minimal things with NSS, basically just hashing):
* The error tables are not cleaned up. This is the most invasive
change since it adds a
On Wed, 7 Apr 2010 16:18:41 -0400
Ben Boeckel maths...@gmail.com wrote:
While going through fixing memory leaks in CHASM[1], I fixed some leaks
within NSPR and NSS.
Ben, thanks for the work here. Always great to have outside
contributions for Mozilla projects. Open source is what makes this
In article 20100407160150.2b5d0637.r...@reedloden.com you wrote:
On Wed, 7 Apr 2010 16:18:41 -0400
Ben Boeckel maths...@gmail.com wrote:
While going through fixing memory leaks in CHASM[1], I fixed some leaks
within NSPR and NSS.
Ben, thanks for the work here. Always great to have outside
On 2010/04/07 10:43 PDT, Matt McCutchen wrote:
On Wed, 2010-04-07 at 09:55 -0700, johnjbarton wrote:
On 4/4/2010 10:41 PM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
We plan on alerting users in a future update. This is fair warning
to server operators and those who are debugging their sites.
If this is a real
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