Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
after having presented Condorcet elections to some people in the Czech green
party, the following question came up.
Condorcet elections might work with three candidates, but what about if
there are twenty of them, will the system work and elect the best candidate?
Hello,
The last thing I did with my simulation is check whether on average a
candidate would prefer to have withdrawn (considering the results of
thousands of trials of one position) than stand, with the assumption that
they care what happens when they lose. (I'm not sure that's actually a
good
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
after having presented Condorcet elections to some people in the Czech
green party, the following question came up.
Condorcet elections might work with three candidates, but what
Hi Kevin,
thanks for your view on the topic.
In election-theoretic language, what criterion is used to describe, that a
method performs as well with many as with few candidates?
There is a list of criterias in the table at:
On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:34 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
after having presented Condorcet elections to some people in the
Czech green party, the following question came up.
Condorcet elections might work with three candidates, but what about
if there are twenty of them, will the system work and
All common Condorcet methods work fine also with multiple candidates
(although not all methods meet exactly the same criteria). The first
problem are probably human behaviour related, i.e. people start hating
the voting process if it is too tedious, and they may not rank all
relevant
Irrelevant Ballots Independent Fallback Approval (IBIFA) is the name I've
settled on for the method I proposed
in a May 2010 EM post titled Bucklin-like method meeting Favorite Betrayal and
Irrelevant Ballots.
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy which
asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the chances
of my candidate being elected.
If I have a second or third option, the chances of my
On Jun 16, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same
guy which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the
chances of my candidate being
Hi Peter,
My quick responses to this:
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy
which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the
chances
of
Hi Kristofer,
thanks for a detailed answer.
As you answer contingency, it might be beneficial to turn the question
around.
In what situations will bullet voting help my candidate to win (considering
the advanced Condorcet systems)?
Peter
On Wed, Jun 16, 2010 at 8:14 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2010/6/16 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
On Jun 16, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same guy
which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
In what situations will bullet voting help my candidate to win
(considering the advanced Condorcet systems)?
The simplest is probably the one you gave. For example:
43 A
27 B vs. BC
30 CB
If B voters don't give
Some more viewpoints that were not covered very well yet.
1) Typical (=all common) Condorcet methods make pairwise comparisons
and derive the results from those comparisons. Changing one's vote
from ABC to AB=C does not change the pairwise comparison results of
ones favourite (A) against
Peter,
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the chances
of my candidate being elected.
Bullet voting in an election using a method that complies with the Condorcet
criterion does I suppose
somewhat increase the chance of your candidate being the Condorcet winner.
But
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
The last thing I did with my simulation is check whether on average a
candidate would prefer to have withdrawn (considering the results of
thousands of trials of one position) than stand, with the assumption that
they care what happens when they lose. (I'm not sure
Chris, thanks for pointing these things out. I didn't know about the
Later-no-Help.
You write: But all Condorcet methods fail Later-no-Help, and in some this
effect is sufficiently strong for the method to have a random fill
incentive.
Do you know for which Condorcet methods this effect is
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 49.
- A loses to C, 49-51. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 51.
Thus: If the
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a écrit :
Thus: If the three C voters will truncate then they will win instead of B
in winning votes based Condorcet methods.
This is correct, if proportional completion is not used (see page 42
in
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
I think that a nomination simulation would have to be more
complex, to take feedback into account. Candidates would
position themselves somewhere in opinion space, then move
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
49.
- A loses to C, 49-51. In
On Jun 17, 2010, at 12:29 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com a
écrit :
Thus: If the three C voters will truncate then they will win
instead of B
in winning votes based Condorcet methods.
This is correct, if proportional
I wrote some code to study proportionality in the Czech Green Party
case. I uploaded some of that stuff also in the Internet in case you
are interested to experiment with it. The code is purely experimental
and draft and not very stable at the moment, i.e. no guarantees given,
but right
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Juho juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
If you are using proportional completion (or
symmetric completion) then
you're not using winning votes, you're using margins.
The described algorithm seemed to make the completion in a
non-symmetric way, leading
On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:57 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
a écrit :
Even so, the simulation would fail to catch
certain aspects
of the election cycle itself. Consider a two party
state
under FPTP. In a pure
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:11 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Dave Ketchum
da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
That is possible. Would primaries encourage that
effect? If
so, would we expect parties in two-party states
without
voter primaries to be closer to each
26 matches
Mail list logo
