2011/11/26 fsimm...@pcc.edu
While working with MinMaxCardinalRatingsPairwiseOpposition (MMcrwPO) I got
an
idea that high resolution Range might have an acceptable solutin to the
defection problem that we have been considering:
Sincere ballots
49 C
x: AB
y: BA
where x appears to be
matt welland wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin or
Condorcet) despite
2011/11/27 matt welland m...@kiatoa.com
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
If one is going to propose a method involving proxies, then Proxy DD is the
biggest and most
ambitious improvment. I described it in a posting when you asked about it.
Though it's a much more ambitious thing to ask for, maybe people _would_ want a
good proxy system such
Dear all,
do anyone of you know the best way to incorporate single constraints
into STV and proportional rankings from STV (see for instance:
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue9/p5.htm)?
For instance, the constraint can be that at least 1/3 of the elected
seats go to candidates of each gender.
2011/11/26 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
Jameson:
You said:
There are other methods which you don't mention even though their
advantages are similar to those of the ones you do.
2011/11/25 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
Regarding the co-operation/defection problem, there are
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Mike,
I like MMPO2 because (unlike MMPO1) it takes into account opposition from
supporters of eliminated candidates, so is more broad based, and it is easily
seen to satisfy the FBC. Also it allows more brad based support than MMPO3 where
only the support by top raters
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
do anyone of you know the best way to incorporate single constraints
into STV and proportional rankings from STV (see for instance:
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue9/p5.htm)?
For instance, the constraint can be that at least 1/3 of the elected
seats go to
Hi Kristofer,
I don't consider Schulze STV, only standard STV (IRV-based, fractional
static Droop quotas, not meek),
since it is the only method, which is simple to explain to
non-enthusiasts and widely used and have tested and widely used
software support for vote counting.
I guess, that by the
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
I don't consider Schulze STV, only standard STV (IRV-based, fractional
static Droop quotas, not meek),
since it is the only method, which is simple to explain to
non-enthusiasts and widely used and have tested and widely used
software support for vote
On 27.11.2011, at 8.05, matt welland wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 22:31 -0500, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 11/26/11 6:58 PM, matt welland wrote:
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
they don't know anything about Approval (or Score or Borda or Bucklin
David L Wetzell wrote:
The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the de
facto center.
But positioning yourself around the de facto center is dangerous in
IRV. You might get center-squeezed unless either you or your voters
start using strategic
Peter
If you haven't already found the Church of England Regulations for STV with
constraints, they are here:
http://www.churchofengland.org/media/1307318/stv%20regulations.doc
These are the only published regulations for STV with constraints that I know
of.
Your first link (below) is to
On 27.11.2011, at 12.55, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
do anyone of you know the best way to incorporate single constraints
into STV and proportional rankings from STV (see for instance:
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/issue9/p5.htm)?
For instance, the constraint can be that at least 1/3
Nov 2011 23:05:49 -0700
From: matt welland m...@kiatoa.com
I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
better or worse than IRV and why?
Approval is a far superior system to FPTP and IRV because approval:
1. unlike FPTP and IRV, it solves the spoiler problem of a
David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:I think this is where we differ, really. On a scale from 0 to 1,
you think their relative merit is something like:
0: Plurality
0.7: IRV3/AV3
0.72: Condorcet, MJ, etc
while I think it's something like:
0: Plurality
0.25: IRV
On 27.11.2011, at 18.35, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Nov 2011 23:05:49 -0700
From: matt welland m...@kiatoa.com
I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
better or worse than IRV and why?
Approval is a far superior system to FPTP and IRV because approval:
1. unlike FPTP
dlw: The two major-party equilibrium would be centered around the
de facto center.
KM: But positioning yourself around the de facto center is dangerous
in IRV. You might get center-squeezed unless either you or your
voters start using strategic lesser-evil logic - the
Mike,
De : MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
À : election-meth...@electorama.com
Envoyé le : Samedi 26 Novembre 2011 13h39
Objet : [EM] An ABE solution
This was answered in the first part of the paragraph that you're quoting. What
Woodall calls a preferential
election rule is by definition a
Hi Jameson,
My perspective is the following:
1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might not
be visible from the ballots.
1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a wrong answer,
so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in that case.
2.
dlw: I believe you're serious. Like I said, I'm not that motivated by
money(especially for a guy with a PhD in Econ.) It's a byproduct of me
being an aspie. So I'd feel bad about taking you up on the 2nd one and the
first bet is inadequately framed in my view
C'mon. Neither of
meh,
I don't want to take bet number 1. This list-serve is skewed towards smart
and politically-interested folks, who equally importantly tend to be
arm-chair/list-serve/blog activists. Methinks, we tend to project our
attributes too much onto the general voting population as a matter of
wishful
On Sat, Nov 26, 2011 at 3:20 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a bunch of responses
dlw: SL may be more proportional than LR Hare, but since I'm advocating for
the use of a mix of single-winner and multi-winner election rules, I have
no problems with the former being biased
When beat path produces a tie, this method can produce a single winner unless
the tie is genuine. It is the same method I presented earlier except for the
addition of the Removing step, which resolves the ties.
Candidates are classed in two categories: Winners and
Losers. Initially, all
so this is interesting. it seems to be an extension of Tideman
ranked-pairs that considers first the margins and then the opposing
votes (or winning votes for the opponent) to break ties. is that
essentially it?
On 11/27/11 10:21 PM, Ross Hyman wrote:
When beat path produces a tie, this
Dear Ross Hyman,
you wrote (27 Nov 2011):
A and B are both winners. A is in B's set and B is in A's set.
So A is deleted from B's set and B is deleted from A's set.
A(W): A(W), C(L), D(L)
B(W): B(W), C(L), D(L)
C(L): A(W), B(W), C(L), D(L)
D(L): A(W), B(W), C(L), D(L)
affirm A B
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