On Jan 14, 2010, at 10:17 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Would that FairVote and Rob Richie had listened, they'd have
learned and they would have modified their strategy to focus on
deeper and more effective goals. The ultimate goal of FairVote, in
its foundation, was proportional
On Jan 27, 2010, at 6:55 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 27, 2010, at 11:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Without the uneven strategy problem, full-blown Range would be,
hands down, the best (single-winner) voting system possible
Would you be happy with fixed range ballots (e.g. 0 - 99) or should
one
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 27, 2010, at 6:55 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 27, 2010, at 11:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Without the uneven strategy problem, full-blown Range would be,
hands down, the best (single-winner) voting system possible
Would you be
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
no, i think that if i can think up a negative number with greater
magnitude than anyone else, i should be able to single-handedly
scuttle a popular candidate.
Ok, you seem to think
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
no, i think that if i can think up a negative number with greater
magnitude than anyone else, i should be able to
On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
it's amazing that anyone touts Range as the most strategy free.
the more handles
On Jan 29, 2010, at 3:36 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
it's amazing that
On Jan 27, 2010, at 7:02 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:10 PM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
The scenario that you described requires some goodwill among the
voters.
That's correct. We seem to imagine that better voting systems will
produce better results even if people continue to lack
On Jan 27, 2010, at 8:16 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (26 Jan 2010):
snip
It may well be that this method can be characterized as not fully
Condorcet and Approval strategy added. I'm not quite sure that the
intended idea of mostly Condorcet with core support rewarded (= do
what the IRV
2010/1/26 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
The typical error is in assuming some strategic faction which votes
sensibly, when everyone else votes in a way that they will regret if they
discover the result they cause.
You can't study history for two minutes without finding
At 08:51 AM 1/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/1/26 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.coma...@lomaxdesign.com
The typical error is in assuming some strategic faction which
votes sensibly, when everyone else votes in a way that they will
regret if they discover the result they
2010/1/27 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 08:51 AM 1/27/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/1/26 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.com
a...@lomaxdesign.com
The typical error is in assuming some strategic faction which votes
sensibly, when everyone else votes in a way
On Jan 27, 2010, at 11:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Without the uneven strategy problem, full-blown Range would be,
hands down, the best (single-winner) voting system possible
Would you be happy with fixed range ballots (e.g. 0 - 99) or should
one allow any integer to be used ( -infinity -
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. = Careful consideration needed.
Only
On Jan 26, 2010, at 6:07 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (25 Jan 2010):
I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's add an approval cutoff in
At 03:04 AM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. =
Hi,
--- En date de : Mar 26.1.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com a
écrit :
Range voting is interesting
precisely because it bases outcomes on a metric for election
performance, and the only issue is a lot of hot air about
strategic voting in Range.
My view on this is simple:
At 08:10 PM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
The scenario that you described requires some goodwill among the
voters.
That's correct. We seem to imagine that better voting systems will
produce better results even if people continue to lack goodwill and
cooperative spirit. It's a fantasy. There are
Juho wrote (26 Jan 2010):
snip
It may well be that this method can be characterized as not fully
Condorcet and Approval strategy added. I'm not quite sure that the
intended idea of mostly Condorcet with core support rewarded (= do
what the IRV core support idea is supposed to do) works well
Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2010 4:49 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and
proponents of election reform thunked up the idea
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. = Careful consideration needed.
Only a voting systems theorist who is not a parliamentarian or
Juho wrote (25 Jan 2010):
I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's add an approval cutoff in the Condorcet ballots. The first
approach could
Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
As a
At 09:52 PM 1/22/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
now remember in the case we're discussing here, there is only two
candidates. again, what consequence to the outcome of the election
(that is, who of A or B wins) occurs whether a ballot is marked
A (and B is last by default) or is marked AB?
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should
Election Ordinance that imposes such a
restriction. So when Minneapolis can obtain certified counting machines that
can deal with fully ranked ballots, there will be no
such restriction in practice.
James
Behalf Of Kathy Dopp
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:43 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs
, there will be no
such restriction in practice.
James
Behalf Of Kathy Dopp
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:43 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (back to the pile count controversy)
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters
are allowed to rank all the candidates who
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
OK James. As I said before, I agree with you that you were
giving the total number of profiles *if* voters were allowed
to rank all candidates, which they were not allowed to do in
Minneapolis or elsewhere in the US public elections if I
On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 11:10 AM, James Gilmour
jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
My formula provides the more practical number of how many
profiles are allowed to be cast by voters and how many
profiles are needed if one wants to count the
On Jan 22, 2010, at 8:54 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
As I said earlier, if paper ballots are required, the length of the
paper ballot must be unlimited if the number of candidates who can run
for office is unlimited and you want voters to be able to fully rank
(not that most voters would want to.)
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would be treated
differently from a ballot marked AB: at the last
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 4:54 PM
James, you are using a straw man argument with me, setting up
a false premise that I said something I never did,
Kathy, I was not setting up any straw man argument with you or anyone else. I
simply stated what a preference profile is and
At 09:33 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would
On Jan 21, 2010, at 8:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
and i believe that it is perfectly
practical when the number of *credible* candidates is small. doesn't
matter what the voting system is. IRV, or whatever.
Yes. But how small?
On Jan 22, 2010, at 3:57 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
At 01:55 PM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication process
here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Variation on previous post. Silly
On Jan 21, 2010, at 3:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication
process here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about
voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM,
People, please. This is not a debate class, and even if it were, no, I won
is really useless even if true. Please take this discussion off list, if you
find it important enough not to stop. There's practically no voting system
content left. As for what is left: we all know that the number of piles
i just want to settle the issue about how many piles one needs to be
precinct summable when there are N candidates.
Kathy was pointing to Abd ul as the qualified actor who refuted the
falsifiable assertion that i made that you needed only 9 piles for 3
candidates. She repeated labeled
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the fact is, transmitting the content (to a central counting
location) of *every ballot* is the transfer of a finite amount of
information. that is even *more* general than sorting to piles and
transmitting the tallies for piles.
Yes, of
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number of
candidates is very small, precinct summability
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that number is 9. if you or
Kathy say it's 15, then
On Jan 21, 2010, at 6:30 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then the possible unique preference
profiles are:
A
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then
ballot to legally equivalent votes. The reduced set is this:
A
B
C
AB
AC
BA
BC
CA
CB
Note that this assumes a 2-rank ballot.
no, it can be a 3-rank ballot where the voter declines to rate their
last choice. 3rd choice is left unmarked.
It also assumes that majority vote isn't
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
I put the general formula
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did put forth a table
which appears to be consistent with
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number
At 03:01 AM 1/17/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 17, 2010, at 12:53 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
There is a common error here, which is to assume that Range
requires too much information from the voter.
well, it does force the voter to consider the questions oh, i hate
this guy
I couldn't resist this and another. Silly time!
At 04:15 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
(I'd written previously)
no slip nor nuttin' else under me kilt. want me to show you?
You already did.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Variation on previous post. Silly time!
At 02:31 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 12:05 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Robert, your slip is showing.
what slip? i don't have nuttin' under me kilt.
We already knew that.
Silly hat, Off.
Robert, if you want
At 02:31 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
and FairVote.org will point to experts that strongly advocate IRV.
big fat hairy deel.
They will. Anecdotal. Look, a lot of experts follow the EM list. Have
been for a long time. Very few who aren't politically committed in
some way, such
11:54 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (Dave Ketchum)
At 02:31 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
and FairVote.org will point to experts that strongly advocate IRV.
big fat hairy deel.
They will. Anecdotal. Look, a lot of experts follow the EM list. Have
been for a long time. Very
At 01:13 PM 1/20/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:09 AM 1/17/2010, Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (17 Jan 2010):
To me, it seems that the method becomes Approval-like when (number of
graduations) is less than (number of candidates). When that is the case,
you *have* to
Sent from my iPhone
On Jan 20, 2010, at 1:35 PM, Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
wrote:
Abd has repeated an erroneous statement about Nicolaus Tideman's
assessment of voting methods. Abd wrote:
snipFairVote has really poisoned the air, citing Tideman, for
example,
when
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Variation on previous post. Silly time!
At 02:31 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 12:05 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Robert, your slip is showing.
what slip? i don't have nuttin' under me kilt.
okay, Abd ul, i once got suckered into responding to a big long thing
you made in response to me. you probably seen it, but the list
hasn't because it exceeded some size limit. so i'm gonna snip at the
first place to respond and i'll ask that the next issue area get its
separate email
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:02 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 3:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Exactly as I tried to point out to you, you were either disallowing
voters to rank only two candidates or to rank all
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
we can continue on like this with more discrete levels and all we'll get
are gradations of the above. it's all a matter of degree.
but the 2-position slider is a 1-bit piece of information: No,Yes,
that's the minimum a voter has to judge. that's qualitatively
For the record, I like approval voting and think it would be among the
best, if not the best, first step as an alternative voting method to
plurality. However, I also think Condorcet is OK as long as voters
are not required to rank all choices, to alleviate the point Abd ul
mentions below
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (17 Jan 2010):
To me, it seems that the method becomes Approval-like when (number of
graduations) is less than (number of candidates). When that is the case,
you *have* to rate some candidates equal, unless you opt not to rate
them at all.
That won't make much of
At 03:01 AM 1/17/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 17, 2010, at 12:53 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
There is a common error here, which is to assume that Range
requires too much information from the voter.
well, it does force the voter to consider the questions oh, i hate
this guy
Cutting to the chase, the fundamental error has been to assume that
write-in or so-called inconsequential candidates can be batch-
eliminated before having results from the whole election. No precinct
knows what can be eliminated until it has the results from other
precincts for the first
On Jan 15, 2010, at 10:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Message: 3
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 22:05:58 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
To: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:46 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM,
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:51 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
2) IRV is easier to count manually. Condorcet gets quite tedious
to count manually when the number of candidates and voters goes
up. One can use some
At 09:47 AM 1/15/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Your steady stream of false claims about me in your
recent emails show us much more about yourself than reveal anything
about me.
To those with eyes, most everything we write reveals much about us.
However, Kathy, I suggest you let others defend you;
On Jan 16, 2010, at 12:05 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:22 AM 1/15/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
(about a voting security expert)
you are in the rabid anti-IRV party.
Robert, your slip is showing.
what slip? i don't have nuttin' under me kilt.
Experts in various fields
At 02:06 AM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 15, 2010, at 11:34 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Imagine sending all your ballots nationwide to DC for manual counting
to check the outcome of a Presidential election. We'll simply let the
On Jan 16, 2010, at 3:00 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:30 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I was talking about IRV voting. Where do you get 9 piles from?
it's 3!/0! + 3!/2! = 6 + 3
OK. If you prefer to write the formula that way, you're still
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
results. Generally, voting security people like to use audits that select a
sample of votes and look for errors, then they use statistical analysis to
estimate the overall error in result probability. That's not
Message: 2
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2010 15:14:23 -0500
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: EM Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (Dave Ketchum)
Don't know what you're talking about.
consider Burlington 2009
On Jan 16, 2010, at 3:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Message: 2
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2010 15:14:23 -0500
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: EM Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (Dave Ketchum)
Don't know what you're talking about
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 4:17 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
It may depends on what office(s) are being elected. States are free,
supposedly, to select their electors by any method they choose. STV is
actually a decent method for that. This election would be state-wide. But
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
results. Generally, voting security people like to use audits that select a
sample of votes and look for errors, then they use statistical analysis to
estimate the overall error in result
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 3:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Exactly as I tried to point out to you, you were either disallowing
voters to rank only two candidates or to rank all three.
no, it has nothing at all to do with allowing or disallowing the voters to
I see I
Kristofer,
I don't know about Condorcet auditing because I haven't tried to
figure it out yet, but its mathematics seems to be much simpler than
IRV/STV since only n(n-1) counts are necessary to report for each
audit unit (precinct or whatever.) and I'm sure the fact that
Condorcet counts fit so
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:02 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 3:41 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Exactly as I tried to point out to you, you were either disallowing
voters to rank only two candidates or to rank all three.
no, it has nothing at all to
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2010 18:40:09 -0500
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: EM Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality
unlike you, Kathy, i'm a lifelong student. and, at 54, i've also
Hey Yet ANOTHER (count them) WRONG FANTASY
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Try to get this through your head too. It is *not* necessary to
belittle others, have a pissing contest with others, or put others
down in a derogatory fashion in order to build yourself up.
Indeed.
Try to get this through your head. I am
On Jan 16, 2010, at 8:43 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Try to get this through your head too. It is *not* necessary to
belittle others, have a pissing contest with others, or put others
down in a derogatory fashion in order to build yourself up.
On Fri, Jan 15, 2010 at 1:44 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
Kathy may make mistakes, but I'd be astonished to find her lying.
she's pretty partisan (as am i), now i don't even remember what she said
that i found so hard to believe.
Really!!?? Since I've never
On Jan 15, 2010, at 9:47 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Jan 15, 2010 at 1:44 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
Kathy may make mistakes, but I'd be astonished to find her lying.
she's pretty partisan (as am i), now i don't even remember what
she said
that i found
Oh. OK. I thought you were using the word partisan in the typical
sense of political party adherent which I am not.
OK. I agree that I am a strong adherent of voting rights so naturally
oppose IRV/STV as removing the rights of voters to participate in the
final decision-making process, removing
At 10:51 PM 1/14/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 7:17 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Again, as I mentioned, the Condorcet Criterion looks good, it's
intuitively satisfying. Unfortunately, it depends on pure rank
order, neglecting preference strength.
Just for the record:
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:46 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and
proponents of election reform
Message: 3
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 22:05:58 -0500
From: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
To: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:46 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Imagine sending all your ballots nationwide to DC for manual counting
to check the outcome of a Presidential election. We'll simply let the
GW administration, for instance, count the results in his own IRV
election!
That's something of a non
On Jan 15, 2010, at 11:34 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 15, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Imagine sending all your ballots nationwide to DC for manual counting
to check the outcome of a Presidential election. We'll simply let the
GW administration, for instance, count the results
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 22:24:53 -0500
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
To: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com, EM Methods
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
At 02:14 AM 1/13/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
IRV/STV is fundamentally unfair because a
On Jan 14, 2010, at 11:03 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 22:24:53 -0500
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
To: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com, EM Methods
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
At 02:14 AM 1/13/2010, robert bristow-johnson
On Jan 13, 2010, at 8:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 5:02 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 7:57 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This seems to me to be a claim that is at best not self-evident
(in the sense that Pareto or anti-dictatorship, say, are).
On Jan 14, 2010, at 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
do you mean their 2nd choice is not counted because their first choice loses
in the final round? that goes without saying, but that's the dumb IRV rules.
that is an *arbitrary* threshold imposed upon IRV, that 1st choices count
On Jan 13, 2010, at 3:15 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:30 AM 1/13/2010, Terry Bouricius wrote:
It has been argued that IRV tends to reduce negative campaigning,
or makes
campaigns overly bland (depending on your stance), because in
addition to
seeking first choices, candidates
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I'm glad to hear you don't support IRV/STV methods.
There are several scenarios where voters' marked 2nd choices are never
counted, even when their first choice loses,
if their 1st choice loses at
...@audioimagination.com
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 1:17 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I'm glad to hear you don't support IRV/STV methods
Dave Ketchum wrote (9 Jan 2010):
For a quick look at IRV: 35A, 33BC, 32C
A wins for being liked a bit better than B - 3533.
That C is liked better than A is too trivial for IRV to notice - 6535.
Let one BC voter change to C and C would win over A - 6535.
Let a couple BC voters switch to A
On Jan 14, 2010, at 1:12 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
We know that we can't have a system with all the properties that we
might independently desire. Consequently, we compare systems
overall, looking not just at their list of properties met and
unmet, but at the implications for voter
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