Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Good Morning, JQ re: ... I do not think that you can ... conclude that any method which does not reach all those goals (i.e., all voters being able to participate in meaningful fashion) is thereby useless. In fact, I think that such imperfect methods are necessary stepping stones to your vision.) I agree. At the same time, it's important to keep the goal in sight. It's too easy to fall into the trap of becoming so absorbed with the minutiae of methods that the purpose of the process is obscured. One guard against this eventuality is to include in Fobes 'Declaration' the principle that electoral methods are designed to afford the electorate meaningful participation in the electoral process. Last week I suggested identification of principles as a prelude to creating the declaration, in the hope the members would include such a principle. Do you think it worth considering that there are attempts to establish democratic regimes going on at several places in the world? Would it not be proper to discuss the flaws we've experienced in the party-based model openly and in considerable depth so those struggling with embryonic systems can avoid them? Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Thanks for the link to Rousseau, Mike. I haven't read it, but need to. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Good Afternoon, Mr. Quinn On Mon, 29 Aug 2011 @ 07:25:31 you cited a portion of Michael Allan's Sun, 28 Aug 2011 @ 23:24:48 post to me, to wit: ... But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list. and offered this comment: I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a supposedly-proven, but still- debated claim. Current events on this list should make the point adequately: Richard Fobes proposed a 'Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts'. Everyone on the list can participate in honing the declaration, to the full extent of their desire and ability. That's the democratic approach. If, instead, groups of elites proposed versions of the declaration and told list members to choose between them, that would be profoundly undemocratic. That's the party-based approach. I believe (and I think Michael shares this view) an electoral method that embodies the concept of the former, giving every member of the electorate an opportunity to participate in the electoral process to the full extent of their desire and ability, is possible, practical and necessary. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
2011/8/31 Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net Good Afternoon, Mr. Quinn On Mon, 29 Aug 2011 @ 07:25:31 you cited a portion of Michael Allan's Sun, 28 Aug 2011 @ 23:24:48 post to me, to wit: ... But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list. and offered this comment: I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a supposedly-proven, but still- debated claim. Current events on this list should make the point adequately: Richard Fobes proposed a 'Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts'. Everyone on the list can participate in honing the declaration, to the full extent of their desire and ability. That's the democratic approach. If, instead, groups of elites proposed versions of the declaration and told list members to choose between them, that would be profoundly undemocratic. That's the party-based approach. I believe (and I think Michael shares this view) an electoral method that embodies the concept of the former, giving every member of the electorate an opportunity to participate in the electoral process to the full extent of their desire and ability, is possible, practical and necessary. First, thank you for responding, I finally understand what you are getting at. Second, I agree. But I do not think that you can thereby conclude that any method which does not reach all those goals is thereby useless. In fact, I think that such imperfect methods are necessary stepping stones to your vision. JQ Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
(Resubmitting to the list as Michael Allan suggested :-) Michael Allan wrote: Warren Smith wrote: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Your proof is flawed, of course. It assumes the election method would allow one to change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. Such gross manipulations are not permitted by the rules of any election method. The rules grant to the voter a single vote, and that is all. I haven't been following the list all that closely of late because I have been busy with other things, therefore I'm replying here instead of to list. If you think my mail would be of use on list even given the time delay, just say so and I'll put it up there, too :-) Anyway, to prove that a single ballot can change the outcome of an election, it is sufficient to find a single example where this is the case. Such a case is easy to construct for most methods. For instance, this will do in every method that passes Majority: 50: A B 50: B A which is a tie. Now add a single AB vote, or alter an BA vote to become AB, and A wins. Hence a single vote altered the outcome of the election. This can also be used to validate Warren's proof. Say that we have one set of ballots X_a, where A is the unique winner, and another set of ballots X_b, where A is not the unique winner. Then by permuting X_a into X_b one vote at a time, there will be a set of adjacent ballot sets (differing only by a single vote). Call these X_a', and X_a'', where X_a' has A as the unique winner, but X_a'' does not. Then if there was an election, and the submitted ballots just happened to form X_a', then the alteration or addition of a single ballot could turn X_a' into X_a'', and then that would prove that a single ballot could alter the outcome. You might say that these voting situations are very rare indeed, so that a single vote *most of the time* does not affect the outcome. However, most of the time is not the same thing as always. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Jameson, Jonathan and Fred, Jameson Quinn wrote: ...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not to assail its mathematical validity. I guess the critique is not aimed so much at the formal, mathematical validity of the method, as its actual validity in the real world. A method that strips the individual voter of power in the election is unfair, because it leaves her (or him) at the mercy of political forces that she is ill equipped to deal with. She ought to have a degree of influence over the course and outcome of the election. It is her right, and it is the responsibility of the election method above all to deliver on it. Not only is the individual voter placed at the mercy of forces over which she has little control, but society as a whole is compromised because of this. We can argue that the individual has important contributions to make to politics, ones that are sorely needed today. Those other actors who have taken her place on the political stage are not quite competent in that role. I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a supposedly-proven, but still-debated claim. I feel that the point (see above) is supported by the argument and discussion. Several list members have attempted to detect some trace of utility in the election method with regard to the individual voter. So far, nothing was detected save a 1 in 10,000 year event at which the vote count lands on a mathematical cusp and every single vote is suddenly pregnant with meaning. Obviously that is insufficient for real people in the real world. With nothing else to deflect the critique, I think the point must begin to stick. Jonathan Lundell wrote: The usual argument that I've seen is that the expected utility of casting a vote (the utility of the result you favor, however you might measure that, times the probability that your vote will be decisive) is so small (because the probability is small) that the cost of casting the vote outweighs its utility. The validity of the argument depends on the election, of course. In a small enough voting body, it's not true. OTOH, it's obviously true for a US presidential voter in California, who we can safely assert will never be decisive in a presidential election. ... Then too, people are naturally equipped to handle social interactions at small scales. At the very smallest, they don't even need a formal method. It's only at the larger scales where formalisms are indispensible that it becomes possible for people to fall through the cracks of a poorly designed method - or rather, one that's been outmoded and had its weaknesses exploited - and be left defenceless. ... (And yet voters cast presidential votes in California.) We know that many a voter is unsatisfied with demcocracy, and must suspect at times that she (or he) is being cheated of its promise. Maybe she points to politicians in the capital as the culprits, but rarely does she point to the electoral method that is her one and only connection with that democracy. Somehow she places trust in a narrow bridge that now appears to be unworthy of it. Fred Gohlke wrote: Your reference to the experts made me think of Will Durant's observations in the preface to the second edition of The Story of Philosophy[pp v, vi]: ... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture of the good, found its task of coordination too stupendous for its courage, ran away from all these battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of life. and ... The specialist put on blinders in order to shut out from his vision all the world but one little spot, to which he glued his nose. Perspective was lost. Facts replaced understanding; and knowledge, split into a thousand isolated fragments, no longer generated wisdom. Every science, and every branch of philosophy, developed a technical terminology intelligible only to its exclusive devotees; ... Let us hope we can find a tiny chink in this formidable armor so we can consider the purpose of Electoral Methods as well as the mechanics. I like those quotes :-) thank you for looking them up. They remind me of an analogy I once read (I couldn't find the source), that expert cultures and societal fragmentation are the wound of modernity, and that modernity, like the spear in Parsifal, is the only cure for it. Today we have 18th century electoral methods and 19th century mass parties. Together they seem to be robbing the individual of autonomous choice. Rousseau's opening argument in the Social Contract still rings true: Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Dave Ketchum wrote: NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and the voter's vote mattering. That notion of effect has several drawbacks: ...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not to assail its mathematical validity. ... But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list. I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a supposedly-proven, but still-debated claim. Jameson Quinn Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 29, 2011, at 6:25 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and the voter's vote mattering. That notion of effect has several drawbacks: ...all of which merely serve to minimize its practical importance, not to assail its mathematical validity. ... But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list. I've been trying to avoid entering this sub-thread, as I think it's mostly angels-on-pinheads stuff, but if you actually have a point, I suggest you make it, rather than portentiously musing on how it depends on a supposedly-proven, but still-debated claim. The usual argument that I've seen is that the expected utility of casting a vote (the utility of the result you favor, however you might measure that, times the probability that your vote will be decisive) is so small (because the probability is small) that the cost of casting the vote outweighs its utility. The validity of the argument depends on the election, of course. In a small enough voting body, it's not true. OTOH, it's obviously true for a US presidential voter in California, who we can safely assert will never be decisive in a presidential election. (And yet voters cast presidential votes in California.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
From: matt welland m...@kiatoa.com To: EM Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof) and a (new?) metric for voting systems Here in the US we have these things called polls which happen periodically prior to the real election. Other information sources might include attending political rallies and noticing the number of people attending, talking with friends and so forth. FYI, Virtually all U.S. opinion polls, including the ANES Michigan U academic polls adjust their samples (remove people from the sample) to adjust the samples to match US election results based on the unaudited, unchecked officially reported vote tallies. Thus, if US election results are being manipulated by any of the insiders who secretly secure and process US ballots or who secretly count US votes without any independent scrutiny or public oversight, then the opinion polls are biased and do not give any more of a true picture of US opinion than do the secretly processed and tallied US ballots, some of which are even secretly cast (DRE votes). We have very little, if any, reason to believe in the integrity and accuracy of any close election outcomes in the U.S. in the vast majority of US states, and for the same reasons, we should be skeptical of virtually all US opinion polls and the research based on them. There are many many ways to tamper undetectably with election outcomes in the US today, because there are no routine procedures in place to detect such tampering. Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts. Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Good Afternoon, Michael re: ... every voter has that right (to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote), but is forever cheated of it precisely because the election method grants no electoral power whatsoever to the voter, but instead renders his or her vote entirely meaningless in any practical sense. As you say, it is not worth a tinker's dam. But if we (this is my hope) can cogently demonstrate this failing to the experts in this list, especially in terms of the voting mechanisms they understand so well, then they will be more open to drawing the larger conclusions that seem so obvious to you and me, and I daresay others in this list. And my hope, as well. Your reference to the experts made me think of Will Durant's observations in the preface to the second edition of The Story of Philosophy[1]: ... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture of the good, found its task of coordination too stupendous for its courage, ran away from all these battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of life. and ... The specialist put on blinders in order to shut out from his vision all the world but one little spot, to which he glued his nose. Perspective was lost. Facts replaced understanding; and knowledge, split into a thousand isolated fragments, no longer generated wisdom. Every science, and every branch of philosophy, developed a technical terminology intelligible only to its exclusive devotees; ... Let us hope we can find a tiny chink in this formidable armor so we can consider the purpose of Electoral Methods as well as the mechanics. Fred Gohlke 1. pp v, vi, The Story of Philosophy, Will Durant Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Sat, 2011-08-27 at 16:22 -0400, Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? Dave Ketchum wrote: TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. Please relate this to an election. Take an election for a US state governor, for example. Suppose I am eligible to vote. I say my vote cannot possibly affect the outcome of the election. You say it can, under certain conditions. Under what conditions exactly? The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and pointless to discuss. If a barge can carry 10 tons of sand then of course at any point in time while loading the barge no single grain of sand matters, but will *you* get on that barge for a 300 mile journey across lake Superior if it is loaded with 10.1 tons of sand? Probably not. Votes in any election with millions of voters are like this, individually irrelevant, but very meaningful as an aggregate. If there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote then together you have a shot at influencing the outcome of the election with 20 thousand voters. For single winner elections in the US we need the simplest system that can force politicians to be accountable to aggregates of voters. Plurality voting creates a situation where the force on the candidates from these smaller groups is a small fraction of the natural or real force. In my opinion this is *the* key issue to fix at this point in history. I noticed something interesting in that some polling I heard reported on the radio for the Republican nominee candidate sounded like approval. It was reported as a per candidate vote (when asked, 20% of likely voters would vote for X). It really is a very natural way to vote and because it is *aggregates* that matter a single vote for each candidate is all that is needed to accurately articulate the will of the people. So back to meaning of a vote. Well, in approval, if N is the number of candidates and V the number of voters I guess you get a maximum of (N*1/N)/V worth of influence. With plurality you get (1/N)/V for influence so to really stretch the sand analogy, if you fill your barge with plurality sand your 10.1 tons of sand might actually only weigh one or two tons and you can sally forth on your 300 mile journey with nary a worry. A final analogy ... I remember a science fiction story (maybe a Harry Harrison book?) where a prison was constructed of a massive stone disc set in a stone recess. The cells were along the edge of the disk such that the prisoners could push on the outer stone wall but the gap was too small to escape. If enough prisoners pushed on that wall the disk would move a few centimeters. The only way out of the prison was to get the disk to make a full rotation where the cell was exposed to an exit. If on a particular day a prisoner didn't push on the wall you probably could not measure the reduction in distance moved that day. The individual vote (prisoner pushing on the wall) is irrelevant, but the aggregate is meaningful. This idea is so much a part of life it baffles me when people make the claim that their vote is meaningless. It is blindingly obvious to me that the only meaningful context for discussing a vote is as an aggregate and using thus you must use statistical notions. Note my critique of Warren's proof in the other sub-thread: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-August/028266.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Matt and Dave, Matt Welland wrote: The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and pointless to discuss. ... The individual vote itself is irrelevant? We know that the vote is the formal expression of what a person thinks in regard to an electoral issue. Do you mean: (a) What the person thinks is irrelevant in reality? Or, (b) What the person thinks is irrelevant to the election method? ... If a barge can carry 10 tons of sand then of course at any point in time while loading the barge no single grain of sand matters ... (But an election is not a barge and a voter is not a grain of sand to be shipped around in bulk, or otherwise manipulated. A voter is a person, and that makes all the difference.) ... but will *you* get on that barge for a 300 mile journey across lake Superior if it is loaded with 10.1 tons of sand? Probably not. Votes in any election with millions of voters are like this, individually irrelevant, but very meaningful as an aggregate. If there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote then together you have a shot at influencing the outcome of the election with 20 thousand voters. The election method cannot tell you, there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote. The election method exposes no vote dispositions until after the election. By then it is woefully late for any attempt at mutual understanding, or rational reflection. ... An individual's vote can have no useful effect on the outcome of the election, or on anything else in the objective world. Again it follows: (a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b). Dave Ketchum wrote: Agreed that a is not true though, as you point out, one voter, alone, changing a vote cannot be certain of changing the results. To be sure, the point is stronger: the voter can be certain of having no effect on the results whatsoever. I do not see you proving that b is true. Flawed requires the method failing to provide the results it promises. Well, an election method rarely makes explicit promises. We can only judge by people's expectations of it. Your's for instance. You had the expectation that an individual voter might have some influence over the outcome of the election, at least under certain conditions. Maybe you still do? (You gave examples, but I don't understand the jargon.) Warren Smith and Fred Gohlke had similar expectations. Warren began with the hope of attaching some meaning to an individual vote based on its contribution to the outcome. That turns out to be impossible because the contribution is zero. You, Warren and Fred are all experts in one capacity or another, yet each of you had expectations of the election method that it could not meet. What about the expectations of the voter? Suppose we explained the alternatives to her (or him): (a) What you think is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. She's going to pick (b). She expects her vote to matter in some small way. She expects it to *possibly* make a difference. These are reasonable expectations, and I think any election method that fails to meet them is flawed. Further, the flaw is deep and extensive. It may be working to systematically distort the results, even to the point of electing candidates who could not otherwise be elected. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 27, 2011, at 9:23 PM, Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election by creating a majority with your vote. What do nR and nD stand for? ANY topic for which voters can choose among two goals. Or, suppose a count of nPoor, 1Fair, and nGood and thus Fair being the median before you and a twin vote. If such twins vote Poor, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Poor. If such twins vote Good, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Good. This example speaks of two votes, but the rules grant me only one. I am interested in the effects of that vote, and any meaning we can derive from them. I say there is none. Ok, so you vote alone. To work with that, whenever median is not an integer, subtract .5 to make it an integer. If you vote Poor, that and total count go up by 1, median is unchanged and is now Poor. If you vote Good, that and total count go up by 1, median is unchanged and remains Fair. Note that single voters get no useful power in an election for governor, but a majority voting together do have the power (by combining their votes) to decide the election. I
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof) and a (new?) metric for voting systems
On Sun, 2011-08-28 at 04:32 -0400, Michael Allan wrote: Matt and Dave, Matt Welland wrote: The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and pointless to discuss. ... The individual vote itself is irrelevant? We know that the vote is the formal expression of what a person thinks in regard to an electoral issue. Do you mean: (a) What the person thinks is irrelevant in reality? Or, (b) What the person thinks is irrelevant to the election method? (c) Discussing the meaning of an individual vote is mostly pointless I vote for (c) ... If a barge can carry 10 tons of sand then of course at any point in time while loading the barge no single grain of sand matters ... (But an election is not a barge and a voter is not a grain of sand to be shipped around in bulk, or otherwise manipulated. A voter is a person, and that makes all the difference.) I didn't know that. Thanks for clarifying. ... but will *you* get on that barge for a 300 mile journey across lake Superior if it is loaded with 10.1 tons of sand? Probably not. Votes in any election with millions of voters are like this, individually irrelevant, but very meaningful as an aggregate. If there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote then together you have a shot at influencing the outcome of the election with 20 thousand voters. The election method cannot tell you, there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote. The election method exposes no vote dispositions until after the election. By then it is woefully late for any attempt at mutual understanding, or rational reflection. Here in the US we have these things called polls which happen periodically prior to the real election. Other information sources might include attending political rallies and noticing the number of people attending, talking with friends and so forth. With plurality the available information on how others will vote is essential for an election to be anything other than a farce. Is there a term for this voter values information? I think it is a good indicator on the usefulness of the election method. |Criticality of voter|complexity | Matt gives Method|values information |and burden | Rating of ... -- plurality | extreme | very low | extremely poor condorcet | low | extreme | poor range | low | high | ok approval | medium| very low | good asset | low | medium| ok IRV | extreme | high | extremely poor Hmmm, I think the other column this table needs is stability. For the discussion on what election system to advocate at this time I put very high weight on the complexity and burden column and medium weight on the voter values column. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 28, 2011, at 4:32 AM, Michael Allan wrote: Matt and Dave, Matt Welland wrote: The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant and pointless to discuss. ... The individual vote itself is irrelevant? We know that the vote is the formal expression of what a person thinks in regard to an electoral issue. Do you mean: (a) What the person thinks is irrelevant in reality? Or, (b) What the person thinks is irrelevant to the election method? ... If a barge can carry 10 tons of sand then of course at any point in time while loading the barge no single grain of sand matters ... (But an election is not a barge and a voter is not a grain of sand to be shipped around in bulk, or otherwise manipulated. A voter is a person, and that makes all the difference.) ... but will *you* get on that barge for a 300 mile journey across lake Superior if it is loaded with 10.1 tons of sand? Probably not. Votes in any election with millions of voters are like this, individually irrelevant, but very meaningful as an aggregate. If there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote then together you have a shot at influencing the outcome of the election with 20 thousand voters. The election method cannot tell you, there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote. The election method exposes no vote dispositions until after the election. By then it is woefully late for any attempt at mutual understanding, or rational reflection. Some methods do expose partial counts - especially when most have voted and some have not yet voted. If the final count is 99000D to 9R, the elected governor better understand that D opinions are too strong to dare ignoring such. ... An individual's vote can have no useful effect on the outcome of the election, or on anything else in the objective world. Again it follows: (a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b). Dave Ketchum wrote: Agreed that a is not true though, as you point out, one voter, alone, changing a vote cannot be certain of changing the results. To be sure, the point is stronger: the voter can be certain of having no effect on the results whatsoever. NOT true, for the vote, without the voter's vote, could be a tie - and the voter's vote mattering. I do not see you proving that b is true. Flawed requires the method failing to provide the results it promises. Well, an election method rarely makes explicit promises. We can only judge by people's expectations of it. Your's for instance. You had the expectation that an individual voter might have some influence over the outcome of the election, at least under certain conditions. Maybe you still do? (You gave examples, but I don't understand the jargon.) I still do not see a proof in your words. Warren Smith and Fred Gohlke had similar expectations. Warren began with the hope of attaching some meaning to an individual vote based on its contribution to the outcome. That turns out to be impossible because the contribution is zero. You, Warren and Fred are all experts in one capacity or another, yet each of you had expectations of the election method that it could not meet. What about the expectations of the voter? Suppose we explained the alternatives to her (or him): (a) What you think is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. She's going to pick (b). She expects her vote to matter in some small way. She expects it to *possibly* make a difference. These are reasonable expectations, and I think any election method that fails to meet them is flawed. Further, the flaw is deep and extensive. It may be working to systematically distort the results, even to the point of electing candidates who could not otherwise be elected. Huh? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 27, 2011, at 9:23 PM, Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election by creating a majority with your vote. What do nR and nD stand for? ANY topic for which voters can choose among two goals. Or, suppose a count of nPoor, 1Fair, and nGood and thus Fair being the median before you and a twin vote. If such twins vote Poor, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Poor. If such twins vote Good, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Good. This example speaks of two votes, but the rules grant me only one. I am interested in the effects of that vote, and any meaning we can derive from them. I say there is none. Ok, so you vote alone. To work with that, whenever median is not an integer, subtract .5 to make it
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
An example, due to Samuel Merrill (of Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill fame), simply normalizes the scores on each range ballot the same way that we convert a garden variety normal random variable into a standard one: i.e. on each ballot subtract the mean (of scores on that ballot) and divide by the standard deviation (of scores on that ballot). Once each ballot has been normalized in this way, elect the candidate with the greatest total of normalized scores (over all ballots). Let's call the above version of range voting Merrill's method. As I mentioned before it is strategy free in the zero information case. For the partial or complete info case we can make a double range version (as Warren calls it) using Merrill's method as method X, or more simply ... (1) Have the voters fill out two range ballots. (2) From the first set of range ballots (the potentially strategic ones) extract a candidate A using Merrill's method. (3) Also from the first set, find the Smith set, and the random ballot Smith probabilities. (4) Use the second set of range ballots to decide between the random ballot smith lottery and candidate A. (5) Elect A if more voters prefer A over random ballot Smith than vice versa. (6) Else elect the Smith candidate rated highest on a random ballot (from the first set). This method has the advantage of sincerity on both ballot sets under zero info conditions, and sincerity on the second set under any conditions. Furthermore it always elects from the Smith set when not electing the sincere range winner. It is monotone, clone free, satisfies the Condorcet Criterion, etc. Yes, it relies on chance to a small degree, but doesn't actually pick the winner by chance unless there is no Condorcet winner, and even then only when the expected utility of random Smith is greater than the utility of the (potentially strategic) range winner, which would be rare. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Sun, 2011-08-28 at 23:24 -0400, Michael Allan wrote: Matt, Dave and Fred, The meaning of an individual vote is mostly irrelevant ... The individual vote itself is irrelevant? We know that the vote is the formal expression of what a person thinks in regard to an electoral issue. Do you mean: (a) What the person thinks is irrelevant in reality? Or, (b) What the person thinks is irrelevant to the election method? Matt Welland wrote: (c) Discussing the meaning of an individual vote is mostly pointless I can understand why you might want to dodge the question. You've taken a position that is difficult to defend. Huh? Nothing to defend, if you continue to think that the meaning of an individual vote is worthy of analysis then more power to you. The (a) and (b) answers completely missed the point of my original statement so I added (c). The election method cannot tell you, there are ten thousand people who share your values and will vote as you vote ... Here in the US we have these things called polls which happen periodically prior to the real election. ... I know. Stuff happens outside of the election and beyond the reach of the formal method, even (sometimes) unexpected stuff that the original designers had no experience or understanding of. Maybe later we can say something about these. For now, if you agree, let's return to the topic and look at the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof). You claim that the vote has little meaning, and I claim it has none at all. In either case, I think we can show that the election method is consequently flawed. Once we recognize the flaw and understand its nature, then we can attempt to trace its consequences, including the work of the polsters. I did not say that a vote has little meaning, I said that it is meaningless to discuss the individual vote! Those are two vastly different things. In my original response I voiced the opinion that analyzing a vote in isolation is meaningless. Well, mostly meaningless. I then had some fun contradicting myself and went ahead and gave some simple mathematical meaning to a single vote and illustrated how approval gives the voter N times more voting power than plurality where N is the number of candidates. In my opinion your claim that an individual vote has no meaning is wrong and all one has to do is look at the real world to see that. What is interesting is that I think it may be possible to show the relative value of a vote for each system. Value of a vote per system: V=number of voters, N=number of candidates Plurality: 1/(N*V) Approval: 1/V Condorcet: 1/(2*V) Range: 1/V etc. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Warren Smith wrote: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Your proof is flawed, of course. It assumes the election method would allow one to change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. Such gross manipulations are not permitted by the rules of any election method. The rules grant to the voter a single vote, and that is all. The challenge is to describe how the use of that vote could affect the outcome of the election, or of anything else in the objective world. How exactly could it? You know that it cannot. Earlier you wrote, 'The only genuinely meaningful thing is who won the election?' I agree that matters. But if the election method grants to the individual voter no influence over that outcome, then either: a) What the voter thinks is of no importance; or b) The election method is flawed. We cannot dismiss both of these. One of them must be true. -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Warren Smith wrote: Michael Allan: The effect however of a single ballot is exactly zero. It cannot change the outcome of the election, or anything else in the objective world. --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Also, even in elections which can only be changed by changing a set of (more than one) ballot, ballots still derive meaning from that. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking endorse as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Michael Allan wrote: Warren Smith wrote: Kenneth Arrow has worried that range-voting-type score votes might have no or unclear-to-Arrow meaning. In contrast, he considers rank-ordering-style votes to have a clear meaning. Nic Tideman has also expressed similar worries in email, but now about the lack of meaning of an approval-style vote. In contrast, I think Tideman regards a plurality-style name one candidate then shut up vote as having a clear meaning. E.g. what does a score of 6.5 mean, as opposed to a score of 6.1, on some ballot? But the Bayesian view is: whether or not Arrow or Tideman or somebody has a more-or-less muddled mental notion of the meaning of a ballot, is irrelevant. The only genuinely meaningful thing is who won the election? All meaning of any ballot therefore derives purely from the rules for mathematically obtaining the election-winner from the ballots. The effect however of a single ballot is exactly zero. It cannot change the outcome of the election, or anything else in the objective world. We might attach such meaning to the voting system as a whole, but not to the individual vote. On the effects of an individual vote, see also: How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-April/thread.html#25803 http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-April/thread.html#25840 ... All this analysis really tells us is the Bayesian view is correct. And certainly that any dismissal of range- or approval-style voting on the grounds of their claimed inherent lack of meaning, is hogwash. From the vantage of the voter, however, the critique retains force. It impacts not only range/approval, but also the single bullet and ranked ballot. No such ballot has any effect on the election and its meaning is therefore called into question. Most of an individual's actions in life have *some* possibility of effect and we can attach meaning to this. I can take responsibility for my actions, for example, by weighing the consequences. I can discuss the rights and wrongs of the matter with others. But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. This is the best proposal so far since this takes us as far as offering commensurable ratings. Maybe we should add also voter specific weights to the different issues. Voters could start from the set of issues that the representative body or single representative covered during the last term. They could adjust those issues a bit to get a list of issues that are likely to emerge during the next term. That makes a list that is the same to all (and that makes the opinions therefore commensurable). Weighting makes the results more meaningful since to some voters some questions might be critical and others might be irrelevant. Without the weights the ratings might not reflect the preference order since we might have misbalance due to too many questions of one kind or due to questions of varying importance. In principle one could collect the opinions also indirectly by generating an explicit list of issues and asking voters to mark their opinion an weight on each issue. That list could be structured or allow voters to indicate the importance of each group of questions. It is however not obvious how the questions should be grouped. Grouping could also influence the results. It would be also difficult to the voter to estimate the level of overlap between different issues. In practice one may get equally good results by simply asking how much do you think you will agree with this candidate (from 100% to 0%). I'm repeating myself here, sorry, but... 1. Why isn't this replacing one ineffable candidate utility with n ineffable issue-agreement utilities (where each issue utility is the (signed) issue weight)? Maybe because the voter answers question how often do you agree instead of how strongly do you agree. Time and number of occurrences are commensurable but voters' interpretations of the chemical and physical reactions in their brain and heart are not (maybe one approach would be to use some instruments to measure brain and heart activity with some external device :-) ). With weights added the question continues ... and estimate the importance of those agreements. This is based purely on personal feelings as taken from the brain and heart, but that should not destroy commensurability since all the voters are still on the commensurable scale from 100% agreement to 0% agreement, and the voters are still supposed to answer question how often, if all issues would get the time that they deserve. The n issues could be all binary decisions, agree or disagree. In that case they are commensurable. If they are more complex, e.g. numeric decisions, then the voter must estimate the level of agreement somehow. Maybe the voter should decide on some hard limits to what is agreeable and then decide which candidates agree with him and which ones do not. Also numeric differences would do. This way we can (at least in principle) escape the non-commensurable strength of agreement questions. 2. One doesn't vote for a candidate strictly on predetermined issues. You don't know which issues will arise in the next 2-4-6-whatever years, and the work of an elected official (a president in particular, but also other offices) consists of more than voting on issues. Yes, but the set-up is the same for all voters. Voters will make wrong guesses on what will happen during the next term, but in principle they will all answer the same commensurable question and their answers will approximate this ideal. 3. What's an issue? Take the category of energy policy. Carbon tax? Trading credits? Nuclear energy (and its dozens of sub-issues)? Vehicle efficiency? Corn subsidies? Climate-change implications? Lots more, and not all orthogonal. Yes, all these. I addressed the orthogonality problem shortly by noting that the questions may overlap. When the voter estimates the weights he must also take into account the problems of overlapping. If the voter thinks there are two important questions, A and B, and there are three questions, A ok?, B ok? and B' ok?, then the voter should estimate the weights so that the answer there was only one B related question. The best way to do this is maybe just to ask the voter to give his best guess on the frequency of agreement with each candidate on questions that the voter considers important. Note that the answers would be commensurable even if the questions would overlap and not be orthogonal. That would just
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. This is the best proposal so far since this takes us as far as offering commensurable ratings. Maybe we should add also voter specific weights to the different issues. Voters could start from the set of issues that the representative body or single representative covered during the last term. They could adjust those issues a bit to get a list of issues that are likely to emerge during the next term. That makes a list that is the same to all (and that makes the opinions therefore commensurable). Weighting makes the results more meaningful since to some voters some questions might be critical and others might be irrelevant. Without the weights the ratings might not reflect the preference order since we might have misbalance due to too many questions of one kind or due to questions of varying importance. In principle one could collect the opinions also indirectly by generating an explicit list of issues and asking voters to mark their opinion an weight on each issue. That list could be structured or allow voters to indicate the importance of each group of questions. It is however not obvious how the questions should be grouped. Grouping could also influence the results. It would be also difficult to the voter to estimate the level of overlap between different issues. In practice one may get equally good results by simply asking how much do you think you will agree with this candidate (from 100% to 0%). I'm repeating myself here, sorry, but... 1. Why isn't this replacing one ineffable candidate utility with n ineffable issue-agreement utilities (where each issue utility is the (signed) issue weight)? Maybe because the voter answers question how often do you agree instead of how strongly do you agree. Time and number of occurrences are commensurable but voters' interpretations of the chemical and physical reactions in their brain and heart are not (maybe one approach would be to use some instruments to measure brain and heart activity with some external device :-) ). With weights added the question continues ... and estimate the importance of those agreements. This is based purely on personal feelings as taken from the brain and heart, but that should not destroy commensurability since all the voters are still on the commensurable scale from 100% agreement to 0% agreement, and the voters are still supposed to answer question how often, if all issues would get the time that they deserve. Set aside the question of the meaningfulness or commensurability of utilities. My point is that such a scheme merely changes the need for a voter to determine one utility (for the candidate) to determining n utilities (for n issues). And the issues we care about tend not to be simple. The n issues could be all binary decisions, agree or disagree. In that case they are commensurable. If they are more complex, e.g. numeric decisions, then the voter must estimate the level of agreement somehow. Maybe the voter should decide on some hard limits to what is agreeable and then decide which candidates agree with him and which ones do not. Also numeric differences would do. This way we can (at least in principle) escape the non-commensurable strength of agreement questions. 2. One doesn't vote for a candidate strictly on predetermined issues. You don't know which issues will arise in the next 2-4-6-whatever years, and the work of an elected official (a president in particular, but also other offices) consists of more than voting on issues. Yes, but the set-up is the same for all voters. Voters will make wrong guesses on what will happen during the next term, but in principle they will all answer the same commensurable question and their answers will approximate this ideal. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On 27.8.2011, at 17.38, Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 27, 2011, at 12:25 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 27.8.2011, at 2.13, Jonathan Lundell wrote: On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. This is the best proposal so far since this takes us as far as offering commensurable ratings. Maybe we should add also voter specific weights to the different issues. Voters could start from the set of issues that the representative body or single representative covered during the last term. They could adjust those issues a bit to get a list of issues that are likely to emerge during the next term. That makes a list that is the same to all (and that makes the opinions therefore commensurable). Weighting makes the results more meaningful since to some voters some questions might be critical and others might be irrelevant. Without the weights the ratings might not reflect the preference order since we might have misbalance due to too many questions of one kind or due to questions of varying importance. In principle one could collect the opinions also indirectly by generating an explicit list of issues and asking voters to mark their opinion an weight on each issue. That list could be structured or allow voters to indicate the importance of each group of questions. It is however not obvious how the questions should be grouped. Grouping could also influence the results. It would be also difficult to the voter to estimate the level of overlap between different issues. In practice one may get equally good results by simply asking how much do you think you will agree with this candidate (from 100% to 0%). I'm repeating myself here, sorry, but... 1. Why isn't this replacing one ineffable candidate utility with n ineffable issue-agreement utilities (where each issue utility is the (signed) issue weight)? Maybe because the voter answers question how often do you agree instead of how strongly do you agree. Time and number of occurrences are commensurable but voters' interpretations of the chemical and physical reactions in their brain and heart are not (maybe one approach would be to use some instruments to measure brain and heart activity with some external device :-) ). With weights added the question continues ... and estimate the importance of those agreements. This is based purely on personal feelings as taken from the brain and heart, but that should not destroy commensurability since all the voters are still on the commensurable scale from 100% agreement to 0% agreement, and the voters are still supposed to answer question how often, if all issues would get the time that they deserve. Set aside the question of the meaningfulness or commensurability of utilities. My point is that such a scheme merely changes the need for a voter to determine one utility (for the candidate) to determining n utilities (for n issues). And the issues we care about tend not to be simple. I attempted to create a scenario where we do not try to measure utilities (= strength of personal feelings) but use some other units that can be measured (= same scale for all). In this case the unit of measure was the number of agreements of some given set of issues (taken from fsimmons' mail). If we use fsimmons' original scenario to compare voter opinions and candidate opinions using a fixed set of binary decisions, then the strength of feelings plays no role. We measure only if the voter agrees with some candidate. That should be commensurable. If we add weights, and consider also overlaps (/ non-orthogonality / grouping) of the issues, and if we have also other than binary decisions, we have to be careful not to include any strength of preference style measurements into the ballots. I hope my explanation managed to stay on the non-utility side also here. I tried to cover the problem of dividing one question to n smaller questions (whose answers might contain utility strength information) in the paragraph below. I hope the answers to the n smaller issues were not utility based, nor the way they are summed up (using weights and overlap estimates). My claim was thus that although I used weights that are based on personal feelings, the end result (= ratings of the ballots) would still measure the number of agreements rather than the strength of personal preferences. Let's take one of the small decisions. It could be a binary question on if we should have a new law L. Voters and candidates either agree or not. Every candidate gets
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? Dave Ketchum wrote: TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. Please relate this to an election. Take an election for a US state governor, for example. Suppose I am eligible to vote. I say my vote cannot possibly affect the outcome of the election. You say it can, under certain conditions. Under what conditions exactly? Note my critique of Warren's proof in the other sub-thread: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-August/028266.html -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Dave Ketchum wrote: A SAD weakness about what is being said. On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. To which Warren Smith responded: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. BUT there could be many previous ballots of which none made any change. Since, as stated, A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. and This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes., why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Truly no reason PROVIDED the new method provides the same result, given the same input. Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 27, 2011, at 4:22 PM, Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? Dave Ketchum wrote: TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. Please relate this to an election. Take an election for a US state governor, for example. Suppose I am eligible to vote. I say my vote cannot possibly affect the outcome of the election. You say it can, under certain conditions. Under what conditions exactly? Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election by creating a majority with your vote. Or, suppose a count of nPoor, 1Fair, and nGood and thus Fair being the median before you and a twin vote. If such twins vote Poor, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Poor. If such twins vote Good, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Good. Note that single voters get no useful power in an election for governor, but a majority voting together do have the power (by combining their votes) to decide the election. Dave Ketchum Note my critique of Warren's proof in the other sub-thread: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-August/028266.html -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Dave Ketchum wrote: A SAD weakness about what is being said. On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. To which Warren Smith responded: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. BUT there could be many previous ballots of which none made any change. Since, as stated, A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. and This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes., why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Truly no reason PROVIDED the new method provides the same result, given the same input. Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Dave Ketchum wrote: Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election by creating a majority with your vote. What do nR and nD stand for? Or, suppose a count of nPoor, 1Fair, and nGood and thus Fair being the median before you and a twin vote. If such twins vote Poor, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Poor. If such twins vote Good, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Good. This example speaks of two votes, but the rules grant me only one. I am interested in the effects of that vote, and any meaning we can derive from them. I say there is none. Note that single voters get no useful power in an election for governor, but a majority voting together do have the power (by combining their votes) to decide the election. I believe that is true for all elections that are conducted by conventional methods, regardless of the ballot used - Plurality, Range, Condorcet or Approval. An individual's vote can have no useful effect on the outcome of the election, or on anything else in the objective world. Again it follows: (a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b). -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ On Aug 27, 2011, at 4:22 PM, Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? Dave Ketchum wrote: TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. Please relate this to an election. Take an election for a US state governor, for example. Suppose I am eligible to vote. I say my vote cannot possibly affect the outcome of the election. You say it can, under certain conditions. Under what conditions exactly? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 27, 2011, at 9:23 PM, Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election by creating a majority with your vote. What do nR and nD stand for? ANY topic for which voters can choose among two goals. Or, suppose a count of nPoor, 1Fair, and nGood and thus Fair being the median before you and a twin vote. If such twins vote Poor, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Poor. If such twins vote Good, that and total count go up by 2, median goes up by 1 and is now Good. This example speaks of two votes, but the rules grant me only one. I am interested in the effects of that vote, and any meaning we can derive from them. I say there is none. Ok, so you vote alone. To work with that, whenever median is not an integer, subtract .5 to make it an integer. If you vote Poor, that and total count go up by 1, median is unchanged and is now Poor. If you vote Good, that and total count go up by 1, median is unchanged and remains Fair. Note that single voters get no useful power in an election for governor, but a majority voting together do have the power (by combining their votes) to decide the election. I believe that is true for all elections that are conducted by conventional methods, regardless of the ballot used - Plurality, Range, Condorcet or Approval. An individual's vote can have no useful effect on the outcome of the election, or on anything else in the objective world. Again it follows: (a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or (b) The election method is flawed. Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b). Agreed that a is not true though, as you point out, one voter, alone, changing a vote cannot be certain of changing the results. I do not see you proving that b is true. Flawed requires the method failing to provide the results it promises. Dave Ketchum -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ On Aug 27, 2011, at 4:22 PM, Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? Dave Ketchum wrote: TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. Please relate this to an election. Take an election for a US state governor, for example. Suppose I am eligible to vote. I say my vote cannot possibly affect the outcome of the election. You say it can, under certain conditions. Under what conditions exactly? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
After Kevin's and Kristopher's comments, which I agree with, I am hesitant to beat a dead horse, but I have two more things for the record that should not be overlooked: First, just as there are deterministic voting methods that elicit sincere ordinal ballots under zero information conditions, there are deterministic methods that elicit precise sincere utilities under zero information conditions. An example, due to Samuel Merrill (of Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill fame), simply normalizes the scores on each range ballot the same way that we convert a garden variety normal random variable into a standard one: i.e. on each ballot subtract the mean (of scores on that ballot) and divide by the standard deviation (of scores on that ballot). Once each ballot has been normalized in this way, elect the candidate with the greatest total of normalized scores (over all ballots). Second, I want to get at the heart of the incommensurability complaint: in most elections some voters will have a much greater stake in the outcome than others. For some it may be a life or death issue; if X is elected your friend's death sentence is commuted, if Y is elected he goes to the chair. Other voters may have only a mild interest in the outcome. How can this problem of incommensurability of stakes be addressed by election methods? Answer: it cannot be addressed by any method that satisfies the basic requirements of neutrality, anonymity, secret ballot, one-person-one-vote, etc. So this failure to provide for stark differences in stakes is not unique to Range. It applies to all decent voting methods. Having said that, Range has an option that is better than most methods that are based on ordinal ballots: give top rating to all candidates that might pardon or commute your friend's death sentence, and give bottom rating to all recent former governors of Texas and their ilk. - Original Message - From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm Date: Thursday, August 25, 2011 7:38 am Subject: Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof) To: fsimm...@pcc.edu Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Here's a link to Jobst's definitive posting on individual and social utility: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods- electorama.com/2007-February/019631.html Also, I would like to make another comment in support of Warren's thesis that cardinal range scores are as meaningful or more so than ordinal rankings: Consider that Borda is a method based on rankings. Do the rankings in Borda have the same meaning to the voter as the rankings in IRV do? From Arrow's point of view they do; the ballots are identical in format, and in either case (for a sincere vote) you simply rank A ahead of B if you prefer A over B. But now let's compare Borda with Range; Suppose that there are ten candidates and that the Range ballots ask you to rate them on a scale of zero to nine. On the Borda ballot you are asked to rank them from one to 10. Borda elects the candidate with the highest average rank (i.e. the lowest average rank number). Range elects the candidate with the highest average range score. Now, tell me why Arrow worries about the supposed incommensurable ratings on a scale of zero to 9, but sees no problem with the one to ten ranking scale? Doesn't that confuse the meaning of ranking (versus rating) in itself with the meaning of ranking, as interpreted by the system? I could make a ranked ballot system like IRV that would produce non-monotone results given the ranked ballots that are input to it -- but I could also make a rated ballot system, say the winner is the candidate with the greatest mode, that would also give non-monotone results (since if X is the candidate with greatest mode, rating X higher may lower his mode). Thus, if ratings and rankings are to have meaning, it would seem that this meaning would be independent of the system in question. Otherwise, the meaning would have to be considered with respect to the space of possible voting methods that could use the ballot type in question, and there would be very many outright weird voting methods on both ballot types. If, then, meaning is independent of the method, then Borda's internal workings (where it assigns a score to each ranking) doesn't mean that Borda makes use of a rated ballot, but simply that Borda acts *as if* the ranked ballot is a rated ballot. Because of this, it may produce counterintuitive outcomes (e.g. failing the majority criterion). For that matter, we know that every ranked ballot method can produce a counterintuitive outcome (if we consider determinism, unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA intuitive). However, in the independent-of-method point of view, that doesn't make the ranked ballot itself ill-defined. To use an analogy, say you
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 26, 2011, at 12:07 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Second, I want to get at the heart of the incommensurability complaint: in most elections some voters will have a much greater stake in the outcome than others. For some it may be a life or death issue; if X is elected your friend's death sentence is commuted, if Y is elected he goes to the chair. Other voters may have only a mild interest in the outcome. How can this problem of incommensurability of stakes be addressed by election methods? Answer: it cannot be addressed by any method that satisfies the basic requirements of neutrality, anonymity, secret ballot, one-person-one-vote, etc. So this failure to provide for stark differences in stakes is not unique to Range. It applies to all decent voting methods. Having said that, Range has an option that is better than most methods that are based on ordinal ballots: give top rating to all candidates that might pardon or commute your friend's death sentence, and give bottom rating to all recent former governors of Texas and their ilk. ;-) (I think we could safely make that former and present.) I don't think that normalization (which I think we'll all agree is necessary--each voter has the same weight, no matter how apoplectic they are about the issues) addresses the commensurability problem (if that's even the right term for the cardinality problem). The question is more the meaning of the internal scale: what does half the utility mean, etc? Warren (IIRC, and I paraphrase anyway) that we can only interpret the meaning of a cast ballot as its function in the vote count (meaning is use). I agree. The name approval is unfortunate, since it suggests that a proper instruction would be vote for the candidates you approve. But that's a suggestion for a voting strategy. The proper instruction is more like: vote for one or more candidates; the candidate with the most votes wins. Setting aside non-deterministic methods (reluctantly), isn't something like the same thing true of cardinal rating methods? A voter might try to come up with a utility score (however she might manage that), but that's only one of many possible voting strategies. Moreover, suppose in 2012 we have Obama vs Bachmann vs Paul (somebody decided on a third-party run). A diehard Bachmann supporter will surely rate Bachmann 100, Obama 0, and Paul somewhere in between, and that would be strategically rational, even optimum. But on what possible utility scale does the election of any semi-plausible presidential candidate have infinitely more utility than another? Whatever these numbers are, they're not utility in any conventional sense. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. This is the best proposal so far since this takes us as far as offering commensurable ratings. Maybe we should add also voter specific weights to the different issues. Voters could start from the set of issues that the representative body or single representative covered during the last term. They could adjust those issues a bit to get a list of issues that are likely to emerge during the next term. That makes a list that is the same to all (and that makes the opinions therefore commensurable). Weighting makes the results more meaningful since to some voters some questions might be critical and others might be irrelevant. Without the weights the ratings might not reflect the preference order since we might have misbalance due to too many questions of one kind or due to questions of varying importance. In principle one could collect the opinions also indirectly by generating an explicit list of issues and asking voters to mark their opinion an weight on each issue. That list could be structured or allow voters to indicate the importance of each group of questions. It is however not obvious how the questions should be grouped. Grouping could also influence the results. It would be also difficult to the voter to estimate the level of overlap between different issues. In practice one may get equally good results by simply asking how much do you think you will agree with this candidate (from 100% to 0%). A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. That is one of the most informative and well written mails of the EM list. For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss decides between Y and Z, then (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. The lottery approach is not as good as the issue agreement approach. The issue agreement approach can set clear fixed points in the scale, 100% agreement and 0% agreement, which makes it commensurable. The lottery approach (at least by default) also compares voter utilities, while the issue agreement approach need not (the utility of a 50% agreed candidate need not be half way between the 100% and 0% agreed candidates). Use of utilities makes the lottery approach non-commensurable, if we assume that individual utilities can not be compared as numbers in this way. Percentage of agreements on the other hand is more like a technical fact (has same scale for all voters). And one can add also personal weights to that without making it non-commensurable. The proportion of agreed (weighted) issues does not give us voter utilities yet. Some voters might care less about the election results than some others. But on the other hand often we don't want to use utilities (= personal strength of preference) in the elections. We rather think that one (wo)man should have on vote. The vote of rich and poor voters should have the same weight. And in the same way the opinion of a voter who says this is just my opinion should maybe have the same weight as the opinion of a voter who says do as I tell you to do. (Anyway, all I'm seeking here is commensurable ratings, not commensurability of personal utilities.) In the agreed issues approach we thus have votes that are normalized so that the votes of different voters are commensurable. This is different from the more common normalization where the ratings of a ballot are rescaled so that they cover the whole scale from min to max value. The latter normalization depends on what kind of candidates there are, the former one does not. Do you all agree that ratings can be commensurable? It is of course another question how to get those ratings for some method in a competitive election (and how to derive opinions of the societies from those sincere commensurable ratings). Note btw also that if we want the outcome to be the utility of each candidate to the society (and elect the one with highest utility), it is not necessary to derive those utilities from the utilities of individual voters. We might as well take a shortcut and derive the society utility from something else, like the issue agreement values. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 26, 2011, at 1:17 PM, Juho Laatu wrote: On 24.8.2011, at 2.07, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. This is the best proposal so far since this takes us as far as offering commensurable ratings. Maybe we should add also voter specific weights to the different issues. Voters could start from the set of issues that the representative body or single representative covered during the last term. They could adjust those issues a bit to get a list of issues that are likely to emerge during the next term. That makes a list that is the same to all (and that makes the opinions therefore commensurable). Weighting makes the results more meaningful since to some voters some questions might be critical and others might be irrelevant. Without the weights the ratings might not reflect the preference order since we might have misbalance due to too many questions of one kind or due to questions of varying importance. In principle one could collect the opinions also indirectly by generating an explicit list of issues and asking voters to mark their opinion an weight on each issue. That list could be structured or allow voters to indicate the importance of each group of questions. It is however not obvious how the questions should be grouped. Grouping could also influence the results. It would be also difficult to the voter to estimate the level of overlap between different issues. In practice one may get equally good results by simply asking how much do you think you will agree with this candidate (from 100% to 0%). I'm repeating myself here, sorry, but... 1. Why isn't this replacing one ineffable candidate utility with n ineffable issue-agreement utilities (where each issue utility is the (signed) issue weight)? 2. One doesn't vote for a candidate strictly on predetermined issues. You don't know which issues will arise in the next 2-4-6-whatever years, and the work of an elected official (a president in particular, but also other offices) consists of more than voting on issues. 3. What's an issue? Take the category of energy policy. Carbon tax? Trading credits? Nuclear energy (and its dozens of sub-issues)? Vehicle efficiency? Corn subsidies? Climate-change implications? Lots more, and not all orthogonal. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Here's a link to Jobst's definitive posting on individual and social utility: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019631.html Also, I would like to make another comment in support of Warren's thesis that cardinal range scores are as meaningful or more so than ordinal rankings: Consider that Borda is a method based on rankings. Do the rankings in Borda have the same meaning to the voter as the rankings in IRV do? From Arrow's point of view they do; the ballots are identical in format, and in either case (for a sincere vote) you simply rank A ahead of B if you prefer A over B. But now let's compare Borda with Range; Suppose that there are ten candidates and that the Range ballots ask you to rate them on a scale of zero to nine. On the Borda ballot you are asked to rank them from one to 10. Borda elects the candidate with the highest average rank (i.e. the lowest average rank number). Range elects the candidate with the highest average range score. Now, tell me why Arrow worries about the supposed incommensurable ratings on a scale of zero to 9, but sees no problem with the one to ten ranking scale? Doesn't that confuse the meaning of ranking (versus rating) in itself with the meaning of ranking, as interpreted by the system? I could make a ranked ballot system like IRV that would produce non-monotone results given the ranked ballots that are input to it -- but I could also make a rated ballot system, say the winner is the candidate with the greatest mode, that would also give non-monotone results (since if X is the candidate with greatest mode, rating X higher may lower his mode). Thus, if ratings and rankings are to have meaning, it would seem that this meaning would be independent of the system in question. Otherwise, the meaning would have to be considered with respect to the space of possible voting methods that could use the ballot type in question, and there would be very many outright weird voting methods on both ballot types. If, then, meaning is independent of the method, then Borda's internal workings (where it assigns a score to each ranking) doesn't mean that Borda makes use of a rated ballot, but simply that Borda acts *as if* the ranked ballot is a rated ballot. Because of this, it may produce counterintuitive outcomes (e.g. failing the majority criterion). For that matter, we know that every ranked ballot method can produce a counterintuitive outcome (if we consider determinism, unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA intuitive). However, in the independent-of-method point of view, that doesn't make the ranked ballot itself ill-defined. To use an analogy, say you could instruct a robot either by giving somewhat general commands (ranking), or by explicitly programming it (rating). Now, if you were to find a theorem that there's no way to construct the robot so that it never misunderstands any of your commands, then that doesn't mean that the concept of a general command is without meaning. It just means that there are hard limits to the robot's understanding. Of course, one could then argue what the meaning of a ranked ballot is. I think this is easy enough: a ranked ballot is a compact representation of a combination of preferences (prefers A to B, B to C, C to D, etc), so that the combination is transitive. (Using that definition, one could even design a strategy-free method where voters are encouraged to submit full rank orders as defined: the method would be random dictator but with a pre-stage that removes a random subset of the candidates. That method would be nondeterministic and not that good in practice, though.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. --(2) I agree that it is difficult to measure utilities commensurably across voters. However, range voting and double range voting do not do so, and do not claim to do so. What IS commensurable across voters, are the scores voters give to candidates (since those by the rules of the voting system lie within fixed bounds). Double range voting will extract honest utilities from each voter, but not commensurably, i.e. with different and not-known scaling factors for each voter. As a result, neither range voting, nor double range voting, are perfect regret-free voting systems, and they were never claimed to be. What I am claiming, is that a double range voting ballot (honest part) has a MEANING. It has a very definite, very unique, very clear, meaning, which due to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is clearer than the meaning of ballots in any (rank-order, deterministic) voting system Arrow ever considered in his life. NO such rank-order system exists or ever can exist, in which meaning is as clear as in double range voting. Therefore, Arrow's meaning-based argument against score-type and in favor of rank-order-type ballots, is busted and has no validity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? To which Warren Smith responded: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Since, as stated, A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. and This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes., why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
A SAD weakness about what is being said. On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Michael Allan wrote: But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? TRULY, this demonstrates lack of understanding of cause and effect. IF the flask capacity is 32 oz then pouring in 1 oz will: . Do nothing above filling if the flask starts with less than 31 oz. . Cause overflow if flask already full. In voting there is often a limit at which time one more would have an effect. If the act were pouring sodas into the Atlantic the limit would be far away. To which Warren Smith responded: --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. BUT there could be many previous ballots of which none made any change. Since, as stated, A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. and This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes., why would a voter prefer a new electoral method over the existing plurality method? From the voter's perspective, (s)he is already familiar with plurality, so , if the new method produces the same result, why change? Truly no reason PROVIDED the new method provides the same result, given the same input. Cui bono? Obviously, not the voter. When considering the 'meaning' of a vote, it is more important to examine the question of what the voter is voting for or against. Voting, of the type used in plurality contests, is profoundly undemocratic, not because of the vote-counting method, but because the people can only vote for or against candidates and issues chosen by those who control the political parties - the people Robert Michels' described as oligarchs. If the object of changing the electoral method is to build a more just and democratic government, the proposed methods must give the people a way to influence the choice of candidates and the issues on which they vote. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? --(2) I agree that it is difficult to measure utilities commensurably across voters. However, range voting and double range voting do not do so, and do not claim to do so. What IS commensurable across voters, are the scores voters give to candidates (since those by the rules of the voting system lie within fixed bounds). Double range voting will extract honest utilities from each voter, but not commensurably, i.e. with different and not-known scaling factors for each voter. As a result, neither range voting, nor double range voting, are perfect regret-free voting systems, and they were never claimed to be. What I am claiming, is that a double range voting ballot (honest part) has a MEANING. It has a very definite, very unique, very clear, meaning, which due to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is clearer than the meaning of ballots in any (rank-order, deterministic) voting system Arrow ever considered in his life. NO such rank-order system exists or ever can exist, in which meaning is as clear as in double range voting. Therefore, Arrow's meaning-based argument against score-type and in favor of rank-order-type ballots, is busted and has no validity. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. And if the polls suggest that A B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. And if the polls suggest that A B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a meaning beyond rankings. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 6:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. And if the polls suggest that A B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a meaning beyond rankings. How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; what's my motivation to do otherwise? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Here's a link to Jobst's definitive posting on individual and social utility: http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-February/019631.html Also, I would like to make another comment in support of Warren's thesis that cardinal range scores are as meaningful or more so than ordinal rankings: Consider that Borda is a method based on rankings. Do the rankings in Borda have the same meaning to the voter as the rankings in IRV do? From Arrow's point of view they do; the ballots are identical in format, and in either case (for a sincere vote) you simply rank A ahead of B if you prefer A over B. But now let's compare Borda with Range; Suppose that there are ten candidates and that the Range ballots ask you to rate them on a scale of zero to nine. On the Borda ballot you are asked to rank them from one to 10. Borda elects the candidate with the highest average rank (i.e. the lowest average rank number). Range elects the candidate with the highest average range score. Now, tell me why Arrow worries about the supposed incommensurable ratings on a scale of zero to 9, but sees no problem with the one to ten ranking scale? Note that in this case a scoring challenged voter could rank the candidates, and then subtract their respective ranks from 10 to get evenly spaced range scores on the required scale. Thus 1 , 2, 3, 4, ... 9, 10 transform to 9, 8, 7, 6, ... 1, 0, respectively. [When Borda is counted, this transformation is part of the counting process; Borda elects the candidate with the largest Borda score.] If the scoring challenged voter doesn't like the evenly spaced aspect, there is nothing she can do about it in the ranking context, but in the range context she can adjust some of the ratings to reflect bigger and smaller gaps in preference. It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can relate to independent of the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that criterion slightly better than cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the operational meaning. But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, think of the example that Warren gave in which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that example it makes no difference (except for ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different range; some could use zero to 100, some negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish among the two finalist lotteries in the same way after any affine transformation of the scores. A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. His investigation led to the result that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various orders along with the standard real values that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective meaning for utilities, but in the context of voting, especially lottery methods, he can give you a precise objective meaning of the scores. For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss decides between Y and Z, then (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally assign scores to a set of alternatives. I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Hi, It seems to me all Warren is saying is that a more practical definition of meaning would be a practical one. Arrow doesn't care about whether the definition is practical, and as you'd then expect it doesn't happen to be all that practical. The Arrow/Tideman view doesn't even care what the election method is. With the minimal assumption of top = good you can aggregate the data on claimed relative preferences. When you have data that can't be interpreted even across two ballots (beyond they chose to vote like this), and it is proposed to use that data to pick the winner, that feels unpleasant. I'd be the first to say that every election method is basically just a game. But if it comes in a box with plastic pieces and a spinner, the electorate may not be willing to try it. The will of the people, and democratic legitimacy, is serious business. Everybody's right, basically. I'd note though that I've never seen a simulation or estimation of utility that attempted to incorporate any factor other than how happy people were with the winner. So even if we agree with the primacy of BR as an EM criterion, we don't really know what this advises us to do. Kevin Venzke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 24, 2011, at 8:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: : Lundell: Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING, described here: http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any voter who foolishly uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse election result in expectation. This was not an unwarranted leap, this was a new advance because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters. It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter? Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A B C. On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest? In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance. And if the polls suggest that A B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility? The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a meaning beyond rankings. How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; what's my motivation to do otherwise? Because there's a small chance that your (first honest range) vote actually will decide between a lottery of some chance of A or C and a certainty of B. If you haven't voted honestly, then that could make the wrong decision. And such decisions are all your honest ballot is ever used for, so there is no motivation to strategize with it. JQ That's always the case with strategic voting when we don't have perfect knowledge of the other votes. There's a larger chance (in this example) that a sincere vote will cause B to defeat A. The more I know about the state of other voters, the more motivation I have to vote insincerely. This is true, of course, of any manipulable voting rule. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Michael Allan: The effect however of a single ballot is exactly zero. It cannot change the outcome of the election, or anything else in the objective world. --no. A single ballot can change the outcome of an election. This is true in any election method which is capable of having at least two outcomes. Proof: simply change ballots one by one until the outcome changes. At the moment it changes, that single ballot changed an election outcome. QED. Also, even in elections which can only be changed by changing a set of (more than one) ballot, ballots still derive meaning from that. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking endorse as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 21, 2011, at 5:06 PM, Warren Smith wrote: Kenneth Arrow has worried that range-voting-type score votes might have no or unclear-to-Arrow meaning. In contrast, he considers rank-ordering-style votes to have a clear meaning. Nic Tideman has also expressed similar worries in email, but now about the lack of meaning of an approval-style vote. In contrast, I think Tideman regards a plurality-style name one candidate then shut up vote as having a clear meaning. E.g. what does a score of 6.5 mean, as opposed to a score of 6.1, on some ballot? But the Bayesian view is: whether or not Arrow or Tideman or somebody has a more-or-less muddled mental notion of the meaning of a ballot, is irrelevant. The only genuinely meaningful thing is who won the election? All meaning of any ballot therefore derives purely from the rules for mathematically obtaining the election-winner from the ballots. Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational meaning as a function of its use in determining a winner. But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters. For a simple example of how ballots have no inherent meaning without voting system rules, consider plurality and AntiPlurality voting in which the meanings of a name one candidate ballot are pretty much opposite (plurality: most-named candidate wins; AntiPlurality: least-named candidate wins). Let us now enquire more deeply about ballot meaning. In a non-monotone voting system like Instant Runoff, your vote ABC can cause A to lose, whereas your vote BCA would have caused A to win. Would Arrow be right if he said IRV is wonderful because ABC has a clear meaning? Or would a Bayesian be right in saying this example indicates the meaning Arrow had in mind, was not valid? Indeed the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem http://rangevoting.org/GibbSat.html shows that in essentially ANY rank-order ballot system and also in the plurality and AntiPlurality systems with name one candidate ballots -- i.e. exactly the systems Arrow Tideman thinks have meaning -- there ALWAYS exist elections in which some voter's vote of ABC will cause a worse election winner (for the ABC notion of better and worse) than some different dishonestly-ordered vote would have caused. (And with Plurality and AntiPlurality, dishonestly ranking your non-favorite candidate top or your really-not-worst candidate bottom, can be the only way for you to get an improved election result.) In such an election, what is the clear meaning of an ABC rank-order vote? Gibbard identified/invented exactly two rank-order ballot systems in which honest and strategic voting were the same thing (this required him to employ non-determinism), but stated that both of his systems were not good enough for practical use since they leave too much to chance. In contrast, consider the double range voting system invented by F.Simmons and Warren D. Smith http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html This system (or others of the Simmons class) ARE good enough for practical use if any rank-order system is (since it leaves only an arbitrarily small amount of the deciding to chance, and deviates from your favorite system in an arbitrarily small way). In this voting system, each ballot contains a part on which the voter is urged to provide her honest scores (on, say, an 0-to-9 range) for each candidate. In this system, ONLY voting on this ballot portion in a unique honest manner is strategically best. Any deviation from perfect honesty (or omision of information) is a strictly worse voting strategy. That is, if your expected utility if A wins is 6.5 and your expected utility for B winning is 6.1 on an 0-to-9 scale (defining the utility scale so you've rated the best available candidate 9 and the worst 0) then you MUST score A=6.5 and B=6.1 EXACTLY, otherwise you are guaranteed to get in expectation a worse-utility election result. So contrary to assertions by the likes of Arrow that utility is unmeasurable or that range votes lack meaning it seems to me that we have a very clear, totally unique, not changeable by one iota, meaning for the scores 6.5 and 6.1 deriving wholy from the procedure the voting system uses to determine the winner from the votes. This is wholy unlike EVERY allegedly-practical rank-order voting system. So Arrow, and Tideman (and anybody else) are simply wrong if they assert scoring-style votes are inherently less-meaningful than rank-ordering-style or name-one-candiate-style votes. So now Arrow might perhaps riposte that to HIM, deep in the recesses of his brain, rank-order votes have more meaning, even though every voting system he and his colleagues have ever considered for
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can relate to independent of the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that criterion slightly better than cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the operational meaning. But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, think of the example that Warren gave in which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that example it makes no difference (except for ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different range; some could use zero to 100, some negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish among the two finalist lotteries in the same way after any affine transformation of the scores. A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. His investigation led to the result that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various orders along with the standard real values that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective meaning for utilities, but in the context of voting, especially lottery methods, he can give you a precise objective meaning of the scores. For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss decides between Y and Z, then (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally assign scores to a set of alternatives. I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
On Aug 23, 2011, at 4:07 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: It seems to me that Arrow must want a unique generic meaning that people can relate to independent of the voting system. Perhaps he is right that ordinal information fits that criterion slightly better than cardinal information, but as Warren says, what really matters is the operational meaning. But back to a possible generic meaning of a score or cardinal rating: if you think that candidate X would vote like you on a random issue with probability p percent, then you could give candidate X a score that is p percent of the way between the lowest and highest possible range values. Note that this meaning is commensurable across the electorate. So would a score that reflects the difference in height between each candidate and the voter, but neither one is a plausible utility measure. And that's assuming that a voter actually knew not only what the candidate would be voting on, but in each case how he would vote. That in itself is a judgement that each voter (even voters with the same preferences) would make differently. Worse, each projected vote would have to be weighted by some (incommensurable) sense of how important each vote is to the voter (the utility of each vote). So now we've exploded the problem is coming up with a candidate utility to adding up a bunch of utilities of votes that we're guessing about years into the future. That seems worse than circular. And *that's* assuming that the list of votes is the utility measure we want. But that's not really plausible, either. Consider as an extreme case voting for US President, though something similar obtains for legislative candidates with respect to leadership, initiative, ability to persuade others, c. But set that aside, and return to my first point. You don't help the problem of candidate utility by converting it to a sum of vote utilities. Furthermore, with regard to commensurability of range scores, think of the example that Warren gave in which the optimum strategy is sincere range strategy; in that example it makes no difference (except for ease of counting) whether or not each voter uses a different range; some could use zero to 100, some negative 64 to positive 64, etc. A ballot will distinguish among the two finalist lotteries in the same way after any affine transformation of the scores. A few years ago Jobst gave a rather definitive discussion of this issue. His investigation led to the result that ideally the scores should allow infinitesimals of various orders along with the standard real values that we are used to. Jobst is skeptical about generic objective meaning for utilities, but in the context of voting, especially lottery methods, he can give you a precise objective meaning of the scores. For example, if you have a choice between alternative X or a coin toss to decide between Y and Z, and you don't care one whit whether or not X is chosen or the the coin toss decides between Y and Z, then (for you)objectively X has a utility value half way between Y and Z. A sequence of questions of this nature can help you rationally assign scores to a set of alternatives. I'll see if I can locate Jobst's results in the archives. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the meaning of a vote (or lack thereof)
Warren Smith wrote: Kenneth Arrow has worried that range-voting-type score votes might have no or unclear-to-Arrow meaning. In contrast, he considers rank-ordering-style votes to have a clear meaning. Nic Tideman has also expressed similar worries in email, but now about the lack of meaning of an approval-style vote. In contrast, I think Tideman regards a plurality-style name one candidate then shut up vote as having a clear meaning. E.g. what does a score of 6.5 mean, as opposed to a score of 6.1, on some ballot? ... But the Bayesian view is: whether or not Arrow or Tideman or somebody has a more-or-less muddled mental notion of the meaning of a ballot, is irrelevant. The only genuinely meaningful thing is who won the election? All meaning of any ballot therefore derives purely from the rules for mathematically obtaining the election-winner from the ballots. The effect however of a single ballot is exactly zero. It cannot change the outcome of the election, or anything else in the objective world. We might attach such meaning to the voting system as a whole, but not to the individual vote. On the effects of an individual vote, see also: How to fix the flawed Nash equilibrium concept for voting-theory purposes: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-April/thread.html#25803 http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2010-April/thread.html#25840 ... All this analysis really tells us is the Bayesian view is correct. And certainly that any dismissal of range- or approval-style voting on the grounds of their claimed inherent lack of meaning, is hogwash. From the vantage of the voter, however, the critique retains force. It impacts not only range/approval, but also the single bullet and ranked ballot. No such ballot has any effect on the election and its meaning is therefore called into question. Most of an individual's actions in life have *some* possibility of effect and we can attach meaning to this. I can take responsibility for my actions, for example, by weighing the consequences. I can discuss the rights and wrongs of the matter with others. But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree? -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 416-699-9528 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
