On 09 Oct 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
[your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in
only one place.
If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one
place (insofar as
On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:25, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno
I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M,
and of 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming
comp, the protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.
This begs the question.
You make a quote out of
On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:37, LizR wrote:
If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100%
probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places.
Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100%
probability to him splitting and observing all possible
On 10 Oct 2013, at 05:50, chris peck wrote:
Hi Liz
Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.
(Or then again, I won't...)
Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)
Then we can be certain that we are all the same person. We all comes
from the same
On 09 Oct 2013, at 22:02, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2013 12:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/8/2013 2:51 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 10:20:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 22:22, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2013 12:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 23:56, LizR wrote:
http://www.quantumdiaries.org/2013/10/08/and-the-2013-nobel-prize-in-physics-goes-to/
Today the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to François
Englert
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:30:16 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
On 10 October 2013 13:03, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:
wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 5:52:46 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
It's not that
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man,
Yes.
Thank you!
and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he
receives.
Not at all.
What do you mean not at all?!
On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the
only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They
don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an
experience
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I
don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I
may be missing something.
Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit
suggests) then this is actually impossible,
On 11 October 2013 11:37, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, October 10, 2013 4:32:54 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the
only natural things
On Thursday, October 10, 2013 6:53:18 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
On 11 October 2013 11:37, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:
wrote:
On Thursday, October 10, 2013 4:32:54 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
Unless a machine
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man.
I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual
I may be missing something.
Of course if
On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html
A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't
understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A mechanical
On 10 October 2013 12:25, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno
I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of
1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the
protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.
This begs the question. And the
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm
not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI
by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my
understanding of Deutsch's version of MWI, the reason for Born
On 10/10/2013 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H
man. I don't
see that you two really have
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these
universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a
binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some
branch-counting measure produces the
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