On 10/10/2013 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H
man. I don't
see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I
Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as
suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't
personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is
the way down - with the problems that causes (like the "ultraviolety
catastrophe") - and if it's digital at any level, this will work.
Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level. So the
couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum state
necessary. But I don't think this is the case. Tegmark, among others, has
that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum superpositions - so we can
assume that classical copying is enough, with at worst a little loss of
memory. It's interesting to consider though how accurate the copying would
be for Bruno's question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only
random 10% of the H man's memories?
That is the famous "substitution level". However, even if it did require the quantum
states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if we think the MWI is
correct we can still ask the same questions using the duplication that creates. E.g.
suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room and then we perform a quantum measurement, and
as a result we either send the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we
open one of two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we ask
him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I imagine, but we know
he ends up in both.
According to the paper I posted, even if we flipped a coin, the outcome would constitute a
quantum measurement. But as for knowing there's a duplication: Only if we know MWI, an
interpretation we made up, is true.
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