On 10 October 2013 12:25, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Bruno
>>> I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of
>>> 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the
>>> protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.
> This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in
> both your view and mine.
>>> P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first
>>> person) events.
> That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no
> person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment
> will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each
> Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in
> order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I
> think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation,
> but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the
> situation that is relevant.
> He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in
> Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies'
> are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same
> way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki
> than Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in
> time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other
> relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.
> It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of
> 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future
> Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your
> analysis violates the yes doctor axiom.
> This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked
> the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington
> and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the
> fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for
> Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt
> that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location.
> I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin
> to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by
> Hillary Greaves "Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic
> Multiverse". Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized
> setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just
> intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me
> confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion
> as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an
> analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and
> warrants more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been
> All the best
When I toss a coin, I expect to see either heads or tails but not
both, and in fact I see heads or tails but not both. In a multiverse,
versions of me will see both heads and tails. Should I therefore
conclude that I don't live in a multiverse?
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