# Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

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On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:25, chris peck wrote:```
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```Hi Bruno

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>> I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive.
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This begs the question.
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You make a quote out of the context.

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And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in both your view and mine.
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Good. So it is one that he stay alive, and so it can only be one halve that it will be W, or M. The copies are numerically identical, P(M) = P(W), and so 1/2 is the only solution.
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>> P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) events.
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That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno- Moscow, in the experiment will experience both simultaneously.
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OK.

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```But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each outcome.
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How could that ever be possible?
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"experience" is taken in the first person pint of view, and they can be only W, or M, not both. You need some telepathy, or you need another protocol.
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In the 3p view, you are right, but that was not the question asked.

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Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki.
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The 1p-indeterminacy is objective and has nothing to do with a feeling. It is obtained by a reasoning.
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I think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is relevant.
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Yes, indeed, that is what is revolutionary (forgetting the MWI). We are in a context where we have all the information, and yet cannot predict an elementary outcome. It shows that determinacy entails objective first person indeterminacies (objective because 3p- communicable). The same can be said for Everett QM, accepting to interpret a self- superposition as a sort of self-duplication, or self-differentiation.
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He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than Bruno-Moscow.
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All this made my point. I agree.

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That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.
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But there is still an objective indeterminacy. By reasoning alone, we can see that only "W V M, but I don't know which one" will always be confirmed, and anything more precise will be refuted by some copies.
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It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him.
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But that has to be the case from the future points of view. Like John Clark, you seem to pursue the thought experiment at the first person perspective after the duplication.
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```This is why I say your analysis violates the yes doctor axiom.
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?  (see just above).

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This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location.
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OK. The duplication is responsible for that ignorance. The helsinki man know that on advance, and so, knows in advance that he will not been abale to know his location before opening his eyes. You can add the principle that if I know in advance that I will be confronted to an uncertainty, then I am right now uncertain. In some lengthier explanation, I add principles like that, but they are confusing for most, so I delete such type of (too much obvious) principle.
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Ofcourse, apart from the fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location.
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I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary Greaves "Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse". Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.
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I prefer avoiding authoritative arguments. Yet, as you mention this, my PhD thesis has been peer-reviewed by three juries, and the scientific members of those juries have all declare not having seen any errors. Only literary continental philosophers have problems, but they refer explicitly to personal convictions, without any further ado. Some scientists seem to defend those philosophers for reason which seems to be academical solidarity (or worst, but that's beyond our topic). Anyway, it is preferable to get the point by oneself, and not rely on any authority, as we live in a lasting era where many people identify science with Aristotle theology.
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Best,

Bruno

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All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

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> How do you explain quantum mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds interpretation?
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Not very well, assigning probabilities is unquestionably the weakest part of the Many Worlds theory. True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum Mechanics works.
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So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.
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Brent

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