Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread meekerdb
On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent -

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread meekerdb
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist mailto:yann...@gmail.com>> wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree i

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread LizR
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: > > As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a > temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - > differentiation or whatever). > > But to say the split is tempora

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread meekerdb
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread LizR
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: > Liz, > > I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. > That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the

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2014-10-28 Thread meekerdb
On 10/28/2014 6:01 AM, Peter Sas wrote: Recently I readKant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) where he tries to base the basic concepts of physics on the transcendental categories and principles laid down in his Critique of Pure Reason. One of the most interesting parts, I fou

Re: "The Span of Infinity"

2014-10-28 Thread LizR
Well that WAS the point of my original post... : D On 29 October 2014 00:55, Peter Sas wrote: > Maybe 'spam of infinity' is a better term ;) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop re

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2014-10-28 Thread LizR
Balancing classical forces appears to require cancellation to infinite precision (which is one of the problems with "Tronnies"). Quantum theory fixes that by doing something akin to converting the maths from using real numbers to integers. On 29 October 2014 10:43, Russell Standish wrote: > On T

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2014-10-28 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 06:01:15AM -0700, Peter Sas wrote: > Recently I read Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) > where he tries to base the basic concepts of physics on the transcendental > categories and principles laid down in his Critique of Pure Reason. One of > the m

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Oct 2014, at 09:25, Peter Sas wrote: First my apologies to you and Brent for the mix up. I'm new to this wonderful forum, and the format still disorients me a bit... No problem. which is why the universe exists in the first place, that is, it is not nothing (= ontological differe

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. > Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was unreasonable. > My simple-minde

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR wrote: > The entire point of Bruno's "proof" and all of his bizarre thought >> experiments is to examine and get rid of that "semantic quibble", and yet >> from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already >> crystal clear even though

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread meekerdb
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he a

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:30, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Sent from AOL Mobile Mail Okay, I don't see how quantum mechanics can be wrong either? It was a fresh new paper that came out and it didn't seem to go against him WY such just a subtle interpretation difference. For me, p

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice, but I am afraid you might be conscious. It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where eve

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individua

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's "obvi

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2014-10-28 Thread Peter Sas
Sorry about that last line... I forgot to delete that... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post

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2014-10-28 Thread Peter Sas
Recently I read Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) where he tries to base the basic concepts of physics on the transcendental categories and principles laid down in his Critique of Pure Reason. One of the most interesting parts, I found, was the second chapter on 'dynamics

Re: "The Span of Infinity"

2014-10-28 Thread Peter Sas
Maybe 'spam of infinity' is a better term ;) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this gro

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread Richard Ruquist
Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this world the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world' and perhaps every possibility in between. So in the 3p view, all choices balance out. Bruno r

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

2014-10-28 Thread Peter Sas
First my apologies to you and Brent for the mix up. I'm new to this wonderful forum, and the format still disorients me a bit... which is why the universe exists in the first place, that is, it is not > nothing (= ontological difference). > > You wrote: That looks like a play with word, which d

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread LizR
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist wrote: > My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true > then my consciousness is an illusion, period > Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

2014-10-28 Thread LizR
On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR wrote: > > > So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've >> heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of >> an individual person. > > > The entire point o