Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-07-02 Thread Tom Caylor
Lee Corbin wrote: Tom writes The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal writes What I argued was that it would be easier to find the trace of a person's thoughts in a universe where he had a physically continuous record than where there were discontinuities (easier in the sense that a smaller program would suffice). In my framework, this means that the

RE: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. [LC] I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit : That's not contrary to my conception at all. I certainly do bet on the existence of others, and of chairs and tables and stars and electrons and myself, and all for the essentially the same reasons. OK. I don't understand the

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced doesn't rule it out of a scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can. OK, but we were discussing about theories. general relativity, as a theory does

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:59, James N Rose a écrit : Math and reductive science ignore and dis-consider collateral co-extancy. The comp assumption leads to the less reductive possible account of the person and person POVs. For example, comp does not guaranties *any* survival, but it

Re: Only Existence is necessary?

2006-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit : My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary? Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the rest of his diagonalization tricks to

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread jamikes
Hello, Quentin: we agree in spite of a different formulation: death - I wrote about it as a process in a concept, while I feel you refer to the 'death' of a 'person' or whatever, as a state. The person (or whatever) is a complex entity of its (his?) interconnected and self-reflective (yes, even

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread jamikes
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 3:34 PM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity John M wrote: ... Stathis wrote: ... I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world

Back to Existence: Physically Real vs. Platonic

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis wrote, Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger structure, but they do need

RE: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis also wrote in the same email, Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent wrote That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a world model. On the other hand, if we

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced doesn't rule it out of a scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can. OK, but we were discussing about theories. general

Re: Back to Existence: Physically Real vs. Platonic

2006-07-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Lee Corbin wrote: Stathis wrote, Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger structure,

Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-07-02 Thread James N Rose
Bruno, I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch OP-ponent and challenger to Godel's incompleteness theorems. In the way that they are structured - with the premises Godel preset, of initial boundaries for what he was about to design by 'proof' - his theorems are both

Re: Fermi Paradox and measure

2006-07-02 Thread Russell Standish
Large has a lot to do with old. Universes where conscious life arose by a lengthy evolutionary process will have larger measure (by vitue of simpler initial conditions) than do universes whose conscious life arises spontaneously, or by relatively short evolutionary processes. It is also