Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
...
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
future.
That's the whole
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
future.
That's the whole problem. I could just as easily
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the
Brent Meeker wrote:
It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given
some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of
the form It is true that axioms = theorems.
For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form.
Brent
This is a post I wrote yesterday, but apparently did not go through.
--
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
It could be a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
future.
That's the
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 7:21 PM
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote:
Discovery is not simply a matter of seeing where a particular set of
axioms and
1Z wrote:
The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict your own experience, but I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
future.
That's the whole
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in
1Z wrote:
...
And
surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally
1Z wrote:
Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
are not, it must be rejected.
I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad -
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
consciousness.
But the
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
Peter Jones writes:
I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
virtual
reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for
the sake
of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
experience do not
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