Brent Meeker writes:
> >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> >>> the
> >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> >>> future.
> >> That's the whole problem.
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > David and 1Z:
> > > > >
> > > > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> >
Brent Meeker wrote:
> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given
> some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of
> the form "It is true that axioms => theorems".
For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form.
> Brent
This is a post I wrote yesterday, but apparently did not go through.
--
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
>> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > > It co
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > >>> the
> > >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> > >>>
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 7:21 PM
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
>
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > Discovery is not simply a matter of seeing where a particular set of
> > axioms and rules of inference leads. i
1Z wrote:
> The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict your own experience, but I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> the
> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> futu
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > the
> > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
>
> Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
> this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
> cont
Tom Caylor wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent Meeker writes:
>>>
>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
>>> the
>>> future, then ipso facto you wou
1Z wrote:
...
>> And
>> surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
>> experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
>> intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
>> informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, coul
1Z wrote:
> Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> are not, it must be rejected.
I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad -
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> > are not, it must be rejected.
>
> I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not.
> The key aspect is
1Z wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
...
>>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
>>> the same consciousness.
>> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
>> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
>> consciousness.
>
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> ...
> >>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> >>> the same consciousness.
> >> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> >> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - ju
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>> David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
>> ...
> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are p
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
> > > > virtual
> > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for
> > > > the sake
> > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> >
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