Tom Caylor wrote: > Brent Meeker wrote: >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> Brent Meeker writes: >>> >>>>>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next >>>>>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the >>>>>>> future. >>>>>> That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP >>>>>> universe. But I never do. >>>>> Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from >>>>> now 2 copies >>>>> of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a >>>>> 2/3 chance >>>>> of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in >>>>> Washington. It is a >>>>> real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be >>>>> experienced than the >>>>> orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of >>>>> some of the >>>>> debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a >>>>> mathematical as opposed >>>>> to a physical multiverse. >>>> I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of >>>> the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're >>>> wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's >>>> possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM >>>> and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, >>>> may provide a natural measure favoring order. >>> What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, >>> physically instatiated? >>> My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP >>> problem, unless we say that >>> only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making "multiverse" narrower >>> than "all mathematically >>> consistent universes". I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not >>> mainstream physics, even >>> among those who accept the MWI. >> The MWI posits multiple worlds in which every evolution of the world >> consistent with quantum physics is realized - it's really just one Hilbert >> space and the "multiple" arises only because macroscopically different >> worlds are projected onto orthogonal subspaces. But it is assumed that >> evolution in this Hilbert space is due to one Hamiltonian with specific >> values of coupling constants etc. Tegmark's "all mathematically consistent" >> universes would seem to include a Newtonian universe, an Aristotelean >> universe, a Biblical universe, and in fact any universe that didn't include >> a flat contradiction, X and not-X. >> >> Brent Meeker > > The "set of all mathematically consistent universes", i.e. defined by > NOT(X and not-X), is very telling. A universe has to have some kind of > coordinate/reference system and/or language/units in order for a > property or predicate X to be able to be well-defined enough to define > not-X.

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No. All it needs is one proposition as an axiom and the ability to negate a proposition and to form the disjunction of two propositions. >But once that is done, and it is determined that not-X does not > hold, Under most rules of inference (not-X does not hold) => X. >then there exists a change to the coordinate system or language > that results in X and not-X. Most mathematical structures don't admit a coordinate system. I don't know what you mean by "a change of language" but I suspect it is not permitted by the rules of inference. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---