Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >>>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> >>>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in 
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the 
> >>>>> future.
> >>>> That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP
> >>>> universe. But I never do.
> >>> Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from 
> >>> now 2 copies
> >>> of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 
> >>> 2/3 chance
> >>> of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in 
> >>> Washington. It is a
> >>> real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be 
> >>> experienced than the
> >>> orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of 
> >>> some of the
> >>> debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a 
> >>> mathematical as opposed
> >>> to a physical multiverse.
> >> I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of 
> >> the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're 
> >> wrong.  There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's 
> >> possible to define one).  But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM 
> >> and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, 
> >> may provide a natural measure favoring order.
> >
> > What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, 
> > physically instatiated?
> > My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP 
> > problem, unless we say that
> > only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making "multiverse" narrower 
> > than "all mathematically
> > consistent universes". I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not 
> > mainstream physics, even
> > among those who accept the MWI.
>
> The MWI posits multiple worlds in which every evolution of the world 
> consistent with quantum physics is realized - it's really just one Hilbert 
> space and the "multiple" arises only because macroscopically different worlds 
> are projected onto orthogonal subspaces.  But it is assumed that evolution in 
> this Hilbert space is due to one Hamiltonian with specific values of coupling 
> constants etc.  Tegmark's "all mathematically consistent" universes would 
> seem to include a Newtonian universe, an Aristotelean universe, a Biblical 
> universe, and in fact any universe that didn't include a flat contradiction, 
> X and not-X.
>
> Brent Meeker

The "set of all mathematically consistent universes", i.e. defined by
NOT(X and not-X), is very telling.  A universe has to have some kind of
coordinate/reference system and/or language/units in order for a
property or predicate X to be able to be well-defined enough to define
not-X.  But once that is done, and it is determined that not-X does not
hold, then there exists a change to the coordinate system or language
that results in X and not-X.  This argues for the essentiality of the
definer.  Otherwise no X could exist at all.

Tom


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