Le 30-oct.-08, à 19:11, Michael Rosefield a écrit :
At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the
teleporter just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the
question, but it might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all
possibilities.
In which theory? What
Le 30-oct.-08, à 23:47, Kory Heath a écrit :
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication
Le 31-oct.-08, à 06:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 05:48:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Physical supervenience is the conjunction of the following
assumptions:
-There is a physical universe
-I am conscious (consciousness exists)
-(My) consciousness (at
Le 31-oct.-08, à 10:40, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the
probability remains invariant for that too. The probability remains
equal to
1/2 in the imperfect duplication
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I agree that a corpse can be considered as blind, deaf, amnesic and
paralytic. But a corpse does not vehiculate a person.
A blind, deaf, amnesic and paralytic is not necessarily a corpse. It
could vehiculate a person which, although blind, deaf,
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But there are many ways for what comes out of the teleporter to *not* be you.
Most of them are puddles of goo, but some of them are copies of Bruno or
imperfect copies of me or people who never existed before.
Suppose it's a copy of you as you were
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer that the
probability remains invariant for that too. The probability remains equal to
1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is the perfect one).
But of course you have to
On 31 Oct 2008, at 13:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I agree that a corpse can be considered as blind, deaf, amnesic and
paralytic. But a corpse does not vehiculate a person.
A blind, deaf, amnesic and paralytic is not necessarily a corpse. It
On 30 Oct 2008, at 23:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but that doesn't change
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the
Bruno, your explanations were closer to me than many lately and I found the
crucial point(s) in my not-understanding. Let me try to point to it as
incerted into your text by [JM: .] lines
John
On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 30 Oct 2008, at
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in
I'd love to make a serious comment at this point, but every one I can think
of involves I am Spartacus jokes. Sorry.
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL
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