Bruno, your explanations were closer to me than many lately and I found the crucial point(s) in my not-understanding. Let me try to point to it as incerted into your text by [JM: .....] lines John
On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On 30 Oct 2008, at 07:51, Kory Heath wrote: > > > > > > > On Oct 28, 2008, at 12:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Measure theory is the branch of math which has been invented to > >> tackle > >> those infinities, and those similarity relations. > > > > I don't know much about measure theory. I understand a bit about how > > it's supposed to tackle those infinities, but I don't understand how > > it relates to similarity relations. > * > OK, measure theory theory does not relate directly to the similarity > relations. This happens with the comp hyp through indiscernability > relations. But we cannot know our level, we can only make some empirical bets. > Strictly speaking the equivalence relation is not constructive. We don't > really can know who we are, and the probabilities cannot be defined > with certainty. [JM: similarity in my vocabulary is restricted to those select features we compare - extracted from those we know about at all. Identity I restrict to omniscient comparison only.] > If some probability calculus works well, empirically, it > would give evidences (not proof) for some level, and if QM can be > extracted from comp, this would mean that empirical quantum mechanics > would assess the idea that, roughly speaking, our level of > substitution is given by the position of our particles up to the > Heisenberg uncertainiy relations. The quantum indeterminacy would, in > that case directly results directly from the 1-person comp > indeterminacy, but we don't yet know this. That would be nice because > the empirical many-world (the empirical reasons for not believing in a > collapse of the wave packet) would comfort the fact that we share > histories (given that we can share the quantum indeterminacy). Quantum > Mechanics would really be a non-solipsistic first person *plural* > indeterminacy calculus, and physical reality as we know it today, > would really be the product of dream sharing. QM would comfort that we > belong to the same "matrix". > > > > > > What bearing does it have on the > > case when you make exactly two copies of a person, one which is exact > > and one which contains (say) roughly half of that person's memories, > > personality, or whatever? > > > To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember > the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow > (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type > of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a > priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six > (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do > assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you > have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice! > So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George > Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person > probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the > level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly, > and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own > substitution level. > > Now, your question could still make sense if you accept the idea that > there is only one person possible. We would all be the same person in > different context. With this you can predict that amnesia would be > lived as a remembering of your more correct identity. Unfortunately > record of amnesia by wounded person does not confirm this, except, > apparently for some drug induced amnesia, like the one provoked by the > use of the plant salvia divinorum (there are many reports available on > the net). So it looks like some type of amnesia (which belong to some > type of computation) could confirm "we are the same person", and in > that case, those amnesia would not change the probability rules. But > all this is much more speculative so I conjure you to take this with a > bit of a distance. Of course if you are lucky to belong to a country > where the consumption of salvia divinorum is authorized, you could > test it on yourself but read the manual before and be cautious. I have > tested it and I do find the effect very interesting for learning > things about identity and reality, but not to the point of having get > any definite conclusion. It certainly opens me to be more interested > in the amnesia phenomenon, and it makes me more open to the "only one > person" proposition, but it is not a sort of knowledge easily > sharable, except, well like consciousness, through sharing identical > brain transformation, which of course is very hazardous when they are > produce through the use of some chemicals (but still less hazardous > than using an hammer on your skull or getting a car accident). > > The day will come (not tomorrow) where we will bet on some effective > artificial brain, and this will lead to more systematic way to handle > such questions in much less hazardous way. The hazardous part will be > put entirely in the bet on our substitution level. > > To sum up my comment: probability of self-multiplication with loss of > memory depends most probably on the way such memories are deleted. > The fact that some drugs give a "remembering" feeling through amnesia > could be an evidence that Darwinian evolution (by itself very long > computations) has handled brain/identity recuperation mechanism, and > that we share a personal identity. Some mystic describes similar > experiences. > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
