Re: Is QTI false?
Brent, Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 03:06, meekerdb wrote: On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) Sure, the cul de sac is "avoided" by reaching the state of unconscious which is then consistent with with many more continuations. e.g. as a rock. I am not sure this makes sense. By definition a cul-de-sac world has no continuation. To be unconscious or dead (never more conscious) means no more experience at all (if that means something). The QTI is based on quantum theory of unitary evolution; not on the survival of memories or consciousness. Those are claimed to be consequences, so they must be justified from QM, not just promoted from conjecture to axiom. Assuming comp, QTI should be a particular case of Comp-TI. But this is complex to analyzed for the reason that we can survive ith amnesia, so that we can never be sure of who is the person who really survive. Comp and QM TI might end up trivial if there is only one person in the fundamental reality. Russell is right. The presence or non-presence of cul-de-sac is a question of points of view. Precisely we have that G* proves the equivalence of Bp and Bp & Dp. But the machine cannot see that equivalence. The modality Bp entails the existence of cul-de-sac world at each states, and Bp & Dp eliminates those end worlds. People have to go back to the semantic of G or of normal modal logic to see this. In a cul-de-sac world every statements are provable, but none are possible or consistent. With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Brent To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? Comp might certainly be false. But I am not sure I see your point here. There is an infinity of computational histories going through your state. The substrate (matter) is "made-of" that infinity of computations. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. I think that the Turing principle is contradictory with Church thesis. What we can do is to (re)define matter by adding the "& Dp" (= & ~D ~p) in each state. It is needed for defining the first person measure "one" in the case of the first person indeterminacy. matter and physics is a probability/credibil
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince wrote: > In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” > And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. > > It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear > to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many > discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single > biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being > false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - > which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out > to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. > > So is QTI false? > > Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests > the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious > mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby > that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an > appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. > (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) > > > To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a > critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form > of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby > requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another > consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person > dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, > there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking > Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness > – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. > > Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very > specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would > be something special about the architecture which the substrate > employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode > of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an > appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of > the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could > simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to > implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say > no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. > The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of > Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the > physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as > a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent > extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul > de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness > is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement > it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques > for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even > as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that > if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then > they must be built somewhere in some universes! > > But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in > some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to > how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people > living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the > facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater > than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t > get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated > with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued > extensions of consciousness by branching into worlds where we > supervene over new born babies (or something – animals, aliens?) - > accidental deaths of people of any “normal ages” we can think about > could of course be accommodated by the NCDSC). That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. > The mechanics of such reincarnational transitions would be > interesting to speculate about since I see this as the only way out > for a QTI. > > Nick Prince - Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message b
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 11:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote: > This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book > "Reasons and Persons", where he considers a continuum from his mind > to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the > essence is what is important). I hadn't read that book at the time I > wrote mine, otherwise, I would undoubtedly have cited it. > > Now in the case of Parfit's argument, I find considerable doubt that > the argument can be made to work. Whilst, if I randomly knocked out 1% > of your neurons, you will still be awake, and probably little > different from the experience, if I knocked out certain "keystone" (as > the concept is called in ecology) neurons to a level of 1% of all > neurons, your brain function would fall apart quite rapidly. Yet to > transition from your brain to that of Napoleons would require rewiring > those same keystone neurons, and that, I believe casts significant > doubt that the continuum is possible, even in principle. > > Now, we also know that infant minds are not a tabula rasa. So I am > sceptical that the transition of a dementiaed mind to an infant mind > is possible, for just the same reason. It doesn't have to happen by removal of neurons in a single individual. The transition could happen, for example, by having a series of separate individuals who share a proportion of their predecessors' memories. They don't even have to run on the same substrate, let alone the same brain. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its "rebirth" relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such "rebirth", although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued extensions of consciousness by bra
Re: Is QTI false?
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is QTI false? On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its "rebirth" relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such "rebirth", although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associate
Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is QTI false? On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its "rebirth" relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such "rebirth", although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore eith
Re: Causality = 1p Continuity?
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 12:33 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is QTI false? On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote: snip *** Hi! There seems to be a conflation of the ideas of the continuity of 1st person Identity (over implementations/reincarnations) and Causality. Why is this? Hi Stephen, It is normal. Usually people take the comp hyp by assuming that consciousness is related to a physical, or just a single implemented computation, without taking into consideration the infinities of computations leading to the same or equivalent states, as needed from the first person perspective (plural or not). In fine the physical computation is defined by the infinity of computations (executed by the UD, or in arithmetic) leading to the equivalent state, and physical causality emerges from all of them, leading to some multiverse structure observable once we look at ourself below our comp substitution level). If this does not help, try to make your question more specific. It is a difficult subject. You like math, I think. I can define for you the 'arithmetical physical causality': event A causes event B means that BD(BD A -> BD B) is arithmetically true, with B and D being the new box defined by the Bp & Dp translation in arithmetic. Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is related to the notion of counterfactual. You will find the reference in my papers. Unfortunately orthomodularity is still an open problem in the arithmetical 'quantum logic'. Eric Vandenbusche is currently trying to optimize the G* theorem prover to get an answer. Bruno *** Hi Bruno, I understand the role of the infinities of computations and the equivalence as you are considering them finally, from reading your papers over and over and a brilliant discussion of the concept of quantum superposition in Andrew Soltau's book Interactive Destiny, but am still not seeing the conflation of physical causality and logical entailment. For one thing they point in opposite directions! I still don't understand how you persist in not seeing the implications of the Stone duality! Oh well, that is your choice, but putting that aside the continuity of 1st person should supervene on the UD, no? It seems to me that from the point of view of the UD there is no before or after or this causing that. To the UD everything is simultaneously given. Additionally, the way that the dovetailing seems to work makes it so that the UD is dense on the space of computations in the same way that the Reals are dense in the continuum. But how can this be? I am very interested in Eric Vandenbusche's work. I will see that Google yields from him... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish wrote: > The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain > age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical > impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient, > because there is always the possibility of mind uploading into > machines that may be of arbitrary age. I follow that this observation is not evidence against the NCDSC but am wondering if it is evidence against QTI! If we eventually end up as Tegmark's amoeba then this can be deemed continuous in some sense but hardly immortal. My definition of immortal (which I held for the purpose of my posting) was that it would be more like a continuation of self aware consciousness - ie the ability to recognise I was experiencing an observer moment. > Even Jacques Mallah accepted the possibility that people of > arbitrarily old age must exist somewhere in the Multiverse. What he > couldn't accept was the certainty of getting from here to there, that > the NCDSC implies. The refinement of that debate lead to the distinction of > ASSA vs RSSA, and the NCDSC. But If we were to find ourselves in a universe in which we alone were arbitrarily very old and all other people had ages that were distributed about a mean of 70 yrs (give or take thirty yrs) then that would lead me to believe I was living in a very improbable universe - I might suspect self delusion! I often wonder about so called delusional conditions and their validity? In any case I would have suspected that the NCDSC would bring me into the most probable universes on the whole ( RSSA?). Hence if I was living to a very ripe old age then I would expect others to be sharing this perception too along with others who were even much older than me. I agree that we might just be on the verge of discovering the uploading of minds into computers, but if I had been a viking in 200 AD this would not really be realistic - yet they too must still be alive somewhere if the defined QTI I am considering is valid. Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
>Bruno wrote > With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most > normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are > not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. > If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer > are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their > consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that > respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in Platonia", > and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different > levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Stathis wrote > That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since > from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a > great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person > perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the > most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) > terms. > Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince wrote: > Stathis wrote > > >> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since >> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a >> great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person >> perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the >> most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) >> terms. >> Stathis Papaioannou- > > Hi Stathis > > I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if > I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect > to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most > probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this > as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable > if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has > many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook > which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is > related to the notion of counterfactual. You will find the reference in my > papers. > > Unfortunately orthomodularity is still an open problem in the arithmetical > 'quantum logic'. Eric Vandenbusche is currently trying to optimize the G* > theorem prover to get an answer. And here I thought I was making progress in understanding Bruno's thesis. I clearly have a *long* way further to go in my studies :-) Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is QTI false?
On 03/31/11, Nick Prince wrote:>Bruno wrote> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most > normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are > not excluded.Hi BrunoMaybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains mightdeterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old toa young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphicto a young brain.Why not consider that it becomes homomorphic to an unconscious brain? If your consciousness is a property of some bundle of UD computations it does not follow that the most probable continuation is also conscious. We already know that if you get hit in the head the most probable continuation is unconsciousness for a time.Brent Indeed this defines the consciousness I amconsidering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physicscan be simulated on a computer then no problem.> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer > are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their > consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that > respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in Platonia", > and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different > levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth).This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everythingincluding consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would youagree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we needonly consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending thesteps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful buthard to pin down as a concept.BestNick-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mar 31, 8:10 pm, meeke...@verizon.net wrote: > > > On 03/31/11,Nick Princewrote:>Bruno wrote > > With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a > > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most > > normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are > > not excluded. > Hi Bruno > Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might > deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to > a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic > to a young brain. > Why not consider that it becomes homomorphic to an unconscious brain? If > your consciousness is a property of some bundle of UD computations it does > not follow that the most probable continuation is also conscious. We already > know that if you get hit in the head the most probable continuation is > unconsciousness for a time. > Brent > Indeed this defines the consciousness I am > considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics > can be simulated on a computer then no problem. > > If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer > > are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their > > consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that > > respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in Platonia", > > and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different > > levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). > This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything > including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you > agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need > only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the > steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but > hard to pin down as a concept. > Best > Nick Is not a sufficiently young brain not isomorphic to a unconscious brain? After all, the brain of a human fetus has to grow to come sufficient level of complexity to "turn on"... But given this, how to we avoid disembodied minds if we are assuming that minds supervene exclusively on brains (or equivalent)? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday > argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from > our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this > setting, as we have already discussed a lot in the past. > > Bruno Marchal > Superficially, this seems to be a very succinct form of Mallah's argument. You're basically saying that given I'm Russell Standish, and QTI, why don't I find myself arbitrarily far removed from the origin (my birth). Of course, the objections to this are obvious, and have been discussed before in this list. The above doomsday argument assumes a linear sequence of OMs that characterise "Russell Standish", which cannot be the case in a Multiverse (required for QTI). Sampling of Russell Standish observer moments must be over all OMs that were born Russell Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Now all we need is for Mallah to admit that the above is not a strawman, and we're done. ASSA vs RSSA can be put in the dustbin :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 3/31/2011 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this setting, as we have already discussed a lot in the past. Bruno Marchal Superficially, this seems to be a very succinct form of Mallah's argument. You're basically saying that given I'm Russell Standish, and QTI, why don't I find myself arbitrarily far removed from the origin (my birth). Of course, the objections to this are obvious, and have been discussed before in this list. The above doomsday argument assumes a linear sequence of OMs that characterise "Russell Standish", which cannot be the case in a Multiverse (required for QTI). Sampling of Russell Standish observer moments must be over all OMs that were born Russell Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not the past:? Brent Now all we need is for Mallah to admit that the above is not a strawman, and we're done. ASSA vs RSSA can be put in the dustbin :). No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.449 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3540 - Release Date: 03/30/11 09:54:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: > >Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to > >being a baby than an adult. > Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not > the past:? > > Brent In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which conserves total probability. However, not all observations are compatible with being an OM of the person of interest (ie the observer dies in some branches). Consequently, the total measure of observer moments must diminish as a function of OM age, roughly given by the observed 3rd person mortality curve. After 70-80 years, the total measure diminishes rapidly, but not to zero (assuming no cul-de-sac). Hence my statement - the measure must be biased towards being a baby. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 3/31/2011 10:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not the past:? Brent In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which conserves total probability. However, not all observations are compatible with being an OM of the person of interest (ie the observer dies in some branches). Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm wondering where the arrow of time comes from in this view? Brent Consequently, the total measure of observer moments must diminish as a function of OM age, roughly given by the observed 3rd person mortality curve. After 70-80 years, the total measure diminishes rapidly, but not to zero (assuming no cul-de-sac). Hence my statement - the measure must be biased towards being a baby. Cheers No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.449 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3540 - Release Date: 03/30/11 09:54:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:20:58PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: > > Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM > Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you > also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm > wondering where the arrow of time comes from in this view? > > Brent The arrow of time comes from tieing the 1st person view (observer moment) to the 3rd person unitary evolution via the anthropic principle. Not all 3rd person states support the 1st person view. I don't see what difference time translation symmetry of the birth moment makes. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
