RE: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality
I might still occasionally face accidents where I had to be very lucky to survive, but the lower the probability there is of surviving a particular type of accident, the less likely I am to experience events leading up to such an accident. So if someone is on a cliff about to commit suicide, from his perspective, he will probably find he can't go through with it? In fact will a suicidal person find that nothing tends to go wrong in his life (because if it did he would want to commit suicide)? The more suicidal he is the better! Or perhaps there is a vanishingly small probability of finding yourself so easily depressed even though it is not unreasonable to come across other people that are. But if the tendency to be suicidal is inherited in the genes can it be that this is anticipatory as well? Of course at the time you inherit your genes you aren't conscious. - David -Original Message- From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, 12 November 2003 5:34 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fw: Quantum accident survivor Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2003 15:56:31 +0100 At 14:36 07/11/03 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: snip Well, I do believe in continuity of consciousness, modulo the issues of measure. That is, I think some continuations would be more likely to be experienced than others. For example, if you started up 9 computers each running one copy of me (all running the same program so they stay in sync), and one computer running a different copy of me, my current theory is that I would expect to experience the first version with 90% probability. Almost OK, but perhaps false if you put *the measure* on the (infinite) computations going through those states. I mean, if the 9 computers running one copy of you just stop (in some absolute way I ask you to conceive for the benefit of the argument), and if the one computer running the different copy, instead of stopping, is multiplied eventually into many self-distinguishable copies of you, then putting the measure on the histories should make you expect to experience (and memorized) the second version more probably. It is the idea I like to summarize in the following diagram: \/ | | \/ | | \/ =| | | | | | | | That is, it is like a future bifurcation enhances your present measure. It is why I think comp confirms Deutsch idea that QM branching is really QM differentiation. What do you think? I mean, do you conceive that the measure could be put only on the maximal possible computations? Bruno This is an important point which I think people often miss about the QTI. It is sometimes spoken of as if the QTI only goes into effect at the moment you are about to die (and thus have no successor observer-moment), which would often require some fantastically improbable escape, like quantum tunneling away from a nearby nuclear explosion. But if later bifurcations can effect the first-person probability of earlier ones, this need not be the case. Consider this thought experiment. Two presidential candidates, let's say Wesley Clark and George W. Bush, are going to be running against each other in the presidential election. Two months before the election, I step into a machine that destructively scans me and recreates two copies in different locations--one copy will appear in a room with a portrait of George W. on the wall, the other copy will appear in a room with a portrait of Wesley Clark. The usual interpretation of first-person probabilities is that, all other things being equal, as the scanner begins to activate I should expect a 50% chance that the next thing I see will be the portrait of George W. appearing before me, and a 50% chance that it will be Wesley Clark. But suppose all other things are *not* equal--an additional part of the plan, which I have agreed to, is that following the election, the copy who appeared in the room with the winning candidate will be duplicated 999 times, while the copy who appeared in the room with the losing candidate will not experience any further duplications. Thus, at any time after the election, 999 out of 1000 versions of me who are descended from the original who first stepped into the duplication machine two months before the election will remember appearing in the room with the candidate who ended up winning, while only 1 out of 1000 will remember appearing in the room with the losing candidate. The last minute theory of quantum immortality is based on the idea that first-person probabilities are based solely on the observer-moments that qualify as immediate successors to my current observer-moment, and this idea suggests that as I step into the duplication machine two months
spooky action at a distance
I've been reading about spooky action at a distance at http://www.ncsu.edu/felder-public/kenny/papers/bell.html and several other sites. I'm told that non-locality is a phenomenon that is proven. A review of experiments makes it clear that spooky action at a distance is part of nature. But doesn't this violate the rule that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light? Well, no, it does not - because of a technicality. Nevertheless, how might one of entangled particles, even though separated by light-years, react instantaneously to a measurement done to its sibling? I've seen no hypothesis. The answer is, apparently, one of many Quantum Mysteries. This is unsatisfying. I would like to hear speculations on non-locality. We are told that string theory needs 11 dimensions - could it be, for example, that there is another dimension in which the entangled particles are adjacent to each other? Norman
Re: spooky action at a distance
Norman Samish wrote: I've been reading about "spooky action at a distance" at http://www.ncsu.edu/felder-public/kenny/papers/bell.html and several other sites. "Spooky action-at-a-distance" is a catchy but misleading description of EPR-Bell type quantum correlations because there is no effective "action" or signalling passing between the two correllated particles or subsystems involved. "Passion-at-a-distance" is an entirely better description of what takes place: a certain statistical resilience between the values of time-like separated subsystems that remain bound in an entangled state... I'm told that non-locality is a phenomenon that is proven. A review of experiments makes it clear that "spooky action at a distance is part of nature." But doesn't this violate the rule that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light? Well, no, it does not - because of a technicality. Not a exactly a "technicality" in the sense you intend it. The rule is that "no signal can travel faster than c"but there is no signalling involved in the reservation of these correlations. Nevertheless, how might one of "entangled" particles, even though separated by light-years, react instantaneously to a measurement done to its sibling? I've seen no hypothesis. The answer is, apparently, one of many Quantum Mysteries. It is only a mystery if you try and reason classically about it. Quantum mechanics makes this type of correlation a more "natural" thing than, say, the causal succession of events linking action to effect. It is this later one that needs to be explained from the Qunatum Mechanical point-of-view. This is unsatisfying. I would like to hear speculations on non-locality. We are told that string theory needs 11 dimensions - could it be, for example, that there is another dimension in which the entangled particles are adjacent to each other? The type of unsatisfaction that you display can be mended with what are called "non-local hidden-variable theories", which unfortunately must invoke other "unpleasantnesses", such as non-local potentials. Other dimensions may seem an intuitively appealing option out of this connundrum but not the kind of extra dimensions invoked by string theory, which must be compactified (="curled up locally")at some point. Large extra dimensions may be more accommodating but somehow that has not been tried as of yet. If the EPR correlations were "actions" rather than "passions" that would be somewhat easier to implement. But it is hard to understand why these extra dimensions would have been constrained in this particular way... Norman Kindly, -Joao -- Joao Pedro Leao ::: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics 1815 Massachussetts Av. , Cambridge MA 02140 Work Phone: (617)-496-7990 extension 124 Cell-Phone: (617)-817-1800 -- "All generalizations are abusive (specially this one!)" ---
Re: spooky action at a distance
We are told that string theory needs 11 dimensions - could it be, for example, that there is another dimension in which the entangled particles are adjacent to each other? Norman Of course here we are speaking of spooky actions as possible *physical* effects, involving, or not, superluminal informations. So we are not speaking of spooky actions as *epistemological* effects (such as Rothstein, Page, Hardy, Peres, Cerf, Mermin, etc. described many times, and also Bohr, but in obscure terms). An interesting way of accepting *physical* non-locality (better, non-separability) has been proposed by Ne'eman [Found. Physics, 16, (1986), 361]. Ne'eman assumes that gauge theories should be regarded as geometric constructs, that is to say fiber bundle manifolds. One can construct a strongly correlated manifold (called principal fiber bundle) in which a structure group have global characteristic, such that operators are non-localized. Ne'eman says that what makes QM so weird is just our habit to visualize events in the usual space, and not in abstract spaces. Another possibility is that one suggested by Feynman [Int. J. Theor. Phys., 21, (1982), 467] and Mueckenheim [Phys. Rep., 133, (1986), 337] and Scully, Walther, and Schleich (1994), that is to say the 'negative probability solution'. This solution, imo, is something in between the *physical* and the *epistemological*. But it is not new. Dirac [Proc. Roy. Soc., 180A, (1941), 1] wrote Thus negative energies and probabilities should be considered simply as things which do not appear in experimental results. And of course there is also Costa de Beauregard's theory about retrocausation, and many more similar models.
Re: spooky action at a distance
Norman Samish: This is unsatisfying. Yes. It is also called the conspiracy between QM and SR. I would like to hear speculations on non-locality. There are many in QM. I mean many non-localities. In example the famous 'collapse', the 'Aharonov-Bohm' effect (also with neutral particles), the EPR non-separability, and there are non-localities involving time (interferences in time, quantum beats, Franson interferometers, etc.), and also effects, like the 'delayed choice', possibly related to the 'block universe', or 'holism', or 'wholeness', or time-like non separability. And there are also 'delocalizations'(non just superpositions) in the 'weak measurement' approach (measurements which give little information). And there are - how can I say? - topological (?) non-localities too. Imagine a two-slit apparatus. You can also think this two-slit apparatus as a 'superposizion' of two *physical* complementary *pieces*. Not just hole 1 + hole 2. But something like mattervoid void + matter mattervoid of course with the right measures and shapes! Now imagine to locate one piece in a location and the other piece in another location. You get a sort of 'non-local' two-slit apparatus. Now if a photon beam goes through one of those pieces above and a correlated photon beam goes through the other piece you get an interference effect, due to the 'non-local' two-slit apparatus. Of course all the above are not 'speculations' about non-locality but performed experiments, showing several faces of non-locality. For useful speculations you can also read the Bohrian and instrumentalist Asher Peres (no physical collapse) and the 'philosopher' Suarez (a-temporal quantum)
Re: spooky action at a distance
forgot the links :-) Antoine Suarez http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0311004 Asher Peres http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010
Re: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality
Thank you Bruno Jesse, this anticipatory QTI is the most awesome interpretation of QM I've ever heard. Is it too optimistic to think that we are being 'nudged' toward a biotech breakthrough which will give us legitimate/objective immortality? On Wednesday, November 12, 2003, at 02:34 AM, Jesse Mazer wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fw: Quantum accident survivor Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2003 15:56:31 +0100 At 14:36 07/11/03 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: snip Well, I do believe in continuity of consciousness, modulo the issues of measure. That is, I think some continuations would be more likely to be experienced than others. For example, if you started up 9 computers each running one copy of me (all running the same program so they stay in sync), and one computer running a different copy of me, my current theory is that I would expect to experience the first version with 90% probability. Almost OK, but perhaps false if you put *the measure* on the (infinite) computations going through those states. I mean, if the 9 computers running one copy of you just stop (in some absolute way I ask you to conceive for the benefit of the argument), and if the one computer running the different copy, instead of stopping, is multiplied eventually into many self-distinguishable copies of you, then putting the measure on the histories should make you expect to experience (and memorized) the second version more probably. It is the idea I like to summarize in the following diagram: \/ | | \/ | | \/ =| | | | | | | | That is, it is like a future bifurcation enhances your present measure. It is why I think comp confirms Deutsch idea that QM branching is really QM differentiation. What do you think? I mean, do you conceive that the measure could be put only on the maximal possible computations? Bruno This is an important point which I think people often miss about the QTI. It is sometimes spoken of as if the QTI only goes into effect at the moment you are about to die (and thus have no successor observer-moment), which would often require some fantastically improbable escape, like quantum tunneling away from a nearby nuclear explosion. But if later bifurcations can effect the first-person probability of earlier ones, this need not be the case. Consider this thought experiment. Two presidential candidates, let's say Wesley Clark and George W. Bush, are going to be running against each other in the presidential election. Two months before the election, I step into a machine that destructively scans me and recreates two copies in different locations--one copy will appear in a room with a portrait of George W. on the wall, the other copy will appear in a room with a portrait of Wesley Clark. The usual interpretation of first-person probabilities is that, all other things being equal, as the scanner begins to activate I should expect a 50% chance that the next thing I see will be the portrait of George W. appearing before me, and a 50% chance that it will be Wesley Clark. But suppose all other things are *not* equal--an additional part of the plan, which I have agreed to, is that following the election, the copy who appeared in the room with the winning candidate will be duplicated 999 times, while the copy who appeared in the room with the losing candidate will not experience any further duplications. Thus, at any time after the election, 999 out of 1000 versions of me who are descended from the original who first stepped into the duplication machine two months before the election will remember appearing in the room with the candidate who ended up winning, while only 1 out of 1000 will remember appearing in the room with the losing candidate. The last minute theory of quantum immortality is based on the idea that first-person probabilities are based solely on the observer-moments that qualify as immediate successors to my current observer-moment, and this idea suggests that as I step into the duplication machine two months before the election, I should expect a 50% chance of appearing in the room with the portrait of the candidate who goes on to win the election. But as Bruno suggests, an alternate theory is that later bifurcations should be taken to influence the first-person probabilities of earlier bifurcations--under this anticipatory theory, I should expect only a 1 out of 1000 chance that I will appear in the room with the portrait of the losing candidate. This would lead to a weird sort of first-person precognition, where after the duplication but before the election, I'd have good reason to believe (from a first-person point of view) that I could predict the outcome with a high probability of being right. But this kind of prediction would be useless from a
Reversible computing
I have been wondering whether there is something significant in the fact that our laws of physics are mostly time symmetric, and we have a law of conservation of mass/energy. Does this suggest that our universe is associated with a reversible (and information preserving) computation? - David
Re: Seeding life in the universe
See Charley Lineweaver's recent paper (arXiv:astro-ph/0209385) for a discussion of how likely life is to arise on a terrestrial planet. Of course the issue of how many terrestrial planets is not covered there, although Lineweaver has some arguments for that as well. I would not be surprised if life is common in the universe. However, see Robin Hanson's paper (http://hanson.gmu.edu/hardstep.pdf) for an argument as to why intelligent life might be rare. Cheers David Barrett-Lennard wrote: .. But maybe we have no reason to believe that life will happen so easily. Given the idea of the ensemble for a TOE, it is only necessary that SAS's can exist - no matter how improbable. .. A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
RE: Reversible computing
Assuming neurons aren't able to tap into QM stuff because of decoherence, it seems odd that consciousness is performed with an irreversible computation whilst the universe uses a reversible computation. - David -Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, 13 November 2003 9:59 AM To: David Barrett-Lennard Subject: Re: Reversible computing I think the answer to your question is yes (assuming I understand you correctly). Information and probability are closely linked (through algorithmic information theory - AIT for those acronym lists). Schroedinger's equation is known to conserve probability (basically |\psi(t)| is a constant - usually set to 1 - under evolution by Schroedinger's equation (|.| here means Hilbert spoace norm, not absolute value)). This conservation of probability turns out to be equivalent to unitarity of the Hamiltonian operator, which guess what, means energy is conserved. Unitary evolution is a reversible computation, which is why quantum computations are reversible. Cheers David Barrett-Lennard wrote: I have been wondering whether there is something significant in the fact that our laws of physics are mostly time symmetric, and we have a law of conservation of mass/energy. Does this suggest that our universe is associated with a reversible (and information preserving) computation? - David A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Reversible computing
Dear David, Have you read any of the books by Michael C. Mackey on the implications of reversible (invertible) and non-invertible systems? Some, notably Oliver Penrose, have attacked his reasoning, but I find his work to be both insightful and novel and that his detractors are mostly driven by their own inabilities to take statistical dynamics and thermodynamics forward. Mackey shows that invertible dynamical system will be at equilibrium perpetually and that only non-invertible system will exhibit an "arrow of time". I am very interested in the subject of reversible computation, as it relates to my study of Hitoshi Kitada's theory of Time,and would like tolearn aboutwhat you have found about them. Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: David Barrett-Lennard To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 8:36 PM Subject: Reversible computing I have been wondering whether there is something significant in the fact that our laws of physics are mostly time symmetric, and we have a law of conservation of mass/energy. Does this suggest that our universe is associated with a reversible (and information preserving) computation? - David
Re: Reversible computing
Not so strange. The process of conscious observation creates information. Reversible computations conserve information. Therefore conscious processes must be irreversible. A corrollory of this is that conscious observers will experience an arrow of time, including a second law of thermodynamics. Cheers David Barrett-Lennard wrote: Assuming neurons aren't able to tap into QM stuff because of decoherence, it seems odd that consciousness is performed with an irreversible computation whilst the universe uses a reversible computation. - David -Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, 13 November 2003 9:59 AM To: David Barrett-Lennard Subject: Re: Reversible computing I think the answer to your question is yes (assuming I understand you correctly). Information and probability are closely linked (through algorithmic information theory - AIT for those acronym lists). Schroedinger's equation is known to conserve probability (basically |\psi(t)| is a constant - usually set to 1 - under evolution by Schroedinger's equation (|.| here means Hilbert spoace norm, not absolute value)). This conservation of probability turns out to be equivalent to unitarity of the Hamiltonian operator, which guess what, means energy is conserved. Unitary evolution is a reversible computation, which is why quantum computations are reversible. Cheers David Barrett-Lennard wrote: I have been wondering whether there is something significant in the fact that our laws of physics are mostly time symmetric, and we have a law of conservation of mass/energy. Does this suggest that our universe is associated with a reversible (and information preserving) computation? - David A/Prof Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality
On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 04:34:27AM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: Applied to quantum immortality, this anticipatory idea suggests it would not be as if the universe is allowing events to go any which way right up until something is about to kill me, and then it steps in with some miraculous coincidence which saves me; instead, it would be more like the universe would constantly be nudging the my first-person probabilities in favor of branches where I don't face any dangerous accidents which require miracles in the first place. Of course since this would just be a probabilistic effect, I might still occasionally face accidents where I had to be very lucky to survive, but the lower the probability there is of surviving a particular type of accident, the less likely I am to experience events leading up to such an accident. If you believe this, would you treat terminally ill people as zombies, since their consciousness should already have been nudged away from this branch? What do you do when they protest that they are in fact not zombies?
RE: Reversible computing
I havent read much about invertible systems. Curiously though, earlier this year I was working on a difficult problem related to optimistic concurrency control in a distributed object oriented database Im developing, and found that I only solved it when I decomposed it as an invertible problem into parts that were invertible. The decomposition always involved invertible functions with two inputs and two outputs. All state changes (to a local database) are applied as invertible operations, and the problem is to transform operations so they can be applied in different orders at different sites and yet achieve convergence. I guess its unlikely that this has relevance to physics. - David -Original Message- From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, 13 November 2003 10:14 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Reversible computing Dear David, Have you read any of the books by Michael C. Mackey on the implications of reversible (invertible) and non-invertible systems? Some, notably Oliver Penrose, have attacked his reasoning, but I find his work to be both insightful and novel and that his detractors are mostly driven by their own inabilities to take statistical dynamics and thermodynamics forward. Mackey shows that invertible dynamical system will be at equilibrium perpetually and that only non-invertible system will exhibit an arrow of time. I am very interested in the subject of reversible computation, as it relates to my study of Hitoshi Kitada's theory of Time, and would like to learn about what you have found about them. Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: David Barrett-Lennard To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 8:36 PM Subject: Reversible computing I have been wondering whether there is something significant in the fact that our laws of physics are mostly time symmetric, and we have a law of conservation of mass/energy. Does this suggest that our universe is associated with a reversible (and information preserving) computation? - David
Re: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality
Wei Dai wrote: On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in a room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the election as a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated, it was certainly be much more probable that my next experience would be of finding myself in the room with the portrait of the candidate who would go on to win (since after the election that copy would be duplicated 999 times while the other would not), but the probability of ending up in the room with the losing candidate was not zero, and after the split it is certainly true that both copies are equally conscious. Suppose you get into an experiment where you're copied, then the original is certain to be killed. According to anticipatory quantum immortality, your probability of experiencing being the original after copying is complete is 0. Not really, there is always the possibility (perhaps a certainty if you buy the 'everything that can exist does exist' hypothesis) that an observer-moment with the same memories up to the point he was killed will arise somewhere else in the multiverse, even if it's by a random statistical fluctuation or something. In any case, even if it was possible to have a situation where the first-person probability of my becoming a particular future observer-moment were zero, that wouldn't mean that observer-moment does not experience himself as real, perhaps it would just suggest there was zero chance that his own past included my current observer-moment. The problem here is that you're acting as if first-person measure somehow implies something about consciousness. I do think that complexity of consciousness may be one of the factors that influences first-person measure, so that I could be less likely to become a copy with large amounts of brain damage, but if my interpretation of the two-presidential-candidates though-experiment is right it obviously isn't the only factor, and therefore you can't reason in reverse that less measure -- less consciousness, since in that thought-experiment there's no reason to think either of the two copies is less conscious even if one has only 1/999th the measure of the other. Jesse Mazer _ From Beethoven to the Rolling Stones, your favorite music is always playing on MSN Radio Plus. No ads, no talk. Trial month FREE! http://join.msn.com/?page=offers/premiumradio
Re: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality
Dear Russell and Friends, Does not QM's no-cloning theorem imply Jesse's argument? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 10:45 PM Subject: Re: Last-minute vs. anticipatory quantum immortality I think its a little unrealistic to assert that a given copy is certain to be killed. It is this certainty factor that gives rise to zombies. So long as there is only a 99.999...1% of something happening, then no zombies appear. Wei Dai wrote: On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote: Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in a room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the election as a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated, it was certainly be much more probable that my next experience would be of finding myself in the room with the portrait of the candidate who would go on to win (since after the election that copy would be duplicated 999 times while the other would not), but the probability of ending up in the room with the losing candidate was not zero, and after the split it is certainly true that both copies are equally conscious. Suppose you get into an experiment where you're copied, then the original is certain to be killed. According to anticipatory quantum immortality, your probability of experiencing being the original after copying is complete is 0. Therefore you should have no objection to the original being tortured in exchange for a payment to the surviving clone, right? (Ignore for a moment your natural aversion against torturing anyone. Suppose that if you objected to being tortured, a random someone else will be tortured anyway.) -- -- A/Prof Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- --
