Fw: What do you lose if you simply accept...
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Dear Jonathan,
A "mental fiction" indeed, but one that we can not just imagine away.
;-)
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 10:19 PM
Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others)
refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a
description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word
"dualism" as much as you do (because of the implication that
we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield
to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind
of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing
and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our
whole argument has been one over semantics.
Well, that would be a novel application of "dualism", I think. A
description
of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories;
dualism
would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the
*same
thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that "qualia" refers to anything. It
is a mental fiction.
Dennett (whom I
greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure
thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or
logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts
that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is
just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept
that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so
why is it any different to accept consciousness or
what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description
-of-something
(which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis?
The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be
that
we can not accept "what-is-it-likeness" as an irreducible thing because
there is no such thing as "what is it likeness".
Jonathan Colvin
--Stathis Papaioannou
> > [quoting Stathis]
> > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
> > duplicated
> > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became
> > one" with
> > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
> > go to such
> > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
> > behaviour, or
> > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential
> > difference
> > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can
> > minimise it and
> > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference,
but I don't
> > > >think you can deny it.
> > >
> > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
> > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B):
> > *an apple*.
> > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a
difference between
> > >A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this
> > "essential
> > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular
to do with
> > >qualia or experience.
> > >
> > >Jonathan Colvin
> >
> > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
> > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
>
>My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is
like to be
>that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno
points out, in
>3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or
simulating an
>apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st
person level
>(where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the
>thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does
>"include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the
>correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that
the qualia
>exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the
>description *just is* the thing.
>
>Jonathan
>
_
MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
> Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others)
> refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a
> description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word
> "dualism" as much as you do (because of the implication that
> we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield
> to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind
> of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing
> and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our
> whole argument has been one over semantics.
Well, that would be a novel application of "dualism", I think. A description
of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories; dualism
would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the *same
thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that "qualia" refers to anything. It is a
mental fiction.
>Dennett (whom I
> greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure
> thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or
> logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts
> that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is
> just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept
> that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so
> why is it any different to accept consciousness or
> what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description
> -of-something
> (which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis?
The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be that
we can not accept "what-is-it-likeness" as an irreducible thing because
there is no such thing as "what is it likeness".
Jonathan Colvin
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > > [quoting Stathis]
> > > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
> > > duplicated
> > > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became
> > > one" with
> > > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
> > > go to such
> > > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
> > > behaviour, or
> > > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential
> > > difference
> > > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can
> > > minimise it and
> > > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference,
> but I don't
> > > > >think you can deny it.
> > > >
> > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
> > > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B):
> > > *an apple*.
> > > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a
> difference between
> > > >A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this
> > > "essential
> > > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular
> to do with
> > > >qualia or experience.
> > > >
> > > >Jonathan Colvin
> > >
> > > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
> > > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
> >
> >My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is
> like to be
> >that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno
> points out, in
> >3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or
> simulating an
> >apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st
> person level
> >(where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the
> >thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does
> >"include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the
> >correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that
> the qualia
> >exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the
> >description *just is* the thing.
> >
> >Jonathan
> >
>
> _
> MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
>
>
Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Yes, this is what I meant. What it is like to be something can only be answered from the 1st person perspective. --Stathis Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? What do you mean by " include" ? Does the artificial brain proposed by your doctor "includes" you ? In a 1-person sense: yes (assuming c.) In a 3-person sense: no. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 07:29:33AM -0700, James N Rose wrote:
> I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
> an essential conceptual error that exists in the current
> debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
> an egregious error in logic for the past 2500 years,
> ever since Plato.
>
...
>
> In 1996 at "Towards a Science of Consciousness" (Tucson) I presented
> several exhibits, each one highlighting some specific relational qualia
> of existence in isolation, and identifying each/all in reagrd to a
> potential single holistic description of being -and- performances of
> being.
>
> The one that has bearing here, was simply an apple - inside a black box
> which no light could enter, until the box was opened and photons could
> reach the surface of the apple.
>
> The discussion point went something like this: In contradistinction to
> the 2500 years old 'definition' of self and completeness set forth by
> Plato in his discussions of 'real' vis a vis 'ideal', notice is heregiven
> that the apple inside the closed box is - ideally - an entity which
> is without color ... absolutely and always - even though weak-logic
> presumes and assigns color 'to' things and entities, de facto.
>
> The full existential extent and outer-bound limit of the apple goes
> -only- up to BUT NOT BEYOND its physical manifestation; in this case
> in entity: its skin. Where skin -ends-, "apple" .. -ends- and does
> not 'exist'.
>
> However,
>
> 'color' - that which we first-order associate -with- apple, exists -solely-
> in that region -outside and beyond- ... where 'apple' does not exist. By
> sheer rigid definition of 'existence' - and logical definitions re 'sets' -
> apple and 'color' are and always must be -mutually exclusive-, with no Venn
> intersection at all.
>
> Conclusions:
>
> 1. No entity is 'complete' in and of itself; entities are "completed" only
> in co-presence of external environmentals.
>
> 2. Systems and entities -will have- qualia that exist (emergently) from
> I-Thou relations which they may not be internally aware of, or be self
> appreciative of, nor the impacts of these qualia on their 'self'.
>
> First and Third frames of reference can never be identical, and
>
> 'exhibition of qualia' versus 'access to qualia for feedback purposes'
> are quite different things.
>
> Cybernetic secondary connections 'smooth' and blur this relationship
> of being.
>
>
> (there is more, but I don't have time at the moment to continue; sorry
> to do a 'fermat', but I'll write again, if anyone cares to explore this
> thread after this posting today)
>
> Jamie Rose
> 19 May 2005
Agreed that colour is not a characteristic of an object in itself. How
does this impact on the debate, however?
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpMcqeRxZUqL.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Dear Jonathan, Non-separateness and identity are not the same! Your argument against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and thus, lacking a linking mechanism, fails as a viable theory. On the other hand, once we see the flaw in the assumption that we are making, that Body and Mind - Physical existence and Mathematical existence (or Information!) are not separable in the sense that one can have meaning and "reason to be" without the other, we can again consider how dualism can be viable as people such as Vaughan Pratt have done. The hard part is in overcoming the prejudice that has built up since Descartes flawed theory was proposed. His failure was in assuming that Body and Mind are "substances" that have independent yet equal existence. The use of the assumption of "substance" caries with it the necessitation of a "causal connector". When we consider the duality in terms of process or types and tokens or hardware and software, it makes a lot more sense. This is analogous to claiming that numbers can somehow exist without there being any need for them to be representable in any way. Unless we can somehow "read each other's minds", it is impossible for me to communicate the difference between the number 1 and the number 2. Without some physical structure to act as an interface between our Minds, minds can not interact or even "know" anything; there is no "definiteness". Similarly, Bodies can not ask questions or predictions or have anticipations or self-representations without some Mind associated. Nature has given us fingers with which to understand numbers... Consciousness seems to be more of a functional relationship between the Physical and the Mental, the Outside and the Inside, as Chalmer's states. When the two dual aspects are taken to the ultimate level of Existence in-itself, the distinction between the two vanishes. Russell saw this long ago, he denoted it as "neutral monism". It is too bad that he made the mistake of excluding non-well founded sets from consideration. Stephen - Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 6:22 PM Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept... snip Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is like to be that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno points out, in 3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or simulating an apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st person level (where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does "include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that the qualia exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the description *just is* the thing. Jonathan
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
On Fri, May 20, 2005 at 02:13:00AM +0100, David Pearce wrote:
>
> If the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, then this must include
> consciousness. But this sounds bizarre - and perhaps unintelligible. How
> could all our pains and pleasures, our sensory experiences etc "cancel out"
> to zero?
Nobody has claimed that the sum of all conscious states sum to
zero. The only I see around abouts is that the sum of conscious _and_
unconscious states is zero.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpcbpsFntJYo.pgp
Description: PGP signature
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
At 09:41 19/05/2005, you wrote: Le 18-mai-05, à 18:09, Stephen Paul King a écrit : Pearce's idea is not new and we have it from many thinkers that the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, that is the essence of symmetry. If the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, then this must include consciousness. But this sounds bizarre - and perhaps unintelligible. How could all our pains and pleasures, our sensory experiences etc "cancel out" to zero? For a zero ontology to work, then all the different textures of consciousness [sights, sounds, etc and their "binding" into sensory objects] must be numerically encodable and expressed in the fundamental equation of the TOE - and thus must participate in the summing to zero too. Currently, we don't have a clue why any particular texture of consciousness has the "feel" it does rather than that of any other texture - or how it relates to others. Redness, say, or the taste of cinnamon, would seem arbitrary - and as inexplicable within a materialist framework as the existence of consciousness itself. But on a zero ontology, all the textures of consciousness are necessary, interdependent, and constrained to sum to zero in virtue of being solutions to the master equation of the TOE that encodes all the information there is about the multiverse. Quentin Anciaux, Thanks for the explanation. Unlike much that is said here, I am able to understand what you mean. But it's not satisfying, and the core mystery remains. Even if Pearce is correct and everything in the multiverse self-cancels and adds up to zero, so what? That is not an explanation of existence. But just how well do we understand our pre-theoretic notion of "Nothing" - zero properties - with which existence is supposedly being contrasted? Just as it is (controversially) possible to generate all the natural numbers from the empty set, perhaps a deeper understanding of what "Nothing" - no properties whatsoever - entails will reveal that a multiverse that sums to zero is a logico-physical necessity: a trivial expression of what the net absence of any properties at all entails. [Do I really believe all this? No, but IMO it's still an explanation-space worth exploring] Dave
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a thing and
being the thing. I hate the word "dualism" as much as you do (because of the
implication that we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we
yield to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind of
dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing and its
description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our whole argument has been
one over semantics. Dennett (whom I greatly respect) goes to great lengths
to avoid having impure thoughts about something being beyond empirical
science or logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts that
it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is just an irreducible
part of physical existence. We accept that quarks, or bitstrings, or
whatever are irreducible, so why is it any different to accept consciousness
or
what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description-of-something
(which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis?
--Stathis Papaioannou
> [quoting Stathis]
> > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
> duplicated
> > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became
> one" with
> > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
> go to such
> > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
> behaviour, or
> > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential
> difference
> > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can
> minimise it and
> > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't
> > >think you can deny it.
> >
> >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
> >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B):
> *an apple*.
> >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A
> >and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this
> "essential
> >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular to do with
> >qualia or experience.
> >
> >Jonathan Colvin
>
> Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
> meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is like to be
that
thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno points out, in 3rd
person level (ie. the level where I am describing or simulating an apple),
a
description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st person level (where a
description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the thing, inside the
simulation, as it were), then the description does "include" what it is
like
to be that thing. But "include" is not the correct word to use, since it
subtly assumes a dualism (that the qualia exist somehow separate from the
mere description of the thing); the description *just is* the thing.
Jonathan
_
MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Dear Norman, Your ability to organize these threads is wonderful! I have some comments... - Original Message - From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 4:15 PM Subject: Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST Gentlemen, Thank you for many illuminating replies to the "Why does anything exist?" question. Three are shown below. It's clear that some hold that there is an identity between physical and mathematical existence (although Patrick Leahy may disagree). If so, we can phrase the big WHY as "Why do numbers exist?" (Answer: Because such existence is a logical necessity.) [SPK] This "identity", does it how at all levels of Existence? I would argue that it does not and this is the reason that I am suggesting that we look at Vaughan Pratt's ideas based on Chu spaces as a way to comprehend the "stratifications" of Existence. The duality we find there is easy to understand once we get past our prejudices. Consider the duality that exist between Cantor sets and complete atomic Boolean algebras... http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~pt/ASD/manifesto.html Consider the Cantor hierarchy and the way that "nameability" seems to become more and more difficult as we climb higher and higher. In the limit of the hierarchy, the limit at which physical implementability and mathematical representability are not longer distinguishable, Nothingness and Everything are One. Every transformation is a perfect homomorphism, even an automorphism. This is perfect symmetry. But we must not forget that Existence must be Complete and thus it follows that all modes of Existence also must exist, thus we have the example of the Cantor Hierarchy. http://www.phschool.com/science/science_news/articles/infinite_wisdom.html The question (at least as I mean it) can also be phrased as "Why is there something instead of nothing?" Or perhaps I am really asking "What is the First Cause?" [SPK] First Causes are self-contradicting. The reason why this question has no answer is because there is no point at which the question can be posed such that an answer obtains that is provably True. This is the proof that Bruno's work shows us. The very asking of the question is like trying to predict what one will do, given some Newcombian choice, and then having to wrestle with the implications of the answer. Additionally, the notion of a "first cause", in itself, is fraught with tacit assumptions. Consider the possibility that there is no such a thing as a "first cause" just as there is no such thing as a privileged frame of reference. We are assuming that there is a "foundation" that is manifested by the "axiom of regularity": http://www.answers.com/topic/axiom-of-regularity?method=5 Every non-empty set S contains an element a which is disjoint from S. Exactly how can Existence obey this axiom without being inconsistent? Before we run away screaming in Horror at this thought, consider the implications of Norman's statement here: I think the big WHY must be an unanswerable question from a scientific standpoint, and that Leahy must be correct when he says ". . . there is just no answer to the big WHY." Stephen Paul King says it, maybe more rigorously, when he says, "Existence, itself, can not be said to require an explanation for such would be a requirement that there is a necessitate prior to which Existence is dependent upon." Norman Samish ~~ Stephen Paul King writes: Existence, itself, can not be said to require an explanation for such would be a requirement that there is a necessitate prior to which Existence is dependent upon. Pearce's idea is not new and we have it from many thinkers that the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, that is the essence of symmetry. It is the actuality of the content of our individual experiences (including all of the asymmetries) that we have to justify. Patrick Leahy writes: I find this a very odd question to be asked on this list. To me, one of the main attractions of the "everything" thesis is that it provides the only possible answer to this question. Viz: as Jonathan pointed out, mathematical objects are logical necessities, and the thesis (at least in Tegmark's formulation) is that physical existence is identical to mathematical existence. Despite this attractive feature, I'm fairly sure the thesis is wrong (so that there is just no answer to the big WHY?), but that's another story. Bruno Marchal writes: You can look at my URL for argument that physical existence emerges from mathematical existence. I have no clues that physical existence could just be equated to mathematical existence unless you attach consciousness to individuated bodies, but how? I can argue that without accepting natural numbers you cannot justify them. So any theory which does not assumes the natural numbers cannot be a theory of everything. Once you accept the existence of natural numbers it is po
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 09:54:49AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> The question then becomes not, why is there something instead of nothing;
> but, why is there something instead of everything.
But don't you see the answer to this is trivial? If everything exists,
then conscious observers exist that see something.
That is why I say Nothing and Everything exhaust the possibilities.
>
> Now, we don't know yet if everything exists, or merely some things exist,
> so it is an open question. But it does seem to be a question that needs
> to be answered.
>
> Hal Finney
If only some things exist, not everything, then we have a deep
mystery. Until there is clear evidence that not everything exists, we
should assume it does so by Occam's razor.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgp8thTVlnMuo.pgp
Description: PGP signature
RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
> > >Lee: No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. > He attempts > > > to derive physics from the theory of computation (i.e., recursive > > > functions, effective computability, incompleteness, and > > > unsolvability). > > > His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and > conjectures that > > > attempt to reduce physics to a completely timeless abstract world. > > > Julian Barbour, in The End of Time, gave, as you probably > know, one > > > of the most brilliant presentations from this perspective. > > > >Jonathan: Sure; but I was just addressing the observation by Bruno that a > > description of a ball can bruise you (if you are also a > description). > > That observation is not unique to Bruno's Comp; it applies to any > > theory that accepts the premise of Strong AI. > > I'm astonished to hear this; I thought that "strong AI" > referred merely to the claim that fully human or beyond > intelligence might be achieved by automatic machinery even if > the programs only push bits around one at a time. In other > words, what distinguished the strong AI camp from the weak AI > camp was that the latter believed that more is needed somehow > or other: perhaps parallel processing; perhaps biological > program instantiation; perhaps quantum gravity tubules or... > something. No, the conventional meanings of strong vs. weak AI are merely: Weak AI: machines can be made to act *as if* they were intelligent (conscious, etc). Strong AI: machines that act intelligently have real, conscious minds (actually experience the world, qualia etc). A claim that a description of an object (a simulated billiard ball for instance) can bruise me (cause me pain etc) if I am a simulation, requires strong AI, such that my simulation is conscious. Otherwise, under weak AI, my simulation can only act *as if* it were bruised or in pain, since it is not actually conscious. > As far as believing that a billiard-ball *machine* or a > hydraulic machine might instantiate me (as a running > program), I for one *do* believe that. So in my understanding > of the terms, as I said above, then it follows that I myself > am in the strong AI camp (ontologically). But Strong AI usually presumes substrate independance; so if you don't believe that a mechanical ping pong ball machine for instance could instantiate an intelligence, you would not be classed as in the Strong AI camp. > But I (and I know I speak for others) don't think that I'm > only a description; we believe that we must be processes > running during some time interval on some kind of hardware in > some physical reality. > So we are as yet unmoved :-) by Bruno's descriptions. The usual reply is that this begs the question as to what a "process" is. If we accept the block universe, time is a 1st person phenomenon anyway, so how do differentiate between what is a description and what is a process? Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
> [quoting Stathis] > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the > duplicated > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became > one" with > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to > go to such > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume, > behaviour, or > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential > difference > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can > minimise it and > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't > > >think you can deny it. > > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): > *an apple*. > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A > >and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this > "essential > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular to do with > >qualia or experience. > > > >Jonathan Colvin > > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is like to be that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno points out, in 3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or simulating an apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st person level (where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does "include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that the qualia exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the description *just is* the thing. Jonathan
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Gentlemen, Thank you for many illuminating replies to the "Why does anything exist?" question. Three are shown below. It's clear that some hold that there is an identity between physical and mathematical existence (although Patrick Leahy may disagree). If so, we can phrase the big WHY as "Why do numbers exist?" (Answer: Because such existence is a logical necessity.) The question (at least as I mean it) can also be phrased as "Why is there something instead of nothing?" Or perhaps I am really asking "What is the First Cause?" I think the big WHY must be an unanswerable question from a scientific standpoint, and that Leahy must be correct when he says ". . . there is just no answer to the big WHY." Stephen Paul King says it, maybe more rigorously, when he says, "Existence, itself, can not be said to require an explanation for such would be a requirement that there is a necessitate prior to which Existence is dependent upon." Norman Samish ~~ Stephen Paul King writes: Existence, itself, can not be said to require an explanation for such would be a requirement that there is a necessitate prior to which Existence is dependent upon. Pearce's idea is not new and we have it from many thinkers that the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, that is the essence of symmetry. It is the actuality of the content of our individual experiences (including all of the asymmetries) that we have to justify. Patrick Leahy writes: I find this a very odd question to be asked on this list. To me, one of the main attractions of the "everything" thesis is that it provides the only possible answer to this question. Viz: as Jonathan pointed out, mathematical objects are logical necessities, and the thesis (at least in Tegmark's formulation) is that physical existence is identical to mathematical existence. Despite this attractive feature, I'm fairly sure the thesis is wrong (so that there is just no answer to the big WHY?), but that's another story. Bruno Marchal writes: You can look at my URL for argument that physical existence emerges from mathematical existence. I have no clues that physical existence could just be equated to mathematical existence unless you attach consciousness to individuated bodies, but how? I can argue that without accepting natural numbers you cannot justify them. So any theory which does not assumes the natural numbers cannot be a theory of everything. Once you accept the existence of natural numbers it is possible to explain how the belief in both math and physics arises. And with the explicit assumption of Descartes Mechanism, in a digital form (the computationalist hypothesis), I think such explanation is unique. Also, it is possible to explain why we cannot explain where our belief in natural numbers come from.
Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Hi, Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit : > > Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems > (maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words) "not > Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited > 'comp'. I think that is what Bruno explains (rather my understanding of it), that "consciousness" (a thing ?) is emergent on all computations passing through th(is/ese) state(s). If I understand, there is not one computation that simulate a thing but a set of computation having this state. But it seems to me that an infinity of computation passing through a particular state exists, so I do not very well understand how a measure can be associated to it. > Excuse me for falling through a trap-door into a reply about things I am no > expert in. I may have the wrong bootstraps. I'm not an expert too ;) > Cheers > > John Regards, Quentin Anciaux
Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Russell wrote: -quote--- "Pulling up the door you're standing on is known in the computer industry as "bootstrapping", which comes from the expression "to pull yourself up by your bootstraps". Of course, over time, this has been shortened to "boot", as in "booting your computer". Initially, to boot a computer, one had to enter a small loader program inot the computer by flicking switches. Run the program, and this would a larger program from a disk or tape, which in turn would read in an operating system (or whatever and start it running). These days, this initial program is burned into a nonvolatile silicon chip, which loads and runs the first sector of the hard disk, and so on, so the tedious stage of entering the first program by hand is avoided. Can a conscious mind be understood completely by a conscious mind? This can be cast in terms of Cantor's diagonalisation argument. Goedel's 2nd theorem effectively says that arithmetic "cannot understand itself". However, the set of recursive functions is closed to diagonalisation, namely recursive functions exist that can emulate any other. Coming back to the original question - Bruno Marchal would probably answer yes, with repsect to the assumption of COMP. Robert Rosen (to pick a somewhat extreme opposing example) would probably argue no - that consciousness lies in a class of systems outside the computable set. Cheers" --end quote If my memory serves well, I heard that explanation of "bootstrapping" some decades ago, (cosmological Q-theories) I suppose, before it was applied to computers. Thanks, Russell, for the computer class, however I would not equate 'booting' with 'bootstrapping', especially based on your info about the 'special' initiating programs you have to provide to 'strapp'. It may well be that the usage of the word originated from such poor understanding of the metaphor. I wanted to stress the ignorance of that "bootstrapper" (to use your preferred word) about the way she was acting. She did not want to lift herself up. She thought she is lifting a trapdoor (to go down the stairs). Exactly the goal we are pursuing in trying to understand the 'world' we belong to as part of it - together with its 'sense' of which we use a small part to think with. Maybe Cantor and Goedel were smarter, yet I doubt if they could encompass the totality in its interactions up and down to draw wholistic conclusions upon the world they also were a small part of only. They might have known more than us. That's all. If one considers an infinite set for comp, (imaginary that is) unlimited and encompassing all (knowable and coming) ramifications into its computations, that is a different ballgame. I try to stay within our applicable limits and accept the limitations of our mental capabilities. Not only mine, those of other humans as well. I have no computer working with unlimited sets of data, unlimited ways of comp, unlimited options to consider and the unlimited choice to apply for results, I envy all who have that. Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems (maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words) "not Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited 'comp'. Excuse me for falling through a trap-door into a reply about things I am no expert in. I may have the wrong bootstraps. Cheers John - Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 12:20 AM Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Russell Standish writes: > Alternatively, it is the recognition that Nothing and Everything are > mathematically the same object (This is a little more subtle that > Pearce's "summing to zero", but it is essentially the same > argument). Now either Nothing exists, or something exists. Since Nothing and > Everything exhaust the possibilities, and they are identical, there is > no question left to answer. I don't follow the logic here. Let's suppose we accept that Nothing and Everything are the same. "Now either Nothing exists, or something exists." But where does the next phrase come from: Nothing and Everything exhaust the possibilities. That doesn't seem right. The two possibilities weren't Nothing and Everything, they were Nothing and something. Even if we accept that Nothing and Everything are the same, we then have to explain or decide whether Everything exists or merely some things exist. The question then becomes not, why is there something instead of nothing; but, why is there something instead of everything. Now, we don't know yet if everything exists, or merely some things exist, so it is an open question. But it does seem to be a question that needs to be answered. Hal Finney
Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to an essential conceptual error that exists in the current debating points of this topic, which in fact has been an egregious error in logic for the past 2500 years, ever since Plato. Recent postings cite: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Jonathan Colvin wrote: > > [quoting Stathis] > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the > > >duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I > > >"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I > > >don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new > > >system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and > > >in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person > > >and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it > > >doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't > > >think you can deny it. > > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference > >between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think > >anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with > >comp > >there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does not seem > >to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience. > > > >Jonathan Colvin > > Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include > what it is like to be that thing? > > --Stathis Papaioannou In 1996 at "Towards a Science of Consciousness" (Tucson) I presented several exhibits, each one highlighting some specific relational qualia of existence in isolation, and identifying each/all in reagrd to a potential single holistic description of being -and- performances of being. The one that has bearing here, was simply an apple - inside a black box which no light could enter, until the box was opened and photons could reach the surface of the apple. The discussion point went something like this: In contradistinction to the 2500 years old 'definition' of self and completeness set forth by Plato in his discussions of 'real' vis a vis 'ideal', notice is heregiven that the apple inside the closed box is - ideally - an entity which is without color ... absolutely and always - even though weak-logic presumes and assigns color 'to' things and entities, de facto. The full existential extent and outer-bound limit of the apple goes -only- up to BUT NOT BEYOND its physical manifestation; in this case in entity: its skin. Where skin -ends-, "apple" .. -ends- and does not 'exist'. However, 'color' - that which we first-order associate -with- apple, exists -solely- in that region -outside and beyond- ... where 'apple' does not exist. By sheer rigid definition of 'existence' - and logical definitions re 'sets' - apple and 'color' are and always must be -mutually exclusive-, with no Venn intersection at all. Conclusions: 1. No entity is 'complete' in and of itself; entities are "completed" only in co-presence of external environmentals. 2. Systems and entities -will have- qualia that exist (emergently) from I-Thou relations which they may not be internally aware of, or be self appreciative of, nor the impacts of these qualia on their 'self'. First and Third frames of reference can never be identical, and 'exhibition of qualia' versus 'access to qualia for feedback purposes' are quite different things. Cybernetic secondary connections 'smooth' and blur this relationship of being. (there is more, but I don't have time at the moment to continue; sorry to do a 'fermat', but I'll write again, if anyone cares to explore this thread after this posting today) Jamie Rose 19 May 2005
Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Le 19-mai-05, à 14:44, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Jonathan Colvin wrote: [quoting Stathis] >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the >duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I >"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I >don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new >system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and >in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person >and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it >doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't >think you can deny it. I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does not seem to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience. Jonathan Colvin Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? What do you mean by " include" ? Does the artificial brain proposed by your doctor "includes" you ? In a 1-person sense: yes (assuming c.) In a 3-person sense: no. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Le 19-mai-05, à 14:24, Patrick Leahy a écrit : I find this a very odd question to be asked on this list. To me, one of the main attractions of the "everything" thesis is that it provides the only possible answer to this question. Viz: as Jonathan pointed out, mathematical objects are logical necessities, and the thesis (at least in Tegmark's formulation) is that physical existence is identical to mathematical existance. You can look at my url for argument that physical existence emerges from mathematical existence. I have no clues that physical existence could just be equated to mathematical existence unless you attach consciousness to individuated bodies, but how? Despite this attractive feature, I'm fairly sure the thesis is wrong (so that there is just no answer to the big WHY?), but that's another story. I can argue that without accepting natural numbers you cannot justify them. So any theory which does not assumes the natural numbers cannot be a theory of everything. Once you accept the existence of natural numbers it is possible to explain how the belief in both math and physics arises. And with the explicit assumption of Descartes Mechanism, in a digital form (the computationalist hypothesis), I think such explanation is unique. Also, it is possible to explain why we cannot explain where our belief in natural numbers come from. Sorry for being so short, Bruno Paddy Leahy == Dr J. P. Leahy, University of Manchester, Jodrell Bank Observatory, School of Physics & Astronomy, Macclesfield, Cheshire SK11 9DL, UK Tel - +44 1477 572636, Fax - +44 1477 571618 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Jonathan Colvin wrote: [quoting Stathis] >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the >duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I >"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I >don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new >system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and >in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person >and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it >doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't >think you can deny it. I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does not seem to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience. Jonathan Colvin Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? --Stathis Papaioannou _ Sell your car for $9 on carpoint.com.au http://www.carpoint.com.au/sellyourcar
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
I find this a very odd question to be asked on this list. To me, one of the main attractions of the "everything" thesis is that it provides the only possible answer to this question. Viz: as Jonathan pointed out, mathematical objects are logical necessities, and the thesis (at least in Tegmark's formulation) is that physical existence is identical to mathematical existance. Despite this attractive feature, I'm fairly sure the thesis is wrong (so that there is just no answer to the big WHY?), but that's another story. Paddy Leahy == Dr J. P. Leahy, University of Manchester, Jodrell Bank Observatory, School of Physics & Astronomy, Macclesfield, Cheshire SK11 9DL, UK Tel - +44 1477 572636, Fax - +44 1477 571618
Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Patrick Leahy wrote: [quoting Quentin Anciaux, who responded to Patrick's original post] I thought of Observer Moment as containing the observer... What is the meaning of an OM (the same) which spread accross branches ? If you start by the assumption that OM are fundamental, then a "branch" is an OM. Or a branch is a consistent succession of OM ? I'm also learning a new "language" here as well, so forgive me if I got it wrong. I was trying to put the best "spin" I could on the idea of multiple pasts. Personally I'm not sympathetic to the OM concept in the first place, except as a useful device for anthropic calculations. By a "branch" I mean a branch of the wave function (Psi for short), which in MWI does literally have a branching structure in (configuration space + time). This is absolutely not an OM: for one thing, a branch is extended in time. Also, each branch of Psi describes a history for all the observers in the universe (not to mention all the non-self-aware bits), and hence contains (>>?) billions of OM at any given time. And of course a different OM for each observer at each moment. If the split forever is correct, then does a consciousness spread accross all those branch where the OM is in ? or just in one branch, and in other branches with the same OM, this is not the same consciousness ? This is really a matter of definition, I think. Is there a distinction between "consciousness" and "OM" ? I would say yes but I suspect many here would disagree. From my point of view, I'd prefer to say that each observer (and her consciousness) inhabits a specific branch and has only one past, even if it is indistinguishably different from that of a copy in another branch. If the later, why can it be said that it is in fact the same OM ? I'm with you. But if you take OM as fundamental, as some here do, you might prefer to re-sort the OMs scattered throughout the multiverse so that all identical OMs go into one "pot"; then you can choose to call this pot a single OM with a greater or lesser weight. In which case it is probably legitimate to talk about these having multiple pasts, though in another sense they have no past (they are self-contained moments!), only a memory of one (which is *not* multiple, by definition). Observers and observer-moments are not incompatible ideas. OM's are simply the moments that make up an observer's stream of consciousness. You might reasonably argue, if OM's cannot stand in isolation, but are always grouped together in a particular instantiation of an observer (debatable, but let's grant this is so), then isn't the idea of OM's a needless complication, compared to the traditional concept of an observer who persists through time? The short answer is that it is very difficult to come up with a consistent definition of an observer which covers all eventualities (persistence through time, multiple copies in the same or different universes, upload to a computer, etc.), and the idea of OM's allows you to define an observer on the fly, aknowledging that the idea is ultimately arbitrary. See my recent thread on "observers and observer-moments" for a slightly longer reply. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee® Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963
Re: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Le 18-mai-05, à 18:09, Stephen Paul King a écrit : Pearce's idea is not new and we have it from many thinkers that the totality of the multiverse must sum to zero, that is the essence of symmetry. It is the actuality of the content of our individual experiences (including all of the asymmetries) that we have to justify. I would say we should be able to justify both: where does the 3-person symmetries comes from, and where does the 1-person asymmetries come from. And this from a suitable definition of "observer-moment". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
observers and observer-moments
Regarding observer-moments: This is a good question because it provides an opportunity to explain the reason behind the idea of observer-moments (OM). Essentially, OM is the minimum unit of conscious experience. It is sometimes taken as being instantaneous, but if this presents theoretical problems, it can be redefined as observer-second or whatever you think the minimum should be. An individual's identity, or conscious experience over a period of time, is then constructed from a series of OM. "Constructed" in this context does not necessarily mean that any particular physical process takes place to string the OM's together. Most familiarly, there *is* a physical process doing just this: namely, the OM's follow (more precisely, supervene) in sequence from the electrochemical reactions in an individual brain. However, and this is the crucial insight, there is no reason to think that functionally the same multi-OM conscious interval cannot occur if the OM's are separated widely in time, space, or even across branches of the MW which can have no physical connection. This is because the OM's are "connected" only by virtue of their information content, which can transcend time, space, or being in different universes. This does not necessarily mean that any actual information transfer has to take place; it suffices that the relationship between the widely separated OM's is the same as it would have been if the information transfer had taken place in the usual way, such as in a functioning brain. For example, if I have the thought, "I am counting 1,2,3 bananas..." and by chance somewhere else in the multiverse there arises a sentient computer program which believes it is me, has the same memories as me up to that point, and continues "...4,5,6 bananas", then that latter computer program, although it has no physical connection to me and indeed could not even have possibly obtained any information from me in this universe, nevertheless will experience being me in the same way as if I had continued counting bananas in this universe in the usual manner. A consequence of the above is that it does not make sense to talk about where your consciousness "really" is, or whether it really is the "same" individual accross different instantiations, because a multi-OM conscious interval can be defined any way you like. You can decide that if an OM deviates sufficiently from some arbitrary standard, then that is a new individual. You can also have multiple instances of the "same" individual running in the same or different universes. The only absolute is the OM, and everything else is a construct. Superficially, this may all seem a bit strange: why bother? The reason I was driven to this view was from consideration of the philosophical problem of personal identity. It may seem straightforward that you are the same person as you were last year, but every atom in your body may be different, in a different configuration, and giving rise to different memories and other mental properties. (It may seem that at least the latter two are identical, but the similarity over even a relatively short time period is only approximate). Add to this the result of multiple thought experiments: what if your future self from next week came back in time; what if you were exactly duplicated via a Star Trek-type teleporter; what if you were resurrected in Heaven; what about the multiple near-exact copies of you in other branches of the MW; what about mind uploads; and so on. The only way to avoid the paradoxes of multiple identities is to accept that every apparent "identity" is a separate entity, and moreover that every moment of every apparent identity is a separate entity. This leads directly to the concept of the observer-moment, and the paradoxes disappear. --Stathis Papaioannou From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... Date: Wed, 18 May 2005 18:17:25 +0200 Le Mercredi 18 Mai 2005 17:57, Patrick Leahy a écrit : > > SNIP > > Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an > information-theoretic point of view, i.e. by identifying all > observer-moments in the multiverse which are equivalent as perceived by > the observer; in which case the above point is quite irrelevant. (But you > still have to distinguish the different branches to find the total measure > for each OM). Hi, I thought of Observer Moment as containing the observer... What is the meaning of an OM (the same) which spread accross branches ? If you start by the assumption that OM are fundamental, then a "branch" is an OM. Or a branch is a consistent succession of OM ? If the split forever is correct, then does a consciousness spread accross all those branch where the OM is in ? or just in one branch, and in other branches with the same OM, this is not the same consciousness ? If the later, why can it be said that it is in fact the
