A friend sends me this link:
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/CONSC_INFO_PANPSY.html
which will perhaps be of interest to a number of people here.
But the familiar first sentence just sends me into orbit:
The hard problem of consciousness, according to
David Chalmers, is explaining why
Le 21-mai-05, à 20:32, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Come on, now. Nobody here, understands what Bruno's done, except
*maybe* Bruno.
You exaggerate, I think. And you take the risk of mystifying what I
have done, which is far more simple than you imagine.
Of course there is a conceptual difficulty,
Stathis writes
photon or to *be* a tree photosynthesising. Most people would say that
photons and trees aren't conscious, and therefore they *can* be entirely
understood from a 3rd person perspective.
On this list?? You think that most people *here* presume that
photons and trees are not
Lee,
There are some things that can be known by examination of an object, and
there are other things that can only be known by being the object. When the
object is a human brain, this latter class of things is consciousness. (When
the object is something else, this latter class of thing is...
Le 22-mai-05, à 10:13, Lee Corbin a écrit :
[Stathis] Perhaps this is true, but it is
not logically consistent to say that it must be true and still
maintain the
1st person/ 3rd person distinction we have been discussing. This is
because
the whole point of the distinction is that it is not
First, let me say that I appreciate the comments of Bruno
and Stathis in regard to questions about Chalmerite mysteries;
Unfortunately, I have not quite had time to examine them closely
but they look exceedingly promising.
Meanwhile, I need help.
Who wrote the following? How does one tell?
Bruno writes
Do you imagine that it's possible that we could go to
another star, and encounter beings who discoursed with
us about every single other thing, yet denied that they
had consciousness, and professed that they had no idea
what we were talking about? Yes or No! I want an
Stathis writes
There are some things that can be known by examination of an object, and
there are other things that can only be known by being the object.
Okay; but some examples are probably necessary. (1) Only Mozart can
know what it's like for the Mozart auditory system to hear C-sharp
on
Dear Lee,
Are we not dancing around the Turing Test here?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, May 22, 2005 2:23 PM
Subject: RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!
Bruno writes
Do you
I looked into this mailing list because I thought I'd come up with a
fairly cogent objection to Max Tegmark's version of the everything
thesis, i.e. that there is no distinction between physical and
mathematical reality... our multiverse is one particular solution to a set
of differential
Without getting into a long hurrang, I think that Tegmark is correct, at least
in part. Briefly, there has to be a reason why these alternate worlds exist.
I'm referring to the Everett-Wheeler hypothesis and not just wishful thinking.
Granted, if I remember correctly, Tegmark does deal with the
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 12:03:55AM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
...
A very similar argument (rubbish universes) was put forward long ago
against David Lewis's modal realism, and is discussed in his On the
plurality of worlds. As I understand it, Lewis's defence was that there
is no measure
I'd rather be reading quantum physics, but...
- Original Message -
From: Lee Corbin
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Challenging the Basic Assumptions
Date: Fri, 20 May 2005 18:53:34 -0700
aet writes
Jesse [writes] but hey, this list is all about rambling speculations
I would agree with Russell, here. That's what I meant when I said that I didn't
like Tegmark's mathematical model but I could tolerate it. In the end, it gives
me what I need in that it supports parallel universes and doesn't threaten E/W,
etc. At the same time, I don't have a dog in every
On Mon, 23 May 2005, Russell Standish wrote:
I think most of us concluded that Tegmark's thesis is somewhat
ambiguous. One interpretation of it that both myself and Bruno tend
to make is that it is the set of finite axiomatic systems (finite sets
of axioms, and recusively enumerated
Patrick Leahy writes:
Sure enough, you came up with my objection years ago, in the form of the
White Rabbit paradox. Since usage is a bit vague, I'll briefly re-state
it here. The problem is that worlds which are law-like, that is which
behave roughly as if there are physical laws but not
Regarding the nature of Tegmark's mathematical objects, I found some
old discussion on the list, a debate between me and Russell Standish,
in which Russell argued that Tegmark's objects should be understood as
formal systems, while I claimed that they should be seen more as pure
Platonic objects
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 04:00:39AM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
Hmm, my lack of a pure maths background may be getting me into trouble
here. What about real numbers? Do you need an infinite axiomatic system to
handle them? Because it seems to me that your ensemble of digital strings
is
I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm
focusing on what the behavior system perceives (measures). If all
possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system
should likewise exist in a superpositional state. If there are say, 10
RMiller writes
I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm
focusing on what the behavior system perceives (measures). If all
possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system
should likewise exist in a superpositional state. If there
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