Large has a lot to do with old. Universes where conscious life arose
by a lengthy evolutionary process will have larger measure (by vitue
of simpler initial conditions) than do universes whose conscious life
arises spontaneously, or by relatively short evolutionary processes.
It is also interesti
Bruno,
I have found myself in this lifetime to be a staunch
OP-ponent and challenger to Godel's incompleteness
theorems.
In the way that they are structured - with the premises
Godel preset, of initial boundaries for what he was
about to design by 'proof' - his theorems are both
sufficiently
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Stathis wrote, Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM
>
>
>>A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an
>>important difference between this and conscious experience.
>>Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically
>>collected together to make a coherent larger st
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced
>>doesn't rule it out of a
>>scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can.
>
>
>
> OK, but we were discussing about theorie
Stathis also wrote in the same email, Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
> Brent wrote
> > That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a
> > world model. On the other
> > hand, if we
Stathis wrote, Friday, June 30, 2006 12:24 AM
> A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an
> important difference between this and conscious experience.
> Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically
> collected together to make a coherent larger structure,
> but they do ne
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 3:34 PM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
>
> John M wrote:
> >
> > ...
> > >Stathis wrote:
> > >...
> >
> "I agree. Other people are part of the model of the
> world we form. A
Hello, Quentin:
we agree in spite of a different formulation:
"death" - I wrote about it as a process in a concept, while I feel you refer
to the 'death' of a 'person' or whatever, as a state.
The person (or whatever) is a complex entity of its (his?) interconnected
and self-reflective (yes, eve
Interesting question. I am interested in your own answer. I let Stathis
answer (to see if he will give the comp one).
Note that the comp answer here is not needed in the UDA argument where
overlapping reconstitution (like in duplications) are never followed by
somethings which looks (at least)
Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> My point is that of the thread title "Only Existence is necessary?"
> Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is
> insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the
> rest of his diagonalization trick
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:59, James N Rose a écrit :
>
> Math and reductive science ignore and dis-consider collateral
> co-extancy.
The comp assumption leads to the less reductive possible account of the
person and person POVs.
For example, comp does not guaranties *any* survival, but it guara
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Sure it is. Just because something cannot be directly experienced
> doesn't rule it out of a
> scienctific model: quarks can't be observed, but their effects can.
OK, but we were discussing about theories. general relativity, as a
theory d
Le 01-juil.-06, à 19:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> That's not contrary to my conception at all. I certainly do "bet" on
> the existence of others, and
> of chairs and tables and stars and electrons and myself, and all for
> the essentially the same reasons.
OK.
>
> I don't understand the c
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