David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
> > > conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we
> > > don't know how?
>
> It may be impossible in principle (i.e.
> > unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific).
> >
> > The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it
> is
> > delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only
> > agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy
>
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>>On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
>
> conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that
>
>>>we don't know how?
>>
>>It may be impossible in princi
> On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> > But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that
>> we don't know how?
>
> It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
> ex-hy
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
> > conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we
> > don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hyp
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.
>
>
> Yes.
We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own.
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.
>
>
> Yes.
We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own.
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>
> > If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
> > that matter is redundant,
>
>
> Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
> true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary mat
Le 11-oct.-06, à 05:46, George Levy a écrit :
Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious, only that it can detect if the first mac
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>
> > If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
> > that matter is redundant,
>
>
> Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
> true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary mat
Le 10-oct.-06, à 22:41, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
> Bruno:
> you wrote:
> "...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ..."
>
> Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1?
Because it is equal to six.
> you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally
> instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly t
Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit :
> David Nyman wrote:
>> But this conclusion
>> is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
>> role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
>> equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but
>> rather
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
> If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
> that matter is redundant,
Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even
just the phy
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