RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> > > > > > > I don't > disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st> > > > > person, > pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order> > > > > other > than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience> > > > > > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and > > can't be> > > > > > chopped finer than some limit.> > > >> > > > The order of a pair of > experiences is set by the fact that one is> > > > considered first and the > other second, perhaps because there is a> > > > subjective sense of the > passage of time, perhaps because the second> > > > experience contains a > memory of the first, perhaps due to some other> > > > subtle aspect of the > content of the experiences.> > >> > > But on this view an experience is a > complex thing, far from the > > atomic perception of a red flash, and even > includes parts that are not > > conscious. This comports with my speculation > that a conscious atom is > > fairly complex and has a significant duration > such that it overlaps the > > conscious atoms before and after. This overlap > provides the ordering and > > the sense of time and continuity.> > > > No > doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, > > > containing at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, > > > an understanding of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a > > > subjective duration because however long a perception is, it can't be > > > instantaneous. However, I don't see why it is necessary to speculate > > that > there must be overlap, or even what overlap could possibly mean in > > this > context. Static frames in a film and the infinitesimals studied in > > > calculus give the impression of continuous motion without the need for > > > overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in a film, I > > would > say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states > > P1,P2,P3 > such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not > > give rise > to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. > > This defines > an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap.> > > > > > In the > real world, the> > > > subjective content reflects brain activity which in > turn reflects> > > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order > evolved in the > > first> > > > place), but this relationship is only a > contingent one.> > >> > > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, > but comp also > > leads to strange if not absurd conclusions.> > >> > > > If > the pair of> > > > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no > way for the> > > > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated > in the > > order AB> > > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the > content in some> > > > significant way.> > >> > > That assumes the > experiences can be discretely separated with not > > overlap. Certainly there > are instances like that: the experience just > > before you lose > consciousness due to a concussion and the experience > > just as you regain > it are disjoint in this way. You only recover > > continuity through > accessing memories and there is a gap even in that > > memory. But in > ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent > > in the overlap of > conscious atoms.> > > > I don't think actual situations where you lose > consciousness are a good > > example, because for technical reasons the "cut" > cannot be clean and > > instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are > useful. If you were > > instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and > later reconstituted > > with every atom in exactly the same configuration, so > that e.g. every > > action potential travelling down an axon continues where > it left off, > > then I don't see how it is possible that you would > experience a > > discontinuity.> > I agree that you would not. But it is > because of the underlying continuity of the brain physics which has neural > messages in transit from here to there which are not part of consciosuness - > but will become so. Note that things like nerve potentials obey second order > differential equations and so require initial conditions that include a rate > of change which defines a time direction. > > > > > > > This means there is > no natural order of physical states (or abstract> > > > machine states): the > order can be anything, and the subjective > > order of> > > > experience will > be unchanged. It also means there is no natural > > order of> > > > > subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which> > > > > seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on> > > > > any theory or assumption about consciousness.> > >> > > No natural order of > physical states? Are you denying causality?> > > > I meant that you can't > necessa
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st > > > > person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order > > > > other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience > > > > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and > can't be > > > > chopped finer than some limit. > > > > > > The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is > > > considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a > > > subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second > > > experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other > > > subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. > > > > But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the > atomic perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not > conscious. This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is > fairly complex and has a significant duration such that it overlaps the > conscious atoms before and after. This overlap provides the ordering and > the sense of time and continuity. > > No doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, > containing at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, > an understanding of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a > subjective duration because however long a perception is, it can't be > instantaneous. However, I don't see why it is necessary to speculate > that there must be overlap, or even what overlap could possibly mean in > this context. Static frames in a film and the infinitesimals studied in > calculus give the impression of continuous motion without the need for > overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in a film, I > would say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states > P1,P2,P3 such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not > give rise to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. > This defines an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap. > > > > In the real world, the > > > subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects > > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the > first > > > place), but this relationship is only a contingent one. > > > > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also > leads to strange if not absurd conclusions. > > > > > If the pair of > > > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the > > > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the > order AB > > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some > > > significant way. > > > > That assumes the experiences can be discretely separated with not > overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the experience just > before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the experience > just as you regain it are disjoint in this way. You only recover > continuity through accessing memories and there is a gap even in that > memory. But in ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent > in the overlap of conscious atoms. > > I don't think actual situations where you lose consciousness are a good > example, because for technical reasons the "cut" cannot be clean and > instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are useful. If you were > instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and later reconstituted > with every atom in exactly the same configuration, so that e.g. every > action potential travelling down an axon continues where it left off, > then I don't see how it is possible that you would experience a > discontinuity. I agree that you would not. But it is because of the underlying continuity of the brain physics which has neural messages in transit from here to there which are not part of consciosuness - but will become so. Note that things like nerve potentials obey second order differential equations and so require initial conditions that include a rate of change which defines a time direction. > > > > This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract > > > machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective > order of > > > experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural > order of > > > subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which > > > seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on > > > any theory or assumption about consciousness. > > > > No natural order of physical states? Are you denying causality? > > I meant that you can't necessarily work back from the mental states to > determine the order of the physical states underpinning them. Probably not from the conscious part of the mental state - but as above it seems that for your thought experiment you need to include more than wha
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes: > > > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st > > > > > > person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order > > > > > > other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience > > > > > > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be > > > > > > chopped finer than some limit.> > > > The order of a pair of > > > experiences is set by the fact that one is > > considered first and the > > > other second, perhaps because there is a > > subjective sense of the > > > passage of time, perhaps because the second > > experience contains a > > > memory of the first, perhaps due to some other > > subtle aspect of the > > > content of the experiences. > > But on this view an experience is a > > > complex thing, far from the atomic perception of a red flash, and even > > > includes parts that are not conscious. This comports with my speculation > > > that a conscious atom is fairly complex and has a significant duration > > > such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and after. This overlap > > > provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity. No doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, containing at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, an understanding of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a subjective duration because however long a perception is, it can't be instantaneous. However, I don't see why it is necessary to speculate that there must be overlap, or even what overlap could possibly mean in this context. Static frames in a film and the infinitesimals studied in calculus give the impression of continuous motion without the need for overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in a film, I would say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states P1,P2,P3 such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not give rise to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. This defines an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap. > > In the real world, the > > subjective content reflects brain activity which > > in turn reflects > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order > > evolved in the first > > place), but this relationship is only a contingent > > one. > > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also > > leads to strange if not absurd conclusions. > > > If the pair of > > > > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the > > > > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB > > > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some > > > > significant way.> > That assumes the experiences can be discretely > > separated with not overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the > > experience just before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the > > experience just as you regain it are disjoint in this way. You only recover > > continuity through accessing memories and there is a gap even in that > > memory. But in ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent in > > the overlap of conscious atoms. I don't think actual situations where you lose consciousness are a good example, because for technical reasons the "cut" cannot be clean and instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are useful. If you were instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and later reconstituted with every atom in exactly the same configuration, so that e.g. every action potential travelling down an axon continues where it left off, then I don't see how it is possible that you would experience a discontinuity. > > This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract > > > > machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective order of > > > > experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural order of > > > > subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which > > > > seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on > > > > any theory or assumption about consciousness.> > No natural order of > > physical states? Are you denying causality? I meant that you can't necessarily work back from the mental states to determine the order of the physical states underpinning them. > > > I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in > > > > > arithmetic Platonia. Are we to imagine that some large number > > > > > 3875835442... is a single, atomic experience and another number > > > > > 3876976342... is another single, atomic experience and they have no > > > > > other relation than their natural order? In that case, they would be > > > > > experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness just in > > > > > virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or > > > > > what? Or are we to imagine another Pla
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means
> "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their
> continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I
> don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the
> UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed
> consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes.
> But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related
> by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a
> sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal
> environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is
> only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be
> counted as a computation.
This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set
their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and
for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other
possible interpretations?
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation
> we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all
> equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal
> number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, >
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related
> to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the
> infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to
> our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person
> notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person
> computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete
> states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal
> number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable
> ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of
> self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable*
> computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > >
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > >
> _
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Hal, a decade ago I 'read' your text easier than now: you firmed up your vocabulary - gradually out of my understanding. Sorry. * You seem to accept 'observer moments' and their interaction - even postulate one variable needed. How long is an OM? a million years (cosmology) or a msec? Even if it is a portion of the latter, it makes the existence quite discontinuous - with all the difficulties in it. If it is continuous, then how can we talk about 'moments'? Should we assign an equal rate change to all existence (meaning: ONE selection for the OM length)? If it can be ANY, varying from the infinitely short to the other extreme, it would 'wash away' any sense of the meaning of an Observer MOMENT concept. I think the OM is the figment of us, human observers, who want to use an 'understandable' model. [Like: numbers (in the human logic sense).] Then, in view of the resulting 'unfathomable', we 'complicate' these models - originally created FOR comprehension - into incomprehensibility. [The way as e.g. to bridge Bohm's Explicate to the Implicate (by Nic de Cusa's 2nd principle, left out by Bohm: the "Complicate" - what I like to assign as math).] * That 'one' variable property you mention as needed for state- interaction is IMO not necessarily o n e within our (present) comprehension. I like your 'abhorring' a selection: we could select only from within boundaries of our *present* epistemic cognitive inventory. (Or: from a much narrower one dating back 2500+ years or any time in between). John Mikes - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 11:02 PM Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of universes [which are a sub set of possible "objects"]] is that they are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer moment are fixed for that observer moment. This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that selection? Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed properties as a possibility? This seems more in accord with a zero information ensemble. Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact - that is also a selection. I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one variable property through which universe states can interact. The idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable that one could call hyper existence through which they can interact. They interact by mutually altering each others hyper existence property. This variable property should not have just a binary set of values as a possibility but should also have many discrete levels as a possibility - again to avoid selection. In other words a universe state could experience a non square pulse of hyper existence which could span many of the "this particular state" to other state interactions. This would be like a "wave" of hyper existence propagating through some succession of universe states. Non binary, non square pulses of propagating hyper existence could be a basis for what is called "consciousness" - a "flow" of modulated awareness. Given a random component to the underlying dynamic [which I have also discussed ] some such wave propagations with non binary, non square pulses of hyper existence would be through infinite strings of successive states that would all be "life" - and even beyond that - "SAS" friendly. Hal Ruhl -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.432 / Virus Database: 268.17.14/657 - Release Date: 1/29/2007 9:04 AM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error (was: rep: rep: the meaning of life)
On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > >> universe. > > > Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' > > t care. But > we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. > > Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? I prefer to assume what I can see. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>
>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>> their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was
>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>> series of disjoint states.
>
>
>
>
> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
> related by a computation for making sense.
>
> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation.
> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and
"universal number". We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic expressions. Do
we then represent the computation by a sequence of goedel numbers, each number
corresponding to a mental state (assuming the computation is a simulation at a
sufficient level to satisfy comp)? But what number is "universal"?
>
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to
> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
> universal number.
>
> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states (which
may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of experience); it
is not inherent in the states. And this order is relative to different goedel
numberings?
Brent Meeker
>
> Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it
> cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can
> be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily
> from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness
> is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person
> computation.
>
> That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only
> relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800 > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > > > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > > > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > > > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise > discrete > > > > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > > > was my > > > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > > > > > series of disjoint states. > > > > > > > > > > > > Brent Meeker > > > > > > > > > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete > computational > > > > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an > > > > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of > > > > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve > > > > > continuity of consciousness. > > > > > > > > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent. > > > > > > > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them > > > in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a > > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as > the 1s > > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the > > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order > as in > > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped > arbitrarily > > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of > conscious states. > > > > > > > > Brent Meeker > > > > > > I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly > > > in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia. > > > > Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic > Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal > order that can conflict with the inherent order. > > But "1 2 4 7 6 3..." is a string in Platonia, always "there" even if you > don't explicitly state it (as you must do in the real world), and it > doesn't manage to confuse the order of the counting numbers. > > > >It's not as > > > if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: > > > they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a > > > sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. > Explicit > > > ordering in the physical world is important from a third person > > > perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person > experience, and > > > the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first > person > > > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no > > > external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is > sufficient to > > > create the first person impression of continuity. > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st > person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order > other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be > chopped finer than some limit. > > The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is > considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a > subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second > experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other > subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the atomic perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not conscious. This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is fairly complex and has a significant duration such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and after. This overlap provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity. > In the real world, the > subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects > environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first > place), but this relationship is only a contingent one. Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also leads to strange if not absurd conclusions. > If the pair of > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some > significant way. That assumes the experiences can be discretely separated with not overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the experience just before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the experience just as you regain it are disjoint
Re: _R=E9p_:_The_Meaning_of_Life
Le 29-janv.-07, à 06:07, Tom Caylor a écrit : >> >>> My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in >>> this sense. �I think the answer is that we long to find meaning >>> solely >>> through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to >>> erect science as the god over all meaning. > >> That is just scientism, not science. And then lobian machine are >> already able to guess correctly that meaning or truth is much vaster >> than reason or proof. You should love comp :-) >> >> Bruno > > I'm glad I agree with you that the existence of the first-person (or > meaning or truth) cannot be ignored through an eliminative proof. But > your comp seems also to be only eliminative in nature, noting the > words above "vaster". Thus meaning and truth are simply proved to be > things that are beyond reach. ZF can prove that PA-meaning and PA-truth is beyond PA. PA cannot prove that, but can guess it, or bet on it. Actually all machine M1 can prove that M2-meaning is beyond M2. Some machine cn prove this about herself in some conditional way. No machine can prove its limitation in some absolute way (that would be akin to proving self-consistency). > This doesn't seem to be very useful. Well, about meaning and truth it is even beyond expression or definability. It is not less useful than saying that G... has no name ... > And yet you (have to?) believe that meaning and truth are "out there" > somewhere ... This can help. Hopefully only ... > and that these systems/sets of proof are headed in the right > direction. ... You can prove it for a simpler lobian machine. Simpler than you. For *you*, relatively to you, indeed, IF comp is correct, you can only hope *you* are headed in the right direction. This can make you modest and cautious in fundamental matter, which could be good ethically (when you think about all the bads done by the uncartesian enemies of doubt. > This seems to be saying that a fractal, as it gets > increasingly complex, is approaching the truth. This is correct for some algorithmic way to approach the Mandelbrot set (which can be considered as Truing equivalent, actually). But in provability matter things are more rich (cf the hypostases, etc.) > This is not simply an > analogy. You are saying that a mathematical entity is approaching > *the truth*, all the kinds of truth that there are, including the > solution to the problem of evil, and the answer to the meaning of > life. Some machine can do that, but never in a provable way. I you want, this gives an universal algorithm for never moving away from God: never listen to anyone giving you an algorithm for approaching God ... > The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the > existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core > the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"? Like Plotinus, I define the first person by the knower, and I define the incorrigible knower like Theaetetus and Plotinus as the correct believer, following the tradition who those who knows that, when awake, they cannot believe for sure they are awake, albeit we can know to be dreaming, wrong, etc.. Russell said once this is debatable, and indeed it is. Oops I must go, See you in two/three days, Bruno BTW, I do think that the problem of evil is related to the fact that it is consistent that we could be inconsistent (= Godel II theorem in case "we" = a consistent lobian machine): Dt -> DBf (cf also Benacerraf: God, Godel, and the Devil, ref in my Lille thesis). Possible Evil could be a comp price to pay for Possible Freedom. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Le 29-janv.-07, à 00:11, Jason Resch a écrit : > Thanks, that was an interesting read. I find it surprising how many > people find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always > assuming the worst is happening. Instead of focusing on the good or > bad, I look at the variety it produces. Many worlds leaves no rock > unturned and no path untread, it realizes every possibility and to me > this is an amazing and beautiful result. Yes. Although it makes sense in QM only because QM justifies that some possibility have more weight than others. Now a universal turing machine (in the mathematical sense) cannot distinguish ersatz linguistic worlds (cf David Lewis) from "real" one, and this asks already for a "MWI" interpretation of arithmetic. It less clear that some world will be less weighted (and that is what we call the hunting of white rabbits). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
> their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was
> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
> series of disjoint states.
Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
related by a computation for making sense.
So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation.
You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
universal number.
This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it
cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can
be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily
from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness
is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person
computation.
That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only
relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes:> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> > > > > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the> > > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of> > > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete> > > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > > was my> > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a> > > > series of disjoint states.> > > > >> > > > > Brent Meeker> > > >> > > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational> > > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an> > > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of> > > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve> > > > continuity of consciousness.> > >> > > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.> > >> > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them > > in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious states.> > >> > > Brent Meeker> > > > I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly > > in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia. > > Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal order that can conflict with the inherent order.But "1 2 4 7 6 3..." is a string in Platonia, always "there" even if you don't explicitly state it (as you must do in the real world), and it doesn't manage to confuse the order of the counting numbers. > >It's not as > > if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: > > they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a > > sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit > > ordering in the physical world is important from a third person > > perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person experience, and > > the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first person > > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no > > external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to > > create the first person impression of continuity.> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be chopped finer than some limit. The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. In the real world, the subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first place), but this relationship is only a contingent one. If the pair of experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some significant way.This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective order of experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural order of subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on any theory or assumption about consciousness. > I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic Platonia. Are we to imagine that some large number 3875835442... is a single, atomic experience and another number 3876976342... is another single, atomic experience and they have no other relation than their natural order? In that case, they would be experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness just in virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or what? Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine, that generates both these numbers in a certain sequenc
