Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the 
>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of 
>> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete 
>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It was 
>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a 
>> series of disjoint states.
> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be 
> related by a computation for making sense.
> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation. 
> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all 
> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number 
> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.

That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
"universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic expressions.  Do 
we then represent the computation by a sequence of goedel numbers, each number 
corresponding to a mental state (assuming the computation is a simulation at a 
sufficient level to satisfy comp)?  But what number is "universal"?

> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which 
> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to 
> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all 
> universal number.
> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, 
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be 
> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it 
> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained 
> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.

OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states (which 
may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of experience); it 
is not inherent in the states.  And this order is relative to different  goedel 

Brent Meeker

> Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it 
> cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can 
> be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily 
> from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness 
> is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person 
> computation.
> That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only 
> relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?
> Bruno
> > 

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