Re: The Amoeba's Secret - English Version started
On Sun, Mar 01, 2009 at 05:55:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Kim, > > I didn't expect you to send the translation of the Amoeba's Secret > (AS) on the list. But it is OK, and you did a rather very good job. > > For the other: "The Amoeba's Secret" is the book which has been > ordered to me when I won the LE MONDE prize of the best thesis in > 1998. For obscure reasons (which I don't want to talk about) it has > not been published, it is the only prize LE MONDE which has not been > published. Thanks for sharing these old wounds with us. FWIW, I have read so far the story up to the end of your undergrad days, and I think it is very well written, and as I commented to Kim J - the chapter "Amoeba's secret" would make an excellent basis for a short film. So far, Le Monde's decision not to publish is completely inexplicable (I can understand that the thesis itself being too technical might be a reason for not publishing that). Was there any discussion of removing some of the personal elements from the sorry affair that happened when your thesis was submitted to ULB? Even with politics operating behind the scene (which you have hinted), I can't imagine that nothing of the work is publishable. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal : > All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in > "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can > you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal" > of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness. > > Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed > but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you > could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture" is > allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- > argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very > notion of selfishness. > > I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be > the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of > country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and > without my consent. OK? Living in the first country is equivalent to allowing a contract where you agree to a gain today at the cost of suffering tomorrow, like selling your soul to the devil. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: AUDA Page
Hello, have incorporated most of Bruno's change wishes: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/web/auda Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
Stathis, Bruno, >> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture >> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of >> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule >> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you >> to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". You have already answered your question in the first two sentences with the last two sentences. >But could someone makes >> the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question >> which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the >> physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. In law it is usual that with personal rights, consent can be withdrawn anytime. Why should it be different with duplicates? So, if a duplicate withdraws consent, every prior consent is nullified. >> Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to >> reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source >> which is on fire? Bruno_[n] can decide for himself if he goes on the mission or not. It they decide not to (some or all of them), you have to cope with an army of Brunos though. Maybe they could translate your book into english? ;-)) > made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this > would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt > the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how > short the time since differentiation. That would lead to terrible consequences. You would have slaves! How long would your willingness to hurt them last, after differentiation? Assuming duplication technologies, these guys can stick around for very long, so maybe after a 1000 years they are more similar to 'me in a 1000 years' than to you. Why should you have the right to hurt people like me? In case of availability of duplication technology, there can be only one rule, without exemption: every duplicate has the same rights as the original (it is as the original in any sense that matters), immediately. You have no more rights over your duplicates as I have over mine; duplicates are not things to be owned, but persons. (There is only one right where one should have priority over one's own code: the decision to make duplicates in the first place.) Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal : > >> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to >> torture >> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of >> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule >> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you >> to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes >> the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question >> which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of >> the >> physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. >> Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to >> reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source >> which is on fire? > > Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in > advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was > made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this > would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt > the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how > short the time since differentiation. All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal" of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishness. Do you prefer to live in a country 1 where "self-torture" is allowed but only when the decision is made before the duplication (and yes you could be the victim indeed), or in a country 2 where "self-torture" is allowed after the duplication. It seems to me that your midazolam- argument (I re-quote below(*)) should in fine relativize the very notion of selfishness. I think it is preferable to live in the first country: yes I could be the victim, but I can remember my consent. In the second type of country, I could even more so be the tortured one ... eventually; and without my consent. OK? I guess you did see this, because of your terrible assumption: "Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, ...". The "real" question is: let us suppose you are not selfish ... can you sympathize with those who will propose some right of self-torture? Note that in "The prestige", the self-inflicting decision is taken before, by Angier. Borden had less choice, and it is as he got the full secret that nobody really can both remember and stay alive. (Here I am inconsistent or really near inconsistency, as "the prestige"). With comp, selfishness is not a problem. It is selfishness + ignorance: this mix can generate suffering. Bruno (*) Stathis wrote (2009/2/27): > This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for > personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me > if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) > will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there > exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences > would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated > every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory > loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that > taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have > to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that > dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter. > If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I > don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to > anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about > that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So > if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be > consistent I should also think that death is no big deal. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Amoeba's Secret - English Version started
Hi Kim, I didn't expect you to send the translation of the Amoeba's Secret (AS) on the list. But it is OK, and you did a rather very good job. For the other: "The Amoeba's Secret" is the book which has been ordered to me when I won the LE MONDE prize of the best thesis in 1998. For obscure reasons (which I don't want to talk about) it has not been published, it is the only prize LE MONDE which has not been published. They were supposed to publish the thesis, but judging it to technical they asked me to describe the story of the thesis, despite they new it is a bit sad. But it t contains a good explanation of both UDA and its arithmetical translation AUDA (the interviex of the introspective universal machine) and where those ideas come from. That could help if only because it is far shorter than "Conscience et Mécanisme". You can see it as an enlarged joining post. In that book I am using the term "psychology" of machine instead of "theology", which despite its connotation is far more well suited, especially concerning the secret feature of the "amoeba's" discourse, and which basically concerns the corona G* minus G of the discourse of the self- referentially correct machine. The machine is mute on that, or assert those proposition in an interrogative way. It is the magic of comp: it gives you a logic of what is "true" (ASSUMING comp) but unprovable (ASSUMING comp and some amount of self-consistency). Best, Bruno On 28 Feb 2009, at 13:27, Kim Jones wrote: > The Amoeba’s Secret > > > > by Bruno Marchal > > > > May 19 2000 > > > > English version by K. Jones > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal : > It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture > their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of > course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule > with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not want you > to do on him/her (except to save your soul)". But could someone makes > the decision before the duplication? This is an advanced question > which will make sense when we will all be virtual (with respect of the > physical layer). Comp is consistent with a variety of answers. > Less provocative, a similar question is: do I have the right to > reconstitute an army of "Bruno" to extinguish a nuclear energy source > which is on fire? Assuming I were completely selfish and ruthless, I would not agree in advance to do anything that would hurt my copy before the copy was made, since I might end up being the copy. But after the copying this would no longer be a consideration, and I would not hesitate to hurt the copy or the original (depending on which one I was) no matter how short the time since differentiation. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
