David Nyman wrote:
...
> Now, you don't of course have to accept COMP. But if you want to be a
> physical realist, it means you can only hang on to the computational
> explanation of mind by eliminating the mind itself from reality.
> Personally, not being committed to such an explanation, this d
Rex Allen wrote:
> A further thought:
>
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 4:34 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>> Of course a computational narrative may turn out
>> not to be the way to go, but I strongly suspect that we still await a
>> revolution in - well not physics, but..what? being-science? (gawd) -
>> tha
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about
the validit
2009/7/31 Bruno Marchal :
> Hmm... It is a bit like David, you put to much emphasis, to say the
> least, on the first person, which is the subject of consciousness.
I'm not sure you fully grasp my position on this yet - we're still
struggling to an extent with semantics. And of course, your
per
2009/7/31 Rex Allen :
> So yes, I've no doubt that one can "explain" consciousness by pointing
> to some more fundamental process that you infer from the contents of
> our conscious experience.
>
> But since this more fundamental substrate in turn requires an
> explanation, your net explanatory g
2009/7/31 Rex Allen :
> I don't see that the electron's experiential aspect contributes in any
> way to my experience of electrons. And, in a easier to visualize
> vein, the same goes for chairs. Maybe there's something that it's
> like to be a chair, but this is irrelevant to my conscious expe
A further thought:
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 4:34 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Of course a computational narrative may turn out
> not to be the way to go, but I strongly suspect that we still await a
> revolution in - well not physics, but..what? being-science? (gawd) -
> that will be in a primary se
I comment on Rex's post, as quoted by David, and then I comment
David's post.
On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
> 2009/7/30 Rex Allen :
>
>> It seems to me that the primary meaning of "to exist" is "to be
>> conscious".
Hmm.. I do not completely disagree, because I can prove (w
On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 4:34 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> So my point is simply: let's start from the understanding that to
> exist is just and only what it is to exist-for-oneself: the defining
> characteristic of existence is 'taking everything personally'. The
> standard put-down at this point is
On 31 Jul 2009, at 18:05, 1Z wrote:
>
> If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical
> proofs only prove mathematical "existence", not onltolgical
> existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 "exists" mathematically,
> but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD
Is an atom RITSIAR? Is
Hi,
2009/7/31 1Z :
>
>
>
> On 31 July, 14:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 31 Jul 2009, at 12:43, 1Z wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
>>
>> >>> But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
>
On 31 July, 14:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Jul 2009, at 12:43, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
>
> >>> But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
> >>> mental
> >>> from the physical
On 31 Jul 2009, at 12:43, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
>>
>>> But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
>>> mental
>>> from the physical
>>
>> It is usually called the mind-body problem. There a
On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z wrote:
> There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution
> means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some
> vague way that mind and matter are different things.
Do elaborate. It would be really helpful to have an exactly stated
exposition of the p
2009/7/31 1Z :
> Since the mental is uncontroversially not a fundamental item in physics. it
> has to be
> higher-level or emergent in some way, like shoes and ships and sealing-wax.
Blimey! Thanks, Peter - you couldn't have expressed a circular
argument more succinctly! However, my reformula
On 31 July, 10:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
>
> > But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
> > mental
> > from the physical
>
> It is usually called the mind-body problem. There are many good book
> on the subject.
There are
On 31 Jul 2009, at 10:32, 1Z wrote (to David):
> But you haven't said what the problem is in the emergence of the
> mental
> from the physical
It is usually called the mind-body problem. There are many good book
on the subject.
My own work is partially a reformulation of that problem (and
p
On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/7/30 1Z :
>
> > Cart before the horse:
> > Why should anyone believe in an ontological gap that isn't backed by
> > an explanatory gap?
>
> Why indeed?
Weren't you arguing for one?
> > The mere existence of the mental implies nothing whatsoever
> >
On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:46, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 July, 18:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 27 Jul 2009, at 14:57, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 27 July, 09:31, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
The UDA is a reasoning which shows that once we postulate an
"ontological" physical universal, i
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