Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote: You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously computable, not even partially). Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly interested in, with respect to comp is what is the relation between the 1-p notions and the 3-p ones, from the point of view of causality (which you can put in scare quotes if you prefer). IOW, any 1-p notion, such as pain, is not only non-computable (as opposed to inferrable by analogy) from any 3-p perspective, but is seemingly irrelevant to the unfolding of the 3-p account with which it is (somehow) associated. What scope is there, in the unfolding of the infinity of computations by the UD, for 1-p experience to be viewed as having any consequences beyond those already implicit in the 3-p describable nature of the computations themselves? Does this question make any sense from a comp perspective? What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions. This make possible to associate a "knower" (Bp & p) to a "believer" (Bp), and a "feeler" (Bp & Dp & p) to an observer (Bp & Dp). This makes it not just possible, but necessary, to attach a first person (who will have a logic of first person associate to him/she in a third person describable way) to a 3-person "body" (except that the price to pay is that such a body is an immaterial collection of number relations). Then the incommunicable and private aspect of those knowledge and qualia is provided by the theory of knowledge and the quale logic, provided by the respective intensional variant of G and G*. The difference between G and G* (provable and true) is reflected in those intensional variant. I guess you mean that we cannot "prove" the existence of the 1-p from the 3-p grounds. That's correct (both intuitively with UDA, and it is a theorem of machine's theology (AUDA). Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem to exist). This is not true I think. Already with the uda duplication experience, you can see predict the difference, for example, the apparition of first person indeterminacy despite the determinacy in the 3d description. This is captured by the difference between (Bp and p) and Bp, and that difference is a consequence of incompleteness, when self- observing occurs. But doesn't this lead to paradox? For example, how are we able to refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3- p perspective? Good point. But you are lead to this because you still believe that matter is a primitive 3-p notion. No, I don't "believe" it, but I'm able to entertain it (as an alternative to comp) to see where this hypothesis leads. It leads to non comp. Notably. And to the current insolubility of the mind-body problem. One of the places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is the kind of brute paradox I've referred to. So what I'm asking you is how is this different from a comp perspective? Can our 3-p references to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis? Yes, because we do accept the truth of elementary arithmetic. We can study the theology of simple (and thus *intuitively* correct) Löbian machine. We *know* in that setting that the machine will be aware of an explanation gap, etc. Again, the price is that we have to recover physics without introducing a 3-p physical world. But the physical 3-p notions are just NOT closed for explanation. It collapses all the points of view. It explains consciousness away! I understand that you take this view from a comp perspective, but what about from a primitive-materialist pov in its own terms? You will have to introduce infinities in the 3-p description of whatever the consciousness supervene on. And then it is an open problem to see if this provide any help to solve the mind body problem. Infinity and ad hoc imposed indeterminacy looks like red herring. It blocks the comp hyp, but does not seem to give new clue in the mind-body problem, other than the one extract from lobianity (infinite machine are mostly lobian too, when self-referentially correct). Do you believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited? Is there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp? Not in a way which is not already provided by comp. But unless you weaken comp so much as becoming "God", weakening comp does not
RE: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:38 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:07 PM, rmiller wrote: To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of a particular section of Many Worlds. Now think of a behavior pattern as a set of elements and interactions between elements. Each of the many-worlds is associated with a "snapshot" of your individual behavior pattern unique to that world. But suppose there are similarities between your behavior patterns in worlds A B and C-that set of similar configurations forms what can be described as a fibre bundle through multiple surfaces. If so, this may suggest that at some level consciousness experiences more than one world "surface" at a time. If the ratio of interactions to elements decreases (you enter a darkened room) then the similarities in the behavior system config should result in an increase in the "depth" of the many world surfaces. Increase the ratio of interactions to elements and the complexity of your behavior set increases-linking you to a particular world "surface." It would seem that, like relativity, the frame of reference is not absolute-and in fact changes as rapidly as perception changes. From others inhabiting the single world surface, it would appear that the behavior system is changing without cause; but if we could somehow view the entire group of world surfaces associated with the core group of a particular behavioral system configuration, then we would be more likely to understand the "reasons" for the behavior. Unfortunately, any single nervous system has any number of configurations associated with multiple world layers---and anyone attempting to perceive it has their own particular sets of configurations (and world layers.) The best we can do is arrive at a general consensus of what is perceived and agree to label that the local shared reality. The Copenhagen theorists infamously suggested that nothing exists unless it is perceived (measured)-and as far as it goes, that would be absolutely true. One cannot perceive what doesn't exist in that world layer. But if the perception process naturally involved multiple world layers, then the Copenhagen Interpretation would be true, but trivially so (as Hawking said about Many Worlds.) David Deutsch claims we all inhabit multiple worlds, but can't communicate between the worlds. I think Many Minds, Fibre Bundle topology, and Neodissociationist (Hilgardian) psychology will prove him wrong. RM I am nearly done reading the Fabric of Reality. One thing which isn't clear to me after reading it is how computation or consciousness work if we are all simply unconnected snapshots, without any implicit ordering or connections between any two snapshots, or without the flow of information or causal relationships between such snapshots. The concept of objective snapshots of universes also seems to conflict with the spacetime concept in relativity, which he says is only useful as an approximation. Has this been established or is it a theory of Deutsch's? Jason He seems (to me, anyway) unclear, or if he knows, he hasn't conveyed the concept in a way I can understand. From what I've read, the Multiverse is probably something like a multidimensional Higgs Space with individual (and intersecting) "worlds" existing as fleeting interactions between basic (and yet undiscovered) subunits. It might be envisioned topologically as a near-infinite number of ephemeral, intersecting manifolds that change over time. Certainly there's a substructure that involves time. Cramer's Transactional theory includes particles that travel from the future to the past, and there are a few things about quantum mechanics-the Delayed Choice Experiment comes to mind-that suggests the future may influence the past-or some version of it. German physicist Helmut Schmidt once decided to (effectively) expand Bohr's Copenhagen theorem to real-life experiments. As a result, he was able to show with scientific probability (p <0.05) that a group of students can "change the past." It's commonly known as the retrocausality experiments and he took a lot of heat for them. In 1995 I asked him what he thought the results meant: Did causality run in reverse, or was it a matter of a group of 25 students "choosing" the universe they wanted to be in? His answer: probably the latter. But if you're a fan of Richard Feinman, you may conclude that this is evidence that causality does indeed run in reverse---you can affect the past (or a version of it.) Once Cramer gets his laser experiment to work, we'll be that much closer to knowing the answer. As for
RE: Epiphenomena?
Hi Bruno, Well! Perhaps we are closer than I thought but that has implications of its own… From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:25 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Does the plants quantum computations? Hi Stephen, On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote: snip I like that it does not ignore consciousness as it puts logic in its core notions, but there still something missing. There is no necessity for there to be the phenomena of a physical world evolving in time in Comp. [BM] You worried me, but I see you just have not yet seen the point. It is OK. It is a very subtle point, where "Aristotelians" can have some difficulties. Actually, recently an expert on Aristotle confirmed my feeling (after my reading of Aristotle and Plotinus), that Aristotle got that "subtle point", and that Plotinus found indeed the most plausible correction of Aristotle theory of Matter coherent with the Plato type of "reality/truth/God". Matter is no more an epiphenomenon than consciousness. If you really insist to see an epiphenomenon in comp, you may say that it is the whole coupling matter/consciousness which is an epiphenomenon bearing on the number theoretical relations. [SPK] Wait, are you saying that both matter and Mind are epiphenomena?! This is where, again, I recall my post asking how mere existence of Forms is sufficient to allow for that with is, at least for 1-p, unassailable. As I see it a neutral monism is preferable, but this would require that mater and mind are aspects that only can obtain when the possibility of distinguishing them from each other obtains. *** Not only comp preserves and give a role to consciousness, but it preserves the interaction of mind and matter. And this in the usual two way directions. ** [SPK] Causality has an arrow pointing in one direction and logical precedent in the opposite. This is one of V. Pratt’s ideas with Chu Space construction. But note that his idea only works with a tacit assumption of an underlying process and it is “process” per say that I would like to understand how is allowed in any form of Platonism. AFAIK, Platonism assumes Being as a primitive and becoming is taken as an illusion, thus all things that are transitory are deemed to be lesser and even evil in Plato’s eyes. Maybe Plato and Cantor and You should have a chat. There is a relationship between Infinities and Finities that needs to be considered, a relationship that need not be taken as one supervening on the other. Within infinities one finds the notion of making distinctions to be very difficult, even impossible, thus the problem of the measure. ** You can define a cosmos, or a cosmic history, by a set of "events" and their closure for matter-matter interactions, and those are very solid, given that they sum up the whole (sigma_1) arithmetical truth "everywhere". You can define an accessible multiverse, by the the closure mind-matter interaction, this extend vastly any observable cosmos or branch of reality. It makes possible to share our dreams. It makes possible all couplings of Universal machines with themselves. ** [SPK] I am not sure that closure can be proven unless we are assuming some axioms of set/logic that might not be the case. I think that the foundation and choice axioms are troublesome, but that is a different conversation. BTW, are you familiar with Leibniz’ Monadology? ** The multiverse is just not the whole thing, eventually it is the border of the ignorance of 'God''. Matter is the highly indeterminate part of the arithmetical reality when trying to see itself. It forces the appearance of indeterminacies for each local entities trying to figure out what it is made of, when getting near its substitution level. ** [SPK] Umm, I believe that it is more than just arithmetical reality that is trying to see itself. I bet that there is far more to “Reality” than Arithmetic. This is where I have sympathies with people like Penrose that balk at the idea that we are merely computations. But I think that there is a point where we can be considered as computations and a point where we cannot. This is where I find the idea of the universe as a ‘frozen 4d hypercube” to be missing the point. We cannot just hand wave change away. I see “time” as a measure of change, change in itself does not have a measure associated to it so to not consider that Becoming is fundamental seems to be at least myopia. ** Now, if you want a "time" à-la Prigogine, i.e. if you want time fundamental and primitive, then neither comp nor general relativity nor Plato, nor Plotinus, nor any theory with a notion of block -ontological thing can satisfy you. But this is not related to the "epiphenomena" question. With comp, the simplest ontol
Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:07 PM, rmiller wrote: > To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in > frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a > 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of > a particular section of Many Worlds. Now think of a behavior pattern as a > set of elements and interactions between elements. Each of the many-worlds > is associated with a “snapshot” of your individual behavior pattern unique > to that world. But suppose there are similarities between your behavior > patterns in worlds A B and C—that set of similar configurations forms what > can be described as a fibre bundle through multiple surfaces. If so, this > may suggest that at some level consciousness experiences more than one world > “surface” at a time. If the ratio of interactions to elements decreases > (you enter a darkened room) then the similarities in the behavior system > config should result in an increase in the “depth” of the many world > surfaces. Increase the ratio of interactions to elements and the complexity > of your behavior set increases—linking you to a particular world “surface.” > It would seem that, like relativity, the frame of reference is not > absolute—and in fact changes as rapidly as perception changes. From others > inhabiting the single world surface, it would appear that the behavior > system is changing without cause; but if we could somehow view the entire > group of world surfaces associated with the core group of a particular > behavioral system configuration, then we would be more likely to understand > the “reasons” for the behavior. Unfortunately, any single nervous system > has any number of configurations associated with multiple world layers---and > anyone attempting to perceive it has their own particular sets of > configurations (and world layers.) The best we can do is arrive at a > general consensus of what is perceived and agree to label that the local > shared reality. The Copenhagen theorists infamously suggested that nothing > exists unless it is perceived (measured)—and as far as it goes, that would > be absolutely true. One cannot perceive what doesn’t exist in that world > layer. But if the perception process naturally involved multiple world > layers, then the Copenhagen Interpretation would be true, but trivially so > (as Hawking said about Many Worlds.) David Deutsch claims we all inhabit > multiple worlds, but can’t communicate between the worlds. I think Many > Minds, Fibre Bundle topology, and Neodissociationist (Hilgardian) psychology > will prove him wrong. > > > > RM > > > I am nearly done reading the Fabric of Reality. One thing which isn't clear to me after reading it is how computation or consciousness work if we are all simply unconnected snapshots, without any implicit ordering or connections between any two snapshots, or without the flow of information or causal relationships between such snapshots. The concept of objective snapshots of universes also seems to conflict with the spacetime concept in relativity, which he says is only useful as an approximation. Has this been established or is it a theory of Deutsch's? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the computability of consciousness
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely 3-p grounds. It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious experience. From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious experience. So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, and needing no explanation. But why is that? The physical world doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it? So what caused it? What explains it's initial state? Why does it have it's current state? Why does it change in time the way that it does? If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental? What is lost? What makes this an unpalatable option? It seems to me that it should certainly be the default position. I think it's fruitless to argue about which is "fundamental". Obviously we have direct 1-p experience; but also that there are differences between persons. So if we concentrate on the intersubjective agreement between different 1-p reports we find that we can make some successful predictive models of that 3-p world. At one time there was an assumption that the 3-p world could be modeled as a lot of agents, i.e. beings with 1-p experiences. But that turned out be an impediment and it worked better to model the 3-p world as impersonal and mathematical. So naturally one attractive strategy is to keep pushing what has worked in the past. There's no reason not to try taking 1-p experiences as the basis of your ontology, the positivists tried to put physics on that basis, but so far it seems the way to make progress has been to treat 1-p as basic but fallible and quickly move to an external reality that is more consistent. Brent I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers' Zombies: http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf First, from the introduction: "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost." Then on page 7: "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt. For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion. You might not even have a brain. The only state of affairs you know for certain to obtain is that you exist as a thing such that there is something that it is like to be that thing. You know for certain that you are a thing that has an experience as of having arms and legs, a beating heart, a warm, solid body. You know that you are a subject of experience. But you may not be a creature that exists in space, or has physical parts. It is by engaging in the process of Cartesian doubting that one arrives at a conception of one’s ghost twin. I am not suggesting that the process of Cartesian doubting demonstrates the possibility of ghosts, but I am suggesting that it goes a good way to demonstrating their conceivability. To entertain the possibility that I am the only thing that exists, and that I exist as a thing with no properties other than my conscious experience, just is to conceive of my ghost twin. Any philosopher who agrees with Descartes up to and including the Cogito has a strong prima facie obligation to accept the conceivability of ghosts." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
RE: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of a particular section of Many Worlds. Now think of a behavior pattern as a set of elements and interactions between elements. Each of the many-worlds is associated with a "snapshot" of your individual behavior pattern unique to that world. But suppose there are similarities between your behavior patterns in worlds A B and C-that set of similar configurations forms what can be described as a fibre bundle through multiple surfaces. If so, this may suggest that at some level consciousness experiences more than one world "surface" at a time. If the ratio of interactions to elements decreases (you enter a darkened room) then the similarities in the behavior system config should result in an increase in the "depth" of the many world surfaces. Increase the ratio of interactions to elements and the complexity of your behavior set increases-linking you to a particular world "surface." It would seem that, like relativity, the frame of reference is not absolute-and in fact changes as rapidly as perception changes. From others inhabiting the single world surface, it would appear that the behavior system is changing without cause; but if we could somehow view the entire group of world surfaces associated with the core group of a particular behavioral system configuration, then we would be more likely to understand the "reasons" for the behavior. Unfortunately, any single nervous system has any number of configurations associated with multiple world layers---and anyone attempting to perceive it has their own particular sets of configurations (and world layers.) The best we can do is arrive at a general consensus of what is perceived and agree to label that the local shared reality. The Copenhagen theorists infamously suggested that nothing exists unless it is perceived (measured)-and as far as it goes, that would be absolutely true. One cannot perceive what doesn't exist in that world layer. But if the perception process naturally involved multiple world layers, then the Copenhagen Interpretation would be true, but trivially so (as Hawking said about Many Worlds.) David Deutsch claims we all inhabit multiple worlds, but can't communicate between the worlds. I think Many Minds, Fibre Bundle topology, and Neodissociationist (Hilgardian) psychology will prove him wrong. RM From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 6:28 PM To: Everything List Subject: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds On the many-worlds FAQ: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple, identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate: "Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split? - Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a measurement-like interaction (See "What is a measurement?") as having previous existed distinctly and merely differentiated, rather than the interaction as having split one world into many? This is definitely not permissable in many-worlds or any theory of quantum theory consistent with experiment. Worlds do not exist in a quantum superposition independently of each other before they decohere or split. The splitting is a physical process, grounded in the dynamical evolution of the wave vector, not a matter of philosophical, linguistic or mental convenience (see "Why do worlds split?" and "When do worlds split?") If you try to treat the worlds as pre-existing and separate then the maths and probabilistic behaviour all comes out wrong." However, just below, in the Many-minds question: "Q20 What is many-minds? -- Many-minds proposes, as an extra fundamental axiom, that an infinity of separate minds or mental states be associated with each single brain state. When the single physical brain state is split into a quantum superposition by a measurement (See "What is a measurement?") the associated infinity of minds are thought of as differentiating rather than splitting. The motivation for this brain-mind dichotomy seems purely to avoid talk of minds splitting and talk instead about the differentiation of pre-existing separate mental states." Based on the answers provided in this FAQ, it sounds as though many-minds permits differentiation of pre-existing observers whereas many-worlds does not permit differentiation. The many-minds interpretation also sounds much more similar to computationalism as described by Bruno. Computationalism + arithmetical realism supposes that all possible computations exist, and yield all possible observers. Therefore, the consciousness of these observers would differentiate, rather than split, since they all existed beforehand. What a
Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen wrote: > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, > and needing no explanation. You're right that I'm starting from this assumption, but only because it is indeed the default assumption in the sciences, and indeed in the general consciousness, and my intention was to illustrate some of the consequences of this assumption that are often waved away or simply not acknowledged. Principal amongst these is the fact that the existence of 1-p is not in any way computable - accessible, arrivable at - from the closed assumptions of 3-p. But worse than that, if we take this "default position" of assuming the 3-p mode to be both complete and closed, we are thereby also committed to the position that all our thoughts, beliefs and behaviours - not excluding those apparently relating to the experiential states themselves - must be solely a consequence of the 3-p account of things, and indeed would proceed identically even in the complete absence of any such states! This, ISTM, is a paradoxical, or at the very least an extremely puzzling, state of affairs, and it was to promote discussion of these specific problems that I started the thread. Whether one starts from the assumption of primacy of 1-p or 3-p (or neither) the principal difficulty is making any sense of their relation - i.e. the Hard Problem - and ISTM not only that it is Hard to solve, but even to state in a way that doesn't mask its truly paradoxical nature. For example, as I've mentioned, it's often waved away by some reference to "identity", in the face of the manifest objection that the states of affairs referred to could hardly, on the face of it, be less identical, and in the total absence of any approach to reconciling their radical differences, or their intelligible relations. Despite the difficulty of the subject, I do cherish the hope that progress can be made if we give up explaining-away from entrenched positions, accept the seriousness of the challenge to our preconceptions, and re-examine the real issues with an open mind. David > On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> The only rationale for adducing the additional >> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we >> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the >> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely >> 3-p grounds. > > > It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious > experience. From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as > individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent > existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious > experience. > > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, > and needing no explanation. But why is that? The physical world > doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it? So what > caused it? What explains it's initial state? Why does it have it's > current state? Why does it change in time the way that it does? > > If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why > can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental? What is lost? What > makes this an unpalatable option? It seems to me that it should > certainly be the default position. > > I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers' > Zombies: > http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf > > First, from the introduction: > > "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically > identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious > experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how > threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to > physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse > possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, > creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their > being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a > ghost." > > Then on page 7: > > "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar > Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt. > For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a > delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms > and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel > beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to > the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion. > You m
Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
On the many-worlds FAQ: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple, identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate: "Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split? - Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a measurement-like interaction (See "What is a measurement?") as having previous existed distinctly and merely differentiated, rather than the interaction as having split one world into many? This is definitely not permissable in many-worlds or any theory of quantum theory consistent with experiment. Worlds do not exist in a quantum superposition independently of each other before they decohere or split. The splitting is a physical process, grounded in the dynamical evolution of the wave vector, not a matter of philosophical, linguistic or mental convenience (see "Why do worlds split?" and "When do worlds split?") If you try to treat the worlds as pre-existing and separate then the maths and probabilistic behaviour all comes out wrong." However, just below, in the Many-minds question: "Q20 What is many-minds? -- Many-minds proposes, as an extra fundamental axiom, that an infinity of separate minds or mental states be associated with each single brain state. When the single physical brain state is split into a quantum superposition by a measurement (See "What is a measurement?") the associated infinity of minds are thought of as differentiating rather than splitting. The motivation for this brain-mind dichotomy seems purely to avoid talk of minds splitting and talk instead about the differentiation of pre-existing separate mental states." Based on the answers provided in this FAQ, it sounds as though many-minds permits differentiation of pre-existing observers whereas many-worlds does not permit differentiation. The many-minds interpretation also sounds much more similar to computationalism as described by Bruno. Computationalism + arithmetical realism supposes that all possible computations exist, and yield all possible observers. Therefore, the consciousness of these observers would differentiate, rather than split, since they all existed beforehand. What are others thoughts on this FAQ or reasoning? Is there something many-minds offers over many-worlds? How exactly does differentiation conflict with experimental evidence and the predicted probabilities? How does many-minds lead to interference patterns, or only allow a photon one exit path from an interferometer? Is this the primary question for computationalism to answer? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote: > The only rationale for adducing the additional > existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we > possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the > existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely > 3-p grounds. It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious experience. From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious experience. So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, and needing no explanation. But why is that? The physical world doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it? So what caused it? What explains it's initial state? Why does it have it's current state? Why does it change in time the way that it does? If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental? What is lost? What makes this an unpalatable option? It seems to me that it should certainly be the default position. I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers' Zombies: http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf First, from the introduction: "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost." Then on page 7: "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt. For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion. You might not even have a brain. The only state of affairs you know for certain to obtain is that you exist as a thing such that there is something that it is like to be that thing. You know for certain that you are a thing that has an experience as of having arms and legs, a beating heart, a warm, solid body. You know that you are a subject of experience. But you may not be a creature that exists in space, or has physical parts. It is by engaging in the process of Cartesian doubting that one arrives at a conception of one’s ghost twin. I am not suggesting that the process of Cartesian doubting demonstrates the possibility of ghosts, but I am suggesting that it goes a good way to demonstrating their conceivability. To entertain the possibility that I am the only thing that exists, and that I exist as a thing with no properties other than my conscious experience, just is to conceive of my ghost twin. Any philosopher who agrees with Descartes up to and including the Cogito has a strong prima facie obligation to accept the conceivability of ghosts." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does the plants quantum computations?
Bruno, interesting exchange with Stephen. I have a sideline-question: why do you 'refer-to' and repeatedly invoke into your ways of your advanced thinking the NAME (I did not say: concept) of GOD, a noumenon so many times and many occasions mistreated and misused over the millennia - throughout the entire history of mankind? So much baggage is attached to this noumenon that just mention it brings false ideas into most of the minds: positively and negatively. Sometimes pretty strong ones. I am not talking about 'The Old Man in the Nightgown" or Allah, or Quetzalcoatl, or the Big Bear, or whatever comes to mind, I talk about the 'idea' of misuse and misidentifications for purposes unlimited, faith and hate, rules and sins, priests and money, power, killing etc. with the unlimited prejudice of unlimited kind. The overwhelming part of humanity is involved in such misconstrued vocabularies. It makes it very hard to stay "scientific". I don't think you aspire for the title: "The *Priest* of *Arithmetix*" (or the *Universal computer*)? John Mikes PS. Upon your earlier remark "if you accept an artificial brain from the Dr" I frowned first on the "artificial" - is it restricted to "man-made" or "comp-made"? (in the latter case: does 'comp' include limitless potentials (limitless, indeed, including possible and impossible?) Then I formulated my negative response upon ANY human description of "BRAIN" - a construct, while I do not condone a structural (physics? or any other human idea) definition for the mentality - except for our limited capabilities to apply information. So I would not change my (unlimited?) 'mind' for a namable construct however extended. - JM On 2/21/10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Hi Stephen, > > On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > > > > > Nature has repeatedly proven herself to be vastly more clever > than we can imagine. Quantum coherence is used in photosynthesis by plants > to increase the efficiency of photon energy capture by the use of structures > that act to hold decoherence off just in the right place for long enough. I > will leave it up to the experimentalists to explain the structures. > > > > > > There may be some new evidences. It is good to stay the most open minded > possible. > > > > > > > > He pretends that his trivial model is exact enough to > prove that there can be no exploitable coherence effects. I only claim that > the brain is exploiting coherence effects at small scales that would allow > for increased efficiencies. I am considering an idea different from that of > Hameroff based on resonance damping. But Hameroff’s discussions minus the > “Objective Reduction” stuff, IMO, is still valid. > > > > > > I can follow you. > > > > > >See:http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/pdfs/decoherence.pdf > ** > > > > > > > Thanks. Look interesting. > > > > > > > > > *** > From the evidence we have so far, quantum effects seem limited to > existing within the cells and not between them, but there may be protocols > that allow for exploitation between cells. I am trying to figure this out > but am very limited in my ability. > ** > > > > > > > > Please, keep us informed if there are progresses in that direction. > > > > > > > > > >Ok, maybe I was a bit harsh on Tegmark, but nevertheless how many > research grant proposals have been shot down because of his paper? I myself > have the blunt force of it on my timid querries. > > > > I can understand. It is like Minsky and Paper for then neural nets. > Scientist should be cautious when talking on possibilities and > impossibilities. > But it is difficult. I found Tegmark paper honest and almost convincing. > Not 100% convincing, because there is a sense nature harness "high level > chemistry" since a very long time, and decoherence/coherence is a rather > tricky notion, and we have already be taken by surprise (with > superconduction, laser, etc.). > And then, as far as science talk about reality, it can never be 100% > convincing. Science is doubt. > > > > > > > > My only complaint with your work is that it reduces the physical world to > epiphenomena > > > > > > What? With all my respect, I disagree :) > > > > > > > > and in so doing seems no better that material monism. > > > > > > I will make some coffee. > > > > > > > > I like that it does not ignore consciousness as it puts logic in its > core notions, but there still something missing. There is no necessity for > there to be the phenomena of a physical world evolving in time in Comp. > > > > > > You worried me, but I see you just have not yet seen the point. It is OK. > It is a very subtle point, where "Aristotelians" can have some > difficulties. Actually, recently an expert on Aristotle confirmed my > feeling (after my reading of Aristotle and Plotinus), that Aristotle got > that "subtle point", and that Plotinus found indeed the most plausible > correction of Aristotle theory of Matter coherent with the P
Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly interested in, with
respect to comp is what is the relation between the 1-p notions and
the 3-p ones, from the point of view of causality (which you can put
in scare quotes if you prefer). IOW, any 1-p notion, such as pain, is
not only non-computable (as opposed to inferrable by analogy) from any
3-p perspective, but is seemingly irrelevant to the unfolding of the
3-p account with which it is (somehow) associated. What scope is
there, in the unfolding of the infinity of computations by the UD, for
1-p experience to be viewed as having any consequences beyond those
already implicit in the 3-p describable nature of the computations
themselves? Does this question make any sense from a comp
perspective?
> I guess you mean that we cannot "prove" the existence of the 1-p from the
> 3-p grounds. That's correct (both intuitively with UDA, and it is a theorem
> of machine's theology (AUDA).
Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even
predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know
from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem
to exist).
>> But doesn't this lead to paradox? For example, how are we able to
>> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our
>> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3-
>> p perspective?
>
> Good point. But you are lead to this because you still believe that matter
> is a primitive 3-p notion.
No, I don't "believe" it, but I'm able to entertain it (as an
alternative to comp) to see where this hypothesis leads. One of the
places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is
the kind of brute paradox I've referred to. So what I'm asking you is
how is this different from a comp perspective? Can our 3-p references
to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?
> But the physical 3-p notions are just NOT closed for explanation. It
> collapses all the points of view. It explains consciousness away!
I understand that you take this view from a comp perspective, but what
about from a primitive-materialist pov in its own terms? Do you
believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to
account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited? Is
there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?
(In reply to Stathis):
>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
>>> computation, you have the experience.
>
>
> I think you have the correct intuition, but the phrasing is really
> misleading. I am not a computation, I am a person.
If this is the correct intuition, then the computations already
contain every possibility from the 3-p perspective, and the additional
existence, nature and possible consequences of 1-p notions are as
inaccessible as they are from a primitive-materialist pov, AFAICS.
David
>
> On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:07, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
>> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
>> person perspective?
>
> There is an ambiguity in you phrasing. I will proceed like I always do, by
> interpreting your term favorably, relatively to computationalism and its
> (drastic) consequences.
>
> The first person notion, and consciousness, are not clearly notion to which
> the label computable can be applied. The fact is that, no machine can even
> define what is the first person, or what is consciousness.
>
> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).
>
> But auda makes this utterly clear. Third person self-reference is entirely
> described by the provability predicate, the one that I write with the letter
> "B". Bp is " *I* prove p", Beweisbar ('p'), for p some arithmetical
> proposition.
> The corresponding first person notion is Bp & Tp, with Tp = True('p'). By a
> theorem of Tarski "true" cannot be define (even just define!) by the
> machine, and the logic of Bp&Tp (= Bp & p) is quite different from Bp, from
> the point of view of the machine. That result on "truth" has been extended
> by Kaplan & Montague for "knowledge".
>
> Let Bp = I prove p
> Let Kp = Bp & Tp = Bp & p = I know p
>
> Then, what happens is that
>
> G* proves Bp <-> Kp
> NOT(G proves Bp <-> Kp)
>
> G does not prove the equivalence of Bp and Kp, for correct machine. It is
> false that G proves Bp <-> Kp, and the machine cannot have access to the
> truth of that equivalence (or indirectly by postulating comp).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> The only rationale for adducing the additional
>> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
>> possess
Re: Does the plants quantum computations?
Hi Stephen, On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote: Nature has repeatedly proven herself to be vastly more clever than we can imagine. Quantum coherence is used in photosynthesis by plants to increase the efficiency of photon energy capture by the use of structures that act to hold decoherence off just in the right place for long enough. I will leave it up to the experimentalists to explain the structures. There may be some new evidences. It is good to stay the most open minded possible. He pretends that his trivial model is exact enough to prove that there can be no exploitable coherence effects. I only claim that the brain is exploiting coherence effects at small scales that would allow for increased efficiencies. I am considering an idea different from that of Hameroff based on resonance damping. But Hameroff’s discussions minus the “Objective Reduction” stuff, IMO, is still valid. I can follow you. See:http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/pdfs/decoherence.pdf ** Thanks. Look interesting. *** From the evidence we have so far, quantum effects seem limited to existing within the cells and not between them, but there may be protocols that allow for exploitation between cells. I am trying to figure this out but am very limited in my ability. ** Please, keep us informed if there are progresses in that direction. Ok, maybe I was a bit harsh on Tegmark, but nevertheless how many research grant proposals have been shot down because of his paper? I myself have the blunt force of it on my timid querries. I can understand. It is like Minsky and Paper for then neural nets. Scientist should be cautious when talking on possibilities and impossibilities. But it is difficult. I found Tegmark paper honest and almost convincing. Not 100% convincing, because there is a sense nature harness "high level chemistry" since a very long time, and decoherence/ coherence is a rather tricky notion, and we have already be taken by surprise (with superconduction, laser, etc.). And then, as far as science talk about reality, it can never be 100% convincing. Science is doubt. My only complaint with your work is that it reduces the physical world to epiphenomena What? With all my respect, I disagree :) and in so doing seems no better that material monism. I will make some coffee. I like that it does not ignore consciousness as it puts logic in its core notions, but there still something missing. There is no necessity for there to be the phenomena of a physical world evolving in time in Comp. You worried me, but I see you just have not yet seen the point. It is OK. It is a very subtle point, where "Aristotelians" can have some difficulties. Actually, recently an expert on Aristotle confirmed my feeling (after my reading of Aristotle and Plotinus), that Aristotle got that "subtle point", and that Plotinus found indeed the most plausible correction of Aristotle theory of Matter coherent with the Plato type of "reality/truth/God". Matter is no more an epiphenomenon than consciousness. If you really insist to see an epiphenomenon in comp, you may say that it is the whole coupling matter/consciousness which is an epiphenomenon bearing on the number theoretical relations. Not only comp preserves and give a role to consciousness, but it preserves the interaction of mind and matter. And this in the usual two way directions. You can define a cosmos, or a cosmic history, by a set of "events" and their closure for matter-matter interactions, and those are very solid, given that they sum up the whole (sigma_1) arithmetical truth "everywhere". You can define an accessible multiverse, by the the closure mind- matter interaction, this extend vastly any observable cosmos or branch of reality. It makes possible to share our dreams. It makes possible all couplings of Universal machines with themselves. The multiverse is just not the whole thing, eventually it is the border of the ignorance of 'God''. Matter is the highly indeterminate part of the arithmetical reality when trying to see itself. It forces the appearance of indeterminacies for each local entities trying to figure out what it is made of, when getting near its substitution level. Now, if you want a "time" à-la Prigogine, i.e. if you want time fundamental and primitive, then neither comp nor general relativity nor Plato, nor Plotinus, nor any theory with a notion of block - ontological thing can satisfy you. But this is not related to the "epiphenomena" question. With comp, the simplest ontology is the block- (sigma_1) arithmetical truth, or the universal dovetailing trace (UD*), but from this emerges, as seen form inside (defined by the hypostases) a coupling consciousness/matter, but also a coupling is Its name>/consciousness, and other "hypostatic" couplings. You may
