Re: Autonomy?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:51 AM, John Clark  wrote:

> If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions:
>
> 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in
> Washington and only Washington".
>
> 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
> and only Moscow".
>
> Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct; a very odd situation
> certainly but it is paradoxical only if you make the totally unwarranted
> assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, and without that
> assumption assigning probabilities to the question "what city will I end up
> in?" is pointless because "I" is not defined.

You dismiss human psychology, which includes the belief that I am a
single person who persists through time. If strange things such as
duplication happen to me they will be interpreted in the light of this
belief. It may be delusional, but it's an important delusion.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: truth

[meekerdb]

On 6/27/2012 2:26 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Bruno, think about it as "absolute truth:
Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
Respectfully John


Naah!  It's 10.

Brent
There are 10 kinds of people; those who think in binary and those who don't.

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Re: truth

[John Mikes]

Dear Bruno, think about it as "absolute truth:
Isn't 1+1 not 2, but 11?
Respectfully John

On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Hello John,
>
>   On 24 Jun 2012, at 21:43, John Mikes wrote:
>
>  Bruno:
>
> Doesn't it emerge in this respect "WHAT truth?" or rather
> "WHOSE truth?" is there an accepted authority to verify an "absolute"
> truth judgeable from a different belief system?
>
>
> I don't think such authority exists. We can only agree on hypotheses,
> about such truth, concerning some domain of investigation.
>
> We can also agree on the existence or non existence of facts confirming
> some truth concerning some reality.
>
> But we can bet such truth exists, even if we cannot believe it or know it
> "for sure".
>
> Examples:
>
> - Few people doubt that "1+1=2" is an "absolute truth", when 1 and 2 are
> used as the usual name for the standard natural numbers, and "+" represents
> the standard addition operation. Likewise for the whole elementary (first
> order) arithmetic.
>
> - We usually don't doubt the mundane informations. So, 'Obama is the
> actual president of the US' can reasonably be assumed as absolute. I mean,
> with "actual", that "Obama is the actual president of the US in our
> reality" is the absolute truth. Not the proposition "Obama is the actual
> president of the US" which might be false in the universe next door.
>
> Most theoretical truth are absolute, thanks to their conditional shapes.
> For example the existence of parallel universes in the theoretical
> framework of QM-without-collapse is absolute, accepting some reasonable
> definition of what is a universe (a set of events closed for interaction,
> for example). This is absolute as it is a theorem in QM-without-collapse
> (or of comp). Of course the proposition "parallel universes exist" is not
> absolute at all.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>
>> On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following:
>>>
 On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

> I have many questions.
>
> One is "what if truth were malleable?" --
>
 HI Brian,

 If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our
 "standards" of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of
 the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of
 absolute space.


>>> If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question
>>> would be if a reality were malleable.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by "truth is
>> malleable"?
>>
>> Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it
>> mean that the truth of "17 is prime" is malleable. It looks like we need a
>> more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of the
>> malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything more
>> solid than elementary arithmetic.
>>
>> Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will be
>> only metaphorical. For example the "truth" that cannabis is far more safe
>> than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is just because
>> special interest exploits the lack of education in logic. People driven by
>> power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just errors or lies. I guess
>> Brian's question is more metaphysical, but then in which non malleable
>> context can we make sense of metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian
>> should elaborate on what he means by "truth is malleable"? It seems to me
>> that such an idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself
>> by not allowing that very idea to be relativized.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
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>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: I am the de-phlogistonator!

[John Mikes]

Dear Colin,

I just LOVE your crystal ball. Call it "phlogiston" or whatever.
Your article
http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881

is a beauty and I enjoyed your exchange with Ben Goertzel. My questions,
however, remained untouched from my earlier *agnostic* remarks:

"Who told you that whatever *"brain"* does is *physically * (and I mean the
quantitative figment-science we learn at school)  described as of
yesterday? That it is * A L L*  that
counts?
Your choice of name sounds a bit correct: Becher in 1667 thought everything
is known to deduce his phlogiston and the AI thinks everything is known to
'model' thinking. Not too much of an advancement in "leading" sciences.
It is more than likely that "WE" (whoever that may be) use something we
identify with our "brain" as a practical tool for thinking, but we have no
justification how much more is to it to make it work than what we already
know (in our so far achieved mini-solipsism).

I do not argue against using computers to mimic thinking I just question if
the process is sufficiently *known* to make a workable computer-model
(especially using up the ZERO $ funds available and using our present
embryonic- binary - digital computer models).

If all fits, it still may be an anthropocentric/morphic logic to imitate,
while nature is not restricted to such. But this point goes too far maybe.

Agnostically yours

John Mikes Ph.D., D.Sc. ret. polymer scientist





On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 9:22 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:

>  Hi,
>
> ** **
>
> Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why ‘thinking machines’ don’t
> need computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group.
>
> ** **
>
>
> http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881
> 
>
> ** **
>
> Cheers
>
> Colin
>
> P.S. I am done with this issue. I'll just 'Lavoisier' my way through the
> phlogiston.
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
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Re: Autonomy?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jun 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries  
will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries,  
you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication.  
That is the key point.





So "step 3" is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't  
always predict how environmental factors will change nor how those  
factors will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying  
that you never know what new things the universe will throw at  
you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is  
hard, especially the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The  
indeterminacy is definite, and brought by the possibility of self- 
duplication.


I don't understand what you are saying?  Why is 'self-duplication'  
different from 'duplication'?


In this reasoning, it isn't.  (It would be if you are alone, or if you  
don't trust the others and build your own teleportation device, but  
that is not relevant for the reasoning).




And it's not clear where the boundary is between 'you' and 'the  
environment'.


We can only hope that the "doctor", or the teleportation boxes  
engineers have choose the right comp substitution level. But the  
reasoning assumes, non constructively, that they did so.




If 'you' is just the algorithm your brain is executing, then the  
thermal molecular motion in your brain is 'environment' and  
divergent of thought is due to 'the environment'.  But if 'you' is  
your physical body/brain then the divergence is inherent in the  
physics.


Does this change the P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 for first person prediction on  
its future first person experience in step 3?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

[meekerdb]

On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be different is 
that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That is the key 
point.




So "step 3" is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't always predict how 
environmental factors will change nor how those factors will effect you, which is just 
a convoluted way of saying that you never know what new things the universe will throw 
at you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially 
the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The indeterminacy is definite, and 
brought by the possibility of self-duplication.


I don't understand what you are saying?  Why is 'self-duplication' different from 
'duplication'?  And it's not clear where the boundary is between 'you' and 'the 
environment'.  If 'you' is just the algorithm your brain is executing, then the thermal 
molecular motion in your brain is 'environment' and divergent of thought is due to 'the 
environment'.  But if 'you' is your physical body/brain then the divergence is inherent in 
the physics.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

[meekerdb]

On 6/27/2012 8:51 AM, John Clark wrote:


>Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference is chaotic and mind 
state
diverge from very little difference.


Maybe, but I doubt if it's like the butterfly effect, I doubt if its quite as sensitive 
as that, otherwise we would not be observing personality traits in people that persist, 
largely unchanged, for many decades.


But personality can remain stable while thoughts (and diaries) diverge.  It may be like a 
butterfly effect with personality as a chaotic attractor.  Randomness, e.g. potassium 40 
decays in the bloodstream, may deflect the trajectory of thought, but only into nearby 
channels consistent with personality.  That's why I think the claim that, "It's either 
determined or random." is misleading.  Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense 
of constrained to a fairly narrow probability distribution, and yet random.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jun 2012, at 17:51, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jun 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention  
the delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.


Obviously true.

> Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal  
future diaries content in self-multiplication experience.


Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries  
will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries,  
you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That  
is the key point.





So "step 3" is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't always  
predict how environmental factors will change nor how those factors  
will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that you  
never know what new things the universe will throw at you, which is  
just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially  
the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The indeterminacy  
is definite, and brought by the possibility of self-duplication.





> By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two  
different environments, so that they will differentiate,


Yes.

> and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even in a  
prior state of complete information of the issuing protocol.


If you really had complete information then you could make 2  
predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington".


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow".


That's better. But still ignore the first/third person distinction.





Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct;


Not from the first person point of view, when they relate to such  
view. The one in washington can still say something like "BM" is in  
Moscow, but not "I am in Moscow". And the question was bearing on "I",  
not BrunoMarchal, which refers to a third person description.





a very odd situation certainly but it is paradoxical only if you  
make the totally unwarranted assumption that there can only be one  
Bruno Marchal,


This is implied by comp, trivially for the first person pov.



and without that assumption assigning probabilities to the question  
"what city will I end up in?" is pointless because "I" is not defined.


You don't need to define it to get the point that the proba on the  
localisation on the future sense of self is 1/2.


You ignore again the 1-3 distinction that I made precise.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jun 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the
> delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.
>

Obviously true.

> Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future
> diaries content in self-multiplication experience.
>

Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be
different is that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in
different environments. So "step 3" is just a convoluted way of saying that
you can't always predict how environmental factors will change nor how
those factors will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying
that you never know what new things the universe will throw at you, which
is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially the
future.

> By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different
> environments, so that they will differentiate,
>

Yes.

> and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even in a prior
> state of complete information of the issuing protocol.
>

If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in
Washington and only Washington".

2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
and only Moscow".

Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct; a very odd situation
certainly but it is paradoxical only if you make the totally unwarranted
assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, and without that
assumption assigning probabilities to the question "what city will I end up
in?" is pointless because "I" is not defined.

>Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference is chaotic and mind
> state diverge from very little difference.
>

Maybe, but I doubt if it's like the butterfly effect, I doubt if its quite
as sensitive as that, otherwise we would not be observing personality
traits in people that persist, largely unchanged, for many decades.

John K Clark

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