On 27 Jun 2012, at 17:51, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.

Obviously true.

> Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future diaries content in self-multiplication experience.

Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in different environments.

Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That is the key point.




So "step 3" is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't always predict how environmental factors will change nor how those factors will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that you never know what new things the universe will throw at you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially the future.

It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The indeterminacy is definite, and brought by the possibility of self-duplication.



> By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different environments, so that they will differentiate,

Yes.

> and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even in a prior state of complete information of the issuing protocol.

If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington".

2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary "I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow".

That's better. But still ignore the first/third person distinction.




Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct;

Not from the first person point of view, when they relate to such view. The one in washington can still say something like "BM" is in Moscow, but not "I am in Moscow". And the question was bearing on "I", not BrunoMarchal, which refers to a third person description.




a very odd situation certainly but it is paradoxical only if you make the totally unwarranted assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal,

This is implied by comp, trivially for the first person pov.



and without that assumption assigning probabilities to the question "what city will I end up in?" is pointless because "I" is not defined.

You don't need to define it to get the point that the proba on the localisation on the future sense of self is 1/2.

You ignore again the 1-3 distinction that I made precise.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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