Re: Arithmetic doesn't even suggest geometry, let alone awareness.
On Tuesday, November 13, 2012 12:15:48 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > > On Sun, Nov 11, 2012Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > >> I do know that over the past year you have told this list that >>> information does not exist, and neither do electrons or time or space or >>> bits or even logic, so I don't see why the nonexistence of movement in a >>> "comp universe" or any other sort of universe would bother you. >>> >> >> > It bothers me because it doesn't make sense to suggest that a universe >> of experiences full of objects and positions can be reduced to a mechanism >> > > But a universe without electrons or time or space or bits or logic does > make sense? Lack of logic makes sense? > Spacetime exists for us as objects, it just doesn't exist independently of objects. The difference between object surfaces is a spatial discernment of sense. Logic is an intellectual sense of summarizing other kinds of sense in a minimalist way. Bits are a figure of speech referring to the role played by a class of controlled physical structures. All of these things are very natural and easy to explain for me as aspects of sense. There is no mathematical justification for geometry though that I can think of. Nobody else seems to be able to think of one either. > > > What I am pointing out is that what comp implies is a universe which >> looks and feels nothing like the one which we actually live in. >> > > I'm not here to defend "comp", that's Bruno's job, I don't even know what > the word means. > Then we have no beef. > > > It does present a plausible range of logical functions which remind us >> of some aspects of our minds, but I think that there is another reason for >> that, which has to do with the nature of arithmetic. >> > > So the fact that arithmetic can produce the exact same sort of behavior > that minds are so proud of, like playing Chess or solving equations or > winning millions on Jeopardy, is all just a big coincidence. If you really > believe that then there is a bridge I'd like to sell you. > It's not a coincidence at all, but neither is the fact that arithmetic fails miserably at producing the sort of behavior that minds take for granted, like caring about something or having a personality. > > >> Electrons move around the chips in your computer, and potassium and >>> sodium ions move around the Cerebral Cortex of your brain. >>> >> >> > That doesn't matter. >> > > Doesn't matter?! If I change the position of those potassium and sodium > ions in your brain it will matter very much to you because your > consciousness will change. Yes that's right, the position of those > "meaningless objects" can be the difference between ecstasy and suicidal > depression, and you Craig Weinberg will never find anything that matters > more than that. > You are making my point. They only matter to me because of the feelings and experiences their configurations make available to me. Nobody cares about them for what they are, only what we feel, and what we feel is in no way linked to those objects except through empirical relation. There is no theory by which their configuration should lead to anything beyond the configuration itself. > > > My point is that our senses require a particular presentation of forms >> and experience for us to consciously make sense, >> > > Einstein had access to the same raw data as everybody else, but being a > genius he could make sense out of it even though the data was not presented > in a ideal way, and once he had done that he could teach those with less > powerful minds, like you and me, how to make sense out of it too. Exactly > the same is true of computers. > Einstein made more sense of the data was through imagination and discovery, not through mechanistic data processing or accumulation of knowledge. That is not true of computers. > > I would agree that it [a computer] is better at plotting such a complex >> object rotation on a screen for us to admire, but the computer itself >> wouldn't know an object from a string of bank transactions. Computers know >> nothing, >> > > I would like to know how you know that computers know nothing. Did that > knowledge come to you in a dream? > Because I understand what knowledge is and I understand why computers can't experience knowing. How do you know that Bugs Bunny isn't tasting anything when he eats a carrot? > > > What a computer does is no different than what a lever does when a metal >> ball falls on to one side of it and the other side rises. >> > > Well... A computer is no different from a few hundred trillion levers > interconnected in just the right way that rise and fall several billion > times a second, and you're no different from that either. > We are completely different - we are a single cell which knows how to divide itself into trillions of copies. We are not an assembly of disconnected parts. > > > You will likely tell me again that potassium ions are n
Re: Plato's cave analogy
On 11/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, My claim is that the phrase that you used above "...we agree that for all " is just another way of thinking of my definition of reality as "That which is incontrovertible for some collection of observers that can communicate with each other". It is the mutual agreement between all participants, be they electrons or amoeba or human or galactic clusters, that makes a reality "real". OK. That is recovered in comp by the notion of first person plural (duplication of machine population) Dear Bruno, How exactly is the duplication achieved? What indexes the differences? A Blum complexity measure? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Leibniz's pre-composed harmonic orchestral performance
Hi Roger, The definition of harmony you cite above is "entertainment biased", because: Virtually all music is dissonant as the vast majority of music includes more complex fundamental frequency ratios than unison and octave: anything more complex than 1:1, 2:1, 3:1 etc. is by strict definition already dissonant, leading to rational number ratios etc. Note this is true independently of "somewhat muddled and defective senses". But there's not a large target market for such music: it would be fun to compose music with little dissonance and just Octaves all day... but they already do a version of this with New Age, meditation music etc. but they still need more than the octave, to not bore the listeners to death with static sine wave @ 440hz. But you can't mix 12-tone music with more traditional systems of harmony, unless you build larger musical contexts, because conjunction, transition, simultaneity, harmony, dissonance are defined very differently. Like instead of "either this chord or that chord for this genre in this musical context" in more traditional harmony, you get "this chord AND that chord" in 12-tone music; with either chord on its own being "false" in most 12-tone context. Mark On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Russell Standish > > > I left out the part that the perfect harmony is > only possible in Platonia, but when performed > and/or listened to on earth by people with > somehat muddled or defective senses (us), > will contain distortions and dissonances. > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 11/9/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Russell Standish > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-08, 19:23:50 > Subject: Re: Leibniz's pre-composed harmonic orchestral performance > > > On Thu, Nov 08, 2012 at 05:59:15AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Russell Standish > > > > Yes, the orchestra with the supreme monad as > > composer/conductor playing a pleasing orchestra > > composition (not 12-tone !) that he dug up out of his > > a priori files works fine. > > That is what is incompatible with QM. Sorry... > > > -- > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > As for what the Helsinki Man imagines will happen to him after he pushes that button I really don't care because that depends entirely on the particular personal beliefs of the man involved. > That is non sense. If he's a devout Muslim he believes he will go to heaven with 77 virgins when he pushes that button, but as I said I really don't care what he believes will happen, I care about what will happen. That was my point. What happen does not depend on the beliefs. > > we find that the Washington man remembers being the Helsinki man and remembers that man walking into the booth and being instantly teleported to Washington where he is alive and well, > OK. He feels alive and well, and he has kept his identity. he is the Helsinki man. Yes, but he is not the only Helsinki man because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, and that means the 1P view has been duplicated too, As seen from the 3-views on the 1-views. But not as seen by the 1- views. You did agree that each copies feel to be in only once city. and that means the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too, and that means the 1P view from the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too As seen each time from some 3-view, but that is not what is asked. > So he can verify if his prediction done in Helsinki is correct. If he predicted "Washington", that is correct, for him. If he predicted "Moscow", that is incorrect for him, and if he predicted "Washington and Moscow", that is incorrect for him (and for the other). If he predicted "washington OR Moscow" that is correct for him, Once upon a time there was a equation called X^2=2, and X always wondered what number he would turn out to be, and then one day a magical munchkin mathematician solved the equation and said that X was plus 2 and minus 2. X = 2 OR X = -2. X cannot be equal to 2 and -2. All was well until minus 2 said the mathematician was wrong about who X was and that caused great strife in the land. Minus 2 said he was the solution to the equation and what's more he could prove it, and minus 2 said he was one and only one number and he certainly wasn't plus 2, so the great mathematician was wrong and was unable to predict what X would be. Unfortunately the number plus 2 started making similar claims about being the solution to the equation and got into a huge fight with minus 2, but they all added up to nothing. THE END > This comes from the fact that all notions involved, including the notion of first person, in this setting, admits transparent third person description, like the diary, the bodies, etc. There is nothing in those diaries, nothing about the bodies and no third party description that I failed to predict. Indeed, but you fail to predict the first party description, which was the question. you seem to partially eliminate the first person, when prediction are asked to them about them, like if by some magic, you are all the copies at once, which would contradict comp. > localizing oneself in a city. If a problem has 2 solutions that means it does not have one and only one solution. How profound. > you predicted W and M. But "W and M" never occurs. Mr. Washington man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now in one and only one city and is that city Washington? Yes. Mr. Moscow man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now in one and only one city and is that city Moscow? Yes. Mr. Helsinki man, that is to say the guy who is still experiencing Helsinki, are you still the Helsinki man? Only dead silence can be heard as a answer. ? Unclear. After the pushing on the button, nobody is in helsinki. But the helsinki man survived in W and M, where both copies agree they are in once city and that they could not predict which one in advance. And so "W and M" ALWAYS occurs, From the 3-views. never from the 1-views, and I said explicitly that here, "W "and "M" are the self-localization output experience. "W and M" NEVER occurs as it is logically impossible. that is to say the Helsinki man from the Helsinki man's viewpoint will be the Washington man and the Helsinki man from the Helsinki man's viewpoint will be the Moscow man. And the Helsinki man from the view of the guy who stayed in Helsinki no longer has a viewpoint of any sort. > You are still confusing "the guy in in this city" and "I feel now to be in this city" And you are still confused by the fact that "I" is no longer singular because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED AND SO HAS ALL OF I'S VIEWPOINTS. Obviosuly not from the 1p perspective. You only keep avoiding the question asked. >> even if the Helsinki man was Bruno Marchal, even he made the correct prediction. Bruno Marchal predicted that 2 people will feel to be the Helsinki man and Bruno M
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote: This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp seems to only define a single conscious mind! ? That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M. Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God. You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine common to them. Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a plurality of minds. It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with different experiences and minds. Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first person. If there is only one first person how is the content of such completely self-consistent? There is only one person, in the sense of saying that if I duplicate you in the WM way, you can consider that the person in W and M are the same person (indeed you), but just put in different context. No need to proceed if you disagree with this. It jusy makes sense: it is consistent with comp, but the contrary too, so no need to proceed on that identity question before understanding the whole UDA, as you might be confused. It is really another topic. Dear Bruno, We need to better understand where you define "personal identity" such that this all follows. I have already explain how UDA avoids the need of solving the personal identity problem. What defines your notion of "same"? There are as many notion of same that there are hypostases. My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible points of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined together into a single narrative of a self. One the same person might have different experiences in this case. What defines "sameness"? At the ontological level, it is defined by the axiom of equality. At the other level, by the hypostases modalities, and their arithmetical content, or their higher level contents. But we don't need that to get the "reversal". Then, it an altogether different question to see if such lives can be recombined. I think so, but again, this is not used in the reasoning. the reason I think so is that we can wake up and realize we were doing two dreams at once. It is not different than remembering two different hollidays, and not being able to remember which one occur first. That might also be confused with solipsism. If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is solipsistic by definition; Not with the usual definition of solipsism, which makes the others into zombie. there are no other minds to consider. The other mind still exists, even if they belong to the experiences of the same person. It is like with time travel. You go in the past and talk with yourself. That is locally two different minds, even if from a later pov, they can appear to belong to the same person. Comp does not exclude *logically* that I might wake up and realize that dreamed both your life and mine. "... the self is the only existing reality and that all other reality, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence." It seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all. Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you attribute to them your own identity, What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity? Imagine you look at a video. You see children playing soccer, and then after 10 minutes, you realize that one of the kid there is you. You recognize yourself in that kid. Well, it is the same here. You recognize yourself in some other. I do not understand your definition of "same-ness". My notion of "same person" has to do with my memory of being in a succession of locations and states in a narratable sequence where each new experience is not inconsistent with the previous states and locations. Don't mind this too much. I tend to think that there is only one 1p- person, but this is advanced speculation. It is not used for the reversal, and my opinion on this can still change a lot. where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity (and thus consider them as zombie). Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad thing if we are careful. Solipsism is or the type fact, from the 1p view, but becomes a
Re: Plato's cave analogy
On 13 Nov 2012, at 18:54, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/13/2012 10:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is a cost in resource utilization (or entropy generation)
to gain knowledge.
I can still agree. Then the comp consequence is that the physical
resources are derivable from a notion of arithmetical resource.
Dear Bruno,
Could you explain this idea of arithmetical resource in depth?
Just imagine the universal dovetailer. It generates and implements,
and execute all programs. The infinite resource of arithmetic is
just that we agree that for all x, there is a y with y > x. It is
trivial. PA proves AxEy(x < y & x ≠ y)
Dear Bruno,
My claim is that the phrase that you used above "...we agree that
for all " is just another way of thinking of my definition of
reality as "That which is incontrovertible for some collection of
observers that can communicate with each other". It is the mutual
agreement between all participants, be they electrons or amoeba or
human or galactic clusters, that makes a reality "real".
OK. That is recovered in comp by the notion of first person plural
(duplication of machine population)
This is a result of taking seriously the consequences of many minds
and their mutual statistics. It allows us to derive many properties
and conditions that have to be just assumed to be the case of
postulated in single mind theories. What I am proposing is a way to
bridge between Universals and Nominals to eliminate what I believe
to be a false dichotomy in ontology.
This is not a matter of choice or contrivance. We see something
like this in any system of interactions between many entities. For
example, if I find the local valuation of currencies to be
inconsistent with my goods and services then I will not be able to
interact in a local economy. If I do not find the Doctors in a
universe to able to determine the proper level of functional
substitution of my brain then my ability to be independent of a
particular physical body in that universe cannot occur.
No problem with this.
The difference is methodological. I derive necessary propositions from
comp, only.
May be you are still skeptical that the elementary arithmetical
relations implement all computations, but this is the big thing
discovered by Post, Church, Kleene, and others and which is the
base of computer science.
My problem is that I do not understand how you stratify the many
levels of significance of the numbers. You propose that {0,1, +, *}
are ontologically primitive
I do not. I derive this from comp.
and then jump over what ontological process generates all things
from that basis set of primitives.
? I use only the postulated laws (addition and multiplication, in case
of numbers).
I have been considering a Heraclitean view that takes Becoming as
fundamental, but you seem intent on keeping your ontology as
Changeless.
I use comp, and no more.
I am baffled as to how you seem OK to use the language of Becoming
(as you use verbs and discuss actions at the arithmetic level) but
never discuss how the Becoming or Change comes to be.
That's the easy part. Computations are dynamical notion, even if they
have simple 3p statical descriptions.
Matiyasevitch extended such result by showing that for getting the
Turing universality, the diophantine polynomial of degree four are
enough.
Sure, but his work does not solve the ontological problem.
?
It does. The ontology with comp, is given by the terms of whatever
logical specifications you give for some universal system you choose.
We have chosen the numbers, so the ontology is given by N = {0,
s(0), ...}.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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