On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> > As for what the Helsinki Man imagines will happen to him after he pushes that button I really don't care because that depends entirely on the particular personal beliefs of the man involved.

> That is non sense.

If he's a devout Muslim he believes he will go to heaven with 77 virgins when he pushes that button, but as I said I really don't care what he believes will happen, I care about what will happen.

That was my point. What happen does not depend on the beliefs.




> > we find that the Washington man remembers being the Helsinki man and remembers that man walking into the booth and being instantly teleported to Washington where he is alive and well,

> OK. He feels alive and well, and he has kept his identity. he is the Helsinki man.

Yes, but he is not the only Helsinki man because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, and that means the 1P view has been duplicated too,

As seen from the 3-views on the 1-views. But not as seen by the 1- views. You did agree that each copies feel to be in only once city.


and that means the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too, and that means the 1P view from the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too....

As seen each time from some 3-view, but that is not what is asked.




> So he can verify if his prediction done in Helsinki is correct. If he predicted "Washington", that is correct, for him. If he predicted "Moscow", that is incorrect for him, and if he predicted "Washington and Moscow", that is incorrect for him (and for the other). If he predicted "washington OR Moscow" that is correct for him,

Once upon a time there was a equation called X^2=2, and X always wondered what number he would turn out to be, and then one day a magical munchkin mathematician solved the equation and said that X was plus 2 and minus 2.

X = 2 OR X = -2.
X cannot be equal to 2 and -2.




All was well until minus 2 said the mathematician was wrong about who X was and that caused great strife in the land. Minus 2 said he was the solution to the equation and what's more he could prove it, and minus 2 said he was one and only one number and he certainly wasn't plus 2, so the great mathematician was wrong and was unable to predict what X would be. Unfortunately the number plus 2 started making similar claims about being the solution to the equation and got into a huge fight with minus 2, but they all added up to nothing.

  THE END


> This comes from the fact that all notions involved, including the notion of first person, in this setting, admits transparent third person description, like the diary, the bodies, etc.

There is nothing in those diaries, nothing about the bodies and no third party description that I failed to predict.

Indeed, but you fail to predict the first party description, which was the question. you seem to partially eliminate the first person, when prediction are asked to them about them, like if by some magic, you are all the copies at once, which would contradict comp.





> localizing oneself in a city.

If a problem has 2 solutions that means it does not have one and only one solution. How profound.

 > you predicted W and M. But "W and M" never occurs.

Mr. Washington man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now in one and only one city and is that city Washington? Yes.

Mr. Moscow man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now in one and only one city and is that city Moscow? Yes.

Mr. Helsinki man, that is to say the guy who is still experiencing Helsinki, are you still the Helsinki man? Only dead silence can be heard as a answer.

?
Unclear. After the pushing on the button, nobody is in helsinki. But the helsinki man survived in W and M, where both copies agree they are in once city and that they could not predict which one in advance.




And so "W and M" ALWAYS occurs,

From the 3-views. never from the 1-views, and I said explicitly that here, "W "and "M" are the self-localization output experience. "W and M" NEVER occurs as it is logically impossible.


that is to say the Helsinki man from the Helsinki man's viewpoint will be the Washington man and the Helsinki man from the Helsinki man's viewpoint will be the Moscow man. And the Helsinki man from the view of the guy who stayed in Helsinki no longer has a viewpoint of any sort.

> You are still confusing "the guy in in this city" and "I feel now to be in this city"

And you are still confused by the fact that "I" is no longer singular because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED AND SO HAS ALL OF I'S VIEWPOINTS.

Obviosuly not from the 1p perspective.

You only keep avoiding the question asked.





>> even if the Helsinki man was Bruno Marchal, even he made the correct prediction. Bruno Marchal predicted that 2 people will feel to be the Helsinki man and Bruno Marchal predicted that nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore because the body there has been destroyed, and Bruno Marchal predicted that both people who feel like the Helsinki man will be experiencing one and only one city

> Yes. And the question was "which one?".

Which what? I guess you mean which person goes to which city,

No. I ask to evaluate the chance, for the Helsinki man, to find itself in W or in M. he knows that he will survive in the usual sense, and that he will feel to be in only once city (he assumes comp).



I don't know what else you could mean.

It is hard for me to believe you.



The answer is that the Washington man goes to Washington and the Moscow man goes to Moscow. Where is the indeterminacy?

In the mind of the helsinki man, before pushing on the button, concerning his chance to feel to be the one in W (or M).




>> The question demands a single answer but in this case there is not one.

> This contradicts what you said above, that the guy knows in advance, that whoever he will feel to be, he will feel to be in a unique city. So there is a single answer

There would be a single answer if "he" were singular but it is not because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and that means his viewpoint from his viewpoint has been duplicated too.

That would entail P(<anything>) = 1, as we have never cease to be duplicated, through biology, through Everett-QM.




"W or M, but I can't be sure of which one".

If I demand a single answer from the question "are human beings male or female?" I will always be able to find a counterexample to prove you wrong. Can you find any great philosophical significance from that fact?

It is different, because in the WM-duplication you have to take into account the 1-3 difference, given that the question bears on your future 1p. By you own saying, it is unique.




> The question is asked to the Helsinki man, before the experience is done. The helsinki man does survive, by definition of comp, in both Moscow and Washington.

I agree, so the answer to the Helsinki man's question is that he, the Helsinki man, will survive in both Moscow AND Washington from the Helsinki man's viewpoint.

He might know that he will survive in both city, form the 3p view, but he knows that the question is asked about the future 1p-view, and he knows that it can only be W, or M, as he will not feel to be in two places at once.

You persist simply in avoiding the question asked. From the 1p view, he will never feel the presence of a split. he pushes on a button, and then do a self-localization, and find always (iterating the experience) a precise result: sometimes W, sometimes M, and by reasoning he can predict a perfect Bernouilli scheme and can infer that P = 1/2 is the simplest answer taking its total ignorance of the singular outcome into account.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to