On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> > As for what the Helsinki Man imagines will happen to him after
he pushes that button I really don't care because that depends
entirely on the particular personal beliefs of the man involved.
> That is non sense.
If he's a devout Muslim he believes he will go to heaven with 77
virgins when he pushes that button, but as I said I really don't
care what he believes will happen, I care about what will happen.
That was my point. What happen does not depend on the beliefs.
> > we find that the Washington man remembers being the Helsinki man
and remembers that man walking into the booth and being instantly
teleported to Washington where he is alive and well,
> OK. He feels alive and well, and he has kept his identity. he is
the Helsinki man.
Yes, but he is not the only Helsinki man because YOU HAVE BEEN
DUPLICATED, and that means the 1P view has been duplicated too,
As seen from the 3-views on the 1-views. But not as seen by the 1-
views. You did agree that each copies feel to be in only once city.
and that means the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too,
and that means the 1P view from the 1P view from the 1P view has
been duplicated too....
As seen each time from some 3-view, but that is not what is asked.
> So he can verify if his prediction done in Helsinki is correct. If
he predicted "Washington", that is correct, for him. If he predicted
"Moscow", that is incorrect for him, and if he predicted "Washington
and Moscow", that is incorrect for him (and for the other). If he
predicted "washington OR Moscow" that is correct for him,
Once upon a time there was a equation called X^2=2, and X always
wondered what number he would turn out to be, and then one day a
magical munchkin mathematician solved the equation and said that X
was plus 2 and minus 2.
X = 2 OR X = -2.
X cannot be equal to 2 and -2.
All was well until minus 2 said the mathematician was wrong about
who X was and that caused great strife in the land. Minus 2 said he
was the solution to the equation and what's more he could prove it,
and minus 2 said he was one and only one number and he certainly
wasn't plus 2, so the great mathematician was wrong and was unable
to predict what X would be. Unfortunately the number plus 2 started
making similar claims about being the solution to the equation and
got into a huge fight with minus 2, but they all added up to nothing.
THE END
> This comes from the fact that all notions involved, including the
notion of first person, in this setting, admits transparent third
person description, like the diary, the bodies, etc.
There is nothing in those diaries, nothing about the bodies and no
third party description that I failed to predict.
Indeed, but you fail to predict the first party description, which was
the question. you seem to partially eliminate the first person, when
prediction are asked to them about them, like if by some magic, you
are all the copies at once, which would contradict comp.
> localizing oneself in a city.
If a problem has 2 solutions that means it does not have one and
only one solution. How profound.
> you predicted W and M. But "W and M" never occurs.
Mr. Washington man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now
in one and only one city and is that city Washington? Yes.
Mr. Moscow man are you also the Helsinki man? Yes. Are you now in
one and only one city and is that city Moscow? Yes.
Mr. Helsinki man, that is to say the guy who is still experiencing
Helsinki, are you still the Helsinki man? Only dead silence can be
heard as a answer.
?
Unclear. After the pushing on the button, nobody is in helsinki. But
the helsinki man survived in W and M, where both copies agree they are
in once city and that they could not predict which one in advance.
And so "W and M" ALWAYS occurs,
From the 3-views. never from the 1-views, and I said explicitly that
here, "W "and "M" are the self-localization output experience. "W and
M" NEVER occurs as it is logically impossible.
that is to say the Helsinki man from the Helsinki man's viewpoint
will be the Washington man and the Helsinki man from the Helsinki
man's viewpoint will be the Moscow man. And the Helsinki man from
the view of the guy who stayed in Helsinki no longer has a viewpoint
of any sort.
> You are still confusing "the guy in in this city" and "I feel now
to be in this city"
And you are still confused by the fact that "I" is no longer
singular because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED AND SO HAS ALL OF I'S
VIEWPOINTS.
Obviosuly not from the 1p perspective.
You only keep avoiding the question asked.
>> even if the Helsinki man was Bruno Marchal, even he made the
correct prediction. Bruno Marchal predicted that 2 people will feel
to be the Helsinki man and Bruno Marchal predicted that nobody will
be experiencing Helsinki anymore because the body there has been
destroyed, and Bruno Marchal predicted that both people who feel
like the Helsinki man will be experiencing one and only one city
> Yes. And the question was "which one?".
Which what? I guess you mean which person goes to which city,
No. I ask to evaluate the chance, for the Helsinki man, to find itself
in W or in M. he knows that he will survive in the usual sense, and
that he will feel to be in only once city (he assumes comp).
I don't know what else you could mean.
It is hard for me to believe you.
The answer is that the Washington man goes to Washington and the
Moscow man goes to Moscow. Where is the indeterminacy?
In the mind of the helsinki man, before pushing on the button,
concerning his chance to feel to be the one in W (or M).
>> The question demands a single answer but in this case there is
not one.
> This contradicts what you said above, that the guy knows in
advance, that whoever he will feel to be, he will feel to be in a
unique city. So there is a single answer
There would be a single answer if "he" were singular but it is not
because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and that means his viewpoint from
his viewpoint has been duplicated too.
That would entail P(<anything>) = 1, as we have never cease to be
duplicated, through biology, through Everett-QM.
"W or M, but I can't be sure of which one".
If I demand a single answer from the question "are human beings male
or female?" I will always be able to find a counterexample to prove
you wrong. Can you find any great philosophical significance from
that fact?
It is different, because in the WM-duplication you have to take into
account the 1-3 difference, given that the question bears on your
future 1p. By you own saying, it is unique.
> The question is asked to the Helsinki man, before the experience
is done. The helsinki man does survive, by definition of comp, in
both Moscow and Washington.
I agree, so the answer to the Helsinki man's question is that he,
the Helsinki man, will survive in both Moscow AND Washington from
the Helsinki man's viewpoint.
He might know that he will survive in both city, form the 3p view, but
he knows that the question is asked about the future 1p-view, and he
knows that it can only be W, or M, as he will not feel to be in two
places at once.
You persist simply in avoiding the question asked. From the 1p view,
he will never feel the presence of a split. he pushes on a button, and
then do a self-localization, and find always (iterating the
experience) a precise result: sometimes W, sometimes M, and by
reasoning he can predict a perfect Bernouilli scheme and can infer
that P = 1/2 is the simplest answer taking its total ignorance of the
singular outcome into account.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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