Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation
On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism. I doubt that very much, ... Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict comp, which is assumed also. Dear Bruno, Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each other as a 'physical reality"? There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc. And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp. Dear Bruno, How exactly does the comparison occur? Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that /the observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds/. But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p. I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem: *"**Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the 'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first person picture of that observer. /A "person" with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics./ *Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it. *Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously." The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being ignored. I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp? ? ? ? Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc. I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering. Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp
Re: Against Mechanism
On 21 Nov 2012, at 18:51, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > both the W-man and the M-man know perfectly well who they are, Yes certainly they do, they know exactly who they are but they are not the ones that Bruno Marchal asks questions and demands predictions of, Please just read what I said. If something is not clear, ask a straight question. The prediction is asked to the H-man. The confirmation can be asled on the H-man when he becomes the W-man, and to the H-man when he becomes the M-man. That is the prediction is asked to a singular you, and the confirmation can be asked to all the obtained "you". or at least I don't think they are but who knows. Just read what I say. Consult the paper in case of doubt. Bruno Marchal wants a mysterious entity called "you" to answer questions, This is a so boring rhetorical play. The question is asked to you when you are in Helsinki. If you prefer, I define John Clark by the owner of your identity cart. the question is asked to John Clark when he is in Helsinki, and concerns the evaluation of the chance he found himself (with its identity cart- having the feeling to be in Moscow. a entity who, near as I can understand, is the Helsinki man after he ceases to exist, or maybe its the Moscow man before he starts to exist. ? In either case the men involved aren't going to be answering many questions, they seem to have developed a speech impediment. The question is asked in Helsinki. Never after. You introduce unnecessary complications. > You push on a button, and, as a comp is assumed, you know that when you will open your eyes WHOEVER you will be by the comp assumption, you will see only only once city, and you are asked to evaluate which one. And Bruno Marchal makes the assumption, that is very obviously wrong, that there is only one "you". Not at all. I clearly distinguish the 3-view on the 1-view (there will be two 1-view), and the 1-view from the 1-view, which are both unique as a s simple consequence of comp. > There are no future you in Helsinki, as the body in Helsinki is destroyed. OK. > So you are the Helsinki man in Helsinki, and then you are the W- man AND the M-man, OK, but you are asking the Helsinki man to predict NOW not then about what "you" will see in the future, and if in the future "you are the W-man AND the M-man" then obviously "you" will see W AND M. In the 3-view, but the question bears on the 1-view as seen by the 1- view. by comp you know that you will survive and feel to be unique in once city, and the question bears on that? You come up again and again, with the 3-view on the 1-views, and never take the pain to listen to what each copy is saying. They say "I am in W" or "I am in M", never both. >> "you" can mean anything > Precisely: you are all the copies And yet when a question is asked about what "you" will see Bruno Marchal insists that no ambiguity is involved in the question. No, by the comp assumption. Nothing is ambiguous. There is just an non ambiguous clear indterminacy. you will feel to be one man in once city, but you cannot predict which one in particular. You can predict only that it will be either W or M, as you can be sure in advance that you will not feel to be both copies at once. > in the 3-views on the 1-view. I can conceive of 2 things being identical from the 1-view but not from the 3-view, the biological John Clark and the uploaded John Clark for example; but I can not conceive of 2 things being identical from the 3 view but not from the 1-view, That simply never happens. that's why I don't understand your constant complaint that I'm just looking at things from the 3-view. Because you keep saying that after the duplication you will be in both places. That is correct in the 3p view, but non sensical in the 1p views. > you are only one person, in all situation, Who is only one person in all situations? In a world where duplicating chambers exist Bruno Marchal is certainly not just one person in all situations, but John Clark doesn't know about "you". With QM I am multiplied in more than 10^100+ at each instant, yet there is only one first person view. > You know that you will survive in one city. Who knows that what will survive in one city? You know that from assuming comp and the protocol. You know that you would have survive with probability one in M, if there were no M- reconstitution, and vice versa. But a reconstitution elsewhere cannot influence on the fact that you survive in some places, yet the experiment here shows that it can change the prpbability outcome, and that is part of the point. >You just don't know which one. WHICH WHAT? WHICH YOU?? Which city, and which first person experience (living in M, or living in W). Are you just playing stupid or what? This has been repeat
Re: Arithmetic doesn't even suggest geometry, let alone awareness.
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote: > I would never claim there is no relationship between numbers and > geometry, I claim that there is no function which geometry serves for > arithmetic. Pythagoras discovered and proved his famous theorem using geometry, only later was it expanded into the world of numbers. >> There is certainly a connection between the patterns of neurons in a >> composer's brain and the patterns of sound he produces, if Beethoven were >> given Crack his neurons would fire differently and his symphonies would >> also be different. >> > > >A correlation among patterns in brain activity and acoustic vibration > does not imply that vibrations in the air turn into an experience of sound. > There is a test to determine which of our competing claims is true. Lets monitor a composers brain, say John Williams, and see if Crack makes the neurons in his brain fire in a atypical manner, if it does let him compose some music under the influence of Crack. Then we bring in a panel of music critics and ask them if the new composition is in Williams typical style. Do you really think they will say it sounds just like the Star Wars theme? > A computer is a collection of switches, > Yes. > but it is only a collection in our imagination. > Bullshit. > The switches don't know that they are part of a collection. > Yes, and a neuron in your brain doesn't know it's part of a collection. > They don't know there is a computer > And a neuron doesn't know there is a brain. > Computers are great at doing very boring things very quickly. > That's why people are so bored with computers, boring computers like Xbox's and iPones and Blu Ray players and iPods. "Nyeaaah...What's up Doc?" > ! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation
On 21 Nov 2012, at 14:10, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Yes. the subject (1p) can't. But the machine can still refer to itself. Then in any system there will always be at least one subject, and that subject cannot be part of the rest of the system ? Eve,ntually the "system" belongs only to the imagination of the subject. Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme. Possible. the universal knower in ourself might then be the "supreme monad". But it is not the outer God, it more the universal soul, the third greek god. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31 Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism. I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point out in my book. Hi Russell, And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now. That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.) Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense). Dear Bruno, OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within comp's theoretical structure. You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L bian reality (RA or the UD). I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way... Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!) Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams? I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part. From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-
Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
On 21 Nov 2012, at 11:32, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in great scholarly detail on http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/ To be franc there is nothing new in that paper, on the contrary it fails to mention the work done by Webb (not to talk on mine on Lucas, Benacerraf and the Penrose argument). I have counted more than 50 errors in Lucas paper. Some are uninteresting, and some are very interesting. The argument of Lucas and Penrose are typically invalid, but it can be corrected, and it leads to the proposition according to whioch: If I am a machine, then I cannot know which machine I am, and this plays some role in the formal part of the study of the first person indeterminacy. Lucas and Penrose assumes that they are sound, and that they know that they are sound, but this is already inconsistent, even if the soundness is restricted to arithmetic. In Conscience & Mechanism, I show how all Löbian machines can refute Lucas and Penrose. Basically they confuse []p (3p beliefs) with []p & p (1p knowledge).. It seems to me to be self-evident that 1p cannot be part of 3p But that is good insight of you. For correct machine, this can be proved, as the machine cannot prove the true equivalence between []p and []p & p, as they don't know that they are correct. []p can be defined in the language of the universal machine, but []p and p cannot. By assuming correctness of some other machine, the Löbian one can prove that for simpler machine than themselves, and they can bet on their correctness and lift that idea at their own level, with the usual theological risk of this (forgetting the "bet" in the process). Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like Godel and Lucas did. Or the observer can't be part of what is observed. Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof. Well, both the observer (3p) and the prover (3p) can do that, without necessarily knwoing that they do that. But the knower (1p) cannot. To explain the details of this would need more familiarity in logic, and notably Solovay's theorems, which I might explain someday. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, where are the steps of UD ? You can find them here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/20/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say, that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable. Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not consciousness per se). What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is. Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all computations going through my current comp states, and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable. I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/19/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
On 20 Nov 2012, at 20:47, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/11/20 Bruno Marchal On 20 Nov 2012, at 16:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/11/11 Bruno Marchal On 11 Nov 2012, at 01:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It is an observable fact. is obviously true that if you live in a society where everyone take something as true , no matter what, then it is true for one of its members, you, for example. That's correct. But that still does not make it true. Sometimes everybody can be wrong. That´s the reson why truth can only be defined in objective terms as a belief (except perhaps in the realm of mathematics). Well, mathematicians can differ a lot, but arithmetic seems to be the sharable part of math. When I say this is true, I´m saying that I believe that this is true. I don't think this is a good idea. This works well in many case, but on the fundamental question it is better to distinguish truth and belief. truth, by definition, cannot be made wrong, and is independent of our beliefs. Beliefs are typically wrong most of the time. "P" and "I believe P" have a very different meaning. it is not an idea. is an objective fact. that if you say that something is true, I ´m sure that you believe that this is true. This is the inmediate objective fact that I can extract from your voice Well, in the case the believer is honest, you can assume this. OK. But this does not make truth and belief identifiable. Truth is only definable in the field of mathematics. Actually it is not. Arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic, and mathematical truth cannot be defined at all. But we can approximate it, in special context. Because you are interested in mathematical truths. I am interested in theology and fundamental questions. I use comp as a working hypothesis, and I derive propositions from it, using computer science and logic, but being at the start agnostic on about everything, except perhaps my own consciousness here-and-now. I´m interested in life as is experienced here and now. Ah! What a coincidence. Me too. In the realm of experienced reality, there are no demonstrable absolute and eternal Truth forever and ever. Perhaps. I am not sure. Anyway, once we theorize we make clear our assumptions. I use the idea that my consciousness here and now remains unchanged for some local digital transformation. I assume also elementary arithmetic (and thus some fragment of classical logic on some fragment of arithmetical truth), and the Church Turing thesis. So a definition of truth with no belief behind has no interest, because it can not be applied to anything (some details below) There is no attempt to define truth, nor consciousness. This can be used informally at the meta-level. That is enough, once you agree with the theory, even if only for the sake of the argument. So truth in the realm of experience means "accepted as truth" in a certain context. I would call that delusion. of course sometimes we can be lucky, and assert a genuine truth. But this we can never be sure of, except perhaps in arithmetic (but I do not use this in the reasoning I do). it´s an objective fact. I' m not the believer that is deceived. I´m the objective one that study the one that believe. ? That one can be deceived too. We don't know the truth, except the consciousness here and now. The rest are theories, and it is quite helpful, especially when digging on the fundamental matter (like life and after life) to make all the assumption explicit, with a clear operative level, like in math. We can´nt go further than that if we want to stay objective (or tautological). I think we can, as we can have faith in truth, and just admit that we don't know it. We can still searching. defining truth by beliefs would lead to relativism. I don´t fall in relativism because the said below. If you admit that you do not know every fact of the experienced reality, I admit this. Only this, actually. But I can reason only on theoretical propositions, which of course have to be coherent with the only things I know. the you fall in nihilism. In your case, arithmetical nihilism. It would be nihilist if we believe only in the basic ontology. But that makes no sense as the basic ontology is only the base needed for explaining how both matter and consciousness appear in the epistemology, which is as real as the ontology, even if on different level. But I know that you know that i exist, I don't know that. I belief that, but I might wake up in a second, in a different reality where you don't exist. I don't find this currently plausible, but it remains logically consistent, and it is enough to consider it as a belief, even if a solid one. or you believe that I exist. because you are talking to me. I talk to dreamy creature too, and usually not knowing that I am dreamin
Re: [evol-psych] The problem of what exists*
Dear Richard and Anna: I have an easier stance on the subject: whatever 'comes up' in 'a' mind - exists. If not otherwise: in thought (idea?). Once 'thought' about it, it does become part of the world. Physical attributes may be considered by people who accept those figments but even for those it should not be restrictive. As our inventory of knowables grows steadily we have no restrictions to put in the way of possible(?) existence. We cannot prove impossibility. I do not go for old theories, many of them were rescinded over time when newer items entered the said inventory. My(!) Multiverse consists of quite unequal universes (according to my narrative) - no TWO may be identical because of different circumstances of how they proceed to change. I accept the 'physical world' figment as a workable explanation to things still unknowable, it gave rise to a (conventional) science and a technology which is (almost) good - always brilliant. Yet I also accept (in agnosticism) an unlimited complexity of everything - still unknown to us, yet influencing the happenings we observe (=our actual model of the 'knowable' world - what Richard represents so eloqiently.) I also appreciate every step forward in expanding our knowledge. John Mikes Ph.D., D.Sc. ret. scientist -- On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 2:31 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > Anna, > > I strongly suggest that any interested party read the paper > http://arxiv.org/ftp/astro-ph/papers/0602/0602420.pdf as the copy below > leaves out a most interesting discussion of emergence and entanglement. And > besides the string landscape is not 10500 but rather the vastly larger > number 10^500. To wet your appetite here is a key paragraph: > > "It is of interest to determine just how complex a physical system has to > be to encounter > the Lloyd limit. For most purposes in physical science the limit is too > weak to make a jot > of difference. But in cases where the parameters of the system are > combinatorically > explosive, the limit can be significant. For example, proteins are made of > strings of 20 > different sorts of amino acids, and the combinatoric possibility space has > more > dimensions than the Lloyd limit of 10^120 when the number of amino acids > is greater than > about 60 (Davies, 2004). Curiously, 60 amino acids is about the size of > the smallest > functional protein, suggesting that the threshold for life might > correspond to the threshold > for strong emergence, supporting the contention that life is an emergent > phenomenon (in > the strong sense of emergence). Another example concerns quantum > entanglement. An > entangled state of about 400 particles also approaches the > Landauer-Lloyd complexity > limit (Davies, 2005a). That means the Hilbert space of such a state has > more dimensions > than the informational capacity of the universe; the state simply cannot > be specified > within the real universe. (There are not enough degrees of freedom in the > entire cosmos > to accommodate all the coefficients!) A direct implication of this result > is the prediction > that a quantum computer with more than about 400 entangled components will > not > function as advertised (and 400 is well within the target design > specifications of the > quantum computer industry). " > > Richard > > On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 1:20 AM, Anna wrote: > >> ** >> >> >> ** >> *The problem of what exists** >> ** >> *P.C.W. Davies* >> *Australian Centre for Astrobiology, Macquarie University, New South >> Wales, Australia 2109* >> *Abstract* >> ** >> ** >> *Popular multiverse models such as the one based on the string theory >> landscape require an underlying set of unexplained laws containing many >> specific features and highly restrictive prerequisites. I explore the >> consequences of relaxing some of these prerequisites with a view to >> discovering whether any of them might be justified anthropically. Examples >> considered include integer space dimensionality, the immutable, Platonic >> nature of the laws of physics and the no-go theorem for strong emergence. >> The problem of why some physical laws exist, but others which are seemingly >> possible do not, takes on a new complexion following this analysis, >> although it remains an unsolved problem in the absence of an additional >> criterion.* >> >> 1. Background >> The puzzle of why the universe consists of the things it does is one of >> the oldest problems of philosophy. Given the seemingly limitless >> possibilities available, why is it the case that atoms, stars, clouds, >> crystals, etc. are “chosen” to exist in profusion in preference to, say, >> pulsating green jelly or pentagonal chain mail? A related question is why >> the entities that do exist conform to the particular physical laws that >> they do as opposed to any other set of laws one might care to imagine. >> Physicists have mostly ignored this problem, content to accept the observed >> physica
How Leibniz solved the self-reference problem. Each monad is essentially blind.
Hi everything-list Time is not a variable in the monadology, so everything changes instantly, or at least at the speed of light. The self-reference problem also shows up in Leibniz, but now I see that that's why he used the verb "reflects." Because each monad cannot see outside of his point of reality (there are no windows), there is no 1p, everything is indirect or 3p. He thus avoids the problem of 1p of another 1p. The supreme monad is the only monad that can see, directly (has 1p), and it can see all clearly and instantly update each monad's "perceptions" [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Two possible ways of creating actual objects out of nothing
Hi Russell Standish Sorry, my mistake, I remembered wrong. It was somebody else. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 19:00:51 Subject: Re: Re: Two possible ways of creating actual objects out of nothing On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 08:31:05AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Russell Standish > > I did land on your website or look up your book. > You do have some radical assumptions, one of > them puzzling to me-- that time is an "external" variable. > External to what ? mind ? the physical world ? > > That's not an assumption I make. The TIME postulate is that observers process distinct observations selected from an ordered set (eg a timescale). It is certainly not external to anything, as it is very much observer relative. See the discussion on pages 64-65. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
Hi Bruno Marchal Perhaps I have gotten things wrong, but Godel's problem seems to me to be the self-reference problem uncovered by B Russell, namely that a class (if I am using the right word) cannot itself be a member of that class. For example suppose we have a list of siblings, john, jacob and jeremy. Then the list itself cannot be a sibling. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 12:31:38 Subject: Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic On 20 Nov 2012, at 16:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/11/11 Bruno Marchal On 11 Nov 2012, at 01:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It is an observable fact. is obviously true that if you live in a society where everyone take something as true , no matter what, then it is true for one of its members, you, for example. That's correct. But that still does not make it true. Sometimes everybody can be wrong. That? the reson why truth can only be defined in objective terms as a belief (except perhaps in the realm of mathematics). Well, mathematicians can differ a lot, but arithmetic seems to be the sharable part of math. When I say this is true, I? saying that I believe that this is true. I don't think this is a good idea. This works well in many case, but on the fundamental question it is better to distinguish truth and belief. truth, by definition, cannot be made wrong, and is independent of our beliefs. Beliefs are typically wrong most of the time. "P" and "I believe P" have a very different meaning. So truth in the realm of experience means "accepted as truth" in a certain context. I would call that delusion. of course sometimes we can be lucky, and assert a genuine truth. But this we can never be sure of, except perhaps in arithmetic (but I do not use this in the reasoning I do). We can?t go further than that if we want to stay objective (or tautological). I think we can, as we can have faith in truth, and just admit that we don't know it. We can still searching. defining truth by beliefs would lead to relativism. Thay point of view would be pure relativism unless natural selection is considered. Or many things weaker than that a priori. If you agree that 43 is prime, that is already a lot. I cannot start with natural selection, as I am agnostic on nature. I don't know what it is, if that exist, at which level, etc. It presuppose also arithmetic, and with comp I can argue that I cannot add anymore, except for the epistemological definitions. I do believe in natural selection, but not that it is something so fundamental. first person consciousness selection is more important, as it selects also the laws making natural selection possible. The absolute requirement of existence of the minds which habites in the environmment of the laws of reality makes certain truths possible and certain alternatives impossible. But such a sentences assumes a lot. For example, that "electrons collapse in the nucleus is" can never be true for any living being. Of course, this is a well known physical facts well explained by QM. But with comp, it is nothing but a complex problem, we have to derive QM from + and * before. neither "Mothers don? love their children" for the very same reason in humans. Because these candidates for truth are incompatible with the existence of minds (1) and the human mind (2). Hmm.. I can agree, but you are quick. Many mothers does not like their children. Some kill them. Some kill them all, as in a recent case nearby. It is a known phenomenon. In the middle, there are many truths that can be accepted as truths in some contexts, no matter if they are later refuted. Our time is by no means any different from other times in history. Almost all that we known can be proved wrong in a way or other. except perhaps mathematics (and not even that, if we don? consider life ( autopoietic computation) as criteria for existence). To summarize, to say that all may be wrong is not an impediment for a objective study of truth as as a evolutionary phenomenon and his closed identity with what exist and is perceived good . I agree. That is why I think it is better to distinguih Truth from beliefs, and keep in mind that all scientific "truth" are only belief, by which it is meant that they can be false. truth is what we search (when we have the taste for it). I mean, that this historic consideration is the only objective non speculative method of considering the notion of Truth, whatever if it is considered in capital letters or not. I may say that truth is an evolutionary (historical) path to Truth. With comp something happen, which is that we can limit truth to arithmetical truth. It remains a b
Re: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation
Hi Bruno Marchal Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Then in any system there will always be at least one subject, and that subject cannot be part of the rest of the system ? Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31 Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism. I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point out in my book. Hi Russell, And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now. That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.) Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some sense). Dear Bruno, OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within comp's theoretical structure. You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L bian reality (RA or the UD). I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way... Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!) Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams? I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part. From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams "A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail of
Re: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio]
Hi Bruno Marchal I'm trying to understand your paper, but a seemingly much simpler form of your argument keeps getting in the way. The simpler form is the Lucas argument, discussed in great scholarly detail on http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/ It seems to me to be self-evident that 1p cannot be part of 3p Which seems to be a equivalent to Godels's theorm. Or the observer can't be part of what is observed. Or more generally, the prover cannot be part of the proof. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/21/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-20, 10:05:13 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 20 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, where are the steps of UD ? You can find them here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html You can download the PDF, and also the unique slide with a diagram for each step, as this can help to remember them. For the step 8, the best version is in this list in the MGA thread (the Movie Graph Argument). The seven first steps already explains the reversal physics---/---number's bio-psycho-theo-logy though. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/20/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-19, 09:33:19 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 19 Nov 2012, at 11:22, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I thought that comp is exactly opposite to what you say, that computationalism is the belief that we can simulate the mind with a computer program-- that the mind is computable. Yes that is correct (if by mind you mean the 3p feature of mind, and not consciousness per se). What I wrote in the quote (below) is that the physical reality is not completely Turing emulable, once we assume the mind is. Comp is just the idea that I can survive with a computer at the place of the brain. This does NOT mean that a computer create the consciousness. It means only that the consciousness can only be made manifestable through relative bodies, but it exists only in Platonia. But then matter too, and it relies statistically on all computations going through my current comp states, and the math shows that this will include some continuous/analog observable. I am not sure this can be understood without getting a personal understanding of at least the first seven step of the UD reasoning. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/19/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-18, 07:46:20 Subject: Re: Reality Check: You Are Not a Computer Simulation [Audio] On 17 Nov 2012, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote: > > > Original Message > >> >> More In This Article >> * Overview >> _Is Quantum Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) >> >> >> >> Conventional wisdom says that quantum mechanics is a theory of >> discreteness, describing a world of irreducible building blocks. >> It stands to reason >> that computers??which process information in discrete >> chunks??should be able >> to simulate nature fully, at least in principle. But it turns out >> that >> certain asymmetries in particle physics cannot be discretized; >> they are >> irreducibly continuous. In that case, says David Tong, author of >> "_Is Quantum >> Reality Analog after All?_ >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-quantum-reality-analog-after-all >> >> ) " in the December 2012 issue of >> Scientific American, the world can never be fully simulated on a >> computer. That would be a nice confirmation of comp. As I have often insisted digital physics (the world can be fully be Turing emulated) violated the consequence of comp which makes necessary the presence of non computable observable, and even non enumerable spectra. Digital physics is self-contradictory. It implies comp, but comp implies the negation of digital physics, so, with or without comp, digital physics is contradictory. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything L
