On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
I doubt that very much, ...
Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict
comp, which is assumed also.
Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with
each other as a 'physical reality"?
There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.
How exactly does the comparison occur? Comp seems to necessitate
all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. There is a deep
problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from
the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic
principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what
has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that /the
observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of
equiprobability of possible worlds/. But this claim implies violence to
the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:
*"**Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple
example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an
electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure
the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the
spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it
aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first
person picture of that observer. /A "person" with the third person
perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a
multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from
*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way
I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different
pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.
*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction
changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron
cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same
time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the
spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that
fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both
in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of
QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions,
and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of
such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble
are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take
this "spookiness" seriously."
The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a
'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.
I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is
it necessarily inconsistent with comp?
? ? ?
Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges
from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.
I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent
structure and not some pre-defined ordering.
Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws,
making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,
I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is impossible
for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique Boolean algebra
for all possible 1p. Why? Because it cannot be proven to be
satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of
algorithms. Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a
but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the
case without QM. That would not have the case if "p-><>p" was not a
theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).
Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the
impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the
Satisfiability problem *and* that it is accessible for any finitely
expressible logical structure.
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