Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 06 Jul 2014, at 22:55, meekerdb wrote: On 7/6/2014 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That's the whole point and burden of my analysis. So on that basis I disagree that the same kind of thing can be done in a physical theory. On the comp assumption, by contrast, belief in a truth and acting as if true, in conjunction with their truth content, are alike derived from the outset as consequences of a fundamentally epistemological theory. A consequence of a hypothetical definition. A consequence of the most standard definition in the field. I am not sure hypothetical can be applied to definition. I can be because it's defining a word that already has a common definition, Which one? so the hypothesis has to be that the technical definition will capture what is essential in the common definition. Simply put, all what we ask for belief or believable is that 0=0 is believable, 0 + x = x is believable, if A is believable and if A-B is believable, then B is believable, etc. Up to Gödel, this was thought defining a notion of (rational) knowledge, but then it happened to obey to an axiomatic of belief, and not knowledge for which we ask []p - p, by the most common definition of knowledge. But then the Theatetus' definition works when applied to the rational belief just described. So the Theaetetus' definition do capture what is essential in the common definition (KT or KT4). And the nice news, that Gerson missed in his book on ancien epistemology (and which actually deepen his own conclusion) is that knowledge, when defined by true belief in arithmetic, does change the very logic, but also the nature of the knowing entity. Knowledge, for example appears to be non representational, and is not a propositional attitude, unlike belief. That Theaetetus' definition makes knowledge into a propositional attitude has been considered as a success for the modern naturalist, and as a departure for the non-naturalist (and the anciens, and the mystics). But that does not happen, Gödel/Löb saves the ancien and the mystics idea that to know is not propositional, but still in a rationalist naturalist (in Gerson large sense, which almost mean mechanism (like in Diderot)) way. G* saves rationalism (or general naturalism) by explaining that []p (belief) is equivalent with ([]p p) (knowledge), but yet NOT in the view of the machine: she just cannot believe or know that equivalence. She can't miss the mysterious (non justifiable) aspect of the mind-body relation. If you agree with comp, and if you agree that you believe in elementary arithmetic, such definition do their work, and do relate an unnameable knower to any (enough rich, Löbian) machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 06 Jul 2014, at 15:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Jul 2014, at 05:18, meekerdb wrote: On 7/5/2014 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 July 2014 06:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as not existing just because they are not part of the primitive ontology. But of course I haven't been saying these things don't exist. On the contrary, I've been labouring to differentiate, for the sake of this discussion, two distinct senses of existence. The first sense picks out the basic ontology of a theory and the second refers to whatever can (putatively) be derived from that ontology on the basis of further epistemological considerations. And I've been pointing out that nothing whose existence is picked out only in the the latter sense can be claimed as having any independent relevance (ex hypothesi reductionism) in the evolution of states defined in terms of the former. In physics the stuff that is most primitive in a model is also stuff who's existence is least certain, e.g. strings, super-symmetric particles, space-time quanta,... While the stuff you would say doesn't really exist is the most certain - including the instruments used to infer the primitive stuff and records of the data taken. That's simply not relevant to the point under discussion. Of course what's most certain is whatever is directly epistemologically available, but we're discussing what our theories may actually imply if we take them *seriously*. The hypothesised ontology may be far less certain, but we are persuaded to entertain it in the first place precisely because we conjecture that the things of which we *are* certain are ultimately its complex epistemological derivatives. But this ceases to be the case when we propose a second-order relation like computation as the physical correlate of consciousness, precisely because it vitiates the idea that such relations can be anything other than a manner of speaking, in terms of the *ontology* of a reductive physical theory. Hence, to attribute the ability to evoke conscious states to such imaginary or virtual relations would seem to invoke a sort of ontological magic. I don't see it as any more magic than making mountains out of rocks. You seem to be invoking an argument from incredulity: Consciousness just can't be made out of physical stuff or processes. It doesn't take magic to make mountains out of rocks; it requires only that we respect the distinction in a theory between an ontology and its epistemological derivatives. What I was saying is that, under physical reductionism, we can't coherently claim the ontology of consciousness to be computation, because the relata picked out by computation simply can't be justified as being independently effective. The relata of computation are, ex hypothesi, epistemologically derivative, abstractions of a *uniquely effective micro-physical ontology*: strings, super-symmetric particles, space-time quanta. This ineluctable degeneracy to the basement entails that, if you want consciousness to be made out of physical stuff or processes, that's where you'll find your parts kit. But in any case it is surely rather obvious that we have no business looking for consciousness to be made out of stuff, unless we are willing to take the stuff alone (i.e. the 3p part) to be consciousness tout court. That would be to eliminate the 1p part and if we stick closely to our theoretical analysis such elimination is obviously incoherent on its face, as the very claim invokes the epistemological derivatives it purports to exclude. Of course I know this isn't what you mean: you accept the 1p part. But the point of my analysis has been to argue that unless we are prepared to consign the latter to mystery (i.e. inaccessibility to further explanation) we should perhaps question whether we aren't being misled by very idea of consciousness being made out of something. Arithmetic, in the first instance, is simply posited as the minimal ontological assumption for the construction of an explicit epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers); IOW what physics explicitly eschews at the outset. From that point the explanatory thrust hinges on epistemological considerations and hence can no longer be straightforwardly reduced to the first-order ontology. Yes, that's an interesting aspect of Bruno's theory. He identifies provable with believes. But the the same kind of thing can be done in a physical theory: believes = acts as if it were true. There's even a whole theory of Bayesian inference based on bets. It may not be right, but it's a theory of epistemology. Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology after the physical fact. It assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, No, it defines a certain kind of belief, just as Bruno identifies belief with provable in some axiomatic
Re: RE: American Intelligence
Everything you post is an attempt at derision, which is an attempt to fudge things, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoids answeing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: RE: American Intelligence
On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 2:08 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Everything you post is an attempt at derision, Why? You post your prejudice and will to use force against entire cultural/religious community, most with no military ambition whatsoever. I have pointed out and will continue to point out that I disagree with this radical rhetoric. which is an attempt to fudge things, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoids answeing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war? Assuming I were in office, which yes that'll be the effin day, definitely not some left formula you have in mind. This would be strategically weak and predictable. I would assess the whole position based on all available data; and if things got so ugly that distasteful countermeasure are the only route, then I would take them in offering my resignation, given say lack of time to decide. I sure wouldn't jump to unjustified wars and use only very particular means; definitely not have some prepackaged answer that I would parade on public web lists. That would be strategically insane. No fudging; now what is your point with these posts then? PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 6 July 2014 04:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology after the physical fact. It assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, No, it defines a certain kind of belief, just as Bruno identifies belief with provable in some axiomatic system (which you must admit is not a standard meaning of belief) one can identify belief with certain actions in context. I don't know what you mean by after the physical fact. If it's a physical theory of belief then of course it's explained in terms of physical facts. You seem to reject this as though it's obviously wrong. Not wrong, just not the whole story. My argument has been that any mechanism of belief that is hierarchically reducible to a finite set of (assumptive) primitives cannot thereafter rely on the (supposedly) independent effectiveness of derivative notions such as computation as the basis of its mechanism of knowledge. This is essentially the same conclusion as MGA or Maudlin and amounts to an insistence on what is most powerful in reductive explanation (i.e. the redundancy of intermediate levels of effectiveness) . Hence the specific line of attack is that, under reductionism, the effectiveness of derivative notions such as physical computation cannot be meaningfully distinguished from that of their ontological primitives. Since this isn't always obvious, I've offered suggestions, closer to hand than the hierarchical relation between micro and macro physical phenomena, to exemplify the similarly tacit reification of supernumerary ontological assumptions (e.g. mountains, football teams, societies, etc.). It may be inadequate or Bruno's theory may be better, but you seem to think it's somehow heretical to have a physical idea of what constitutes belief. Well, It is at least my intention to make clear what I actually think so that you don't have to rely on what I may seem to think. But if my argument goes through, what is left to a reductionist strategy would look like some kind of mind-brain, or more properly mind-reductive-primitive, identity theory. But then the burden would be on finding a convincing justification of identical, in this non-standard sense, that doesn't amount to effective elimination of the first term. We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. So no, there's no heresy involved in such an idea unless, IMHO, it is a blind for eliminativism. But the risk in any straightforward equation of the physical idea of what constitutes belief with some parallel physical account, however exhaustive, is that of consigning the 1p part to some not-available-for-explanation limbo. One might therefore say that action, belief and truth are hypothesised as being complementary or co-effective, rather than hierarchical-reductive, in relation. Truth in comp only refers to mathematical truth of the form Exf(x). It's a long way to connect that to I see a dog. True enough it's a long way, but it might yet be a first step on the right path. By contrast, I don't see how any equivalent truth-relation can be tacked on to reductive physicalism except as an act of courtesy. What can it mean to say that the physical evolution of some particularised system corresponds to a self-referential truth (i.e. a subjective reality transcendent over its physical states) other than as an ad hoc attribution in the face of an indisputable a posteriori fact? Of course, sans a viable theory of mind, this latter position is indeed the one we find ourselves in. But what we really seek is some explanatory framework within which such relations as believes, knows and acts can be conciliated on something more than a merely metaphorical or operational basis. Beyond that commonality, the spectrum of subjectivity (i.e. its possible objects) would extend asymptotically towards infinity, I guess, but always according to the specifics of the logic and statistics extractable from comp. At least, that is the hypothesis and the project. OK, I can buy that. OK, sold. How many would you like? ;-) David On 7/5/2014 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 July 2014 06:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as not existing just because they are not part of the primitive ontology. But of course I haven't been saying these things don't exist. On the contrary, I've been labouring to differentiate, for the sake of this discussion, two distinct senses of existence. The first sense picks out the basic ontology of a theory and the second refers to whatever can (putatively) be derived from that ontology on the basis of further epistemological considerations. And I've been pointing out that nothing whose existence is picked out only in the the latter sense can
RE: RE: American Intelligence
-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] Everything you post is an attempt at derision, which is an attempt to fudge things, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoids answeing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war? Definitely not on yet another neocon foreign war of choice as you demand we all line up in support of (or accuse us of being in bed with the enemy -- like a true fascist fuck). Our nation has already been bled dry by two neocon wars of folly, we need a third one like we need a hole in our collective national head. Now go on off now and play with your plastic soldiers, armchair general. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: How dangerous is radiation?
On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 2:29 PM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Then why have IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) studies linked exposure to Radon gas to increased lung cancer (as well as Leukemia) rates? As I said nobody doubts that large amounts of radiation cause lots of cancers, the question is will a tenth as much radiation cause a tenth as much cancer or will it perhaps cause no cancer at all? http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol100D/mono100D-9.pdf There is zero evidence that small amounts of radiation received over a long period of time is harmful, in fact all the evidence points in the other direction. That is simply not true It is? Show me the evidence (and a policy of the World Health Organization is not evidence) that radiation received over a long period of time is harmful. I've looked but I just can't find any. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: How dangerous is radiation?
From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, July 7, 2014 10:59 AM Subject: Re: How dangerous is radiation? On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 2:29 PM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Then why have IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) studies linked exposure to Radon gas to increased lung cancer (as well as Leukemia) rates? As I said nobody doubts that large amounts of radiation cause lots of cancers, the question is will a tenth as much radiation cause a tenth as much cancer or will it perhaps cause no cancer at all? There is zero evidence that small amounts of radiation received over a long period of time is harmful, in fact all the evidence points in the other direction. That is simply not true It is? Show me the evidence (and a policy of the World Health Organization is not evidence)that radiation received over a long period of time is harmful. I've looked but I just can't find any. You did not read the study I posted did you? The epidemiological evidence linking exposure to Radon to increased risk of cancer is evident. The study is very well referenced and conclusive. Of course if you refuse to look at it then you will never see it and will then be able to continue to say that you have seen no evidence that radon exposure leads to increased risks of Cancer. But, on the other hand you could actually just read the study (all forty or so pages of it if you care) and then if you still doubt you can go look at all the reference material that this report is based on. Chris John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 July 2014 04:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology after the physical fact. It assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, No, it defines a certain kind of belief, just as Bruno identifies belief with provable in some axiomatic system (which you must admit is not a standard meaning of belief) one can identify belief with certain actions in context. I don't know what you mean by after the physical fact. If it's a physical theory of belief then of course it's explained in terms of physical facts. You seem to reject this as though it's obviously wrong. Not wrong, just not the whole story. My argument has been that any mechanism of belief that is hierarchically reducible to a finite set of (assumptive) primitives cannot thereafter rely on the (supposedly) independent effectiveness of derivative notions such as computation as the basis of its mechanism of knowledge. That sentence seems to just assume what it purports to argue. Why idependent; why not dependent? What exactly does it mean to rely on in an explanation? I think it only means that the explanan is understandable. Your argument would appear to apply to every reductive explanation in the hierarchy - but the hierarchy only exists in virtue of the explanations. This is essentially the same conclusion as MGA or Maudlin and amounts to an insistence on what is most powerful in reductive explanation (i.e. the redundancy of intermediate levels of effectiveness) . But, as I've argued elsewhere, the MGA and Olympia arguments don't prove what they are generally taken to prove. Reduction must always be applied to an isolated system, which MGA attempts to sneak in by assuming a dream state. But even dreams obtain their meaning from outside referents. Hence the specific line of attack is that, under reductionism, the effectiveness of derivative notions such as physical computation cannot be meaningfully distinguished from that of their ontological primitives. Since this isn't always obvious, I've offered suggestions, closer to hand than the hierarchical relation between micro and macro physical phenomena, to exemplify the similarly tacit reification of supernumerary ontological assumptions (e.g. mountains, football teams, societies, etc.). It may be inadequate or Bruno's theory may be better, but you seem to think it's somehow heretical to have a physical idea of what constitutes belief. Well, It is at least my intention to make clear what I actually think so that you don't have to rely on what I may seem to think. But if my argument goes through, what is left to a reductionist strategy would look like some kind of mind-brain, or more properly mind-reductive-primitive, identity theory. But then the burden would be on finding a convincing justification of identical, in this non-standard sense, that doesn't amount to effective elimination of the first term. We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. But that's just an argument from incredulity. So no, there's no heresy involved in such an idea unless, IMHO, it is a blind for eliminativism. Why? Is eliminativism then the heresy? I'm not even sure what 'eliminativism' means in this context. You seem to argue that reductive hierarchy in physics eliminates the explananda, but in Bruno's theory the reductive hierarchy does not? I don't think anything is necessarily eliminated by explaining it. But the risk in any straightforward equation of the physical idea of what constitutes belief with some parallel physical account, however exhaustive, is that of consigning the 1p part to some not-available-for-explanation limbo. On the contrary, it makes it possible to explain those common instances in which someone says, I believe that X. and then acts in a way that is only consistent with, not X. Physically it is easy to see that the brain consists of modules and those that form language and spoken responses don't necessarily control action. One might therefore say that action, belief and truth are hypothesised as being complementary or co-effective, rather than hierarchical-reductive, in relation. Truth in comp only refers to mathematical truth of the form Exf(x). It's a long way to connect that to I see a dog. True enough it's a long way, but it might yet be a first step on the right path. By contrast, I don't see how any equivalent truth-relation can be tacked on to reductive physicalism except as an act of courtesy. That's because truth-relation is a term of art in logic, not behavior. What can it mean to say that the physical evolution of some particularised
RE: RE: American Intelligence
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Re: RE: American Intelligence
On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 9:37 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: What would trigger you to send troops? Not what you wouldn't do, but what conditions you would? No more evasion, please. When would yo go to war? I answered this. You do not return courtesy of indulging other posters' questions, after having us all read about vague threats and obvious predictions for the last weeks. As I guessed, it's only your questions that count. How considerate from the man that demanded people to have a heart, but dismisses entire cultural, religious groups + their non-violent majorities as threats, because they all wake up in the morning, with insane dreams of virgins... there are some exceptions but that's just how it is; sorry to say but... That's not really demonstrating a handle on geopolitical religious state of affairs, but the opposite. What is the sense of your posts, spud? What are you trying to get across? PGC -Original Message- From: 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: 07-Jul-2014 11:56:51 + Subject: RE: RE: American Intelligence -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com?] Everything you post is an attempt at derision, which is an attempt to fudge things, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoids answeing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war? Definitely not on yet another neocon foreign war of choice as you demand we all line up in support of (or accuse us of being in bed with the enemy -- like a true fascist fuck). Our nation has already been bled dry by two neocon wars of folly, we need a third one like we need a hole in our collective national head. Now go on off now and play with your plastic soldiers, armchair general. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
A world without elephants...
...would be a less surreal place. Also, we drove the mammoths extinct (literally, in fact) so let's make it up to their relatives. I find it hard to imagine a world without elephants, where's the fun in that? Please sign this petition, in case you are the person who tips the balance... https://secure.avaaz.org/en/hours_to_save_elephants/?wbUbKdb -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 8 July 2014 07:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote: We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. But that's just an argument from incredulity. This incredulity isn't *necessarily* misplaced, however, as this later comment shows: *Merely* operational! Metaphorical is easy. Talk is cheap. Operational is hard. Operational is what I assume you want to show is achievable in the exchange quoted above - to get the mind as the operational result of the brain. And, as you say, operational is hard ... or impossible, if one is, in fact, trying to match up heterogeneous concepts (as I suspect is the case for Tronnies, for example, alas). Whether that is the case here is something the scientific community is trying to look into, but so far it seems to have barely scratched the surface. We still have no idea how (or if) the brain generates consciousness, or indeed what consciousness is, or if it's even something that can be defined, or if it's merely the appearance of something, like aether and phlogiston. Admittedly the appearance argument begs the question a bit, of exactly who is experiencing this illusory something, but I assume that could be answered too - perhaps it's a Self Image Module. (I'm sure someone out there has the relevant brain damage to show what happens when one doesn't have one of these, assuming such a thing exists). That's why it's the hard problem, I guess. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: RE: American Intelligence
Plato, you cannot answer for Chris, sorry to say. Your presentation of the majority of Islam, as benign and peacable, is inaccurate at best. This isn't the religion of pace anymore then Christainity has been the religion of peace. You cannot answer for somebody else on this group. If it was the ROP, we wouldn't have jihad inspired agression, from Nigeria to the Philipines, in a great swath of Jihad. -Original Message- From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jul 7, 2014 5:04 pm Subject: Re: RE: American Intelligence On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 9:37 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List lt;everything-list@googlegroups.comgt; wrote: What would trigger you to send troops? Not what you wouldn't do, but what conditions you would? No more evasion, please. When would yo go to war? I answered this. You do not return courtesy of indulging other posters' questions, after having us all read about vague threats and obvious predictions for the last weeks. As I guessed, it's only your questions that count. How considerate from the man that demanded people to have a heart, but dismisses entire cultural, religious groups + their non-violent majorities as threats, because they all wake up in the morning, with insane dreams of virgins... there are some exceptions but that's just how it is; sorry to say but... That's not really demonstrating a handle on geopolitical religious state of affairs, but the opposite. What is the sense of your posts, spud? What are you trying to get across? PGC -Original Message- From: 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List lt;everything-list@googlegroups.comgt; To: everything-list lt;everything-list@googlegroups.comgt; Sent: 07-Jul-2014 11:56:51 + Subject: RE: RE: American Intelligence -Original Message-From: everything-list@googlegroups.com[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] Everything you post is an attempt at derision, which is an attempt to fudgethings, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoidsansweing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war?Definitely not on yet another neocon foreign war of choice as you demand weall line up in support of (or accuse us of being in bed with the enemy --like a true fascist fuck). Our nation has already been bled dry by twoneocon wars of folly, we need a third one like we need a hole in ourcollective national head.Now go on off now and play with your plastic soldiers, armchair general.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google GroupsEverything List group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send anemail to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.to post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.to post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A world without elephants...
The guy Gelerntner, of Havard, I think, just proposed that African elephants be brought to the US, to preserve the species. These are dangerous suckers so I agree with some hesitation. A species I woulsn't allow in on wildlife reservations, would be the face eating chimpanzees. According to Franz Waals, the primatoligist and anthropologist, they are 5 times more violent even then humans! I have toyed with the idea of getting some billionaire to fund a feeding zone for African primates, and provide something chimps and humans would really value, like an Orange Julius concoction. Just feed the chimps and monkeys for free, and change their primate social behavior, even to the point they become dependent on yummies from humans. Its a purely, behavioral conditioning, to be withdrawn if they go violent. Also, maybe cooked soy crap that tastes and chews like steak could be supplied for tastey protein. Hell, if its any good, I'll eat it myself! Deny the pass out, if they start attacking each other or humans. According to one physical anthropologist, what boosted evolution in humans, was cooking food because meats and roots are hard to digest, unless cooked. So please visual Peking Man with a French chef's toupe on, serving up 4 star quisene in the cave. ---T--Original Message- From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jul 7, 2014 5:46 pm Subject: A world without elephants... ...would be a less surreal place. Also, we drove the mammoths extinct (literally, in fact) so let's make it up to their relatives. I find it hard to imagine a world without elephants, where's the fun in that? Please sign this petition, in case you are the person who tips the balance... https://secure.avaaz.org/en/hours_to_save_elephants/?wbUbKdb -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: RE: American Intelligence
On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 12:36 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Plato, you cannot answer for Chris, sorry to say. Your presentation of the majority of Islam, as benign and peacable, is inaccurate at best. You clarify this belief of yours, ok I think I noticed. This isn't the religion of pace anymore then Christainity has been the religion of peace. So terror/war is inevitable with your beliefs. I am uncertain, but I know that radicalized positions will fuel these possibilities. You cannot answer for somebody else on this group. What is this, your private trial of Chris, now? Wow, ok. I'll reply anyway. If it was the ROP, we wouldn't have jihad inspired agression, from Nigeria to the Philipines, in a great swath of Jihad. So I should ask for you to lay it out for us? Why, when your question was answered and you don't answer what point you're trying to get across with your posts or this unspecified hypothetical threat scenario? If you're asking for threat response, then I hold you haven't specified the threat in technical terms. Beliefs don't cut it here, I believe :-) This makes any response trivial to negate or find fault with, which is why such a question is absurd, even if you're talking strategy in an abstract sense. Why don't you answer your own question, with zero data/background/rules as it is stated here, and give it a whirl to see? PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 7/7/2014 3:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 July 2014 07:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote: We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. But that's just an argument from incredulity. This incredulity isn't /necessarily/ misplaced, however, as this later comment shows: *Merely* operational! Metaphorical is easy. Talk is cheap. Operational is hard. Operational is what I assume you want to show is achievable in the exchange quoted above - to get the mind as the operational result of the brain. And, as you say, operational is hard ... or impossible, if one is, in fact, trying to match up heterogeneous concepts That's where, as Bruno says, you have to make your bet. He bets that logically provable = believed. Most people who've thought about it bet on comp = the functional digital replacement of a brain. But this implies philosophical zombies are impossible, which implies that if we create human like behavior we will automatically have created consciousness. Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad). Brent (as I suspect is the case for Tronnies, for example, alas). Whether that is the case here is something the scientific community is trying to look into, but so far it seems to have barely scratched the surface. We still have no idea how (or if) the brain generates consciousness, or indeed what consciousness is, or if it's even something that can be defined, or if it's merely the appearance of something, like aether and phlogiston. Admittedly the appearance argument begs the question a bit, of exactly who is experiencing this illusory something, but I assume that could be answered too - perhaps it's a Self Image Module. (I'm sure someone out there has the relevant brain damage to show what happens when one doesn't have one of these, assuming such a thing exists). That's why it's the hard problem, I guess. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 8 July 2014 11:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 3:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 July 2014 07:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote: We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. But that's just an argument from incredulity. This incredulity isn't *necessarily* misplaced, however, as this later comment shows: *Merely* operational! Metaphorical is easy. Talk is cheap. Operational is hard. Operational is what I assume you want to show is achievable in the exchange quoted above - to get the mind as the operational result of the brain. And, as you say, operational is hard ... or impossible, if one is, in fact, trying to match up heterogeneous concepts That's where, as Bruno says, you have to make your bet. He bets that logically provable = believed. Most people who've thought about it bet on comp = the functional digital replacement of a brain. But this implies philosophical zombies are impossible, which implies that if we create human like behavior we will automatically have created consciousness. I think comp implies that we won't have created consciousness, but we will have enabled some of the consciousness that exists by hypothesis in arithmetic to manifest itself. (Could this imply a test for comp, by the way?) Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad). What kind? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: RE: American Intelligence
From: spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com What would trigger you to send troops? Not what you wouldn't do, but what conditions you would? No more evasion, please. When would yo go to war? Dude, did you get appointed to the bench? Do we need to begin calling you Your Honor now? -Original Message- From: 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: 07-Jul-2014 11:56:51 + Subject: RE: RE: American Intelligence -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] Everything you post is an attempt at derision, which is an attempt to fudge things, or as Alinsky opined, freeze it, attack it. However this avoids answeing a question or two. Its not that tough a question. Under what circumstances would you chose to send US soldiers into war? Definitely not on yet another neocon foreign war of choice as you demand we all line up in support of (or accuse us of being in bed with the enemy -- like a true fascist fuck). Our nation has already been bled dry by two neocon wars of folly, we need a third one like we need a hole in our collective national head. Now go on off now and play with your plastic soldiers, armchair general. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 7/7/2014 5:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 July 2014 11:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 3:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 July 2014 07:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote: We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. But that's just an argument from incredulity. This incredulity isn't /necessarily/ misplaced, however, as this later comment shows: *Merely* operational! Metaphorical is easy. Talk is cheap. Operational is hard. Operational is what I assume you want to show is achievable in the exchange quoted above - to get the mind as the operational result of the brain. And, as you say, operational is hard ... or impossible, if one is, in fact, trying to match up heterogeneous concepts That's where, as Bruno says, you have to make your bet. He bets that logically provable = believed. Most people who've thought about it bet on comp = the functional digital replacement of a brain. But this implies philosophical zombies are impossible, which implies that if we create human like behavior we will automatically have created consciousness. I think comp implies that we won't have created consciousness, but we will have enabled some of the consciousness that exists by hypothesis in arithmetic to manifest itself. (Could this imply a test for comp, by the way?) That's sort of like Boeing doesn't create 787s they just enable a certain arrangement of atoms to manifest the airliner inherent in the quantum field. Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad). What kind? The human kind. That's the kind we can readily recognize from behavior. If we created a robot that didn't behave in a human-like way it would harder to apply the no-p-zombie intuition. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 8 July 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think comp implies that we won't have created consciousness, but we will have enabled some of the consciousness that exists by hypothesis in arithmetic to manifest itself. (Could this imply a test for comp, by the way?) That's sort of like Boeing doesn't create 787s they just enable a certain arrangement of atoms to manifest the airliner inherent in the quantum field. That's sort of like saying you've decided comp is wrong. Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad). What kind? The human kind. That's the kind we can readily recognize from behavior. If we created a robot that didn't behave in a human-like way it would harder to apply the no-p-zombie intuition. I would say we can recognise quite a few types of consciousness from behaviour - dog, cat, mouse, elephant, etc...? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: What's the answer? What's the question?
On 7/7/2014 7:34 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 July 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think comp implies that we won't have created consciousness, but we will have enabled some of the consciousness that exists by hypothesis in arithmetic to manifest itself. (Could this imply a test for comp, by the way?) That's sort of like Boeing doesn't create 787s they just enable a certain arrangement of atoms to manifest the airliner inherent in the quantum field. That's sort of like saying you've decided comp is wrong. No, I'm just a-comp. Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad). What kind? The human kind. That's the kind we can readily recognize from behavior. If we created a robot that didn't behave in a human-like way it would harder to apply the no-p-zombie intuition. I would say we can recognise quite a few types of consciousness from behaviour - dog, cat, mouse, elephant, etc...? Sure, because they are similar to humans. They have similar motivations. Even octopi and squid appear conscious to me. But if we created an intelligent Mars Rover who was motivated by scientific investigation of Mars it might be hard to say whether it was conscious or, what amounts to the same thing, whether it had a consciousness very different from humans. I think that if it were provided with a memory in which it stored brief synopsis of events, which it then used to create predictive models for decision making, then it would have something like a human stream of consciousness. But it would still be quite different because of the different sensors and the different motivation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
