Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. It has been given, and we have agreed on it. We agreed (or I thought we had) that you means anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki. But of course I CT1PAT3P We don't need a better definition of you, we need only to take into account that the question is about the first person experience [blah blah] And by referring to *THE * first person experience rather than *A* first person experience Bruno Marchal completely contradicts what was agreed on. But of course I CT1PAT3P the first person experience from the first person experience pov itself. Please define again what the word you means without circularity (without using the very word to be defined) and with the proper usage of the words a and the in a world with people duplicating machines. I have no clue how you can maintain W and M, except by confusing 1-you and 3-1-you. In the math part, it is the confusion between [etc and etc] Save time, save electrons, use Y CT1PAT3P. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This illustrate well the notion of first person plural, and show that both in Comp and [blah blah] I don't know what Comp is and I don't think you do either, although you think you do. You and I are in Helsinki, and we will both enter the annihilation-duplication box. Your bet is P(W M) = 1, I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. Please explain exactly what the bet is. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 24 Jul 2015, at 18:33, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John Clark knows that's not exactly what was asked but if a better definition of you is given a better answer will be provided. It has been given, and we have agreed on it. We agreed (or I thought we had) that you means anyone who remembers being a man in Helsinki. But of course ICT1PAT3P We don't need a better definition of you, we need only to take into account that the question is about the first person experience [blah blah] And by referring to THE first person experience rather than A first person experience Bruno Marchal completely contradicts what was agreed on. But of course ICT1PAT3P the first person experience from the first person experience pov itself. Please define again what the word you means without circularity (without using the very word to be defined) and with the proper usage of the words a and the in a world with people duplicating machines. I have no clue how you can maintain W and M, except by confusing 1-you and 3-1-you. In the math part, it is the confusion between [etc and etc] Save time, save electrons, use YCT1PAT3P. Wonderful. I see that you see the point. But the YCT1PAT3P (that is the confusion between the 1p pov and the 3p pov) is explained in the [etc and etc] that you juste hide. Your method are transparent. If you have an argument that we can understand, give it to us, and explain. Find a new one avoiding the YCT1PAT3P (your stupid acronym for the 1-3 confusion, that is, your mysterious amnesy of the interview of the copies). Hmm... Let me still make a try to help you, or me (who knows?). Let me ask you a new question, with a different protocol/history. You are in Helsinki, and you want to go to Moscow. But there is a bad whether and no planes, and you decide to teleport you in Moscow, where, incidentally we met. Up to now I hope you are OK that you feel to be in Moscow, in some clear and definite sense. But I have a bad news. There has been some Eve who has eavesdropped your Helsinki-code during the transmission to Moscow. I don't know if there has been a reconstitution made of that copy, still less where if it is the case. All I know is that there has been that copy by Eve. And, I don't dare to tell you. I promise you that the teleportation was safe, and secure. I was wrong, but as I am not sure it is serious, I tell you nothing about it for now. The question is do you think that such information would influence the personal feeling of where you feel to be (in Moscow)? Put in other way, would the presence of a (diverged, post duplication) doppelanger influence your belief that you are, right now, in front of only Russian people in Moscow? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the Helsinki guy. After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but please explain how it is contradictory. There is no ambiguity, you are both guys. You is both guys. One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see only one city. Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out logical contradiction. I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words you will only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun you ; somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: First person plural
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:22, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: This illustrate well the notion of first person plural, and show that both in Comp and [blah blah] You and I are in Helsinki, and we will both enter the annihilation- duplication box. Your bet is P(W M) = 1, I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. How many times this need to be repeated. I will repeat it 100^100 times, but not one more. You could also consult the papers, or ancient post. W refers to the experience of self-localization done after opening the door after the duplication of the step 3 protocole (cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W). Then you told me that you predict that you will *experience* W and M. Which is already a nonsense, as obviously nobody can experience two cities at once FROM THE FIRST PERSON VIEW (without telepathy or special apparatus absent per default in the step 3 protocol). It is your prediction. The prediction that you will feel to be in both city at once. Please explain exactly what the bet is. You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will see one city or two cities. And if one city, which one, with which expectation. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 *you* told me that P(W M) = 1. You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective sensation of seeing something after opening a door. P(W M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong. P(W M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city, and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W., making P(W v M) true. It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city) = 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like white noise is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration. I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes making that divergence. The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki. Exemples: I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front of a door. I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink a cup of coffee. I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow. And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city, among Washington and Moscow. All right? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous. That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the Helsinki guy. After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, but please explain how it is contradictory. There is nothing contradictory. On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge. For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is, well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an intellectual belief. There is no ambiguity, you are both guys. You is both guys. Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the self- localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from the push+self-localization measurement. One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see only one city. yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door, and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee. You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience. Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M. Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out logical contradiction. Where? it is W M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this. I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words you will only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the meaning of the personal pronoun you ; I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question is about the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree that there is a divergence, so I guess you understood that one write in the diary W, and the other write M. Those are what makes the divergence to exist. I keep the meaning of you, and you are in both city, but the point is that in both city you see only once city, so the bet P(one city) = 1 was correct, and P(I see two cities at once when opening the box) = 0. The prediction is on the personal experience of what is seen when opening the door. It is NOT on the third person localization of those experiences. somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work. It works perfectly well. After the duplication, I interviewed all the guys who remember having been the guy pushing on the button in Helsinki, and they all told me that indeed, as predicted, the self- localizaton measurement gave as a result only once city. P(one city) was equal as P(coffe), for the exact same reason: that is what is lived by all the continuations. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: First person plural
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I understand that Mr. You is now in Helsinki but Mr. You has no idea what P(W M) = 1 means. How many times this need to be repeated. Until it is not gibberish. W refers to the experience of self-localization done after opening the door after the duplication So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize (Pompous-speak for see) Washington is 1. cut in Helsinki, and paste in M and in W So the probability the Helsinki Man aka you will self-localize Moscow is 1. So the probability the Helsinki Man, aka you, will see both cities is ___ [fill in the blank] Please explain exactly what the bet is. You will push on the button, in the cut and double paste of the step 3 protocol, and you have been asked to predict if you will see one city or two cities. That's 3 usages of that damn personal pronoun in just 33 words, and so John Clark will ask for the 100^100 time , *WHO THE HELL IS YOU ?!* John K Clark And if one city, which one, with which expectation. No ambiguity in pronouns at all, Correct, this time the ambiguity is in P(W M) = 1 *you* told me that P(W M) = 1. You seem to forget that W refers to an experience, a subjective sensation of seeing something after opening a door. P(W M) is not ambiguous, it is simply wrong. P(W M) = 0, as none of the copies will write in the diary: I opened the door and saw the cities of Washington and Moscow fused together. All copies wrote: I opened the door and saw only one city, and all write down the name of the unique city they saw, in their personal memory/diary, and all the description are ether M or W., making P(W v M) true. It is because we use the definition based on the personal memory for the identity, that we understand the divergence, and the P(one city) = 1, and thus the P(W v M) = 1. Then by numerical identity, assumed in the assumption of the right comp level, P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 is the simplest reasonable expectation, in that simple protocol, like white noise is the simplest reasonable expectation in its iteration. I think you need just to keep in mind that W and M do not refer to city, or body, nor even to first person experience that we can attribute to an other. W and M refer to the proposition describing the subjective experience the helsinki guy get when opening the, or a if you prefer, reconstitution box. You agree that the experience diverges, and the question is about the expectation of the outcomes making that divergence. The prediction is written in the diary in Helsinki. Exemples: I predict that I will find myself in a reconstitution box in front of a door. I predict that whatever the city I will find myself in, I will drink a cup of coffee. I predict that after opening the door of the reconstitution box, I will see only one city, among Washington and Moscow. And the quality of the prediction is measured by sampling what has been written in the diaries of the copies. In this case there is only two diaries, and we can see that the predictions have all been confirmed, as both diaries describes the experience of seeing a door, opening a door and seeing, ..., a well defined unique city, among Washington and Moscow. All right? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
